Power sector reform in Africa : the paradox of hybrid markets by Malgas, Isaac
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
POWER SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA: 
THE PARADOX OF HYBRID MARKETS 
Isaac Malgas 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Cape Town 
Commerce Faculty 
Graduate School of Business 
February 2009 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
DECLARATION 
I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work, both in concept and execution. Neither the 
substance nor any part of this thesis has been submitted for a degree at this university or at 
any other university. 
Signature _____________ _ 
Isaac Malgas 
Date 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support and kindness 
that I have received from so many people and institutions. My heartfelt is expressed to them 
for their efforts and encouragement. 
Anton Eberhard, my supervisor, for his intellectual guidance given throughout the duration of 
this learning journey. 
Katharine Gratwick, for her guidance during the investigations of the empirical cases for this 
thesis. 
Sharman Wickham, for her kindness and timely reviews of the thesis chapters and offering 
useful suggestions for structuring and improving the writing of this thesis. 
The Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform, for providing the funding to carry out 
the empirical work for this thesis. 
Nuroo Ismail from the Knowledge Commons, UCT Libraries, for her kind assistance in 
formatting this thesis. 
My employer, Eskom, for allowing me the time off to complete the writing of this thesis. 
To all the stakeholder respondents and interviewees, who have graciously responded to a 
seemingly endless stream of questions and follow-up queries related to issues in their 
respective power sectors. 
My parents, who have directed my paths in my youth. 
Yolanda, my wife, for her gentle understanding and support; as well as my children, Amy, 
Jodie, and Joshua, for making life worth the living. 
Let the wise listen and add to their learning, and let the discerning get guidance -
Proverbs 1:5 
II 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ABSTRACT 
For many countries in Africa, power sectors in are characterised by insufficient generation 
capacity. Due to poor financial and operational performances, many state-owned utilities 
have had inadequate financial reserves to invest in additional generation capacity. 
Governments, too, have experienced difficulty in financing generation expansions as a result 
of the reduction in loans from traditional tinanciers of infrastructure. Reforms to address poor 
performances in the 1990s, in part, focused on introducing private sector participation to the 
power sector at the generation level through independent power projects. It was anticipated 
that independent power producers would provide benchmarks for state-owned utilities and 
enable longer term power sector efficiency. Reform in this sector followed a prescribed 
evolution towards power markets that would allow wholesale competition amongst generators 
and so lead towards efficiency improvements. Despite reforms being embarked on in many 
African states, competitive power markets have not been established in Africa; rather, the 
result has been the emergence of hybrid markets where state-owned generators and IPPs 
operate devoid of competition; and although IPPs have emerged in a number of African 
power sectors, many countries still do not have sufficient generation to meet their electricity 
demands. 
This thesis investigates the development of private generation power projects in Africa by 
analysing data collected from both primary and secondary sources in four case studies of 
power sectors in Ghana, Cote d'lvoire, Morocco and Tunisia. The thesis identities and 
describes the factors that have contributed to a lack of investment and shortages in generation 
capacity in hybrid markets exploring how policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks 
have contributed to this situation. It also investigates how planning and procurement 
challenges have lead to difficulties in adding sufficient generation capacity in a timely 
manner, exacerbating the problem of insufficient generation capacity in Africa. Finally, the 
dissertation provides suggestions as to how these frameworks could respond more effectively 
to the capacity challenges faced by hybrid electricity generation markets, and how broader 
power sector reforms should be guided to reflect the challenges of hybrid markets better. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Power sector reform, undertaken across developing regions over the past two decades, and 
driven by the need to improve sector performance and attract new investment, has led to a 
largely unexpected consequence. Instead of a new market model, characterized by 
competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets, what presently predominates is a hybrid 
market, where state-owned generators and independent power producers co-exist. These 
hybrid markets present a host of challenges, including the need to create alternative policy, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks, which unless addressed. may impede further 
investment into the sector. 
1.1 Background and Focus 
1.1.1 Africa's Chronic Power Problems 
Compared with other developing regions, the power sectors of most African countries are 
relatively more undeveloped, characterized by insufficient generation capacity, high costs, 
poor reliability and service quality, and low access rates. 
Generally. Africa has low levels of installed generation capacity. Installed power generation 
per capita in Africa, is less than 40 per cent of Asia, and about a fifth of South America (EIA 
2005).1 With growth rates in capacity additions lagging the rest of the developing world 
during the last three decades, the gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world has 
continued to widen. 
The electrification rate in Africa is two to three times lower than the average rate of 
developing regions, and for rural areas electrification rates are three times less than the 
average for all developing countries (lEA 2006). Roughly a quarter of Sub-Saharan Africa's 
population has access to electricity with connection rates as low as 5 per cent in rural areas for 
I For a larger perspective, installed generation per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa) is less than one twentieth of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and less than one thirtieth than that of the United States of America (USA) (EIA 2005). 
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some countries (Cosgrove-Davies 2006). Since 1990, the East Asia, Latin America, and 
Middle East developing regions have all increased their access rates by at least 20 per cent, 
while due to population growth and household formation exceeding new connections, overall 
access levels in Sub-Saharan Africa are declining (Eberhard, Foster et al. 2008:4). If this trend 
continues, fewer than 40 per cent of Sub-Saharan African countries will have universal access 
to electricity by 2050 (Banerjee, Diallo et al. 2007). 
Low access levels may in part be attributed to affordability of power. The average residential 
power tariff in Sub-Saharan Africa is about double the average of other developing regions 
(Eberhard, Foster et al. 2008). This is due to a number of reasons. National power systems are 
typically small. Hence, African power sectors do not benefit from the economies of scale that 
bulk generation offers. Excluding Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, no African 
country has an installed capacity greater than 6000 megawatts (MW) (EIA 2005). Countries 
that are not endowed with sufficient primary energy resources face the reality of even higher 
power costs as expensive fossil fuels are imported. Large network losses in inefficient power 
systems exacerbate the problem. And finally, low population densities raise the cost of 
extending electricity networks. 
Actual costs are even higher for African consumers when, due to poor reliability of the power 
systems, the cost of back-up generation is factored into the equation. In Kenya, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Uganda, more than 80 per cent of large companies depend on their own sources 
of back-up generation because power networks are unreliable, pushing the price of power up 
(Estache 2005:31). In Benin, back-up generation more than doubles the weighted average cost 
of power (Eberhard, Foster et al. 2008: 12). 
Power shortages have also led governments to contract short-term emergency power from 
private power companies. Although such projects may be up and running within a matter of 
months, a key drawback is that they are comparatively expensive, generating power at a cost 
of US$0.20-0.30 per kilowatt-hour. 
Notwithstanding the costly option of rental power to make up for electricity shortages, power 
outages are still endemic to Africa. The average number of power outages for a typical month 
is high in Africa, with Guinea and Malawi reporting 34 and 77 outages per month in 2006 
2 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
re,pecliwly (\,""rld H~n' :>O()7),' The ~\ier~ge numlx" of ",oTllhl) o'J1~gcs for Sub-Saharall 
Africa i, m",e (hall (hree (ime, the n,erage of ['a'tern ['lLrore and C~ntral Asia. and l.a!in 
,\meric~ ~nd the C"riNx"n {World B,,"k :>(l()7). In"dcqu"lc cicclricily ""pacily enme; lOt a 
huge co,1 to the econo mie , of the,e countries and alw undermilles the achie,emel1l of the 
~ 1 i llen ni um Devd"pmelll Cioal' (M I Xis). 
A ke) re"SOn for cap""ily shm1age, i, insuflicienl in\iest",enl in generatior> inf"'''ruclure. ' 
~tany lLtiliti" arc lmahle!O flnaLlce invostmen! offthcir halanee sheet' as t~ritfs hard l covcr 
operaling and mai111ell"" "" cosl, (Eberil"HI. fo,tcr et al. 2008). Large transmission and 
dimibulion I",.sc;. il)Cu"'orl dlLe 10 I"tld cent"" being t~r from genemlion. coupled "illl 
electricity Ihen. lran,late into revenlle losse, for milili",. Poor billing and collection rales 
have imp~Cll'd "n invcslmctll, tlnd als" ha\'e led 10 in~dequlite m"in(en,,,,"e or existing 
facilities. 
Ofti<inl de,e[<)l'mel1l ass istance 1= heen inadeqlLa!e to plug the financing gap', Although 
priy"t~ ".-et", i,,,,.,lmenl htl' hdp, .. d to alle\iialc capacity ,h"rtag"' o"CT the paS! two dcc~des. 
(his has no( heen enough. FlLl1hcrmore. In Africa. private illvestment lags that of other 
dc>eloping wIIlllrio,", ,ilo"n ill Fil'ur~ 1.1, 
Fie" rr 1. 1; ,\ Co"'p"ri'OIl of" Prh.lr 11I>0,1"1t1l1 ill I.,rllor,lioll ill llr' rlopine Rr,:ion. (1990_ 
2007) 
Source AllII~)r' "umpilali()11 bas"d un Ibc \\,' ()rld Bank PPI f),,"b .. ,,, (200h) 
, As " I'O'"lt, ill G""",. aold \1aI.w; "Oout ~Il r<' cen( "Old .111 rer «Il( of firm, ~wOl ()r <I,are gon omlor<. 
attribut"ble oau<e' of fe<ellt ¢nel'gy "JPpll' i"'J¢'. I'h¢ a"erwl\¢ lmi Il~ re,!X'n« was the lad ~f oap,.,i!y 
iOl illf,'awuctu,e ill"o"mont. which was at1fibuted ta the lack ~f i Ilvestlll<nt 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The roor inve>tm~nt ciin"'IC' ill ,\I'ric"n co unlr ics ""d Ihe cOllli"",,,1 w~A , IWC, u l' powcr 
,~clur, rc,ull in J;U'W'~\l c n t' of\en having dilficullie, in attracli ng capi!al to tlnan"e 
expall"o.,. ILl ",Iditi on lu lhe "bo,'em~Jlli\JJ!C<J ilLlpcJimell t>, Jru"J;ht>, ~Jll"lCi,,1 ,hocK> 
affccliJlJ; cncl'll} cost, and e~change rates, "'xl ro litical conllid. among OIhe", Mve all 
impacted lhe power s~clor, of A friem ,Ial"' 10 sume e.,lenl. thercby affccliJlg in"eS lmeLl t, 
1.1 .2 Power Sector Reforms 
III many African ,Iat"" rel'onn, wCrC cmb"rkeJ U[XHl 10 improvc Ihc fliOCl iull illg u l' power 
,ec l""', and more specilically stale-owned utLlities. in par! by allracting illcrea",d inve'lmen! 
inlo Ihe ,cclor, Aculely awarc Oflhc need to changc and g.al' po lid., 10 fC<:ovcr fr",n 'cclor 
malai,., governments ohen. Wilil the a"i,la""e of eXlenl"1 consultants. imp lement",1 
simlegi", 10 ~"h""cC pcr lormancc, I hi' wa, .. ",ncrall )' promplcd by Jc,'cIOf1nl Cnl I;n"nee 
instilutions. the prineip«1 leJlder> lu Afrie", power ",clor>, In the "arly 1990s. the \>','orld 
BaJlk "00 olhcr tnullilatcra l and hilareml ilnancial in,l itulioo, recom mcndcd 'pccirlc JleW 
rolic ie, 10 impro,e , ecWr pc-rtiJm",nce, The objoctives of thes~ po lic ies were; to promOie 
inercd",d ~ nancial and tech nical efficiency in "lil it}' op.rations; to red ucc Ihc l;nJI",ial aJ)j 
<><1m inislrm i"e bunien> that utilili es impose on the state: 10 reLilLce lhe level of Li.b! "-"lLmed 
by j;ovcrnmCl1I from thc po"cr seclor: and ro rcJ",'c lhc c"'l ofclcclricily by <ubjecling Ihe 
ge neration and dislriblrtion sub-s~ctors to com!",litive markt fo'ce, (\\' ol'ld fl ank I '19.1). 
[)e,el0l'ment tinance i Ilsl illllie"" were sllpportiw of programme, towards the establis hment 
of Iran'parcnl rCj;u latOl'y p,occ"cs and Icgo l framcwork' Ihw wo"IJ , uppun power sectUf 
reslruclLLring, It W"' believed lhm "lCh tiamewo"" would instil ill\'e'tOf (o nl1d"""e aliLi 
locilitore competitioo among slLPl'lier;; by e'toblishing, amo ng "'her IhillgS. inslilUlioJlal 
,lnlC lu re, to more clear!; deti"" go veTiunell1's rol. as po licy maker. inslead 01 rower 
proU'lCcr, In rhc .,,"mc vcin, llti lit iL'> wcrc called "POll 10 corp<>ralise and upemle on 
coolmercial princip les 10 creale aulonomous emilie.' that manage their o"n blldgcb, 
procuIcnlClll, as wel l as qntl oc ncl;h, COIpumlis"lio[l aoo c\Jmmercia]i,"lio[l were ma"'e<1 JS 
I hc li,,1 'lcpS lu all,"cl pr i ,'"IC ,",clor parlicip'lIio[l (Worl,1 B"nk 1993), 
Privale pa llicipalion was initially prescriheLi at the generation I.,'e l rhl'Oligh illdepelldcnl 
rowel' pI'OOl.cer;; (IPr,). Pri"ote im' •. ' tmenr in gcncrali "" wll.' aimed w reJ "cillg Ihe co>l of 
[X,,,cr Ihrough coOlpelilioll ill Ihe seclor, ~·lilldful of tllC IJct til"t investor;; wOlilLi """"-
,,,,,,,allces lor nWI">! ris k, lh~se project s woulLi be Oil a [JlIi IJ-Own-Operate ( IJ OO) or IJ"i Id · 
Own-Opemtc-Transtel' ([lOOT) b,,-,i, "ilh ~owel' I'""ita'" .. \j;,,'COlcllls (1'1' .. \,) 10 ""ure 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
revenues. Later it was intended that competition would exist between generators in an 
electricity market to bid and sell power on to customers through a transmission company or 
directly to large consumers (World Bank 1993). 
Despite many African countries initially embarking on the reform prescriptions, little reform 
has actually taken place. Although some of the reform steps were implemented in countries 
that assumed restructuring policies, most power sectors remain vertically and horizontally 
integrated with [PPs operating at the fringes in generation. 4 [n many countries state-owned 
utilities have resumed responsibility for additional capacity expansions, instead of the private 
sector as initially planned. [n some cases, challenges in attracting private investment have left 
many governments and power sectors abandoning the road of reform, and in other cases the 
initial drivers for reform have eased, thereby lending support for increased state participation. 
Difficulties in implementing the entire suite of power sector reform steps up to and including 
competition at the generation and the distribution levels have left African power sectors in an 
intermediate state. What has emerged is an alternative model whereby power sectors are 
between the old vertically integrated, state-owned structure and the intended competitive 
market structure. 
1.1.3 The Challenges of Hybrid Markets 
[n the face of fragmented and stalled reforms, new investments have occurred largely in the 
form of [PPs, resulting in hybrid markets, as state-owned utilities and [PPs now co-exist in the 
sector. Although [PPs represent an important new source of investment, problems of 
insufficient capacity still persist. To date, experience in Africa has shown that hybrid markets 
face their own set of challenges and paradoxes in securing adequate generation investments. 
Despite hybrid markets presenting an opportunity for private sector investment, unattractive 
conditions and negative experiences in some countries have led to diminished private sector 
involvement. Also, regardless of reforms aimed at improving economic performance 
objectives. such as cost recoverable tariffs, most experience has shown that these initiatives 
have proven difficult to implement and maintain. While there is a need to achieve economic 
sustainability in African power sectors, steep increases in fuel costs and high inflation have 
undermined efforts to facilitate mutually beneficial investments over the long-term. [n 
4 The exceptions are Cote d'lvoire, Morocco, and Tanzania (depending on hydrological conditions), 
where more than 50 per cent of power is produced by lPPs (as of2007). 
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addition, despite the need for flexibility in such unstable economic environments, long-term 
PPAs generally lock in fixed charges for up to thirty years. 
Power sector planning involves critical linkages between power sector data collection 
agencies, planning agencies, fuel suppliers, utilities, various interest groups and stakeholder 
institutions, regulatory agencies, licensing agencies, developers, insurers, and environmental 
agencies, amongst others. As part of reforms, planning and contracting, in numerous cases, 
has moved from the state owned utility to the Ministry of Energy or a related agency set up to 
administer these functions without due consideration for devising robust contracting processes 
or adequate skill to staff these departments. As a result, planning has often failed to 
encompass the complexities involved in contracting new capacity, leading to extensive delays 
in developing these projects, and making load-shedding inevitable. 
In many cases SOEs undermine private investment by dragging their heels in engaging and 
contracting private power. Important stakeholders to the agreements signed by the IPPs, they 
act as off-takers of power and therefore have to agree to the terms of the PPA, often 
contesting the higher charges that new investments bring compared to their own plants where 
capital has been depreciated or where tariffs do not reflect the true cost of power. In many 
countries HIPP" goes hand in hand with increased costs, and consumers often get behind the 
state-owned utility in lobbying to build new plants and expand their power base and turf. 
In Africa, there is little evidence of clear and transparent criteria for the allocation of new-
build opportunities amongst state-owned utilities and IPPs. Procurement policies are often 
inadequate and contracting frameworks often lack certainty and transparency resulting in 
lengthy and confusing negotiations and even allowing opportunity for corruption. Weak or 
lacking regulatory and governance frameworks erode the credibility of investment and 
contracting decisions and there is often no clear linkage between planning and the timely 
initiation of competitive tender processes. 
This thesis examines the new challenges that arise in hybrid power markets in Africa. It 
evaluates how policy, regulatory, and institutional arrangements might respond to such 
markets and addresses how specific challenges may be overcome to enhance the performance 
of the power sector. 
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1.2 The Research Questions 
Power sector reforms were formulated in part to address the problems of insufficient 
electricity capacity. [n Africa, however, reforms have not unfolded as planned. Instead, what 
has transpired as a result of initial reform efforts is a hybrid market in generation made up of 
the incumbent state owned utility and [PPs. 
The dilemma that is analyzed by this thesis is that despite private investment coming into the 
sector to alleviate the problems of power shortages, a new hybrid market creates its own 
challenges, which require specific policy, regulatory, planning, institutional and contracting 
measures. 
The thesis will explore the salient features of hybrid markets. The research questions that will 
direct the inquiry are stated as: 
I. To what extent has the emergence of hybrid electricity markets created new 
challenges to attracting investment into generation capacity in Africa? 
2. Have policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks responded adequately to the 
special challenges of hybrid markets? 
• Who assumes responsibility for planning in hybrid markets and is planning 
flexible and dynamic enough for changing market conditions? 
• Have transparent and equitable criteria been developed to allocate new 
opportunities for generation investment to SOEs and IPPs in a fair manner? 
• Are planning processes explicitly linked to a timely initiation oflCBs? 
• How are unsolicited bids treated / accommodated in the framework? 
• Have explicit and efficient tender, bid and procurement mechanisms been put in 
place? 
• Do legal and regulatory frameworks create clear and sustainable off-taker 
contracting arrangements between SOEs and [PPs? 
• Have suitable governance arrangements developed to ensure that single buyer 
market frameworks operate transparently and clearly? 
• And, do the above create sufficient certainty for potential investors, thereby 
facilitating new private investment? 
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3. How could policy, regulatory and institutional frameworks better respond to the 
challenges of hybrid markets? 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The literature on power sector reform, state-owned enterprises, IPPs, planning and 
contracting, guides and informs the analysis of the empirical data in this thesis, which is based 
on four country case studies. 
1.3.1 Research Process 
The process adopted to conduct the research follows that of Mouton (1996:65). The main 
steps that were adopted specific to this research are presented as follows: 
I) The phenomenon that has been observed in African power sectors is that of poor 
sector performance due to insufficient generation capacity. 
2) The problem that this research seeks to address and better understand is why 
investments in African power sectors have been slow despite reforms aimed to 
increase investment in generation infrastructure and alleviate capacity shortages. 
3) Conceptualisation of the problem means embedding the research in a larger body of 
knowledge. With this in mind, the bodies of literature related to power sector reform, 
state-owned enterprises, independent power producers, planning and contracting of 
generation infrastructure were chosen, with the expectation that this would be the 
main areas of knowledge to which the thesis seeks would make a contribution. 
4) Once the problem was conceptualised, the research problem could be operationalised. 
This entails linking the problem to a set of measures to determine the extent to which 
these measures impact on outcomes. In order to operationalise the problem, the 
linkages to policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks were constructed as 
measures to determine the degree to which these concepts give rise to the problems of 
insufficient capacity. 
5) Thereafter the four cases were chosen as select samples of the population of African 
power sectors and to allow for a contrast of factors that contribute to the problem. 
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6) Next, the data were collecloo for ,"lal"si, on the fom cases, 
7) And, tinally hollowing the syntile, i, oflhe data the reslLlt' were interpreted " ith the 
vb, 10 i "' prove underslanui ng of the ome,ved rl",n'JmerlOn. 
The re,eardl proce" ",a, iterati \'e to eillc idate a d.ep'-"r understanding of the problems oj 
in," nieienl g.""rw ion c;<p"C il), . )' igure 1.2 giv., " gmph ic i Ilu., lmlio" of II ,., lTI"i11 stab"" ill 
jhe r.,earch proce<s, as de",ribed above. 
SO"rce: Adap'ed by allt l~)f hom MOll'o" ( 1996) 
, 
".,n,"'"'q 1',* 
.... "," v""_ 
A case study "pproa.r;h "'" i>:Jor<ed to amwe, the ,,,scorch que't ions. , ince the qllestions scek 
"" "Hay of diff.r~nt kinds oj' ~vid" "c~. which i, embedded ill II,., c"'" '" Il i"g (Gillh"m 
2()()()::'). Ev iuenee "as amlrac teu "nu coltmed fmm 1I1 e case , 10 ohlain lile best possib le 
"USI'"" to the T.,."[oh {IU~,tio"" Worki11g i"dlLCti,",y fmm ",h"1 Wi" fo und in the ""'. 
se ll ing'. Ih .Il""' I)' i, b'1'o",Id.d in lhe e"ide llce r~w"t.d. 
1.-'.2 Thl' Ca,cs 
It ,tlO<.,l d be noted at tile outset tilat thi' tilesi, on ly consider; I,ower projecls wll ere primwil" 
long-term contrael, have been ""ne luue u bet"'een inve'lors anu off-Iakers. This lo ng-ten" 
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Figure 1. 3: An Example of key Power Project Stakeholders 
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Source: Adapted by author from Marais (2006: I) and Naidoo (2006: 1 0-11) 
Extensive field work was conducted in each of the countries whereby numerous interviews 
were conducted with IPP stakeholders, including investor representatives, off-taker utilities, 
government ministries, fuel suppliers, electricity regulators, transmission system operators, 
operating and maintenance contractors, equipment procurement contractors, and financial 
institutions that extended debt to projects. External consultants to the power sectors and 
academia were also used as sources of data. Data was collected through extensive interviews, 
observation, records and documents from credible sources; and where possible, data sourced 
from stakeholders were verified with published sources as well. This approach to data 
collection required extensive triangulation to assess the veracity of standpoints and, at times, 
to converge the understanding from the different standpoints. Interim revisions from the four 
cases were exchanged with stakeholders at least three times to review the drafts and provide 
comments, and numerous communication (including faxes, email and telephone calls) was 
part of the effort to produce the case reports over a period of two and a half years. The final 
drafts of the cases were all verified by stakeholders to accurately depict the experiences with 
IPPs and power sector reform. Although stakeholder representatives have been the primary 
source of data for the thesis, due to the sensitivity of the data, their names have been omitted 
and they are identified only by their organisational affiliation. Much of the data that form the 
basis for the cases is therefore not cited. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 examines 
the relevant literature. The four cases start with Chapter 3 presenting Ghana's experience with 
power sector reforms. This is followed by Morocco in Chapter 4, Cote d' Ivoire in Chapter 5 
and Tunisia in Chapter 6. The concluding Chapter 7 provides a synthesis of the preceding 
analysis and reflects on the relevant literature and analytical frameworks, with the ultimate 
goal of advancing knowledge, and explaining implications for power sector reforms and 
future investments in the hybrid market. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE CHALLENGES OF 
HYBRID MARKETS GLOBALLY AND IN AFRICA 
Performance improvements in electricity utility SOEs and the emergence of IPPs in 
developing countries surfaced in the context of power sector reforms which were driven by 
the need for new investment in improved sector performance. This chapter contextualises 
hybrid markets within the broader literature on power sector reform to provide a theoretical 
context for an analysis and understanding of the problem of insufficient generation capacity. 
Recognition of the two principal actors composing the hybrid market in the generation sector 
leads to a review of literature on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and independent power 
producers (IPPs). Since this thesis investigates the problems of insufficient capacity, literature 
on planning and contracting generation infrastructure is also reviewed. Combined, these four 
areas (namely, power sector reform, SOEs, IPPs, planning and contracting) inform and direct 
the analysis of hybrid markets undertaken in the four case studies included in this thesis. 
The sources ofliterature on power sector reform, SOEs and IPPs referenced in this chapter are 
from papers published in journals, research reports by academic institutions, as well as 
country, regional, and global power sector studies commissioned by institutional stakeholders 
in the power sectors of developing countries, amongst others. The World Bank and other 
development finance institutions, which have been major financiers of power sector 
infrastructure in developing countries, have arguably commissioned the most reports on the 
improvement of infrastructure services since their establishment. The single largest source 
from which literature has been sourced is therefore from reports commissioned by 
development institutions such as the World Bank for the sections on power sector reforms, 
SOEs, and IPPs. While there is a large body of literature on power sector planning, little 
theory has been forthcoming on the critical linkages between planning and successful 
commissioning of generation plants as it relates to the narrower problem of insufficient 
generation capacity. An attempt is made to break out and foreground this area of research in 
this thesis. Throughout the chapter, where appropriate, examples are highlighted to exemplify 
the descriptions of the themes presented in the text. 
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2.1 The Evolution of Power Sector Reform 
Power sector reforms were implemented for various reasons in industrial and developing 
countries. Reform across the globe has, however, always had the achievement of greater 
efficiency in the provision of electricity as a key objective. In terms of efficiency, the 
traditional belief was that electricity is a natural monopoly and should remain so in order to 
benefit from economies of scale in generation and to avoid duplication in distribution. This 
conventional notion that generation should be a natural monopoly was challenged when 
technological advances started to make economies of scale in plant construction and operation 
less important (Smith 1996:26-27; Hunt 2002). The optimal size for generation plant in many 
instances became smaller, the time for constructing certain technology plants decreased, and 
an increase in standardisation of plant designs was achieved (Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 
1998: 1). Competition thus posed as an attractive option and also helped to address the 
problem of inefficient investment in (and functioning ot) generation plant. 
To offer a perspective on how power sectors evolved, this section gives a brief overview of 
the origins of electricity supply industry (ESI) transformation from state-owned vertically 
integrated monopolies to reformed power markets. The pioneers of restructuring, namely the 
United States of America (USA), Chile, England and Wales, and some of the Nordic 
countries, were the first to test the waters of change and laid the basis for what would later be 
the blueprint of reform in other industrialised and developing countries. Although the drivers 
and the paths to reforms amongst the earlier pioneers differed, the reform outcomes were 
generally regarded as positive. The success of these reformers served as confirmation that 
electricity may generally be reliably supplied when the supply chain is broken up, while at the 
same time reducing costs through competition. The successes became a driving force for 
subsequent reformers to initiate restructuring processes in their own markets to achieve 
similar benefits. 
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2.1.1 The Early Reformers: How it all Started5 
a) USA 
In 1978 the United States Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA) as part of the National Energy Act to promote greater use of renewable energy (US 
DOE 1990). Creating a market for non-utility electric power, this law obliged electric utilities 
to buy power from independent generators at the avoided cost of generation (Hirsh 1999). An 
outcome of PURPA was the increased prevalence of unregulated independent co-generation 
plants. Thereafter, a number of states permitted distribution utilities to enter into contracts 
with IPPs to secure the required capacity for these utilities to serve their customers. In 
addition to plants that had no connections to traditional utilities, some utilities also set up 
unregulated subsidiaries to develop IPPs in and outside of their service territories, and, by 
1992, IPPs accounted for 60 per cent of new capacity in the USA (Hunt 2002:257). Another 
event that changed the operation of the sector was the institution of a rule by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1996 requiring that each utility or utility pool 
allow non-discriminatory open transmission access, thereby paving the way for wholesale 
competition (Federal Trade Commission 2004). The result was unbundled generation and 
competition in the sector amongst power producers, nearly twenty years after the PURPA 
legislation was enacted, with investor-owned generation accounting for about three quarters 
of US retail electricity sales (Joskow 1998: 13). At the distribution level, municipal, federal 
and customer-owned companies still exist, and despite little switching of customers amongst 
retailers overall, retail competition is available in almost half the states (Sotkiewicz 2007). 
b) Chile 
In 1982, in a more del iberate effort to restructure the electricity supply industry towards 
competition, Chile enacted a new institutional framework for a decentralised ESI with greater 
private participation. Generally recognised as the pioneer of electricity market reforms, the 
Chilean ESI managed transmission on an open access basis giving generators non-
discriminatory entry to the national grid as power generation was subjected to competitive 
forces (Raineri 2006:77). By 1996 there were eleven privately owned generation companies, 
and, by 2000, twenty-six private generators supplied all the country's power. Wholesale 
competition was implemented at the generation (and distribution) levels as new investor 
5 The descriptions of early reformers are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to briefly illuminate 
the origins of power sector reform. More extensive reviews of these earlier reformers are cited in the 
text. 
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financed projects were left to market forces and facilitated through legal and institutional 
changes (CEE 2002; Besant-Jones 2004:6). While the initial market structure and regulatory 
arrangements have not been without problems, the Chilean experience is largely hailed as a 
developing country success story and has been used to persuasively argue for private 
ownership and operation in the power sector (Fischer and Galetovic 2000; Pollitt 2005). 
c) England and Wales 
The British experience with power sector reform has been among the most widely referenced 
reform cases to date for industrial and developing countries alike. Since nationalisation in 
1947, and until 1989, the ESI was under the control of the Central Electricity Generation 
Board (CEGB), which was responsible for generation and transmission (Newberry 2006: 110). 
Although reform was driven mainly by an ideological pledge to reduce the role of the state, 
another key reason for change was the relatively high electricity prices. These had come about 
largely due to obligations by the CEGB to buy uneconomic British coal from suppliers, who 
enjoyed strong political influence from coalitions backed mainly by coal unions (Sioshansi 
and Pfaffenberger 2006:37). With the passage of the Electricity Act of 1989 the way was 
paved for privatisation in the electricity industry (UK Ministry of Justice 1989). Generation 
was vertically and horizontally separated and privatised6, and regulation was appl ied to 
promote competition at the generation level through a market mechanism, resulting in lower 
retail prices and private investment in generation (Bacon 1995). 
d) Nordic Countries 
Starting in Norway in 1990, new legislation through the Energy Act provided a legal 
framework for the restructuring and regulation of the power sector, and ultimately the 
establishment of the joint Nordic Electricity Exchange, also known as Nord Pool 
(Hjalmarsson 2000:3). The exchange officially began operating in 1993, gradually spreading 
to Sweden (1996), Finland (1997) and Denmark (2002), with much of generation remaining 
in public ownership. By 2003, when the utilities in these countries took up roughly three-
quarters of generation through bilateral contracts, about a quarter of electricity produced was 
traded on the spot market managed by Nord Pool. This coincided with a period (2002-2003) 
of reduced generation when reservoir volumes were roughly half that of the preceding twenty 
years and spot prices reached two to three times the norm. Despite these supply side shocks, 
6 Only nuclear power, which amounted to roughly 15 per cent of capacity at the time, was left in public 
ownership. The modern nuclear stations were eventually floated as British Energy in 1996 (Newberry 
2006:114). 
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the system has operated reasonably well, and most analysts have reached the conclusion that 
the market institution handled the large supply variations in hydropower sufficiently (Fehr, 
Amundsen et al. 2004; Bergman 2005; Newbery 2005: 12; Amundsen, Bergman et al. 
2006:149). 
It is worth mentioning that although restructuring among the early reformers, as described 
above. namely, USA. Chile, United Kingdom and some of the Nordic countries, came about 
through different paths, and despite their teething problems 7 they all generally resulted in 
improved efficiencies in the industry by reducing state involvement (except for regulation) 
and by introducing competition. 
2.1.2 The Reform Process 
In most developing countries and some industrialised countries, the motivation for power 
sector reform originated from dissatisfaction with the performance of public utilities, 
increasing fiscal pressure on the state, the need to remove subsidies, and the difficulty in 
attracting finance for new investment (World Bank 1993:43; Bacon and Besant-Jones 
2002: I). Refonns in the sector aimed to address these problems in a sustainable way, and 
optimise benefits to most stakeholders in the long-term. 
Reforms were expected to follow a process that would enable the sector to move from a 
vertically integrated monopoly to a structure where generators were self-sufficient and 
operated at improved efficiencies, thereby achieving the promise of lower electricity prices. 
7The California power crisis in 200 I demonstrated that regulatory rules which placed retail caps on 
distributors and precluding them from entering into forward contracts (moving bulk power trades into 
spot markets), as well as flaws in the market design encouraged market gaming or the exercise of 
market power by traders, utilities, generators and even the state itself. This drove one utility into 
bankruptcy and another near bankruptcy (Sweeney 2006:319). In the case of Chile, a severe drought 
from late 1997 well into 1999 sent shocks into the market and hobbled the country's electricity sector 
where hydropower comprised half of installed generation capacity. Fischer and Galtovic (2000) show 
that it was possible to manage the system without power outages, however, rigidity of the pricing 
system resulted in the system being unable to respond to the large supply-side shocks. The authors 
attribute the weakness to poor regulatory incentives and deficient regulatory governance. In the 
England and Wales pool, shortly after the introduction of competition, generators soon learnt that they 
could manipulate prices and set bids for their stations well above cost, forcing the regulator to institute 
a mechanism to cap pool prices (Bacon 1995). 
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An approach was loosely spelled out in the World Bank's 1993 policy paper for effective 
institutional regulatory and financial reform. It included the following key changes (World 
Bank 1993:43-52): 
I. Regulatory change: to reduce government's involvement in the day-to-day operation 
of the sector, thereby increasing the autonomy and the accountability of staff 
responsible for managing the utility. 
2. Organisational change: to facilitate the structural change from a vertically integrated 
monopoly into separate generation, transmission, distribution and marketing 
functions. This also entailed the establishment of centres to monitor the effectiveness 
of the performance of these functions with respect to management effectiveness, 
operational, financial and technical performance, and service quality. 
3. Commercialisation and corporatisafion: to orient the utility'S business to operate 
more like a private company and less like the extension of a government department. 
This would entail enacting legislation allowing the utility to compete with other 
private companies on equal terms. 
4. Increased private sector participation: to invite private investment 111 electricity 
through a number of ways, including: sale of assets and non-utility generation; 
franchising; contracting and leasing; and stock exchange listings. 
Numerous authors have put forward variations of the fundamentals of reform that broadly 
resemble the above elements (Karekezi and Mutiso 1998; Kessides 2004:7-8; Victor and 
Heller 2006). Others have gone farther to include the number and sequence of the reform 
elements that will have a higher likelihood of leading to desired outcomes (Bacon and 
Besant-Jones 2002; Eberhard 2003; Jamasb, Newbery et at. 2005; Besant-Jones 2006: 111-
I 14).8 Over the years the steps, as noted generally above, came to be known as the 'standard 
8 The rationale behind optimum sequencing of reform elements stems from the practicality in enacting 
reforms, e.g. passing legislation before regulation. It is important to emphasise the value of not 
committing to changes too early by keeping options open and delaying 'irreversible' changes until their 
potential benefits outweigh their potential cost, e.g. having effective regulation in place before 
divestiture and competition. In such a case, although government ownership may be unattractive for 
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prescription' for power sector reform (Hunt 2002:3-9). In following the 'standard 
prescription' of changing the industry structure from a monopoly to a fully fledged 
competitive sector, intermediate industry models have been adopted to facilitate the evolution 
(Hunt 2002:41-54; Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). 
2.1.3 Models of Industry Reform 
Market structure changes have been at the heart of power sector reform, and since 
competition requires a market, the first step to transforming the market structure from a 
monopoly is the single buyer model, an intermediate step in moving towards wholesale 
competition, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2. t: Evolution of Monopoly to Single Buyer 
Monopoly Single Buyer 
Generation 
Transmission 
Distribution Transmission & Distribution 
Customer Customer 
Sources: Klein (1996:5), Hunt (2002:42-43), Barry and Roets (2004). 
Arrows indicate the direction of energy flow. Payment flows would be reversed. 
Under the single buyer arrangement only the existing integrated monopoly is allowed to 
purchase power from public and private generators, with purchases from private generators 
usually taking place through long-term contracts. Key advantages of the single buyer model in 
developing countries have been its ability to attract capital through long term contracts, its 
ability to centralise purchases, and its ease of implementation, since there are no fundamental 
various reasons, optimal sequencing of reforms still guards the option of a well-formulated future 
privatisation. 
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changes to the market structure required to enable non-utility generators to participate III 
generation (Arizu, Gencer et al. 2006:7). Once there are sufficient numbers of buyers and 
sellers in the system, the model is extended to full competition as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2. 2: Generation Wholesale Competition 
Wholesale Marketplace 
Customer Customer 
Sources: Hunt (2002:45), Barry and Roets (2004). 
Arrows indicate the direction of energy flow. Payment flows would be reversed. 
A further development of Figure 2.2 would be competition in the distribution sector where 
commercial and residential customers would be enabled to choose their electricity supplier. 
The reform process as described in Section 2.1.2 would be carefully synchronised with 
movement between the models from a monopoly to wholesale competition.9 
2.1.4 Shaping Reforms: Domestic Actors, the World Bank and Policy 
Consultants 
The standard prescription, as it came to be viewed, was adopted by numerous stakeholders. 
Although the model found domestic champions within developing countries, development 
finance institutions (OFI) and a large network of consultants should also be credited with 
formalising and spreading the reform agenda. 
With many developing countries dependent on finance from the World Bank and other 
development finance institutions, they were in many respects obliged to follow the policies as 
9 For a more detailed description on industry structure models adopted in the reform process, see Hunt 
and Shuttleworth (1996) and Hunt (2002). 
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prescribed by these institutions. lo Commitment lending policies, aimed at improving power 
sector reform outcomes, from multilateral and bilateral lending institutions therefore played a 
significant role in influencing reforms in developing countries (World Bank 1993: 19-22; 
World Bank 2008b: 14,21-30). 
In addition, the World Bank supported funding for technical assistance missions, as well as 
initiatives to address the shortage of expertise for restructuring and regulation (World Bank 
1993: I 7). A number of consultants who were involved in, for instance, the restructuring of the 
Chilean and British power sectors acted as advisors to development finance institutions as 
well as governments of developing countries, often being directly drawn in to the design of 
reforms (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008:8,22). 
2.1.5 Reforms in Developing Countries 
Reform models and lessons learned from the early reformers were thus transferred to 
developing countries as they set out on various paths to transform their respective power 
sectors in search of improved performances. Chile, with a relatively small system, was an 
early case in point, serving as a model for electricity privatisation and competition in 
industrialised and developing countries with smaller grids. As positive outcomes of reform 
were realised in countries that adopted reform exercises, momentum was gained, and a wave 
of reforms were initiated. To date, the developing region that has reformed the most is Latin 
America with Eastern Europe following closely. I I South and East Asia and the Middle East 
and Africa regions have seen significantly less reform. 12 
A key reason for the large variation in the extent of reforms amongst developing regions is the 
diversity in the country and power sector contexts where reforms were instituted. The array of 
10 By the late 1980s, 37 out of 50 Sub-Saharan African countries would implement World Bank 
imposed structural adjustment programmes (Gros and Prokopovych 2005:26). 
II For more extensive appraisals of reforms in Latin America, see Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 
(1998). Fischer and Serra (2000), Rudnick and Montero (2002), Pollit (2004), and Dyner, Arango and 
Larson (2006). For reviews on reforms in Eastern Europe, see Hirschhausen and Opitz (2000), 
Krishnaswamy and Stuggins (2003), and Lampietti (2004). 
12 For assessments on power sector reforms in South and East Asia, see Newbery (2006) and Onuki 
(2001 ). 
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starting conditions for many developing countries as well the range of endowments of 
developing countries made textbook approaches to reforming power sectors impossible for 
the most part, and reformers found it difficult to institute and sustain reforms in certain 
country contexts. Besant-Jones (2004:2-3) contrasts two generally held paradoxical views 
with respect to power sector reform in developing countries. The one is that reform should be 
beneficial to these countries since the starting conditions are generally poor and thus even a 
small change should have sizable positive effects on the sector due to the small base from 
which reforms are started. The other is that reforms are too complex an undertaking to 
successfully implement in smaller systems where the institutional capacity is already lacking 
and the sector cannot support measures to institute reforms and sustain them. 
Although the contradiction elucidated by Besant-Jones is mainly with respect to small 
developing countries with small power systems, larger developing countries have also had 
their share of difficulties in enacting and sustaining reforms. Heller and Victor (2004:24), in a 
survey of five developing nations that have the largest economies and power sectors in their 
respective regions (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa), concluded that the 
difficulty of enacting reforms stems from the nature of state systems. They suggest that key 
political, legal, and institutional factors determine outcomes of the reform process (Heller and 
Victor 2004:4) and may explain why many countries do not make it all the way through the 
entire reform process. Arguing that efficiency improvements alone are not likely to be an 
adequate motivator for reform, they advocate that attributes such as financing, social 
functions performed by state utilities, and their systems of governance and control, ultimately 
guide the reform process as reforms become intertwined with reforms in other aspects of the 
economy. It is these reforms in other aspects of the economic, political or social systems 
which in many cases crowd out initial reform drivers in the power sector and result in 
insufficient momentum to sustain power sector reforms. 
Nowhere is this phenomenon of strong links to other pressing reforms in other areas of the 
economy more evident than in the least developed countries, most of which are found in 
Africa and South East Asia. In these regions, restructuring has not progressed in the ways 
foreseen by theorists, and in most instances it has stagnated because the theory of power 
sector restructuring has not adequately mirrored the political and institutional realities 
associated with dismantling state-dominated systems and revolutionising them into market-
oriented entities, as mentioned in section 1.2 (Heller, Tjiong et al. 2003: I). 
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2.1.6 Reforms in Africa and the Emergence of Hybrid Markets 
By any measure. power sector reform as per the 'standard model' has been difficult to 
implement in the African context. Bacon and Besant-Jones (2002:8) contrasted the reform 
progress of Africa and found the extent by which the region lags other developing regions to 
be significant, as illustrated in Table 2.1. 
Table 2. I: Number of Countries Having Taken Key Reform Steps by 1998 
Sub- Europe and Latin Middle East 
East Asia 
Saharan Central America and and North South Asia 
Key Reform Step and Pacific 
Africa Asia Caribbean Africa (5) 
(48) 
(9) 
(27) (18) (8) 
Corporatisation 15 (31%) 4 (44%) 17 (63%) II (61%) 2 (25%) 2 (40%) 
Legislation Enacted 7 (15%) 3 (33%) II (41%) 14(78%) 1(13%) 2 (40%) 
Institution of Regulator 4(8%) 1(11%) 12(41%) 15 (83%) 0(0%) 2 (40%) 
Introduction of IPPs 9 (19%) 7 (78%) 9 (33%) 15 (83%) 1(13%) 5 (100%) 
Restructuring / Unbundling 4(8%) 4 (44%) 14 (52%) 13 (72%) 3 (38%) 2 (40%) 
Privatisation of Generation 2 (4%) 2 (22%) 10(37%) 7 (39%) 1(13%) 2 (40%) 
Privatisation of Distribution 2 (4%) 1(11%) 8 (30%) 8 (44%) 1(13%) 1(20%) 
Reform Indicator 0.88 (15%) 2.44 (41%) 2.70 (45%) 4.28 (71%) 1.00 (17%) 3.00 (45%) 
Source: Bacon and Besant-Jones (2002:8). The number of countries is presented in parentheses under 
each region in the headings. 
There has been little unbundling of electricity supply industry functions to enable competition 
in African power sectors with the large majority of state-owned utilities remaining vertically 
integrated. There is no competition in the market. and, in many cases, little to no competition 
for the market. Even where there have been invitations to private participation, responses and 
outcomes have been poor (Gokgilr and Jones 2006). 
Few African countries have established independent regulatory agencies to help attract new 
investment by way of encouraging efficient and reliable service provision while attaining 
financial viability (Eberhard 2007). Moreover, even where there have been regulatory 
agencies established, in some cases their performance has been questionable, with the 
independence of regulators often undermined as governments exert pressure on regulators and 
tariff setting becomes politicised (Stern and Cubbin 2005:3-4). Effective regulation is also 
impeded by limited human resources as well as inadequate funding (Eberhard 2006). 
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A number of authors have challenged the practicality and applicability of enacting power 
sector reforms up to and including wholesale competition in African and other developing 
countries where conditions are significantly different to those countries where successes have 
been achieved and power sectors have reformed to the 'standard model' (Bayliss and Hall 
2000; Pineau 2002; Wamukonya 2003; Williams and Ghanadan 2005; Douglas 2006; Yi-
chong 2006). They have grounds for their criticism since nowhere in Africa has the standard 
model been achieved despite nearly two decades of reforms. This non-achievement is 
noteworthy, considering that a developing country like Argentina, for example, was able to 
reform its electricity sector to the point of wholesale competition in generation in less than 
three years (Pollitt 2004:5), and that was done without the abundance of theory and 
experience in power sector reform that has been gained more recently. 
2.1. 7 Problems Attracting Investment in Africa 
Regardless of the theory and experience accumulated on power sector reform to date and the 
approaches proposed for various country contexts, the initial drivers for reform in Africa are 
still present. Technically and financially, state-owned utilities are still underperforming; 
service delivery with respect to quality of supply and electricity access is poor; and 
investment in new generation remains a key challenge. 
In terms of attracting foreign investment into the power sector, a key reason for reforms in 
Africa, the continent attracted only about 5 per cent of global electricity investment into the 
sector by 1998 (World Bank 2008a), with less than 2 per cent going to Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bacon and Besant-Jones 2002: II). This contrasts poorly to the Latin America and Caribbean 
region that attracted 40 per cent of investment, and the East Asia and Pacific region that 
attracted 36 per cent of investment. 
Not only has Africa attracted less investment in generation infrastructure than other 
developing regions, investment is also on the decline. From a peak in 1997 of almost US$I.8 
billion into greenfield power generation projects, investment gradually diminished in 2006 to 
almost 25 per cent of that sum (World Bank 2008a). The downward trend in investment may 
be attributed to a number of reasons. Private sector investors were negatively affected by the 
financial shocks of the Asian and Latin American currency crises that spilled over into most 
of the developing world. Many contracts were renegotiated in these regions, and some were 
cancelled outright leaving investors with less appetite for foreign power markets. The 
contracts that were not cancelled left many host governments, including those in Africa where 
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currencIes devalued significantly, with increased power charges due to the currency 
devaluations and inflexible purchasing contracts. Subsequently some governments, as in a 
case of Egypt, reverted to state funding of electricity infrastructure projects, bolstered by 
development finance institutions, which began to rethink their policies on conditional lending 
(Gratwick 2007: 13). The demise of Enron globally also influenced private investors in foreign 
power markets to reduce their risk exposure in these emerging markets and return to their 
domicile markets, even though Enron's bankruptcy was triggered by events mostly unrelated 
to its developing country investments (Harris 2003: I 0). 
2.1.8 Hybrid Markets: Solutions Giving Rise to New Challenges 
Countries that have not been adversely affected by economic shocks have not necessarily seen 
more reform than those that have. Developing countries with IPPs that have not experienced 
significant currency shocks are still faced with the challenging task of integrating IPPs with 
rigid contractual arrangements into planned wholesale markets. The transitional step to guide 
the industry structure towards competition, i.e. the single buyer, has proved to be a tricky one 
to move beyond, as the issues of excess capacity. stranded costs and uneconomical tariffs 
prove to be a difficult challenges for market designers and policy makers (Woolf and Halpern 
200 I; Gambhir 2006). Lovei (2000) suggests that it may even be better to skip the single 
buyer step and adopt a market model with multiple buyers immediately after unbundling due 
the complexity of moving away from a single buyer arrangement. Despite the intricacies of 
single buyer arrangements, in certain cases the single buyer is considered the only alternative 
to distressed power systems. Within this arrangement there are a few mechanisms that 
mitigate against its many drawbacks such as increasing the lack of transparency, finding ways 
to accommodate the otherwise rigid contractual and institutional arrangements, and the 
reduction of contingent liabilities for host governments (Arizu, Gencer et al. 2006:4,9). 
To their credit, in many countries, single buyer arrangements and IPPs have launched and 
sustained the reform process by demonstrating the benefits of private investment and 
management. Relatively easy to implement in power sectors that have not seen much reform, 
IPPs can enter wholesale power markets under any of the industry markets described in 
Section 2.1.3. They have generally sold their power under long-term power purchase 
agreements to state owned utilities acting as the single buyer, thereby affording private 
investors some mitigation against market risk. With reforms having stagnated and levelled out 
as hybrid markets, it would appear that the single buyer arrangement will dominate the 
African power sector landscape in the foreseeable future as the need for IPPs continues due to 
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insufficient state funding, and as political, economic and social challenges in many cases 
continue to stifle further reforms, as is evidenced in the empirical cases investigated in this 
thesis. 
The literature now turns to state-owned enterprises in the ESI and the degree to which reforms 
have been successful in bringing about the changes envisioned with the objective of attracting 
investment and ensuring adequate generation capacity and making the sector more 
sustainable. 
2.2 State-Owned Enterprises 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have remained dominant in nearly all African countries and 
continue to be the providers of most of the electricity generated in Africa. The rationale for 
SOE existence, how they came into being, and how they function is connected to the problem 
of insufficient generation capacity. In many ways, SOEs have played a part in frustrating 
investment in the sector, both due to their own limited financial position and, more recently, 
by discouraging entry of private generators. This section briefly describes the rationale for 
SOEs and the reasons behind their poor performance. It gives an account of the two rounds of 
reforms which were intended to address the problems of poor SOE performance, the first 
between the 1960s and the 1980s, and the second from the 1980s onwards. Also included is a 
discussion of why efforts to address the poor performance of SOEs have been largely 
unsuccessful and the implications for continued investment in the sector. While SOE reforms 
have had a long history dating as far back to the immediate post-independence era of many 
African states, it sets the context for today's public utilities. In the empirical cases which 
follow from Chapter 3 through Chapter 6, it will be demonstrated how the manner in which 
SOEs have been managed and supported by governments has strong links to how investment 
in generation (private or public) has been sustained or stifled. 
2.2.1 The Rise of State-Owned Enterprises: The Rationale for Public 
Champions 
In the early 1960s, when many African countries gained their independence, a belief existed 
that government involvement in the economy would be crucial for development. This notion 
was, in part, due to the experience with previous colonial regimes (in which central economic 
planning often was the standard) and also to the successes achieved through central ised 
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economic planning in many western states (Appiah-Kubi 200 1: 199; Nellis 2005:4).13 Many 
development finance institutions also channelled their aid and loans to governments through 
state-owned enterprises that formed part of the socio-economic development organs of poorer 
nations. thereby providing funds for the expansion and. at times, creation of SOEs (Haile-
Mariam and Mengistu 1988: 1569).14 The practice of public ownership and management of 
utilities. established as a result of governments' development strategies. was almost universal 
in African countries. Apart from international views backing public control of infrastructure 
industries. the small size of economies and the lack of private capital markets made state 
owned enterprise a logical policy choice for most African states (Root 200 1 :565). 
Even if domestic private capital existed, the notion among developing countries was that they 
could not rely on a laissez-faire approach toward industrialisation. especially in strategic 
sectors of the economy (Cooper 200 I: II). Instead. late developers needed the state to have 
strong levers of control over the economy (including via import substitution strategies) to 
overcome the technological gap separating them from early developers. This development 
strategy was also a key reason for many of the nationalisations that occurred after 
independence in African states. 
While the maximisation of profits was generally regarded as the primary objective of private 
corporations. particularly from a shareholder perspective, profitability was only one of many 
goals of SOEs. and evidence would suggest that it was not the most important one. In 
developing countries. SOEs were expected to create employment, keep prices down 
artificially. help develop laggard regions, and be at the vanguard of social progress, even if 
\3 Western economies in Europe and North America had adopted centralised state planning and control 
in many strategic sectors of their economies, especially after the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and the 
Great Depression of the 1930s (Toninelli 2000: I 0). In the period between the two world wars, the 
national enterprise model dominated (Vernon and Barnet 1974: 104). The ideology continued to gain 
popularity even after World War" through the works of John Maynard Keynes, as government 
involvement became an integral part of reviving economies after the war. 
14 It should also be noted that significant state involvement had its legitimacy in development 
economics at the time, which encouraged strong government engagement in the absence of local 
capitalists and any large inflow of foreign investment, or where foreign domination was prevalent 
(Appiah-Kubi 2001 :201). The position amongst many African countries was that the gains in self-
confidence and national pride would outweigh economic growth and 'supposed' technological 
advantages gained from association with industrialised nations through foreign ownership (Akinsanya 
1981:775). 
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these goals hurt their financial and operational performance (Mazzolini 1979:713; Vernon 
1979:9). The state was considered to be better placed to ensure allocative and distributive 
efficiencies than markets as welfare economics played an important role in social and 
economic development and as these functions reflected the ideological preferences of state 
leaders to guard against social inequality and promote social stability. State corporations 
could also attract loans at a lower rate than their private counterparts, thereby reducing the 
cost of capital, and theoretically providing goods and services at lower prices. 
During the 1950s and I 960s, as the demand for electric power increased dramatically, 
coordination procedures for system operations were consolidated and a national self-
sufficiency theory prevailed, implying that electricity should be controlled as a strategic 
resource. Financing the electric power system became dominated by the state or state 
controlled banks (Heller and Victor 2004:3). As economies of scale in the power sector 
increased during this period, it reinforced the conventional political and developmental 
driving forces for state ownership and control, and suggested that electricity supply was 
indeed an integrated natural monopoly as first laid out in section 2.1 (Heller and Victor 
2004:3). 
2.2.2 Inefficiency, Poor Performance and Financial Distress 
In the mid to late 1960s, many public enterprises started to register poor financial 
performance, which led to increasing government debt. Through state subventions to support 
loss-making entities, SOEs were drawing down the state's fiscal resources, instead of 
contributing to them as originally intended. 15 This, in turn, translated into minimal investment 
in infrastructure expansion and general maintenance, negatively impacting on the quality of 
services provided to customers, and subsequently, discouraging private investment in other 
industry sectors. 
The causes of poor performance were multifarious; however, the fundamental conclusion was 
that public enterprises were managed according to too many divergent objectives (Vernon 
1979:10; Aharoni 1981:1341; Shirley 1983; Ramamurti 1987:877; Mascarenhas 1988:166). 
The combination of commercial and social objectives invariably led to political meddling in 
15 As an example, the increasing foreign debt for the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation 
(ZIMCO) alone accounted for over half of the nation's total debt by the mid 1980s (Ayub and Hegstad 
1987:86). 
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company operational decisions to the extent that commercial performance and organisational 
efficiency were severely compromised (Ayoub-Geday 2006).16 
Political interference stemmed from arrangements whereby ministers often served as 
chairmen or held seats on SOE boards (Blunt 1970:33). This led to a push towards the 
political and social objectives of the respective ministry (an organ of the state) at the expense 
of the commercial and performance goals of SOEs. In addition. board members often lacked 
training in the specifics of the industry since their appointments were based more on their 
political associations rather than industrial competence (Shirley 1983; Ayub and Hegstad 
1987:96). 
Weak and sometimes absent performance evaluation monitoring meant that there were few 
indicators that would alert external controllers and SOE stakeholders of business areas 
displaying unsatisfactory performance (Ramamurti 1987). The lack of credible evaluation 
criteria often stemmed not only from the knowledge that profits were not the overriding 
objectives of SOEs. but also from the inability to translate clear social objectives into 
measurable performance criteria. Few governments were capable of providing SOEs with 
clear-cut performance goals and credible trade-offs amongst conflicting objectives (Zif 1981; 
Ramamurti 1987:877).17 
SOE managers lacked the autonomy to change inefficient relations with business associates 
such as suppliers and service providers. These business relations were often with other public 
enterprises in search of partnerships that would increase the performance of their own 
undertakings. Executives also had difficulty in shedding labour where public corporations 
were clearly overstaffed and were sometimes obliged to add more workers than needed or 
16 The vagueness in objectives may be considered a managerial problem since managers became 
unclear on what was really expected from them. and also an opportunity for managers since the 
multiple objectives provided a built-in excuse for not fulfilling a specific objective (Mascarenhas 
1988: 166). Eggleston (1931) argued that in such a system where an enterprise is managed directly by a 
state department and its officials are likely to be political rather than industrial experts, officials cannot 
have much initiative and thus cannot be held responsible for the success or failure of the enterprise. 
17 Conventional accounting and reporting systems, which were developed and used in the private 
sector. were incompatible with SOE objectives. and where they were employed they often gave 
external controllers performance measures that were inappropriate and inconsistent with the overall 
goals of SOEs (Ramamurti 1987:891-892). 
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wanted to their payrolls (Vernon and Barnet 1974: 107)18. The limited control that executives 
had over labour and other costs contributed to the resulting lack of profitability of their 
utilities. 
To make matters worse, governments frequently failed to increase tariffs to the point where 
they were below levels of cost recovery.19 This, in turn, limited growth in terms of network 
expansions and related service improvements. Low collection rates further strained the 
financial situation of SOEs with government departments and other SOEs sometimes being 
the worst defaulters on bills. Even with the help of tax exempt status and despite most of their 
investment income coming from government budgets, many SOEs could not maintain 
positive cash flows (Haile-Mariam and Mengistu 1988: 1572). 
In the most perverse cases, it could be argued that SOEs became an apparatus for 
misappropriation of funds, corruption and nepotism, to further the interests of the ruling elites 
(Vernon and Barnet 1974: I 07; Haile-Mariam and Mengistu 1988: 1570). This, in turn, led to 
SOEs becoming even more inefficient, as their control reflected less the interests of the 
corporation and more the parochial interests of a select few?O 
18 In 1987, for example, the numbers of electricity utility customers per employee reported were nine 
for Burundi, eight for Botswana and six for Rwanda. As a reference the USA and France had 240 and 
222 customers per employee respectively (Escay 1990). 
19 A report based on a survey for over sixty developing countries showed that electricity tariffs fell by 
roughly 35 per cent between 1983 and 1987 in constant US$ terms and that developing countries 
generally faced tariff levels that were too low to encourage efficient use of electricity, and utilities were 
unable to raise sufficient revenues to finance their expansion needs. In 80 percent of developing 
countries tariffs were found to be below the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of production and two 
thirds of African countries surveyed did not plan to base their tariffs on the economic cost of power 
(World Bank 1990:3-15). 
20 In extreme cases, SOEs were created deliberately as a cover for political party fundraising. Blunt 
(1970:33) reports this to have been the case with the National Development Company in Ghana (which 
was investigated by the Azu Crabbe Commission), and the National Investment and Properties 
Company in Nigeria (which was investigated by the Coker Commission). 
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2.2.3 Reform: A Prescription for Poor Performance 
2.2.3.1 Reaction by Development Finance Institutions 
Development finance institutions that lent money to SOEs, most notably the World Bank, 
became concerned and gave much attention to the predicament by: examining the underlying 
causes of the problem in more detail; assisting governments to improve performance through 
instituting monitoring methods; and making further borrowing conditional on improved 
policy formulation and implementation, as well as institutional changes to improve 
governance functions for SOEs (Nellis 2005:10). The focus on the problems relating to SOEs 
corresponded to the period of the World Bank's structural adjustment lending programme in 
the late 1970s, where infrastructure sector performance featured prominently in the bank's 
objectives. 21 African states were prominent amongst developing countries that accepted the 
terms of the loans from the Bretton Woods institutions due to their ailing SOEs, and hence 
attracted noteworthy technical assistance operations and training assignments, which would 
carryon well into the 1980s to improve SOE performance (Gros and Prokopovych 2005:26). 
2.2.3.2 The First Round of Reforms: SOE Performance Improvements 
Reforms proposed to address the poor performance of SOEs took the form of adopting a 
'modern enterprise system' by transforming SOEs into shareholding corporations, all within 
an overall framework of public ownership. Corporatisation, in part. was intended to clarify the 
rights of SOEs and free them from ministerial and administrative interference by establishing 
them as separate legal entities run by professional managers (Anastassopoulos 1985). 
Furthermore. reforms focussed on operational analysis to determine the array of factors 
leading to SOE losses and a wide range of restructuring and performance improvement 
21 Structural adjustment policy changes and conditions were instituted by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that lending would be done in a manner that would meet 
the initial objectives of the loans. To correct for borrowing countries' fiscal imbalances, Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were instituted to reduce protectionist behaviour through the 
reduction of trade barriers and the promotion of free market principles (Welch and Oringer 1998). 
Critics of the World Bank's SAPs contend that the acceptance of SAPs was merely because of pressure 
exerted by the World Bank and IMF since developing countries had limited alternate access to funds, 
and complied due to a lack of options. 
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measures, which excluded ownership changes in infrastructure sectors such as electricity. 
Some of the specific reforms requested, as noted by Nellis (2005: 12), included: 
• Classification studies to clarify the role of the state and categorise SOE portfolios into 
companies that should be retained, restructured, sold or closed. 
• Legal and administrative reforms aimed at making public enterprises more 
commercial in nature by rational ising control procedures, increasing the autonomy of 
SOE managers, and altering the form, duties and roles of boards of directors. 
• Changes in determining pricing formulae for infrastructure service tariffs, including 
review periods and criteria for ad-hoc reviews. 
• Labour studies and policies for determining the correct levels of staffing, the funding 
of retrenchment mechanisms, and training and redeployment schemes. 
• Rationalising of financial systems to reduce automatic or concessionary access to 
credit. 
• Creating or bolstering SOE monitoring bodies and strengthening the scrutiny of SOE 
expenditures and borrowing. 
• Reviewing the competence and qualifications of managers in infrastructure SOEs and 
studying and improving management procedures. 
• Performance contracts were used to provide a means to clarify performance 
objectives and to monitor and judge performance against prior agreed criteria. 
• Privatisation or preparation for privatisation of non-strategic SOEs which were of a 
commercial nature. 
2.2.3.3 Implementation and Reform Outcomes 
Although many initiatives were called for to address the operational and fiscal troubles of 
state corporations, implementation proved challenging. [n the case of Senegal, Nellis 
(2005: 15) reports that: tariff hikes agreed on by government were later rejected; pledges from 
government agencies to pay their bills were not kept; commitments to make investment 
capital available to infrastructure SOEs were not honoured; and, contrary to agreements, 
managers were not allowed to fire workers, change suppliers or cut off service to non-paying 
customers. Where price increases were realised to recover the cost of commodities or 
services, the culture of non-payment persisted, and where they were paid, it often translated 
into inflationary pressures within the fiscal system, an unintended (and often not well thought 
through in terms of impact) consequence of the increases. Resistance and disillusionment also 
came from customers who found themselves paying more for no notable increase in service 
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quality (Nellis 2005: 13). Often, the ill-coordinated cessation of subventions to loss-making 
SOEs strained working capital, leading governments to arrange extensions of loans with state-
owned banks to ailing SOEs (Kikeri, Nellis et al. 1992: 17). In these cases, the problems of 
poor fiscal discipline were shifted rather than resolved. Retrenchment of excess workers also 
proved to be easier said than done, with reductions in salaried costs being modest. 22 Side-
stepping by governments and frequent recanting on initial commitments to support SOE 
rehabilitation were common obstacles to restructuring efforts, since they were generally 
politically risky and socially upsetting. 
In some cases, written performance contracts provided a means to clarify performance 
objectives and to monitor and judge performance against prior agreed criteria. In other cases, 
agency problems between governments and SOEs persisted in contributing to the poor 
performance of SOEs as information asymmetry caused problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.2.1 As a result, it was difficult for the state to set and enforce equitable 
contracts that required a reasonable amount of effort on the part of managers for a 
commensurate reward. Shirley and Xu (1997) analysed the impact of twelve written 
performance contracts between SOE managers and their governments in six developing 
countries and found no evidence to support the argument that improved performance could be 
credited to contracts. In half of the cases, pre-contract productivity performance trends 
continued and in a quarter of the cases performance deteriorated after the contracts were in 
force. Problems encountered were that contract targets changed too frequently; there were too 
CC In many cases, public enterprises have been subject to gross overstaffing in the past, and in general 
governments wanted to avoid the already high levels of unemployment that were prevalent in most 
African states. In addition, collective bargaining arrangements concluded between unions and SOEs 
granted employees generous retrenchment payouts. Given that some SOEs' liabilities exceeded their 
assets, the inability to pay termination provisions brought reform to a halt (Tangri 1991 :532). 
c3 Moral hazard is the notion that an entity largely insulated from risk will behave differently when 
exposed to the whole or a significantly larger stake of the risk. SOEs managers are normally exposed to 
less risk due to soft budgets and insufficient retrenchment disincentives. Information asymmetry occurs 
when one party to an agreement has more or better information than the other party. This impairs the 
balance of power in the agreement and could result in the agreement going awry. SOE managers often 
know more about the operational aspects of the business than government officials who they engage 
with during performance contracting and could be tempted to demand huge bonuses for relatively soft 
performance targets. Adverse selection is the tendency for a higher risk group to seek coverage more 
than less risky groups. In the case of SOEs, adverse selection occurs when the state decides on the 
future of loss-making corporations in the absence of complete information. 
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many objectives from too many principals; and governments pledged actions that they were 
not motivated, or politically able, to implement.24 When managers put a high probability on 
government reneging on its commitments such as providing support, increasing tariffs, or 
paying incentives, they invariably would not exert the effort to effect performance 
improvements. Such weak incentives therefore led to shirking by managers.25 
Despite some successes from the wave of reforms to address SOE performance, outcomes 
were largely ineffective in bringing sustained change. By 1990, development finance 
institutions concluded that a new approach to SOE performance improvement was required. 
Despite the reluctance of African governments to move towards privatisation in commercial 
and manufacturing sectors in the 1980s, development finance institutions pushed for private 
sector involvement to become the driving force of SOE reform in the 1990s (Nellis 
2005: 17)?6 
2.2.3.4 The Second Round of Reforms: Privatisation 
Just as the rationale for SOEs (in the preceding half century) had come from western states 
(see Section 2.2.1), the motivation for privatisation also came from industrialised countries. In 
the UK and the USA during the 1980s, in a departure from Keynesian economics, the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations instituted liberal economic policies informed by the 
24 A reason for the pledges that government could not or would not fulfill was the lack of credible 
alternative options as the helpline from the World Bank was often the only one extended. In Ghana and 
Senegal, for example, promises were made to obtain foreign aid, which may not have been forthcoming 
without such concrete pledges (Shirley and Xu 1997). 
25 Shirley and Xu (1997:5) ascribe the problems in contracting between government and managers to 
contracting maturity (or immaturity) since government agencies were in the early phases of a learning 
process on how to contract successfully. They also note that commitment to honour the contracts when 
circumstances changed was a problem since it was difficult, if not impossible, to force the state to 
comply. 
26 Privatisation (involving a change in ownership) was prioritized for SOEs that exhibited an 
improvement in performance under the first round of reforms for the following reason. In times of 
crisis, governments committed to hard budgets, granted managers autonomy, and gave priority to 
commercial objectives. However, as the crisis disappeared, gradually government commitment also 
faded. Therefore, even in cases where previous reforms not involving ownership changes yielded 
positive results, privatisation was still thought to be beneficial since it would lock in the gains from 
earlier reform efforts (World Bank 1996:50). 
34 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
works of Hayek and Friedman (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998)27. These largely successful 
privatisations resulting in improved sector performances in industrial nations, as well as the 
transition economies of Latin America, helped make a case for privatisation in less endowed 
countries in Africa. 
The change in western economic policies and the growing sense that previous performance 
improvement policies had failed, made some officials in developing country governments 
question earlier commitments to state-led development and sparked debate on the possibility 
for more far-reaching market reforms, including divestiture. 28 Towards the mid-1990s, a 
number of developing country governments thus focussed on divestiture, especially within 
infrastructure industries (sectors that had been spared in an earlier wave of reforms due to the 
fact that they were considered natural state-owned monopolies. unlike other commercially-
oriented enterprises in manufacturing) (World World Bank 1995a:26). It is important to 
reiterate that the World Bank and other development finance institutions lent strong support to 
privatisation as a change of ownership in order to improve the performances of SOEs and 
meet the objectives of reforms (Haile-Mariam and Mengistu 1988: 1565; Kikeri, Nellis et al. 
1992:32). 
It was expected that divestiture would address the question of ownership, which was believed 
to be at the root of the problem of poor SOE performance, and also bring in foreign exchange 
receipts that would alleviate pressure on the balance of payments (Appiah-Kubi 200 1:212). [n 
addition, privatisation in the form of divestiture held the potential to stimulate the economy 
and yield additional tax revenues by the entry of a rejuvenated private sector. Furthermore, it 
could promote open markets and reduce the power of trade unions. 
By the mid-1990s the concept of improving SOE performance under government ownership 
was therefore exchanged for privatisation and private participation in infrastructure (PPI) 
amongst development finance institutions in transitional and developing economies (Nellis 
2005:16-19). As will be seen in Chapter 4, in Africa. Cote d'Ivoire was the first country to 
27 In the USA much of the generation was already in private hands. 
28 Christensen (1998) observed that in the case of Ghana, the low political cost of government 
interference was one of the main reasons for the failed reforms, and that divestiture (partial or full 
disposal of public enterprises through a sale, closure or bankruptcy) was thought to be a more efficient 
way of dealing with poor SOE performance. 
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invite private participation in its ESl, first via a management contact to a private consortium 
to manage its state-owned utility in 1990 and then with an IPP four years later. 
2.2.4 Reform Loses Flavour and SOEs Survive 
Although divestitures in electricity generation infrastructure were few in Africa29, by the 
second half of the 1990s, IPPs, where contracts were entered into with utilities and host 
governments to add capacity and supply power, were on the increase. Many African countries 
formulated reform plans to privatise and introduce competition at a generation and a 
distribution level, but efforts have in almost all cases stopped short thereof~ as first detailed in 
Section 2.1.6. Publicly owned utilities have thus remained dominant in almost all African 
power sectors. Although in some cases SOE performance has improved, the utilities of most 
countries are still not able to finance capacity additions to support the increased demand. And, 
while the private sector has a role to play in additional investment, the poor financial state of 
public utilities has hindered investment. 
Although privatisation of SOEs became a common occurrence in commercial and 
manufacturing sectors, infrastructure sectors -- particularly the electricity supply industry--
have been among the most difficult to reform. Changes in ownership have been difficult to 
implement for a number of reasons, as detailed below, and are reminiscent of earlier attempts 
starting in the 1960s (as discussed in Section 2.2.2). 
a) Comparing Ownership Performance 
While privatisation was largely associated with increased performance objectives, there was 
evidence to suggest that, in certain contexts, there was little difference between the 
performance of private and state owned companies, putting the factor of ownership as the 
single determinant into question.30 Instances where divestitures hardly showed an 
improvement by private capital (compared to state ownership) merely increased the mounting 
~9 According to the World Bank PPI Database, between 1990 and 2007 only one full divestiture in 
electricity was realised (Zambia) and four partial divestitures (Cape Verde, Kenya, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) (World Bank 2008a). 
30 For examples see Dollar (1990), Bosec, Koh, Berg and Kenny (1996), Breton and Cote (2002), 
Omran (2003), Feng, Sun and Tong (2004). 
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resistance to privatisation. J I This, In turn, slowed the momentum of privatisation as 
intellectuals, government officials, non-governmental organisations, academics and other 
interest groups started to challenge the appropriateness of divestiture as a means to 
performance improvement. 32 Even in instances where private participation did not involve a 
change in ownership (e.g. through management contracts), performance was questioned by 
stakeholders, whose expectations were not realised by the contract outcomes, as was the 
experience in Tanzania." 
31 For example in 2003, US-based AES bought a 50 per cent stake in Kelvin power station, a coal-fired 
plant supplying roughly a quarter of Johannesburg's electricity in South Africa. Following the Enron 
scandal, AES reassessed its international operations and decided to pull out of its South African 
operations. The shareholding was then sold to a consortium led by CDC Globeleq, but by 2006 CDC 
Globeleq abandoned its stake in Kelvin, citing technical problems at the plant, after it recorded losses 
of £ 15 .6m on the plant. After spending approximately £30m on refurbishing the plant, the plant could 
only generate 25 per cent of its rated 600MW capacity (Hall 2007: 11-12). 
)2 It has to be stated here that any comparison between state and private corporations needs to be made 
with caution. Public companies are often required to fulfil some societal objectives which their private 
counterparts are not necessarily obliged to fulfil. Governments may have acquired loss-making 
companies for non-economic or strategic reasons, thereby nullifying comparison on a profit basis. 
Therefore, even when the financial performance of private firms has been found to be superior, it does 
not necessarily mean that they were more productive. Furthermore, comparison becomes problematic 
when the review or comparison period is too static. This could be the case when a new and 
inexperienced public enterprise is compared with a well-established private company. Finally, while 
large profits may indicate efficiency, they may reflect market distortions and monopolistic pricing. For 
example, Ghana's profitable distilleries and cocoa factories owed their financial success almost 
completely to monopolistic positions and protection from foreign competition, while their value added 
at international prices was negative (Ayub and Hegstad 1987:82) . 
. 13 In the management contract involving the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company Limited 
(T ANESCO) and NetGroup Solutions that was aimed at preparing the national utility for privatisation, 
it was found that the management contract outcome was highly dependent on how governance and 
performance incentives were structured. Revenue incentives made up more than 99 per cent of contract 
fees that were awarded, and the contract failed to place sufficient emphasis on customer service, as it 
was assumed that it would automatically follow from other objectives. With customer service standards 
and incentives largely omitted from the contract scope, it was hardly surprising that end-users were 
disappointed by the customer service outcomes of the management contract despite the contractor 
improving collection rates and nearly doubling utility revenues in two years (Ghanadan and Eberhard 
2007). 
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b) Negative Perceptions about Privatisation 
Speculation about the lack of transparency, including allegations of corruption in the 
management of divestiture, has also negatively impacted the overall impression of 
privatization. First, many of the transactions were never publicised, contributing to this 
impression (Appiah-Kubi 200 I :223). Furthermore, in many cases, absent or weak regulatory 
frameworks after divestiture allowed privati sed business to continue protecting their 
monopolistic positions rather than increase their competitiveness. In addition, many African 
states lacked the resources and skills to negotiate with multinational or domestic private firms 
in such a way to ensure that the public interest was protected during the sale, or to institute 
and sustain credible regulatory institutions after the sale (Nellis 2005:28). Persistent claims 
that assets were sold at artificially low prices also added to negative perceptions of 
privatisation as uncertainties clouded valuation methodologies, as did buyers who delayed 
payments. 
Even where there was no transfer of ownership, rumours and accusations of embezzlement by 
foreigners fuelled negative perceptions relating to the practice of private participation as 
happened in the case of Cameroon.34 Although such instances were not the norm, their 
occurrences did slow momentum to privatisation as they were widely cited by opponents to 
privatisation. 
c) Weak Regulatory and Tariff Reform 
Non cost-reflective tariff structures have been key obstacles in attracting private sector 
investment. This was observed in Zimbabwe, where in 1991, as part of wider SOE reforms, 
the Government of Zimbabwe embarked on reforms to improve the performance of the 
national utility, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). While there have been 
improvements in the technical operations and customer service areas, little reform progress 
34 In 2000, a bid was launched to sell off 51 per cent of the Cameroon electricity utility, Societe 
Nationale d'Electricite de Cameroun, SONEL, for which the government of Cameroon was expecting a 
purchase price of US$80-90m. AES was the only company among five pre-qualifying consortia that 
submitted a bid and subsequently bought the majority stake in Sone! for US$70m. In March 2002, 
AES' parent company was reported to be in financial difficulty, and AES was accused of diverting 
funds from SONEL to its parent company (UNECA 2002:8). Despite an improvement in the 
relationship and a turnaround in the performance of the utility, the period shortly after AES took over 
the management of SONEL negatively impacted on perceptions of privatisation due to the accusations, 
making it difficult for government and investors to rally support from the masses for further private 
sector participation. 
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has occurred on the legal and regulatory fronts. Failure to raise tariffs affected the utility's 
financial performance and has frustrated the government's efforts to attract private sector 
investment. Furthermore, the failure to increase tariffs to the long run marginal cost (LRMC) 
may be directly linked to the failed negotiations of the Hwange Privatisation and Expansion 
Project'5 and the Gokwe North Project36 (Mangwengwende 2002). Zimbabwe is only one 
example of many that illustrates how tariffs that are insufficient to cover the economic cost of 
production hamper efforts at transforming SOEs and increasing investment. Later, in the cases 
of Ghana and Morocco it will be shown further how weak regulatory reform and uneconomic 
tariffs continue to cast a shadow on financing prospects for continued generation investment. 
d) High Perceived Risk and Lack of Private Sector Interest 
Many countries have not been able to attract quality private investors due to the perception of 
high country and sector risks (Bacon and Besant-Jones 2002:5). [n 200 I, the World Bank 
financed the bidding process for 51 per cent of the shares of Mauritania's national utility, 
SOMELEC after making privatisation a condition for debt reduction. After two pre-qualifiers 
for the bid withdrew. only Morocco's Office Nationale d'Electricite (ONE) was left in the 
running. ONE subsequently put in a low bid in the hope that the Government of Mauritania 
would feel compelled to acquiesce. Realising that the country would be incurring a significant 
loss in accepting the offer from ONE, the government renegotiated its debt reduction 
35 In September 1996, the Government of Zimbabwe issued a letter of intent for the sale and expansion 
of Hwange power station. The joint venture between YTL Corporation of Malaysia (51 per cent) and 
Zesa (49 per cent) was expected to finance the expansion of 2 X 300 MW units to the value of 
US$550m on a non-recourse basis. The value of the existing plant as stated by the government was 
US$627m. In order for the investment to attract a 20 per cent return as asked from the investor, tariffs 
needed to be increased from 2.97US c/kWh in 1996 to 6.2 US clkWh by 2000. When the proposed 
tariff increase was considered to be too high by government, YTL proposed to pay US$184m for the 
existing plant. Having already publicly put US$627m as the fair value of the plant, the government 
could not accept the large discount on the plant and called off the negotiations, without reaching an 
agreement. 
16 In April 1997. the Government of Zimbabwe signed a letter of intent with National Power and Rio 
Tinto of the UK to develop a 1400MW plant at Gokwe North. Inclusive of finance charges, the coal-
fired development would cost US$1600m. Project viability was conditional on achieving tariffs 
reflective of the LRMC by the year of commissioning of the first unit. With the government unable to 
fulfill the commitment, the project failed to attract the financial support and negotiations were 
abandoned in early 2000. 
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conditions with the World Bank, which, in turn, agreed that Mauritania could not be held 
liable for the failed privatisation (AEI 2002). 
Mauritania is not the only country in the West African region to have difficulty in attracting 
credible private investors. In 1996, the Senegalese government embarked on reforms, with the 
support of the World Bank and other donors, which were aimed at eventually privatising the 
national electricity utility (Fall 2004). Eager to transform its ailing electricity industry it 
initiated institutional, legal and regulatory changes and by March 1999 it had sold off 34 per 
cent of the Senegal Electric Company (SENELEC). The partial privatisation of the utility 
lasted only 18 months mainly due to conflicts over investment and pricing issues. A new 
government bought back the shares from Hydro-Quebec International and Elyo, the company 
which initially secured the bid and, in 200 I, tried to re-privatise the utility with a new 
framework to address the shortcomings that strained the first relationship. Only two consortia 
responded and, despite active discussions, successful negotiations did not lead to any deal 
closures. Ultimately, the privatisation effort was abandoned, with the private partners losing 
financially and the Senegalese government still saddled with the burden of subsidising the 
utility (GokgUr and Jones 2006). 
e) Economic Nationalism and High Political Costs 
The lack of private sector interest also has roots in economic nationalism. Many host 
countries must share the responsibility for the lack of investment appeal to the private sector 
due to its hostility towards PPI initiatives. This antagonism may partly be explained by the 
idea that privatisation was 'forced' onto countries with hardly any credible alternative options 
since Africa, in general, was a policy taker, not a policy maker. "In very few cases was the 
decision to privatise totally home-grown or strongly endorsed or supported by domestic 
decision- and opinion- makers. While African proponents qf privatisation could be found. the 
main impetus for divestiture came from the donor community in general, and the 
[development} finance institutions in particular" (Nellis 2005: 16). 
A key problem in infrastructure is the perception of loss of sovereignty. When infrastructure 
in strategic sectors is placed into the hands of foreigners, it conjures up fears of neo-
colonialism. There is a strong link between the antagonism to the privatisations of the 1980s 
and the nationalisations that preceded reforms in the 1960s. "There is a pattern throughout 
the continent: Africans want control in their own house" (Akinsanya 1981 :776). Thus, the 
sale of publicly owned infrastructure assets was often especially sensitive politically and the 
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desire to appease economic nationalist opposition influenced the appetite for privatisation. 37 
In Ghana, for example, to allay the fears of opposition parties, the government maintained 
minority shareholdings in divested companies and undertook fewer divestitures during 
election years (Appiah-Kubi 200 I :222). Even in new companies, as will be seen in Chapter 3, 
despite the state having limited resources to partner in the country first IPP on an 50/50 equity 
basis between the government and the private sector as initially intended, it still pushed for a 
shareholding and only managed to raise cash which could give it claim to a 10 per cent of the 
projects equity. 
Despite a sense of economic nationalism in Africa, where the popularity of officials (and 
ultimately political survival) was more dependent on enacting reforms to reverse the 
downward trend of SOE performance than on political patronage, there was generally a 
greater reform momentum than in countries where the political survival of governments 
depended on defending SOEs (Appiah-Kubi 200 I: 198). Nevertheless. in many cases, political 
considerations shaped the outcomes of the privatisation process, as the political costs of 
privatisation swayed governments into action or inaction. 38 
There were thus many investor, sector, and country related challenges that aggregated and 
made divesting of monopoly SOE electricity utilities, the implementation of management 
contracts. and broader private sector participation, difficult in African power sectors. These 
challenges will be described in the case study chapters. 
37 Even where local capital was a possibility, privatisation was often viewed as being against the 
political interest of leaders in government since divestiture might undermine the government's ability 
to use public corporations as instruments of employment creation and patronage (Tangri 1991:526). In 
addition. governments were reluctant to shake up the management of SOEs unless they were sure that 
new managers could take over smoothly and swiftly (Vernon 1984:47). The fact that skills in utilities 
were in short supply (especially knowledge of the local industry) gave managers some bargaining 
power with governments. 
38 In Egypt for example. despite net foreign aid diminishing from 5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP) in 1980 to zero in 1988, and trending into negative in 1989, the SOE workforce was important 
enough in the leadership's support base to condone poor SOE performance (at least in the short term), 
and the aid crisis was not considered a strong enough imperative to lead to successful reforms (Shirley 
1999: 129). 
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2.2.5 Views Regarding Future Reforms 
What is to be done and what should be the focus of the next round of reforms to bring about 
sustained improvements in African power sectors? Should countries revert to the non-
divestiture reforms instituted from the 1960s to the 1980s given the problems encountered 
with privatisation, or should the last three decades of reform failures with state ownership be 
reason enough to do away with state ownership altogether and take away 'the government of 
business from the business of government'? 
In spite of the number of African countries that embarked on reforms, the fact that nowhere in 
Africa have governments been able to fully dismantle the public apparatus in the power sector 
suggests that there is still a need for SOEs in electricity - the question at the heart of the issue 
remains, as asked by Seidman (1954: 183) more than half a century ago, is "How can the 
operating andfinancial flexibility requiredfor the successful conduct ola business enterprise 
be reconciled with the need for controls to assure public accountability and consistency in 
public policy?" 
While at this stage the road to future SOE reform efforts remains blurred in terms of how 
SOEs will be dealt with, a number of authors have presented varied views on what the next 
round of improvements should entail. 
Shirley (1999) analysed the political economy of state enterprise reform and concluded that 
because privatisation has similar political costs as corporatisation (instituted in the first round 
of reforms from the 1960s to the 1980s), the two (privatisation and corporatisation) tend to 
succeed or fail together. She argues that where reform was politically feasible, desirable and 
credible, countries corporatised and privatised successfully, whereas where countries were not 
politically ready to reform, substitute ownership strategies were not successful in improving 
performance. Shirley's comprehensive view of refonns is relevant here since earnest reforms 
are likely to retrench excess workers, reduce subsidies to suppliers and customers, and affect 
changes in management, regardless of the impact on government ownership (Shirley 
1999: 128-129). From Shirley's analysis a corollary could be that any kind of reform should 
only be embarked on in countries that are ready politically, socially and, perhaps, 
economically for such transformation and where government commitment to reforms is 
compelling. 
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Nellis (2005:29) believes that the SOE model should not be jettisoned, given the difficulties 
in making PPI work effectively in Africa. He cautions, however, that the limitations of the 
PPI approach should be recognised, and that stakeholders should work harder at creating the 
conditions to make it function effectively. Gomez-Ibai'iez (2007) shares this view and 
suggests that although earlier reform efforts produced only moderate successes, some of them, 
when carefully applied, may help in improving the performance of infrastructure SOEs. With 
the difficulties encountered with privatisation, it may be a reasonable prospect to give reform 
under government ownership another chance in selective cases. Nellis and Gomez-Ibanez' 
support for giving SOEs a second chance stems from the idea that experience over the last 
three decades has taught governments, donors and other institutions valuable lessons, 
allowing them to proceed with caution. Due to the advances made in the theory of 
performance and management contracts, corporate governance, regulatory arrangements for 
SOEs in less endowed country contexts, centralised and decentralised ownership functions, 
the impact and functioning of institutions. the management of managerial incentives, three 
decades later we are armed with new and more current knowledge on how to tackle the old 
problems of poor SOE performance. 
Irwin and Yamamoto (2004), although cautioning about the prospects of performance 
improvement in electricity SOEs without privatisation, maintain that improvements in 
corporate governance are still worth pursuing to create an arms length relationship between 
the government and the utility. What is needed are changes to the rules and the structures that 
govern the relationship between governments and SOEs. which should. in turn, impact on the 
long-term performance of the SOEs and the sector. Again, given the advances made in the 
theory and practice of corporate and SOE governance. there may be a way forward as hoped 
by Irwin and Yamamto. 39 The view that SOE performances may be improved through better 
formulated governance arrangements is shared by Vagliasindi (2008). She advises that 
governance guidelines be tailored to the specific infrastructure sectors and renect market 
structures and regulatory arrangements in which SOEs operate. Cautioning against partial 
remedies. she stresses that internal as well as external governance factors need to be 
39 Classic corporate governance has two important assumptions built into it. Firstly, the right of free 
exit of shareholders and the threat of a hostile take-over is relied on by an efficient equity market. 
Secondly, the maximisation of shareholders' wealth (as opposed to social benefits) is the principle 
criterion for efficiency (Kuznetsov 1999:443). These assumptions may contradict the realities for SOEs 
in most African states where private equity in SOEs is absent, and where social objectives feature 
heavily due to the gap in development. 
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holistically addressed since focussing only on one governance dimension is not likely to yield 
improved SOE performance in a sustainable way. 
Heller and Victor (2004:24) conclude that the difficulty in reforming SOEs stems from the 
nature of state-centred systems. This includes their systems of governance and control, their 
financing, and the many ancillary societal functions that are performed by SOEs. They 
advocate that the unlocking of performance improvements of SOEs lies in better 
understanding how institutions discourage sector progress, and strengthening the institutions 
(formal or informal) that govern their existence and operations to achieve sustained progress. 
Institutions do matter (especially the institutional links between government and utilities) and 
they ultimately have a pervasive influence on the long-run character of economies 
(Williamson 2000:596). Good economic management, therefore, depends on the effective 
design and quality of public sector institutions that are responsible for executing reform 
policies and providing public service (Estache and Martimort 1999). 
It is clear that governments alone will not be able to finance the expansion of electricity 
infrastructure to meet the objectives of development. The private sector will have to playa 
key role in adding capacity to African grids. In order for private investment to be attracted to 
the power sector, however, public sector capacity must be enhanced. How this will be 
achieved in the next cycle of reforms is still somewhat unclear. What is clear is that unless 
frameworks are effectively geared to achieve the required synergy to promote mutual 
partnerships between the state and the market, the next round of reforms will be no more 
successful than the last. 
2.3 Independent Power Producers 
Second to state owned utilities, independent power producers are major players in the African 
electricity generation sector. Called, in part, to plug the shortages in capacity, they also assist 
in relieving governments of their obligations for financing investment. As previously stated in 
Section 2.1, the introduction of IPPs was seen as a step towards the standard model of reform 
towards wholesale competition amongst a number of generators, since private producers 
would eventually compete in the generation power market. This section of the literature 
review examines some of the obstacles to IPPs entering emerging power markets as they 
contribute to the problem of insufficient capacity, and considers ways to promote private 
investment in generation and improve its outcomes. 
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2.3.1 Attracting Private Investment into Generation Infrastructure 
While many stakeholders are involved in private infrastructure development projects, the 
concerns of international - and to a lesser extent domestic - investors have been prominent in 
emerging power sectors. To ensure that the sector remains sustainable. governments have to 
be in tune to their needs and interests in order to continue attracting investment from this 
limited source. The broad investment climate that would attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and investment in general is a strong determinant for attracting private investment in 
generation. Policy formulation and implementation, domestic financial systems, international 
trade and financial markets, the labour market, public infrastructure. tax systems, legal and 
regulatory frameworks and governance ultimately affect the progress of market-oriented 
reforms and the attraction of FDI (Loayza and Soto 2003). In general, a good investment 
climate with sound regulatory governance and reliable infrastructure bodes well for attracting 
investment since it reduces the cost of doing business in that country (Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier et al. 2004). In addition, where important public interests are at stake and market 
forces are weak. strong government institutions are an essential prerequisite for successful 
private sector participation (Jacobson and Tarr 1995). 
The African region, however, generally has been unable to achieve the conditions that would 
facilitate and attract sufficient amounts of private investment in generation infrastructure. 
Africa has relatively poor investment attractiveness compared to other developing regions. 
Roughly a third of countries on the African continent are rated for their investment 
attractiveness and only four countries have investment grade ratings according to the three 
major ratings agencies. Fitch, Moody's and S&P (Kotecha 2005; Sheppard, von-Klaudy et al. 
2006). Poor investment climates, in general, have contributed to the lack of investment 
specifically in infrastructure where costs are sunk and returns are amortised over a long period 
of time. 
Around forty IPPs have been developed in Africa. Mostly complementing state-owned 
generators in providing electricity, they provide less than 9 per cent of generation capacity.40 
Despite being an important source of new generation in many African countries, this modest 
contribution is concentrated in a few countries on the continent with Cote d'!voire, Egypt, 
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania and Tunisia accounting for roughly 80 per cent of 
40 This figure is based on lEA (2007) data which puts installed capacity at roughly 107GW and the 
author's calculations oflPP capacity in Africa. 
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installed IPP capacity (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). The small percentage of IPP capacity 
attracted in Africa in indicative of the challenges that most African countries (along with 
other less endowed developing nations) face in bringing in investment, even though there is 
such a huge demand for power. 
Despite the flurry of interest in developing regions and activity from investor utilities in 
industrialised countries in the 1990s, a 2005 survey showed that three out of four investor 
utilities in the US and more than four out of five European investor utilities intend to remain 
focussed in their home regions (PWC 2005: 11). Investors have faced many obstacles in 
realising satisfactory returns on their investments and disappointing investment experiences in 
some emerging markets have lead many investors to retreat from IPP investments in 
developing countries, including Africa. 41 The decline in private investment in generation 
infrastructure over the decade from 1998 to 2008 has been driven by a number of factors, the 
principal ones being the effect of economic crises in developing countries, the unfinished 
reforms which has meant that infrastructure business has not been placed on a commercial 
footing (Tenenbaum and Izaguirre 2007), underdeveloped local capital markets in most 
developing countries42, the deteriorating financial position of many sponsors (Rigby 2004), 
growing concerns over re-nationalisation, and disappointing returns on some projects due to 
renegotiations (Izaguirre 2004a). There is also recognition that ways in which project risks 
were allocated has left stakeholders such as governments, investors and consumers, 
unnecessarily exposed (Izaguirre 2004b). The cases in this thesis will show how some of 
these issues have played out in the countries, such as deteriorating financial positions of 
sponsors, which has resulted in equity changes in projects in all four of the countries that have 
been investigated in this thesis, as well as the project risks which have left consumers and 
governments exposed in the cases of Ghana and Morocco. 
2.3.2 Key IPP Risks 
While certain risks in developing IPPs may have been well managed through traditional 
means, it is clear that traditional risk management mechanisms were inadequate to cater for 
41 Governments also continue to face challenges in dealing with fundamental policy problems and 
creating an environment in which private investment can flourish while the development needs of 
countries are achieved. 
42 The absence of domestic capital markets for infrastructure in most African states has meant increased 
risk premiums by way of higher interest charges to offset inflation and volatility in domestic currencies. 
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all risks in reforming emerging power markets and experience suggests that some risks may 
have been overlooked. Below is a brief overview of three key risks that investors view as 
most significant deterrents in investing in electricity infrastructure in developing countries 
according to two independent surveys conducted (Lamech and Saeed 2003; PWC 2005).43 
Presented are brief descriptions of the risks; the traditional ways in which they were managed, 
and prospects for improved risk management of these investor concerns. 
a) Expropriation Risk 
Infrastructure investments are sunk costs - investors cannot use their assets in other locations 
and investments are irreversible. Not only are the costs sunk, it also takes a long time for 
investors to recoup their investment outlays. Over such long time periods investors face 
numerous risks, one which is having their assets expropriated. Once investors are committed 
to their projects and the only exit strategies involve huge losses, governments can be tempted 
not to honour commitments as previously agreed and investors risk becoming victims of 
expropriation, or what is called obsolescent bargains (Vernon 1971). Since outright 
expropriation, as in nationalisation of assets, is less common today, investors have recently 
been more concerned with creeping expropriation, such as the mandatory renegotiation of 
PPAs. 
Robust contracts have generally been used by investors and project sponsors to give 
themselves legal recourse in the event of expropriation. In addition, government guarantees 
have traditionally been called on to manage the risk of creeping or outright expropriation. 
Drawing on government guarantees to attract investors to finance new infrastructure as a way 
to appease investors may appear appealing to host governments because without having any 
immediate costs, the government can benefit from the investment. Experiences in developing 
countries have shown that despite these legal measures, contracts have often been insufficient 
in keeping expropriation at bay. A study initiated by Stanford University's Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development (PESO) analysed the outcomes of private investment in 
generation infrastructure and found that contracts which evaluated risk ex-ante and made 
provision for it through the legal conventions fared poorly in anticipating risks and specifying 
solutions (Woodhouse 2005c:48-51 ).44 Out of the sample of independently contracted plants a 
43 These are also key risks that were the causes behind many of the renegotiations in IPPs. 
44 The study closely examined 33 greenfield independent power projects of varying sizes, fuel sources 
and technologies in 12 different countries in various geographic regions, with varying power sector and 
country contexts. 
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third of the project contracts between governments and IPPs had undergone mutual 
renegotiation and roughly a quarter of the contracts faced unilateral renegotiation or non-
payment - amongst these were slightly more than a tenth of the sample that ended in litigation 
or arbitration. 
Even where agreements contained government guarantees, the above study found no evidence 
of outcomes having a bias toward the guarantee risk provision45 . A classic example is the case 
of the Dabhol IPP in India that received overlapping guarantees from central and provincial 
governments as well as a guarantee for part of the project from the federal government along 
with a series of letters of credit and escrow arrangements (Lamb 2006). Despite these 
seemingly robust measures, the security arrangements still proved insufficient. Evidence from 
the Stanford study showed that while contractual measures are necessary conditions to defend 
the financial and operational terms of the projects, they are not sufficient in themselves since 
not all risks can be mitigated through contracts and there is often little certainty as to the 
ability of contracting parties to uphold their end of the contractual bargain, depending on the 
intensity of the issues that are stressing the agreements. Reneging on contractual agreements 
and guarantees has also dented the image of governments and, in many cases, has deterred 
investors from making future investments. 46 
b) Currency Risk 
Currency risk remains a key consideration for investors and governments in IPP development. 
While foreign investors are notionally shielded from currency risk when PPAs are 
denominated in hard currency, in reality they share a large part of the risk when local 
45 In many cases, governments have issued guarantees but have failed to manage the risks they have 
guaranteed. They do not allow generation costs to be passed through in the tariffs; manage the 
country's macroeconomics in ways that undermine off-taker's ability to service PPA charges; and 
institute changes that lead to significant decreases in the value of domestic currency. 
46 Irwin (2007:4) cautions on the use of guarantees by governments and states that good outcomes with 
respect to guarantee decisions are more likely under the following conditions: when an effective 
framework for judging when a government guarantee is employed to justify the use of a guarantee; 
governments or their advisors know how to estimate the cost of the guarantee; and when decision 
makers in governments follow conventions that encourage careful reflection of the guarantee's costs 
and benefits. As an alternative to government guarantees, although mainly used in the oil sector, the 
use of securitisations or asset-backed securities in electricity sectors could be considered due to the 
interest reducing benefits that it has on debt in countries that are rich in fuel or mineral exports (Ketkar 
and Ratha 200 I). 
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currencies in developing countries undergo significant devaluations. Currency risk could 
easily be compounded by political risk leading to creeping expropriation when governments 
find it politically difficult to pass on the increased costs and decide to renegotiate IPP 
contracts. IPP contracts extend over many years, sometimes up to 30 years, leaving 
stakeholders open to lengthy periods of exposure. 47 It is for this reason that the development 
and strengthening of local financial systems should not be underestimated for exchange rate 
risk mitigation where banking systems become independent of government and gain 
experience in long-term and structured finance (OME 2003:81). 
A gradual devaluation in local currency over a number of years could be managed 
successfully in most cases, but serious problems are created when the decline is precipitous as 
IPP investors found in South Asia and in Latin America during the financial crises that 
gripped markets in these regions. 48 Currency devaluations are normally coupled with higher 
interest rates which affect economic growth and subsequent demand for contracted power 
which could lead to power planning problems due to a reduction in anticipated power. It could 
also stall other projects in the pipeline that have to be re-evaluated to incorporate increasing 
costs as a result of both devaluations and higher interest rates. 
Since the majority of investments are made in foreign currency exposing shareholders and 
creditors to currency risk, creditors, in particular, often seek out ways to shape the contractual 
arrangements to pass this risk onto governments or consumers. The state's presumed 
influence over currency risk is often stated as a factor when arguing for allocating this risk to 
governments. Interestingly, a different view has been proposed by Gray and Irwin (2003b) 
who suggest that investors take on all the financing related exchange rate risk even though it 
may translate into higher tariffs for consumers as a premium for bearing such risk. They 
support their proposition by arguing that government's financial positions are affected in 
47 Gray and Irwin (2003a) observed that in the 25 years prior to 2003, developing country currencies 
lost on average 72 per cent of their value relative to the US dollar. Roughly a fifth of developing 
countries' currencies lost more than 99 percent of their value. The Brazilian real and the Argentinean 
peso lost almost all of their value between 1985 and 1990, and the Indonesian rupiah lost roughly 80 
per cent of its value in 1997 and 1998, which impacted on utilities' abilities to pay charges. 
48 [n the Philippines widely publicized renegotiations followed the devaluations in currency. [n 
Malaysia and Thailand, while the dozen plus IPPs faced some pressure during the Asian financial 
crisis, local capital sourced almost entirely from domestic markets as output was sold under long-term 
local currency denominated contracts to the national utility, helped reduce financial strain on the power 
sector and continued to ensure healthy profits for [PP investors (Rector 2005; Woo 2005). 
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complex ways and by many factors unrelated to infrastructure projects, and because 
governments' responses to financial incentives differ from those of firms and individuals. 
They do recognise, however, that the problem could be foregrounded in the longer term when 
too much foreign currency debt is taken on as experienced in the Philippines where more than 
forty long-term contracts were signed (Woodhouse 2005a)49. In cases where competitively 
priced plants have kept power charges low and privately contracted power represents a 
smaller percentage of the country's generation, currency devaluations have been less of a 
problem, as in the case of Egypt where significant currency devaluation occurred in 2002 and 
2003 (Eberhard and Gratwick 2007). 
c) Regulatory and Political Risk 
Another major barrier to investment In developing countries is the perceived threat of 
regulatory risk (Jamison and Holt 2005; Newbery 2006: 16-17). Changes to an initially agreed 
legal framework that governs investment in electricity infrastructure could spell a potential 
loss of income to investors. If regulatory capacity is weak or the framework is viewed as 
unpredictable, foreign and domestic investors are deterred from committing their money. 
Firms with international equity investments in power sectors in developing countries often 
stress that the conditions essential to success are the rule of law, respect for investor's rights, 
as well as legal and regulatory processes that are free from government interference (Lamech 
and Saeed 2003). 
Power plants, because they sell an important and highly visible commodity that is viewed as a 
public good, are particularly exposed to social and political risk. Because many developing 
countries have a long history of subsidised tariffs, PPA charges are often highly politicised in 
poorer settings where consumers are expected to pay the full cost of service provision. While 
effective regulation is able to have an important impact on the performance of the sector and 
the economy, no perfect regulatory reform models exist indicating potential problems 
especially for investors finding themselves in nascent regulatory environments (Alexander 
and Estache 1999:25-26). Even with independent regulation, objectives can conflict as 
regulators have to consider the socio-political impact (increased tariffs and potential political 
instability) of attempting to make the sector attractive to investors (Mwenechanya 2005). 
49 The disruption by the Asian financial crisis had a significant impact on IPP power purchase 
agreements in the Philippines, making the take-or-pay contracts unsustainable. During and after the 
crisis, the government continued to honour the contracts until 200 I when a new legal requirement 
mandated the review of PPAs leading to contract renegotiation efforts in the IPP sector (Woodhouse 
2005a). 
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Regulatory and political risk insurance has been employed in many cases as means to isolate 
private investors from this risk. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
provides political risk insurance cover for most types of political risk (A DB 2004; World 
Bank 2007) and the World Bank's Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) is extended to cover many of 
the legal regulatory and contractual risks (Gupta, Lamech et al. 2002). 
Power sector reform, in itself, can contribute to regulatory and political risk. While addressing 
underlying policy problems is an ideal to be achieved by governments, policy goals in search 
of improved sector performances, as reforms evolve, could impact investment negatively. 
Power sector reform is an evolving process and changes instituted as part of reforms could 
hinder and slow down the reform which was intended to encourage further investment (Lovei 
2000). This could be the case when IPPs have to be incorporated into wholesale power 
markets and existing contracts have to be integrated into evolving market arrangements as 
power sectors move toward the' standard prescription' and take-or-pay contracts do not allow 
a framework for competition in the market (Woolf and Halpern 2001).50 In the case of 
Morocco in Chapter 5, this difficulty has resulted in dual regulated and non-regulated markets 
operating side by side being proposed to deal with the intricacies of integration. Although the 
Moroccan proposal does not deal with integration in the long-term, no further longer-term 
plans have been documented beyond the proposal on dual markets. Despite the plans for the 
dual market, implementation is at least three years behind schedule, depicting the 
intractability and complexity of moving on with reforms involving integration. 
The abovementioned risks are generally viewed by project sponsors as the most applicable in 
investing in reforming developing regions. There are, however, additional risks that have also 
contributed to stalled negotiations, delayed construction times, or cancelled projects. Table 
2.2 below gives an overview of some of the risks that both investors and governments face 
during the development of power generation projects and some proposed mitigation 
techniques which could be employed to moderate the possibility of adverse outcomes. In the 
empirical cases that follow, many of the risks mentioned below will re-emerge, along with the 
varied experiences of how governments and power sectors fared in managing them. 
50 Impediments in integrating IPPs into markets delays the scope for competition and could result in 
large resource costs for countries if plants are dispatched out of merit order (Woolf and Halpern 
2001 :2). 
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Table 2.2: Independent Power Project Risks 
Phase Risk Proposed Mitieation Mechanism 
Conflicting or lack of decision-making Develop a strong institutional and implementation 
authority, changes in authorities 
(elections), framework 
Delays in approvals or failure to obtain Develop a strong institutional and implementation 
approvals, permits and licences framework 
Inadequate or inappropriate legal Legal reform 
structure for project finance 
Resistance and protests by interest Cooperation and integration of stakeholder concerns groups such as NGOs, unions, etc 
Project Bidding risks Interest in project bidding should be maximised 
Preparation Legal challenges to the awarding of Develop and use transparent award procedures project 
Perform comprehensive Environmental Impact 
Environmental risk Assessment (EIA), comply with lender guidelines such 
as the World Bank, external monitoring 
Preference for proven technology and a reputable 
Technological risk constructor. New technology should be allowed on the basis that technological guarantees and assurances are 
provided 
Dclays in t1nancial closure Deadline should be realistic 
Preference should be given to fixed-price turnkey 
Cost overruns and completion delays contracts. Penalty clauses and performance incentives 
should be used to prevent delays 
Failure to meet performance Make provision for clauses in contracts 
specifications 
Changes to approvals, permits and Negotiation with relevant authorities or arbitration licences 
Failure to complete supporting 
Project 
infrastructure (transmission links, Strong coordination with counterparties 
roads, fuel delivery) 
Construction Unforeseen delays Make provision in project agreements 
Force m~eure Make provision in project agreements, multilateral guarantees 
Default by contractors or equity Invoke shareholders' agreements or step-in rights holders 
Liability risks Take out private insurance 
Strikes and demonstrations Take out private or multilateral insurance 
Expropriation or nationalisation Compensation clauses and multilateral insurance 
Demand risk PerfiJrm independent and accurate demand fixecast, use 
take-or-pay contract 
Supply risk Robust fuel supply contract with a number of credible 
suppliers 
Payment risk Make escrow facilities, letters of credit and other credit 
enhancers a requirement 
Breach of contract by ofr·taker Government guarantees, litigation and arbitration 
Pro.iect Government guarantee withdrawal I nternational arbitration 
Operation Inadequate price adjustment 
mechanisms, changes to contract, Independent regulation, international arbitration 
creeping expropriation 
Change oflaw Government guarantees 
Exchange rates, interest rates and Use hedging, user charge indexation and contract 
inflation movements extension mechanisms 
Foreign exchange availability and Arrange for agreements with Ministry of Finance or 
convertibility government guarantees 
Sources: Sader (2000), World BankiUSAID (2004), Natdoo (2005) 
52 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
As far as possible, project risks, including construction and project risks, should be identified 
and risk management strategies agreed upon at the project preparation stage due to the 
difficulties involved in altering agreements once all the stakeholders are in agreement with the 
terms, especially when the change involves certain parties shouldering more risk that 
originally agreed on. Generally, risks during project construction have been relatively better 
managed in turnkey IPP projects partly due to the short construction periods (relative to the 
operation phase) and the intense negotiations which precede this phase with a strong focus on 
project construction and commissioning. 51 Risks during the project operation stage, due to the 
long duration of this phase of the project, can vary over time and it is here that a number of 
eventualities (internal or external to the project) can threaten the sustainability of the IPP. An 
example of note is the fuel risk in Tunisia's second IPP in Chapter 6, where fuel availability 
posed as a serious problem after operations had already started and threatened the project's 
source of revenue. 
2.3.3 Managing IPP Risks 
As already described in this chapter, the problem of attracting investment into power sectors 
is strongly linked to the real risks and the risk perceptions of investors. There are a number of 
risks that are present in developing infrastructure projects in general, and with private 
generation projects the intricacies and complexities of the arrangements required to achieve 
the success of projects can easily become more complex. The continuous search for optimal 
risk management techniques has contributed to shaping the risk management strategies 
employed by stakeholders in private generation infrastructure investments. Continued 
difficulties in dealing with risks often result in projects being distressed; delays in contracting 
the much-needed new capacity; or even outright cancellation of planned projects (Harris, 
Hodges et al. 2003). Certain risks are particularly tricky to manage due to insufficient market 
instruments and related mechanisms to cater for risks in developing country settings (Dailami, 
Lipkovich et al. 1999:1; Malgas 2002; Auffret 2003).52 
51 The use of reputable, well-experienced project developers has also reduced construction risk. 
S2 Due to the relative undeveloped power pools, power markets have not developed as in industrialised 
countries. With relatively few players and with a regional shortage of capacity in these pools markets, 
Contracts-For-Differences and other derivative instruments, for example, do not exist. The scope of 
uncertainties on exchange rates and weather-related effects (such as droughts) would make insurances 
for electricity supply difficult to quantify and underwrite. Although there are insurances offered by 
multilateral agencies for certain risks (as in certain categories of political, regulatory and force 
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Privately sponsored power plants are usually developed and financed through special purpose 
vehicles on a limited recourse basis, a structure that is exposed and sensitive to many 
uncertainties. The means to cater for these uncertainties are woven into a complex web of 
contracts and agreements. Once a project sponsor has reached an agreement with a 
government that specifies the details of the project, the sponsor needs to obtain all relevant 
licences, approvals and clearances from other national, provincial and local government 
entities such as the power purchase agreement, land titles and environmental clearances, 
construction permits, tax agreements, import permits, fuel supply agreements, foreign 
exchange convertibility and transferability agreements, immigration permits, and specific 
government guarantees (Sader 2000:23-24). In addition, the project sponsor has to finalise 
agreements with other private parties that would support the construction and operation of the 
project such as engineering procurement and construction (EPe) contractors (normally on a 
turnkey basis) as well as operating and maintenance (O&M) contractors, before the project 
can reach financial closure involving contractual arrangements with other investors, 
multilateral, bilateral or commercial lenders, insurers, and export credit agencies. These 
multifaceted contractual structures engage many different players whose collective 
expectations require conceiving an arrangement that is acceptable to all parties by meeting 
different objectives and incentives. The interaction and nature of the contracts motivate the 
financing choices and inform governance arrangements for these investments, as the project 
allocates contracted and non-contracted risk between different stakeholders (Dailami and 
Hauswald 200 1:3-4). Efficient risk allocation means allocating corresponding risk factors to 
the party that is best suited to exercise the associated real options to manage the risk 
(Bettignies and Ross 2004: 139; World BankiUSAID 2004: 134-139; Irwin 2007:60). Where 
returns on investments can be adjusted to cover underlying risks or the risks can be reduced to 
meet lower returns, attracting private capital becomes possible (OME 2003:28). In many 
cases, however, investors deem returns to be insufficient for the risks that they assume. In 
such cases, projects may be stalled or cancelled outright if stakeholders feel uncomfortable 
with the risks that they are expected to bear by other parties. 
2.3.4 Alternative Approaches to Attracting Investment into Generation 
While the challenge is for investor firms and governments to find mechanisms that reduce risk 
and manage them in ways that are cost-effective and relatively trouble-free, the complication 
majeure) many governments do not want to be saddled with contingent liabilities. In the absence of 
such guarantees, there are few similar offerings on the market to hedge against these kinds of risk. 
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is that each country is different and that varying country contexts set their unique backdrops 
for how risks present themselves and, ultimately, the outcomes of projects. Broad conclusions 
about risks and how they relate to project outcomes are, therefore, often difficult to apply in 
specific settings. In addition, although surveys among large sample sizes of private 
infrastructure projects such as those performed by Lamech and Saeed (2003) and PWC (2005) 
generate broad conclusions about risks and indicators of IPP experiences, they are often tricky 
to quantify and compare systematically. Hence, there has been a need for alternatives to 
traditional risk management in improving IPP outcomes for investors and host countries. 
Three alternatives are discussed below. 
a) Risk Compensation and Risk Reduction 
Governments can attract private investment in infrastructure in two broad ways (Dailami and 
Klein 1997:20; Klingebiel and Ruster 2000:2). Firstly, they can offer financial support to 
investors in the form of grants, low-interest loans and guarantees in order to compensate for 
risks involving low tariffs, insolvent SOEs, unstable macro-economic conditions, and other 
problems. Secondly, they can address the underlying policy problems that trigger investors' 
concerns by ensuring macro-economic stability, raising tariffs to more viable economic 
levels, and establishing sound policy and regulatory frameworks. Although both methods can 
attract investment. the former tends not to reduce overall costs but to allocate them to captive 
taxpayers, while policy reforms aspire to improve project fundamentals and make them 
attractive to investors without unnecessarily imposing costs on taxpayers (Klein 1996). The 
latter approach is by its nature more sustainable and, hence, has been the path considered by 
most governments, including those in the four country cases investigated in this thesis, albeit 
with varying outcomes, due to the unique challenges that have been encountered reforms. 
b) Flexibili(v and Strategic Partnerships 
Setting out to draw specific conclusions on IPP investments in specific contexts, Stanford 
University's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development assessed a range of 
independent variables that would explain the variation in private investment outcomes for 
greenfield IPPs (Victor, Heller et al. 2004).53 In addition to strategic risk management 
53 The Stanford study identified the universe of countries that have IPPs and selected a sample of 
countries that have a variation in the factors that may explain success or failure of projects and a 
variation in the role that IPPs play in the power sector. The study closely examined 33 greenfield 
independent power projects of varying sizes, fuel sources and technologies in 12 different countries in 
various geographic regions, with varying power sector and country contexts. The Stanford IPP study 
focussed on IPP outcomes from two perspectives: an investment perspective to assess the extent that 
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practices helping to structure projects in ways that reduced their vulnerability to risks, the 
study linked future successes to more flexible contract parties or stakeholders, since goodwill 
and legal contracts sometimes go further in resolving problems when deals come unstuck than 
do contracts on their own. In this way, the willingness of stakeholders to make concessions 
generally could lead to more beneficial outcomes in the longer term (Woodhouse 2005c:64). 
The ability to manage counterparty risk, especially during politically sensitive periods which 
may lead to renegotiation, is also considered indispensable to preserve successful outcomes 
(Woodhouse 2005c:67-75). Here, local partnerships prove to increase substantially the 
likelihood of successfully mitigating the political risks which are often inherent in foreign-
owned investments (Woodhouse 2005c; Eberhard and Gratwick 2007). With local 
partnerships the ability to manage fuel supply, dispatch, non-payment and renegotiation were 
increased and were often proximate determinants of project outcomes when these stresses 
threatened operations and the sustainability of the projects. In Morocco's third IPP (discussed 
in Chapter 5), where the national utility was the local partner with the largest shareholding in 
the plant, the project enjoyed government support to the extent where the state assisted in 
arranging local financing from local Moroccan banks to manage the currency risk on the 
project. 
c) Balancing Investment and Development Outcomes 
In a study of African IPPs by the University of Cape Town's Management Programme for 
Infrastructure and Regulatory Reform (MIR), the investment and development successes of 
IPPs was found to be attributed to project level factors as well as factors related to the host 
country.54 The study tests a hypothesis that balanced investment and development outcomes 
lead to more sustainable projects. The assumption was that if investment and development 
outcomes were in balance and both investors and off-takers were satisfied with the project 
arrangements and their investment and development outcomes respectively, private 
investment would continue to grow. The investigation found that indeed a balance between 
investment and development outcomes leads to the sustainability of projects within the 
investors' expectations were met by the project, and a development perspective to determine the degree 
to which the project met the expectations of the host country. 
54 Drawing from the methodology and research framework of the previously mentioned Stanford study 
and using project and country level factors as independent determinants of outcomes, the study makes a 
departure from the Stanford PESO IPP study by seeking to determine the extent to which project and 
country related factors make projects sustainable, and creates a direct link between these factors and the 
investment and development outcomes. 
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context of the conditions that existed when the projects were developed, even if the balance 
was achieved with time and, in some cases, only after renegotiation as evidenced in the case 
of Kenya (Eberhard and Gratwick 2007).55 Perceived imbalances often intensified by 
exogenous stresses lead to contracts becoming unstable and even renegotiated despite the 
security arrangements which could prove insufficient to sustain the contracts. [n most cases, 
the incidences of contractual problems did not necessarily imply the end of the project, but 
lead to a search for a new equilibrium in balancing outcomes that proved more sustainable. 
Table 2.3 details the project level factors that were cited as contributing to the outcomes of 
[PPs. Control of these factors are largely considered to be within the purview of the project 
sponsor and contain elements such as favourable equity partners, debt arrangements, the 
means to secure revenue, credit enhancements, strategic risk management measures, good 
technical performance, and strategic management and relationship building. Like the Stanford 
study (as described in section 2.3.3.1), the M[R investigation establishes a link between 
favourable equity partners and the development and investment outcomes for African [PPs. 
Links were established between favourable debt arrangements and project successes since the 
financing mix and type could have implications for the financial sustainability of the projects, 
especially when local currencies devaluate. Closely related to financing, the means to secure a 
revenue stream for investors (mainly through the financial viability of the off-taker) also 
impacted on the successes of projects. Since revenue payments are contractually linked to 
plant technical performance, plant availability and dispatching was also linked to project 
outcomes. Lastly, ongoing strategic management and relationship building have proved to be 
helpful when projects face obstacles for which no provisions were made contractually. These 
contributing elements to the success of IPP projects are themes that will feature in the 
empirical cases for this thesis from Chapters 3 through 6. 
55 After the end of the PPA terms for Iberafrica (an initial stop-gap IPP) and OrPower4, both privately 
owned plants agreed to reduce capacity charges in order to secure PPAs for a second term. Prices 
became more competitive with that of the state-owned generator, KenGen, which contributed to more 
positive development outcomes for Kenya (Eberhard and Gratwick 2007:24). 
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Table 2. 3: Project Level Elements Contributing to IPP Outcomes 
Contributin~ Elements Details 
-Local capital/partner contribution, where possible 
-Risk appetite for project 
Favourable -Experience with developing country project risk 
equity partners -Involvement of a DFI partner (and/or host country government) 
-Reasonable, fair ROE 
-Development-minded firms 
-Low cost financing 
Favourable 
-Local capital/markets mitigate foreign exchange risk 
debt arrangements 
-Risk premium demanded by financiers or capped by off-taker matches 
country/project risk 
-Some t1exibility in terms and conditions (possible refinancing) 
-Commercially sound metering, billing and collections by the utility 
- Robust PPA (stipulates capacity and payment as well as dispatch, fuel 
metering, interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, 
Secure and change of law provisions, refinancing arrangements, dispute resolution, 
adequate revenue etc.) 
- Security arrangements where necessary (escrow accounts, letters of 
stream 
credit, 
stand-by debt facilities, hedging and other derivative instruments, 
committed public budget and/or taxes/levies, targeted subsidies and 
output-based aid, hard currency contracts, indexation in contracts) 
Credit enhancements -Sovereign guarantees 
and other risk -Political risk insurance 
management and -Partial risk guarantees 
mitigation measures -I nternational arbitration 
Positive technical 
-Technical performance high (availability) 
performance 
-Sponsors anticipate potential cont1icts (especially related to O&M, and 
budgeting) and mitigate them 
Strategic Sponsors work to create good image in country through political 
relationships, development funds, effective commun ications and 
management and 
strategically manage their contracts, particularly in the face of exogenous 
relationship building 
shocks and other stresses 
Source: Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) 
Table 2.4 presents the country level factors considered to contribute to the outcomes of IPPs. 
Control of these factors is largely within the purview of the project sponsor and includes 
elements such as a favourable investment climate, a clear electricity policy framework, 
impartial, transparent and consistent regulatory oversight, coherent power sector planning, 
competitive bidding practices, secure contracts and the abundance of low-cost fuel. Again, 
similarly to the Stanford study, the MIR investigation considered the role of a favourable 
investment climate in attracting IPPs. It established a link between clear policy and credible 
regulatory frameworks and positive IPP outcomes. Since regulatory and policy risks are 
concerns for investors, it is beneficial for these frameworks to be enshrined in legislation, i.e., 
policy is clearly spelled out and regulatory decisions are transparent to command investor 
confidence. The study considers the extent to which power sector planning had impacted on 
lPPs, i.e. has the planning (or lack thereof) facilitated or obstructed the entry of IPPs. Lastly, 
it found that the presence of domestic fuel plays a part in reducing lPP costs and reduces the 
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chances of renegotiations due to high prices when conditions change. Thermal IPPs are highly 
exposed to fuel market conditions, and plants that have been able to secure a fuel supply that 
was cost competitive and reliable have been able to minimise fuel risks (Woodhouse 2005c; 
Gratwick and Eberhard 2008).56 In two of the four cases presented in this thesis, it was found 
that the countries with domestic fuel sources for power generation, namely Cote d'lvoire and 
Tunisia. had in fact been less exposed to fuel risk and proved to have adequate generation to 
meet their domestic demands. 
The MIR study has therefore made a contribution by identifying various factors (shown in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4) that contributed to IPP outcomes for investors and off-takers and appear 
to make investment in independent power projects more sustainable. 
56 Even in Africa, countries that have their own source of fuel have traditionally been more successful 
in maintaining lower charges for power from IPP such as Egypt, Cote d'lvoire and Tunisia. 
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Table 2. 4: Country Level Elements Contributing to IPP Outcomes 
Contributing Elements Details 
-Stable macro-economic policies 
-Legal system allows contracts to be enforced, laws to be upheld, 
arbitration 
Favourable investment -Good repayment record and investment grade rating 
climate -Requires less (costly) risk mitigation techniques to be employed which 
translate into lower cost of capital and hence lower projects costs and 
more competitive prices 
- Potentially more than one investment opportunity 
-Policy framework enshrined in legislation 
-Framework clearly specifies market structure and roles and terms for 
Clear policy private and public sector investments (generally for single buyer model, 
Framework not, yet, wholesale competition in African context) 
-Reform-minded 'champions' , concerned with long-run, lead and 
implement framework 
-Transparent and predictable licensing and tariff framework improves 
Clear, consistent investor confidence 
and fair regulatory -I mproves general performance of private and public sector assets 
oversight -Cost-reflective tariffs ensure revenue sufficiency 
-Consumers protected - improves development outcomes 
-Energy security standard in place; planning roles and functions clarified 
-Power planning vested with lead, appropriate (skilled, resourced and 
empowered) agency 
Coherent power -Power sector planning takes into consideration the hybrid market (public 
sector planning and private stakeholders and their respective real costs of capital) and 
fairly allocates new build opportunities among stakeholders 
-Planning has built-in contingencies to avoid 'emergency power' or 
blackouts 
Competitive -Procurement process is transparent and competition ultimately drives 
bidding practices down prices 
Abundant low cost -Cost-competitive with other fuels 
fuel & secure contracts -Contract safeguards affordable and reliable fuel supply for duration of 
contract 
Source: Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) 
In summary, African countries have not been able to adequately allay the concerns of 
investors and this has contributed to insufficient investment and a shortage of capacity in the 
African power sector. The challenge is to find improved mechanisms to deal with the risks 
faced by investors and governments (Besant-Jones 2006:72) or be prepared to pay higher risk 
premiums for the higher perceived risks. Failing this, the problem of insufficient investment 
will persist. 
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2.4 Electricity Planning and Procurement 
The importance of electricity planning lies in its role in helping governments and utilities to 
recognise opportunities and avoid costly mistakes. It enables planners to grasp more clearly 
what they want to achieve, and when and how they can achieve it. With power sector reforms 
a rearrangement of institutional functions often resulted in the planning function being taken 
away from the state-owned utilities and assumed by sector ministries or related agencies. 
Reformers often assumed that new generation investments would be taken care of by the 
market and did not explicitly focus on the issue of planning. The necessity of planning under 
hybrid market and various single buyer arrangements remained even more obscure. Planning 
often turned out to be inadequate leading to delays in building power plants and consequently 
insufficient generation capacity. 
In the past, the national state-owned utility assumed sole responsibility for generation 
expansion planning. But with the entry of IPPs, it was not often clear whether the SOE 
remained the supplier of last resort. Planning functions were often neglected or were 
transferred to the Energy Ministry which often had insufficient capacity to plan effectively. 
Weak or absent regulatory and governance frameworks for generation planning and 
procurement undermine the credibility of investment and contracting decisions and there are 
often no clear linkages between generation planning, the timely initiation and implementation 
of tender processes, and commercial operations of new generation plants. 
In reviewing the literature on electricity planning as it relates to the problem of insufficient 
generation capacity, this section evaluates why reform efforts have largely ignored these 
issues. It further explores the links between planning, procurement and contracting and how 
the emergence of hybrid markets creates new challenges in terms of allocating institutional 
responsibility and capacity for these functions. 
2.4.1 Electricity Planning 
The purpose of generation planning is to determine the amount and type of generation 
capacity to be constructed, and the time in which it needs to be constructed and 
commissioned, while the total cost to the utility is minimised (Kagiannas, Askounis et aI. 
2004:414). Energy security is important in the modern age due to its links to economic and 
social development. Energy security is reduced when countries hold inefficient generation 
portfolios that are unnecessarily exposed to fossil fuel price volatility or drought (Awerbuch 
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2006), suggesting that generation planning should not be performed in isolation. Reliable 
planning scenarios for the electricity industry are often dependent on upstream fuel industries 
that have different drivers and constraints for quantity, price, and quality of supply to that of 
the ESI. Effective resource allocation, co-ordination and supply projections are, therefore, 
necessary between electricity and upstream industries (Harris and Davies 1980:28). If 
electricity planning fails to adequately consider the links to upstream supply industries, such 
as fuel markets and equipment sLlppliers to support power plants, or to downstream links, sLlch 
as transmission expansions required to evacuate the power generated, and to demand patterns, 
it could result in undesirable consequences. It is, therefore, essential for planning to 
encompass an integrated approach to supply and demand-side additions, constraints, and 
requirements. 
2.4.1.1 From Conventional Electricity Planning to Integrated Resource 
Planning 
Traditional electricity planning focussed on supply side additions to generation infrastructure 
to meet the anticipated demand and minimise economic costs of expansion (Anderson 1972; 
Auer 1974). Until the 1970s, the supply of low-priced energy and resources helped sustain 
world economic growth and the traditional approach to energy planning was developed 
against this background (DeOliveira and Girod 1990:530). Traditional planning often relied 
on increased economies of scale in generation capacity with little consideration of the need 
for greater energy efficiency. Consumers generally absorbed the costs of expansion and the 
holding of large reserve capacities, often with little choice (Dickel 2003). One of the primary 
reasons for energy planning having a one-sided supply focus was because energy planning 
was not extensive; planning objectives evolved separately within the various energy sub-
sectors and individual enterprises (Eberhard 1992:2). The energy sector was dominated by 
engineers who had a supply fOCLlS. However, after the oil shocks of the I 970s, increased 
supply costs, led to a greater fOCLlS on least-cost utility planning. Least-cost expansion has 
evolved toward integrated resource planning (lRP), which allows for broader economic, 
environmental and social objectives to be integrated in electricity planning. 57 IRP goes 
57 Electricity costs normally exclude the external costs imposed by society. These costs can be in the 
form of air and water pollution, exposure to volatile fuel markets and worsening trade balances that 
increase debt to other countries (Michelfelder 1993 :228). In a study of electricity costs and externalities 
in South Africa, Spalding-Fecher and Matibe (2003) estimated the external costs of electricity based on 
quantitative analysis of air pollution impacts of human health, damages from greenhouse gas 
emissions, and the avoided health costs from electrification, at approximately 40 and 20 per cent of 
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beyond supply side technologies to include energy efficiency and demand-side management 
(DSM) technologies, amongst others, to ensure a balance between supply and demand in 
future planning scenarios. 58 
The boundaries of energy planning are, therefore, no longer fixed by the energy sector but by 
the energy system as a whole and the linkages between sectors and with the broader economic 
and social environment (DeOliveira and Girod 1990:53 I). 
Within integrated resource planning, demand-side options are just as important as supply-side 
opions. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has shown that in some cases DSM can 
cut demand by more than 50% (Hirst and Goldman 199 I: 109). In a study conducted by Hill 
(1999:4), it was estimated that the Chinese island of Hainan could shave off as much as 80 per 
cent of its 1992 peak by 2000 by investing in cost-effective DSM programmes. Another study 
employing integrated resource planning by Volpi, Jannuzzi and Gomes (2006) presents the 
view that with more aggressive measures for reducing energy wastage at the production and 
consumption levels and promoting renewable energies, Brazil could reduce its projected 
power demand by 38 per cent by 2020 avoiding 74.6 GW of installed capacity and saving 
US$15 billion.59 
2.4.1.2 Why the Promise of Integrated Planning Fell Short of its Potential 
Before power sector reforms were initiated in developing countries few African countries 
included IRP in a rigorous way in power sector planning or even used it as a means to 
compare supply and demand side options. Although many developing countries have 
industrial and residential tariffs, respectively. In this regard plant location, technology and fuel choices 
have become ever more important in generation investment decisions (Hirst and Goldman 1991 :98). 
58 Put differently, the goal of IRP is to match the supply of energy service to the demand of energy 
services while trying to minimise the quantities and the costs of both. Thus if building additional 
generation capacity is more expensive than meeting the demand for energy by improving energy 
efficiency, then energy efficiency improvements should be selected as the resource to achieve the 
objective of least-cost. Through 1RP therefore the difference between supply and demand could be 
reduced and, more importantly, it could be reduced more cost effectively (D'Sa 2005:3). 
59 This equates to a saving of 293TWh. The efficiency programme was estimated to create up to eight 
million new jobs and stabilize Brazil's CO2 emissions to 2004 levels by 2020 (Volpi, Jannuzzi et al. 
2006). 
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legislated and mustered organisational support for energy conservation, these have generally 
not been fully integrated into power sector planning (D'Sa 2005:5). Why is it then that, 
despite IRP holding so much potential to postpone or negate the need for additional 
generation capacity, it did not playa more central role in energy policy and power sector 
planning in developing countries? The reasons are numerous. 
a) Path Dependence 
Traditional rigid master plans developed by utilities and/or energy ministries were 
infrequently updated and lacked the flexibility required for the modern-day contexts in which 
power sectors were evolving. Cost estimates are often outdated and timelines for project 
development unrealistic. With private funding and ownership, long-term economic returns 
needed to make way for shorter-term financial returns (Munasinghe 1990).60 In many cases, 
however, planning failed to contemplate the evolving needs of power sectors in developing 
countries, including those in Africa; instead, utilities reacted to energy shortages by 
contracting stop-gap measures rather than focussing on systematic planning. The electricity 
crises in certain countries were so acute that, understandably, utilities were more concerned 
with dealing with immediate crises rather than long-term planning. However, even when 
power crises were less prevalent, the concept of the traditional one-sided approach was 
dominant and hard to shake off. Decision-making was based on a supply paradigm that 
largely sidelined DSM resources and little real consideration was given to energy efficiency 
as a means to manage the effects of increasing electricity demand and diminishing reserve 
margins. 
b) Preoccupation with Power Sector Reforms 
With power sector liberalisation, it was believed that additional generation capacity would be 
'left to the market' (Reddy 2005:5). Generation planning therefore became a casualty of 
market reforms in Africa. However, wholesale competition was not reached and private 
investment did not take care of capacity expansions, as expected. Power sector reforms aimed 
to transform vertically integrated monopolies into wholesale and retail power markets and 
planning was often overlooked or neglected in the process. While many electricity wholesale 
markets in industrialised countries which were opened to competition have managed to 
maintain adequate investment in generation (lEA 2003:3), the same cannot be said of 
60 While capital costs is a key factor that shapes investment choices, technologies that can be installed 
quickly and operated flexibly in response to market demands have become increasingly attractive to 
power markets (lEA 2003:3). 
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developing countries where reform has stopped short of competitive wholesale markets. The 
emphasis in power sector reform in many developing countries was on unbundling and 
advancing regulatory frameworks in preparation for the new market. Dealing with difficult 
ownership transfers. complaints from agitated consumers and objections from discontented 
labour unions consumed the focus of those in authority, to the exclusion of what were 
considered longer term issues. including planning (D'Sa 2005:7).61 
c) Poor Illstitutiollal Co-ordillatiol1 
Poor institutional arrangements have also inhibited an integrated planning approach to 
electricity. Often commitment from senior government officials was lacking and there were 
rarely institutional vehicles well resourced to take the lead in lRP. Ministry departments or 
agencies able to influence demand-side factors often operated in isolation from those 
responsible for supply side capacity planning. D'Sa (2005:7) notes that in India, for example, 
the Ministry of Power was distinct from the Ministry of Non-conventional Sources of Energy 
and that these two entities did not draw up integrated energy plans. Hence programmes were 
planned and implemented independent of each other and there was little co-ordination 
between supply and demand programmes. [n many post reformed power sectors, the planning 
function is either neglected or is shifted from the national power utility to the Energy 
Ministry. which often does not have the capacity to undertake the function adequately. 
Confusion sets in as to who is finally responsible for ensuring that the lights stay on: the old 
state-owned utility, government or [PPs? Without explicit allocation of planning 
responsibilities and functions, there is no proper co-ordination and each entity is generally 
more concerned with its own narrow objectives than integration for overall development of 
the power sector. 
d) Questionable Suitability amI Lack of Resources 
A belief that was widely held was that [RP would only be useful for developed energy 
systems in the most industrialised countries where the data. finance, management and skills 
existed to use it properly (Munasinghe 1990:445). De Oliviera and Girod (1990:529) argued 
that developing countries have politicaL financial, social and economic conditions that are 
distinct from those in industrial countries and, therefore, need different methods of energy 
61 It would also appear that corporatisation and privatisation would lessen the need for IRP for utilities 
since strategic plans of utilities would be more inclined to deal with narrow shareholder-informed 
objectives than with the overall benefits of the energy system or even society. Investors would 
therefore have been unlikely to consider externalities and other benefits that accrue to society if it 
potentially decreased their own profits (D'Sa 2005:7). 
65 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
planning.62 Even standard capacity expansion models used in industrialised countries were 
considered ill-equipped to model and compare developing country risks between various 
projects and generating technologies (Andrews 1995). As a result, demand forecasts in 
developing countries could be out by far. During the development of India's Dabhol IPP, for 
example, the growth in electricity demand was projected to be 18 per cent. In reality, the 
actual demand turned out to be 5.1 per cent (Woodhouse 2005c:75-77; Lamb 2006:51). 
Moreover, many developing countries lacked the skills, management and finance to use 
complex computer-simulated generation planning programmes and techniques properly 
(Munasinghe 1990). In many cases, utilities continued to face severe financial pressure 
leading to inadequate resources being available for energy efficiency and generation planning, 
let alone IRP, which was seen as elaborate and a nice-to-have. Integrated resource planning is 
rather information intensive and energy ministries in many developing countries rarely had 
the required information to use as inputs to make quality IRP decisions. 6J 
In many cases, planning was limited to indicative planning and failed to include financial, 
legal, and environmental aspects of generation development. In these cases, although planning 
appeared adequate on paper, it failed to anticipate the challenges experienced in securing 
financial resources, equitably allocating project risk and contingent liabilities, evaluating 
environmental constraints to project development, and assessing the security of fuel supply. 
62 Developing countries have heterogeneous societies (in comparison to industrialised countries where 
societies are more homogenous) which make patterns of energy consumption difficult to link to groups 
of consumers. In addition, energy systems are in many ways still under construction in developing 
countries making forecasting trickier (DeOliveira and Girod 1990:534). Demand forecasting due to 
access expansion and demand growth investment decisions is often more uncertain than supply-side 
investment uncertainty. Planners and policy makers often did not have a firm handle on the factors that 
impact on growth and patterns in energy demand in order to make credible demand projections and 
respond to these with appropriate demand and supply-side management policies. 
63 IRP is resource intensive because the process is dynamic. This is not only because changes in 
demand and supply are evolutionary, but because of DSM programmes and supply side alternatives 
have feedback effects which impact on the process of selecting future planning strategies (Hill 1999). 
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2.4.2 PO'Hr Plant Procurl'lIll'nI in lIybrid l\Iarkets 
following 01' trom the difti culties ,,'Sociatod \\ illl pla"ni'~~. del":, i" pmclJring new 
gc"cration caPi','ily "I", aggra\ialC ]XobieIn' nr iJ""fiIcienl cap"cit~, Often. as 1'",1 of plmer 
sector ,etorms, rcsp'lIlsih ilili c, for procuremcnt haw , ll iflCd fmm lJ lililic, 10 min i'lric, (or 
'claled ag""cic,) \',ilh lillie OT nO experience in Ihi , "Tea. Many gownunen!> I"ce ,eTiUlLS 
delici\s in the in,titulion"1 c"pcrti,c "nd c"p"cily nccc,,",y 10 im plemcnl pri\i"IC g"ncmlion 
inlb,trllctll," pToject" Whi l" they may be proticient in teelmical "_peets of infrastructure 
pmjecl>, civil ,cn'aLlts oflcn lack faLllili",il: ",jlh I,"","cl in", in projecl fin"'lCc and in Ihc 
complex leg"li tie, of "I"boraie BOOT inve'tInents (Sader 2()OO,J2), Generation iLlt,"struetme 
prOClLreInell1 tOlICheS on a numl"" oC aspects "hicil, if "Ol opcimally i mr!clncnl ed, can I cad 10 
problem, <UKi dela~s in conmlC'ting additioJwl c"p"cily, A Llumher of Ihe,e a,pects are 
dc,c,ihed hc ln\\', 
II) (il/l(rI1c(ing GOIwnllllee 
Thc in\roduClio" o C IP~, ,ahc, quC"""" "!eh ",: Ho\\' ,hou ld Ihe pr(>(;c" oC "ddi ng 
generation capacity be "mmged".' ShOl.lld compel iti ," bidd i Llg processes grm,t JPP, the ri ght to 
co"'pcle for a ll futllre gencmlion';' \Vf>Iol dcci,inn-m"~ing pax'e"", n" proc uring gencTmion 
caJl',cit~ should be llSed in the long nm"! (RosemaLl aoo 'I-1alhutra I'l')(,), In Ahic". tllere i, 
liltl" e\iidencc nr de"T m,d Irml']Xuenl ",ileri" for the "1Iox"tion of new-h uild npP"rl'H,ilie, 
"Illongst ,t2fe -o","ed utilitie, and IP P, . and contracting decision, and policie, ofteLl lack 
'" flicienl gowen,"m'e Jnechm,i'In', rlw "b>en"e of "ertainl: and ""llSp"rency teJ~1s to re,"1i 
in lengthy aoo coniilSiLlg negl>lim iolls that delay projecl development. In add itiu n. many 
cnunlri C, in 1\ frica bck i'KlepeJ~leJ1l mnniln ring hodie, In ]X,wide o.ersight of ]XocuTCmeJ1l 
""Ii\' it ies. In ("hana, I'm e:>..ampl e, while all iLldepeooelll procuremell1 agellC~ exi,ts 
'pecifically for this plLrpuse. the urgency of getting puwe r geLleratioLl facilit i", develo ped in 
an cnvi"",mcnl nf dlronic cicC lri cil: ,h("I"ge, appears In ha." cxempted Ill" p'mcr ,cel,,' 
trom adhering to the natiollal pfuClu'ement pulleies of the couLllry' , Pllblic ProcuremeLli 
lluil.leil}, 
b) Pmcurcmcm Wwknc."'c.' 
~Iajor weaknesses, otien seeLl in ,tme proc urement systems, cont ri bute to delay, in a","rding 
co ntracts aoo "" ,,-compliance \\ith ru lcs and fegulations. Vague gllidc l,n c" roOf 1ll0<1 itofing. 
v.cak in,lillllio,,"1 'UppOri. "'KI in"de(lu"l" kJlov.led!;e and ,kills h""" e.~",'crh"lCd Ih ",c 
delay" Due to lime 'tLld Cl>st OHm",s, the procmement 'ystem is otten 'ie\\ed as an <.>bstacle 
to CLlsuring thc timely co<l1racting of gC'lCration capacity (l.iyan"gc 200-".10) , Figure 2,] 
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['>f0\ ide, an e,ample of the timetin" of [PI' contracting from project ('on('ep lua[i,ation lLntil 
closure of the deal. A, il l ",tM,·,L wilh opti "1« [ ,onlracl ing p,-ooe"es. il can t" ke between 1 8 
aT.l 24 months for til e eontr~cti',!! partie; to ,,",('to agl''ClllCni. \Vith "eal or ya!;lIe ('011lmcting 
pr()("'>SC" ,",d, pha,e holels the 1~"em i~1 h )f' deb). \"..-hen {he ~U!horil, over the electr icity 
investment i, .,bared by so many cOllStinl<'lX'lc' mxl govcmrTl<'nl departlllC'lm. reg,, [mor} 
'y,tcms ollen b i[ 10 'e"ore public ,Ol1Sen{ ear ly enough for 'i{ in ~ [lOwer rbllg (1ll. jlCr 
[ ~87; ] IX12). "'~e nci ", oneil operate in i,o lation "hieh TIIcam Ihal good r,'gLiia lo<)' i11le11l ion, 
01lell trall, [al .· 10 i[[ -lim.·d or Je[a,ed decisions. \l,'hen prclCe<se, ~re tlOt wi Jely ~gr"eJ on by 
var iou, swkelwlders in the contracting pnl<:c>s ex mOl". Jelay, rnay b.· cxpcTien ,ed durin!; II .. • 
prOC LIrerTl<'nlpro,e,,-''' 
, " ... ,," 
r ; ~" " •• "" 
,.J ... " •• 
!'{{ ,~{ 1 
,."-,, .. 
"_f'· ... " 
'--' ~,."b, 
",,;~., ... 
''','f"", ,, 
, .. ~"" ' •. , 
.,';~." ... 
1 , ~"''"~,, 
, ...... , 
.~ ... ",," 
r; ..... "~" 
J.'~,"", 
hen \\toen th ,'re is "orp[LI, ,"p",ity. illC Ion!:'. leaJ time, before Cl)mmissionirl~ takes pboe 
Ill "ke timel,' decisions e.'''''nti~L Most lar!!e [lowc' marke ts ill thc world are apprDad,illg, or 
are in. a major ilWestrnml C}de as ,,,'p[lI' ,"p",ily l>as heen dep[el ed (I~A 20113:1]), Thi, 
pLlI' p,-essl,,-e on Th e surrl, of [lOwer !\eneration " Ill ipment witil ,on" orig ill" [ C<llliplllent 
rnan"fa,l ll'-c,,' {(H-',M) w"ilin~ tist; eXlending to ~ nllmber ot year, before the required 
equipment c~n be ' lLpp[ied, " nnen. procurcment p[anlling f"iis W ",~ i(' ip"le dc [a}, in the 
~[ ob~1 [lO,,'er equipment 'lLpply market thereby leading to delays in boringing 011 additional 
gcneralion capd,ily ((,aTd ner and Rogers [9')9:1289) In adJition. where !\overnments have 
loca[isatio n re<l"i reillem, am[ nOl ellough prq>amWT} \\0'-' has h,,,," Jorl<' 10 accommodate 
'" ill aJ Ji,ion. the lnngcT Lhe ,ime !ak,'n in con!r",,{illg. Lhe co,{ ii<r iL bcC(){lle, IMollOlu l .. ZU U7l. 
" Ourillg !he year> 0 1' ''''ptu> cap,,,i{}. "'''''y m",wli,d arcn ~f cquipm<Jll "". Iod <low" or d,,,.<l .x, ... ro 
"mJue!i,," ii citi{i," to loe", on lmlim""" J"e a,,(1 c,-""ul{irog ,,, Ii"i{i.s, 
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this in the procurement framework, delays in developing and commissioning generation 
plants may result. 
c) Non-transparent Procurement Processes 
Most power sectors in developing countries started refonns and the introduction of IPPs under 
a single buyer purchasing framework due to its ease of implementation and the minimal 
structural changes required. Although single buyer models have advantages, such as the 
ability to attract private capital under long-term PPAs, they also have potential pitfalls. The 
single buyer framework centralises many of the planning and procurement functions (in itself, 
a positive move). but without adequate governance or transparency: and procurement and 
purchasing arrangements are open to political interference. leading to corruption (Arizu, 
Gencer et al. 2006: 1 0). Africa is not unfamiliar with controversies around government 
spending and many projects have been distressed due to inadequate and non-transparent 
procurement processes employed by government departments and utilities. Although there are 
well-known guidelines for ensuring efficient public procurement - developed by organisations 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, and other multilateral 
organisations - many developing countries do not subject their procurement policies to 
multilateral surveillance or international disciplines (Hoekman 1998:249).66 Non-transparent 
procurement processes allow for bribery of procurement officials and corruption which could 
increase project costs by as much as 50 per cent (Hoekman 1998:255). 
The lack of transparency and risk of corruption are thus significant impediments to efficient 
and timely procurement of infrastructure. (,7 
66 Reasons for this may include intent to discriminate against certain firms; unfamiliarity with the 
multilateral endorsed governance procurement rules; a perception that the potential benefits of adhering 
to these rules are small; or successful opposition from groups that benefit from current practices 
(Hoekman 1998:249). 
67 In Nigeria, with the development of the Enron/ AES Barge IPP, competitive bidding was overlooked 
for a directly negotiated deal. Later, the deal came unstuck and renegotiations carried on for six 
months. Major objections were raised regarding the lack of transparency in procurement, the fact that 
the plant would not be penalised for poor performance, claims that the project company would receive 
excessive contract termination payments, and that these payments could bankrupt national utilities 
(Momodu. Gratwick et al. 2006:13). For Nigeria's second [PP, Okpai, which was also developed from 
a direct negotiation, investment costs rose by roughly 50 per cent between the time of initial 
negotiations and final commissioning of the plant. Among the reasons cited for increased costs was the 
underestimation of the cost for transmission infrastructure. Although the parties were seeking ways to 
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d) Unsolicited Proposals 
In many cases electricity is procured from unsolicited IPP proposals. Proponents often cite 
their possession of intellectual property rights on aspects of project technology as a reason for 
sole source contracting. Others claim that special circumstances around the lack of private 
sector interest, cost efficiency due to the scale, risk profile or location, or uniqueness of 
projects, warrant direct contracting from an unsolicited bid. Still others assert that the 
shortage of power, especially during emergencies, dictates the need to speed up project 
development and bypass lengthy competitive procurement processes. While under certain 
conditions governments may justify direct negotiations on unsolicited proposals, the 
experiences in several countries have shown that sole-source negotiations usually take longer 
to reach closure than originally intended and could delay projects by several years.68 
Prices also escalate as private sponsors adjust their offering to the required specifications -
this could be the case when the purchaser knows little about the technology at the start of the 
project or little is known about the government's requirements by the project sponsor (80S 
and Lulfesmann 1996:53-54). In Indonesia, for example, the negotiations of many unsolicited 
proposals spanned several years with negotiating parties not being able to reach financial 
closure. Negotiations for the Dabhol plant in India continued for nearly a decade when a new 
government cancelled the initial agreement and restructured the deal under different terms 
(Hodges and Dellacha 2007:4). Excessive costs and alleged corruption were cited as the main 
reasons for the Indian government's cancellation of the original Dabhol IPP agreements and 
settle the dispute around the increased costs, the off-taker refused to make full payments for the power 
produced (2006: 15). 
68 The author does not advocate that all procurement should be processed through competitive bidding 
since this may not be in the best interests of governments or developers when projects are complex and 
there are few available bidders. [n the case of complex projects, competitive bidding processes may 
stifle communication between parties involved in procurement leading to the buyer missing out on 
innovative opportunities to save on costs, time and effort (Bajari, McMillan et al. 2003). However, 
where projects use standard technology and development is, by and large, customary, tender 
specifications can be simplified, and, generally, more bidders will drive down price in accordance with 
competition theory (Bettignies and Ross 2004: 148). [n the main, competitively contracted generating 
plants have found their costs to be lower than directly negotiated plants and, irrespective of the contract 
terms, on the whole, competitively contracted plants were found to be less likely to attract adverse 
renegotiations (and delays in reaching closure) than directly negotiated plants (Woodhouse 2005c:65). 
Competitive bidding in [PPs is reported to have reduced PPA charges by as much as 25 per cent 
(Albouy and Bousba 1998:5-6). 
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restarting negotiations which led to a delay of 16 months at a cost of US$175m (Sader 
2000:35).69 Unsolicited proposals which are not channelled through a transparent and 
competitive process often increase perceptions of corruption. Those that have lead to directly 
negotiated deals have resulted in contracts for power projects which were not needed and, in 
addition to attractive terms and high prices for investors, shifted all the major risk to the 
buyer, the host utility government. 
Hodges and Dellacha (2007:vii) advocate that, as a minimum. all unsolicited proposals should 
be channelled through a process where competitors can challenge each others' proposal on 
pre-determined criteria, such as price, with the possibility of winning the tender. A number of 
countries have adopted systems to establish broader sector support for projects by guiding 
unsolicited proposals through a process where competitors have a fair chance of winning the 
tender. One such system is the 'bonus system' where a bonus is awarded to the original 
proponent of the project when the project subsequently goes out on open tender (Hodges 
2003). If. for example. the bonus allocated to the original proponent is 5 per cent, the tender 
will only go to this proponent if his offer is less than 5 per cent above the lowest price 
tendered for the project. The bonus is, therefore, a reward for the preparatory work done in 
the original project proposal. Another popular system for treating unsolicited proposals is the 
Swiss challenge which allows third parties to make counter proposals to that of the original 
promoter. If a third party challenger's bid is found to be more favourable. then the original 
promoter is given another chance to match this. The idea behind the process is to discourage 
opportunism and avoid exaggerated project development costs (Verma 2007). Another similar 
system is known as the 'best and final offer'. Here. the initial promoter does not enjoy the 
advantage of matching the lowest bid, since only one round of tendering is allowed. 
e) Allocation of New Build Opportunities 
In many cases, new build opportunities for the public and private sectors are not based on 
equitable and transparent criteria. While SOEs often maintain that they can build new plants 
cheaper than can the private sector, they often do not provide any financial bases for their 
claims or explain how conditional risks will be allocated. With public investment, the cost of 
power is frequently assessed without taking into account contingent liabilities that are saddled 
on governments. consumers and tax payers. In many cases, single buyers are the incumbent 
('9 In retrospect. many government officials in India questioned the decision to use direct negotiation 
with the objective of speeding up the development of the project. The PPA terms were unbalanced in 
favour of investors and the host country payment obligations were viewed as exploitative by the public 
and not sustainable (Lamb 2006:39-40). 
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SOEs who can block potential private investments in generation by discriminating against 
them with respect to transmission access. With only one wholesale buyer, the creation of 
flexible off-taker agreements has proved to be difficult when SOE utilities have not allowed 
potential IPPs to supply power to existing customers. Rules for the dispatching of power 
stations are developed by SOE utilities, which are also the transmission system operators. 
Under single buyer arrangements, therefore, SOE utilities have a conflict of interest which 
concerns investors contemplating entering the market. Given the flexibility required for 
progressing future market development, investors have also been concerned about the 
certainty of their long-term PPAs (Eberhard and Kapika 2008). 
In summary, delays in contracting new generation plant due to inadequate planning prolong 
the immediate inconvenience of insufficient capacity. Similarly, deficient procurement 
frameworks often lead to delays and, in an environment of non-transparency, they are subject 
to corruption. Prospective investors and lenders are wary of making investments in countries 
where such problems exist, or they add significant premiums to compensate for the increase 
in the perceived risks. Experiences or perceptions of corruption make it more difficult for 
countries to attract investment for future generation projects thereby exacerbating the 
challenges of dealing with shortages in generation capacity. Lastly, in many cases, purchasing 
arrangements have allowed state-owned utilities to frustrate investment by the private sector. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has contributed to the development of a useful framework for analysing 
emergent hybrid power markets in Africa with a specific focus on the extent to which these 
markets have created new challenges to attracting investment in generation capacity. The 
framework rests critically on the recognition of four important insights. 
Firstly, power sector reform in Africa came about largely as a result of dissatisfaction among 
many power sector stakeholders with the functioning of national utilities and their poor 
performances under state ownership. Prompted mainly by development finance institutions 
such as the World Bank, power sector reform was initiated out of a desire to improve 
performance and attract sufficient resources for expansion in order to meet and sustain 
development goals. The standard model of reform involved unbundling, privatisation and 
competition. Yet, as we have shown, the standard reform model has not been fully 
implemented in Africa or other emerging economies. While IPPs have been introduced, 
incumbent SOEs have often retained their dominant market position. What has emerged in 
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practice is a hybrid power market which has profound implications for new investment in 
generation capacity. The theory and experience of power sector reform, therefore, frames the 
broader context for the empirical analysis in this thesis. 
Secondly, the role of SOEs in hybrid power markets and in securing additional generation 
capacity remains seminal. Sometimes they may continue to invest directly in new generation. 
Alternatively, they are off-takers for IPPs. The perfonnance of SOE utilities is thus critical. 
But as a result of the social and development role that electricity has played, and continues to 
play. power utility SOEs have become politicised and their complex relationships with 
governments have made it difficult to transform them. Although reforms have brought new 
institutional arrangements, regulatory frameworks and changes in functional responsibilities 
which affect SOEs, improving their performance remains a difficult challenge. These 
contextual factors have important explanatory power in helping to elucidate how and why the 
functioning of SOEs is closely linked to problems of insufficient investment. 
Thirdly. sponsors of private producers of power, as the latest entrants in African hybrid 
markets. have investment expectations. The degree to which these expectations can be met 
largely determines the country's ability to attract and sustain investment through IPPs. The 
challenges in attracting private generation investment in evolving power sectors as outlined in 
this chapter serve as an additional background for understanding and analysing the problems 
of insufficient investment in generation capacity.70 
Lastly. the dynamics of hybrid power markets present new challenges that unless explicitly 
addressed will frustrate attempts to bring in new power investments. Planning functions can 
be neglected. Weak linkages between generation planning and procurement of power plants 
can result in delaying the commissioning of power stations and. thus, the provision of 
electricity services to consumers. Under certain conditions, contracting arrangements hold the 
potential to discourage investment in generation infrastructure, instead of facilitating it. The 
responsibilities and functions of power sector planning. procurement and contracting need to 
be explicitly assigned in hybrid power markets and sufficient capacity needs to be developed 
to undertake these effectively. 
70 This thesis does not consider investment theories or theory on FDI but, rather, jumps straight to the 
issues that are immediately related to generation investments in reforming power sectors in Africa 
where investment conditions are generally less than favourable. 
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The analytical framework developed through this chapter is relevant for examining challenges 
in attracting investment in generation and addressing the research questions posed in Chapter 
I. This analytical framework will be revisited again in Chapter 7 in considering how the 
analysis of the data in the empirical chapters provides new insights and might enable further 
extension of these frameworks and a deeper understanding of how future reforms may be 
directed to increase investment in generation in hybrid electricity markets in developing 
counties. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POWER SECTOR REFORM IN GHANA 
In the case of Ghana. the ambition of transforming the ESI according to the standard reform 
model has not been realised and in the absence of a competitive market arrangement. the 
institutional and governance /i-ameworks have proved to be inadequate for the single buyer 
arrangement in the hybrid model that has since emerged. More than a decade afier power 
sector reforms were instituted in Ghana. the country has been unable to transform its power 
sector to deal with challenges of insufficient generation capacity and power blackouts. 
Reforms prompted the establishment of new institutions to usher in a new era (~f power sector 
development; and various functions in the power sector were re-assigned to institutions in 
accordance with the reform agenda. One such/imction was that (~f planning. originally vested 
with the state-owned utility. As part of the reorganisation process. this function was 
transferred to a new agency responsible for long-term planning. While the agency took 
responsibility for indicative planning. it did not take responsibility for detailed planning or 
for the procurement and contracting functions previously performed by the state-owned 
utility. 
Inadequate procurement /i-mneworks contributed to the problems of insufficient capacity 
since processes for procurement and contracting have been vague. Where attempts were 
made to improve procurement policies. these processes were not always adhered to. even in 
cases where the state administered the process. Regulatory and governance /i-ameworks have 
been ill equipped to provide adequate oversight with respect to generation planning and 
procurement. and therefore unable to guide the power sector towards its rej(mn objectives. 
Although the Ministry of Energy has attempted to facilitate the development of additional 
capacity. inconsistencies in the application of the country's stated preferred procurement 
process have resulted in project delays and cancellations. Political intelference and the 
government's reneging on its previous commitments to the sector. especially with regard to 
tariff setting. have also contributed to a lack of credibility in the processes and institutions in 
the ESJ. In addition. Not only have regulatory institutions been undermined in the execution 
of their tasks. but institutional coordination aimed atfacilitating investment in generation and 
respond to the challenges of capacity shortages in the hybrid market. has been lacking. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Power sector reforms in Ghana formed part of a larger Structural Adjustment Programme, 
which was prompted by the World Bank and the IMF, to stabilise the Ghanaian economy. In 
return for financial aid to put the country on the road to recovery, Ghana agreed to institute a 
series of Structural Adjustment Programmes with the objectives of adopting market-driven 
policies and reducing the role of government in the economy. With power production playing 
a central part in the economy, as was the case with many developing countries, the Ghanaian 
electricity industry and its associated institutions were included in the portfolio of economic 
sectors that were due for reform and private investment. With insufficient public finance to 
fund generation capacity expansions, private sector participation was seen as crucial. 
This chapter describes and assesses Ghana's experience of attracting generation investment 
into its ESI. It evaluates, in detail, the development of the only large-scale greenfield 
independent power project (IPP) operational in Ghana by 2008. It also briefly describes other 
generation projects that have been planned and negotiated but never came to fruition. By 
evaluating these projects, this chapter helps to show how various issues in the power sector 
aggregated to create conditions that were not conducive for new power generation 
investments. 
The chapter is structured into five main parts. Immediately following this brief introduction, 
the next second section provides a description of the power sector in Ghana. The third section 
describes sector reforms that were planned and implemented. The fourth section describes the 
development of Takoradi II, the country's first large scale IPP. Finally, the last section 
discusses some of the key elements that frustrated investment into new generation capacity. 
The information presented in this chapter draws mainly on detailed interviews with key 
stakeholders during a country visit in 2007. Interviews were subsequently followed by email 
correspondence to clarify discussion points in 2007 and 2008. Stakeholder interviews 
included representatives from the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Volta River Authority, 
Energy Company of Ghana, Ghana Energy Foundation, Consumer Michigan Services (CMS), 
the Energy Commission, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, the World Bank, as 
well as a number of unaffiliated industry professionals from non-governmental organisations 
and academia. Throughout the text, stakeholders have not been identified by name but by 
organizational affiliation. 
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3.2 The Ghanaia n I'ower Secto r: l'ast and l' rcsrn t 
Thi, >ccli"" .,;ivcs a brief ,Ic,c,iplion of I he I :SI in Gh,ma and I he in"ilul iona l conle,t "hid, 
,ets the background tOr [Xl" er ","ctor rotOrlll alld th~ imrodllction of [pr.. 
3.2. 1 Generation 
As ~arl) "S 1915. [he Volta Ri,~r was identifi ed as a r~,ource 1o proollc,' hydroelectricity. 
which ,",OLLI<1. i" ILlm. hell} 'pu, irl(h"I,iali<;alinn, [)ev . lnl,,"~m nf th. '.'OlH". wa, made 
more I ikely with the disco,.,") of bauxil. alXl lhe potenti"1 for alumini lim pnxiliction which 
'e'lui'e> large alllOunl' 0 f che~p elect,icity. ~ urlhe, ,1",1 ic; i" the 1 9SOS 'epn". d fJvnurahly 
on the Prosl",ct' of the hydro ge ll erat ion facility and an al ll lll illi um il1dustr:),. It wou ld. 
tKl',,"' er. take another decade befme work on lhe Voila Iti"er would comlT,ence. 
The Volta River AmllOfity (VRA) wa, e,tabli,hed followil1g the Voila Riwr Dev"lopment 
IIcl (llel 46 nfthe f{epublic nfGhana) in 1961 (VRA 200n) , Wnrk hega" 500n tI"" . ati . r on 
the Volta Ri,er dJm and the VRA's fi,,1 h)druelectric station "t Akosombo "'a, 
cOHllTlissioned ill 1%5. wilh tw" ";CJlCmlnf\ totalling 294M'll-', Two mMe unit; we'e 
Cnllll}ieted ill 196n to bring th o total capacit} to 588MW ny 1972 two additionailinit' witll a 
com bi "",J capacity of n4M W were comm i"k"""J to b,ill"; Ihe 10lal ""racit} of IIko<,(]lll bo In 
912)1.IW. Thi; w~s lat . , upgraded to IO"O~ I W The Kpong hydroelectr ic l"ojeC! followed in 
19H2. a<;kJing anOlhe, 1 (,()MW (V RII :(06)." 
In 1983 alXl 1984. drollght caused daln levels to decr,,"se to" point where daily load·shedding 
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rl~"ro J. I , F.lo<trld,y 1'"",I"nlo" from 1I )'dro ",, " TI"·"".I1>o ,, ,«. I" Gh~n " 
ilg"in. ill 1'1')8, low ""illli,ll imp"cled l ile COU llt,}. whe n !i<o AkOfoOmbo dnm I<:vd te ll I<l 
2]7,5 leet compared 10 a minimum operat ing 1<:,,1 of 241) tCc'I. Frequcm lo"'l -sheddin~ 
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.,upp ly [X"r day. A., ililistraled in rigure 3. 1. the etiects of!l", drollght ,,<:rc not ,IS 'ignili"mt 
a' thai of 19K, al>:1 WC,", ill pnrt, cu, hio"ed by Ta'o radi 1 ami "apacity I'rom the emergenc}' 
diesel o[X"rated g,neralor .,,,1, pro<:ured by the M i l1istt)' 0/ Mines ,,,,d Energy, "hid, c''''' c on 
liflt at tl'" lime, The la,'k o/rail1 "'il, fIOt, however. Ih" onl}' cXrl''''''l ioll tor II", I~~S power 
,I~lrlag,-", Vall Edig (2(~JO) " ','gc,h Ihal lo" lari n', "dminislered b, the gowrnm"l11 ,,,,,,It,,,1 
ill inadeqllate resources to hmd add itional 1()I1~-term i,westmcill all<i thai iI, i, w", a key 
lmd,,'lying ,"a,on I'or It.<: da i Iy 1{~,d'3"c(kling, 
In 2(~JO. Ihe counlry- , lirsl 11'1'. Takor,kli In len~"\ti o l1a 1 Com pal1, (TICO). ,,1'0 rcfe"",l lo as 
Takomdi II. ,"JnlC onlil"'. li"lhe" hol'te"illg 1he co" nlry', gCllcralion po1<:nli,,1. \,'hile Ihe 
(k,ign ""Kk proYi'ioll lor" combined ~ydc plant il wa, col1strllctcd inili"lI}, ," " ,implc 
cycle nO\1W pbn!. 
In 2006 and 2IK)7, Uhun" filUlXI itsdl' ill It.<: midst or JfIOthcr po"cr crisis_ pn"l} d"" 10 
reduced hydro ge l1e"'tion, lad of inyes tmen!, aim" ,ignific,mt ;nc"en,e in ekC It'i ,;ly dcmand. 
Lhe We" .'I.lii,,," Gas Pipdi llC (W,-\liP) , Oth<T portlle"" are (,hHm" T"OC0 (16,7 I"" COlli), 11", 
,,'i gcrian -.alio"a l Pclrokum Curporation (25 1"" cent), Sh <1I I I R per .oem). ~o l \oG", (2 1"''' ceOI) "ml 
S~TO·G"L (2 per ce,,1) lElA c<):):l). 
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which has been driven by buoyant economic growth. 73 Thus, despite the thermal 
complementation, hydro still remains dominant in Ghana's capacity mix, as depicted in 
Table 3. I below. 
Table 3.1: Ghana Installed Power Generation Capacity (2008) 
Plant Type Owner Installed MW 
Akosombo Hydro VRA 1020 
Kpong Hydro VRA 160 
Tema74 Thermal VRA 30 
Takoradi I Thermal VRA 330 
Takoradi II Thermal CMS 75 90%, VRA 10% 220 
3.2.2 Revived and Stillborn Plants 
It is important to note that a number of other privately financed power projects, mostly (but 
not exclusively) thermal generation plants, have been considered over the last decade, but 
none had come to fruition. Brief descriptions of these projects are presented below. 
0) Bui 
The Bui hydro project was initiated as far back as 1966 when a Russian consortium working 
on the development was forced to leave Ghana as a result of the coup in 1966 that ousted the 
country's first president after Ghana's independence. The project was reappraised several 
times in the three decades that followed, but it was the recent power crises that spurred on the 
Government of Ghana to once again pursue it with a greater sense of urgency. In 2005, the 
Government of Ghana signed a memorandum of understanding with Sino Hydro, a Chinese 
construction company, to undertake the construction of the Bui dam at a cost of US$500m. 
This 400MW plant is now fully back on the agenda and construction started by the end of 
2007 (The Statesman 2007) with completion scheduled for 20 I 2 (Adda 2007). 
n Power cuts to mitigate the imbalance between supply and demand started in August 2006 and 
continued for about one year. 
74 The VRA has a 30MW diesel station in Tema. The Tema plant was installed between 1961 and 1963, 
and ran continuously until 1966. Thereafter, it was used on standby until 1979. The station has been 
operated as a contingency plant since then (Energy Commission 2005). 
75 CMS sold its share in Takoradi " to the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company (TAQA) in 2007. 
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b) Osagyefo / Western Power 
Another project that has been resurrected is the Osagyefo barge or Mangyea Project, better 
known as the Western Power [PP - two units, supplied by Ansaldo Energia of Italy, with a 
combined capacity of 138MW. This IPP was planned by the Ghana National Petroleum 
Company (GNPC). Mainly charged with the management of petroleum imports and 
exploration, the GNPC embarked on plans to generate power as an IPP (Turkson and Amadu 
1999:25). The CEO was well connected to the erstwhile president and as a result had 
considerable leeway in the management of the company. The corporation soon branched out 
into other business areas such as salt and mining (KNUST pers. com. 2007). It then turned to 
power generation and kick-started the Western Power Project when off-shore gas was found 
in the western part of Ghana. The Japan Bank for Internationa[ Cooperation agreed to finance 
the barge but the project stalled when assurances could not be obtained for the development 
of the gas infrastructure to exploit the gas fields. 76 With the inauguration of a new president in 
2000 and the subsequent selling off of ailing state-owned enterprises, many subsidiaries of the 
Ghana Nationa[ Petroleum Company were closed down (including the Western Power 
Project). Relocation of the plant on-shore to Tema in order to use gas from the WAGP when 
this becomes available was considered, but the idea was shelved and the government went 
back to the original plan to install the plant at Effasu (where there is still no gas infrastructure 
available) (Energy Commission pers. com. 2007). [n July 2007 the Government of Ghana 
signed a PPA with Balkan Energy of the US to make the barge operational and run it on diesel 
until gas becomes available (Ministry of Energy 2007).77 
c) SIIF Accra 
Yet another project that did not come to fruition was that of the SIIF Ghana, an 80 MW 
thermal plant negotiated during the drought of 1998 (Heath Lambert Group 2002). By the 
76 It was calculated that the life span of the Tano oil fields (15 years), which was to fire the barge, was 
too short to make the initiative viable. The transmission lines that would have transmitted the power 
from the barge had however been constructed, including two large substations. Available information 
indicates that when the barge arrived in Ghana, the access to the pond was not large enough for the 
barge to be towed. Although an inter-ministerial committee was set up to investigate other possible 
sources of fuel to operate the plant, the final verdict was that the preferred fuel would not be available 
at the right price and within the given timeframes to operate the plant, and that diesel would be the only 
alternative (The Chronicle 2005; Ministry of Energy 2007). 
77 The first phase of the barge was reportedly completed and operational by the last quarter of 2008 
(Reuters 2008). The second phase, scheduled to start in 2009, was the expansion of the existing 125 
MW simple cycle plant to a combined cycle plant (Balkan Energy 2008). 
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time that the project agreements between the developers and the Ghanaian government were 
signed, dam levels had stabilised, but were still considered low. Construction of the plant was 
well underway when weather conditions improved and dam levels recovered. When the 
government announced that it would no longer buy the power as agreed, a dispute was 
declared and the case went for international arbitration. The plant was eventually removed 
and sold to Togo. 
eI) AES Sirocco 
AES Sirocco Limited sought to develop a 300MW thermal IPP in Tema. The VRA would be 
the off-taker and have a small shareholding in the project. The project was indefinitely stalled 
when a bill was tabled in Parliament with the intention of prohibiting the VRA from acquiring 
equity stakes in any more thermal projects. 78 In addition, AES took on a much more cautious 
approach to financing new power plant investments following the collapse of Enron and the 
subsequent financial difficulties experienced in the international power trading industry in 
200 I and 2002 (ECA, 2003). 
e) AsltantilKMR 
In 1998, Ashanti Goldfields also promoted the development of a 300MW thermal plant with 
KMR.79 Serving Ashanti's mines as well as a few other mines would be the primary purpose 
of the plant. The remaining capacity, which could reach up to 50 per cent depending on the 
mines' load profiles, would then be available for other customers or sold to the grid. In 
addition to the provision of a 15-year PPA, Ashanti would have carried the risk of selling 
power onto other mines. KMR which would take on 80 per cent of the project equity (Ashanti 
would retain the remaining 20 per cent) was reportedly keen to proceed with the project on a 
15 per cent rate of return. Ashanti which hoped to achieve an electricity tariff of 4c/kWh once 
gas from the West African Gas Pipeline became available, needed to achieve this rate 
inclusive of transmission charges, but at the time the VRA demanded 1.5c/kWh for 
transmitting the power. The VRA justified these charges through a revaluation methodology 
of their assets which Ashanti disputed, mainly on the treatment of inflation in this new 
methodology. When Ashanti was told that they would not be permitted to sell to any existing 
VRA customers and that the proposed buy-back rate would be 2c/kWh for the surplus energy 
of the project. the project was halted. Although they examined the options of developing the 
78 After much debate, the proposed bill was eventually scrapped. 
7'1 KMR was bought out by AES in 200 I. 
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plant in - and importing from - Cote d'Ivoire or locating the plant in neighbouring Benin, 
Ashanti still faced the bane of wheeling charges from the VRA (ECA, 2003). 
j) Aggreko and Cummins 
Two other plants were also negotiated through a rental system to plug the immediate power 
shortages during the drought of 1998. They were those of Aggreko which entered into an 18-
month contract with the Government of Ghana to supply 30MW at Tema, and Cummins 
which entered into a similar 24-month contract with the government. While Aggreko did 
supply power, it was only after the power crisis that Cummins Power Generation was fully 
operational. Already having signed the PPA, and despite no longer needing the power, the 
government was invoiced for the power in accordance with the take-or-pay agreement. By 
mid-2007, eight years after the drought, a legal battle was still pending in London with the 
Government of Ghana to settle a mounting debt of approximately US$20m to Cummins 
which was signed under the previous regime. The former Minister of Mines and Energy, 
Joseph Kofi Adda, in his speech to parliament in June 2007 also mentioned three additional 
power companies who had contracted with the government for private power production and 
later sued for damages despite not having generated any power; Global Aero Design 
Company, Stone and Webster and Faroe Atlantic Company. In the case of Faroe Atlantic 
Company from the UK, the Ghanaian government entered into a PPA with the firm to provide 
additional capacity. Although the Ministry of Finance represented the Ghanaian government 
in the deal, internal parliamentary approval had not been sought by the Ministry of Finance, 
despite this being a requirement for such large-scale projects. On Faroe's court action, the 
High Court first ruled in Faroe's favour the sum of US$6.3m plus interest. The government 
then appealed, but the case was dismissed by the Appeals Court leaving the government with 
the bill for damages. But when the government appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis of 
the legality of the transaction, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the government based on 
its obligation to uphold the constitution (and the laws of the country). The Supreme Court 
ruled that the agreement was unenforceable due to lack of mandatory parliamentary approval 
and concluded that the absence of parliamentary approval rendered the contract null and void 
(Oxford and Beaumont 2006). 
In summary, a number of plants have been planned and negotiated over the years; while some 
have been developed to completion without generating electricity onto the grid, others are 
again on the agenda and in the development stages despite these projects having been initiated 
a long time ago. 
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3.2.3 Future Plants 
Looking forward towards 2020, Ghana's Strategic National Energy Plan (2006) estimates that 
the country will need an additional 2000 MW of generation capacity, based on a moderate 
economic growth projection. This demand projection increases to well over 2500 MW of 
additional capacity for a high economic growth scenario (Energy Commission 2005:8). It is 
almost certain that private participation in the power sector will continue, in line with 
government and World Bank policy. The need for a favourable investment climate to attract 
and facilitate private power procurement should not be understated and will remain a 
challenge for the country at least in the medium term. 
According to the Ministry of Energy, as per Ghana's Strategic National Energy Plan (2006), 
plans are also in place to convert Takoradi II to a combined cycle plant in 2009 (African 
Energy 2007). As it currently stands, the plant would have to be taken out of service to 
complete the steam phase. With the current power crisis, more capacity would first have to 
come on line to avoid large scale blackouts. However, an EPC request that was put on tender 
expired without stakeholders reaching agreement on the terms (CMS pers.com. 2007).80 
Despite an EPC which was subject to an open tender bid, the government still believed that 
the charges asked from CMS were too high and the security arrangements demanded were too 
stringent. In 2003 it was estimated that the additional steam cycle would cost a further 
US$140m CECA 2003). By 2007 the steam cycle phase was estimated at US$2l5m for an 
additional Il0MW (Adda 2007). [n spite of costs having inflated over the years, the 
additional efficiency and the debt financing would still result in lower electricity tariffs. 
Apart from Ghana's existing thermal plants, much has been riding on the expectation of the 
long awaited WAGP from Nigeria in terms of future capacity expansions. According to the 
Ministry of Energy, there are a number of independent power projects in the pipeline. Of the 
remaining half dozen projects that are planned for development, the soonest to come on line 
may be the Kpone [PP, a project company made up of a consortium of local and international 
partners (CenPower, and [nfraco and Reltub). The 400MW, gas fired, combined cycle power 
plant will be located in the municipality of Kpone within the Tema industrial zone and will 
become one of the main off-takers of the WAGP (Evans, 2007). With a construction time of 
two years the US$300m project, which is designed for at least 25 years of operation, is 
80 The EPe bid process favoured Black and Veatch. 
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scheduled to commence commercial operations in 2009, depending on progress with the gas 
pipeline (CenPower pers. com. 2007; InfraCo 2007). 
An IPP company had also been registered to develop the Osonor Thermal Plant late in 2007. 
This development was planned to be a joint venture between the VRA and Tema Osonor 
Plant Limited (TOPL). The VRA would install a combustion turbine to generate electricity. 
Together with the combustion turbine of TOPL, the overall strategic plan was to develop a 
combined steam cycle using the exhaust gases from the two plants which are planned to be 
located on the same site (AtDB 2007). 
In april 2008, sunon asogli power limited (ghana) was founded by a chinese company, 
shenzhen energy investments co. Ltd, and the china-africa development fund, to develop a 
combined cycle power plant in the tema region (China Daily 2008). The plant was expected to 
have an installed capacity of 560mw and construction was scheduled to start late in 2008. 
Although there are a number of plants in the pipeline, past experience has shown that ghana 
has a history of negotiating and even developing some plants that do not come to fruition. The 
number of negotiations ongoing suggests that ghana aims to maximise their chances of 
securing investment. This approach, however, risks having inadequate focus and insufficient 
deliberation on individual projects by sector stakeholders within a broader capacity expansion 
context. It may be more beneficial to focus on only one or two projects and, in so doing, 
maximise the chances of project success. Also while some sponsors are negotiating with the 
vra, others are in talks with the electricity corporation of ghana (ecg), and still others are 
consulting directly with the ministry of energy. The silo effect risks a lack of coherence in 
implementing sound strategies in procuring generation. At this stage, the official process to 
procure generation within ghana is unclear with a number of informal processes available for 
prospective project sponsors (World Bank pers. com. 2007). 
3.2.4 Transmission and Distribution 
At the time of Ghana's independence in 1957 the public sector, through the Electricity 
Department operating under the Minister of Public Works, assumed responsibility for 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution. In 1967, the Electricity Corporation of 
Ghana (ECG) was established to replace the Electricity Department. The ECG was charged 
with the procurement of bulk electricity and its distribution to all consumers throughout the 
country. 
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Over the years, however, the ECG became weighed down with substandard service levels, 
poor financial performance, labour disputes, and disruptions at a senior level in the 
organisation. Eventually, the government decided that the ECG should focus on resolving its 
organizational problems and that the vRA should take over the distribution of electricity in 
the four northern regions. Through its subsidiary, the Northern Electricity Department (NED), 
established in 1987, the vRA assumed responsibility for power distribution in Brong-Ahafo, 
Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions. In southern Ghana, viz. Ashanti, Central, 
Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta regions, the ECG remains responsible for the distribution of 
electricity to consumers.8! Substantial progress has been achieved in electrification over the 
years and access rates approached 50 per cent in 2007. 
To enable power exchange to neighbouring Togo and Benin, a transmission link was 
completed in December 1972 (vRA 2006). A transmission link with Cote d'[voire was also 
established in 1984. Power flow was initially from Ghana to Cote d'lvoire, but following 
Ghana's power crises in the 1990s, trade flows have been reversed. 
3.2.5 Demand-Side Management 
After the country's electrification programme increased demand for electricity, the 
government introduced a number of energy efficiency and conservation initiatives. 82 These 
81 The four regions were among the main areas earmarked for rural electrification and called for 
significant extension of the power distribution grid. At the time, the VRA. , was in a relatively 
favourable financial position and it was therefore advantageous to offer the management of the 
electricity distribution in the four regions to the VRA in order to secure the required loans for that 
portion of the rural electrification project (EFG pers. com. 2007). 
8c [n Ghana, the growing customer base can be attributed, in part, to the National Electrification 
Scheme (NES). Instituted in 1989, the scheme is the Government of Ghana's primary policy instrument 
to electrify the country over a thirty-year period, from 1990 to 2020. At the time the scheme was 
instituted, only 15% of the total population had access to electricity supply. For the rural population 
who account for more than 70% of the population, access to electricity was as low as 5%. In addition to 
poverty reduction by increasing the socio-economic development of the Ghanaians, the NES aims to 
facilitate the promotion of small-to-medium scale industries in rural areas while creating employment 
in the rural areas and reducing the rate of rural to urban migration. Largely financed by the World Bank 
and other bilateral funding agencies, the NES had connected about 3000 towns and villages to the 
national grid by September 2005. In accordance with the 2000 population census, electricity access 
increased from 15% in 1989 to 43% in 2000. In 2006, Ghana's National Energy Policy document 
estimated national electricity access at 48% with 77% of urban households having access to electricity 
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were conceived by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Chamber of Mines83, executed 
by the Energy Foundation of Ghana (EFG), and focussed mainly on provision of technical 
support to industries, introduction of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) and public education. 
The EFG have advocated implementing time-of-use tariffs to change consumption behaviour 
but acknowledge that metering requirements would pose the single biggest challenge (EFG 
pers. com. 2007). 
Frustration is perceived on the part of the EFG at the slow response (or lack thereof) of 
decision makers when it comes to fund allocations for projects that provide benefits in terms 
of energy efficiency and return on investment. A proposal that was sent to the Ministry of 
Finance in 2003 to install 5-million CFL in Ghana had received no response by 2007 despite a 
number of follow-up requests during the four years. Through this initiative alone, it was 
envisaged that 180MW could be saved during peak-load periods. A bankable energy-saving 
pilot project was also proposed to refit military barracks with more energy efficient devices, 
but again this was not realised due to delays in the Ministries of Energy and Finance (EFG 
pers. com. 2007). 
The relatively low tariffs have also meant that incentives for energy efficiency have not been 
as attractive as they would have been if tariffs had reflected the LRMC of generation. As a 
result, they have not encouraged energy efficiency on the scale envisaged. 
In sum, Ghana's ESI is characterised by a generation mix that is still largely dependent on 
hydro power. Recurring drought coupled with the pressure to extend electricity access to more 
Ghanaians has led to a greater focus on developing thermal generation capacity and importing 
more power from neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire leading to greater energy dependence. Power 
shortages remain a major threat in Ghana. 
compared to only 17% of households in rural areas (Ministry of Energy 2006). Even though all the ten 
regional capitals and 130 districts are connected to the national grid, there is regional disparity in 
access with the southern part of the country having higher access than the northern part. 
83 The benefits of the Foundation's energy efficiency initiatives include lower consumption due to 
power factor corrections at a number of factories in Ghana. 
86 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
3.3 Power Sector Reforms 
A review of the electricity supply industry in Ghana suggests that there have been many 
factors that have shaped the pace, as well as institutional aspects, of reform in the sector. One 
such factor is the role that the World Bank has historically played, and will most likely 
continue to play, in the sector. The World Bank has extended loans to the VRA from the time 
of its inception. Generally, these loans have been linked to the country's economic recovery 
programme and were tied to conditions, which included power sector reform and the 
introduction of private capital to assist in infrastructure expansion. 
3.3.1 Reform Influences and Actions 
A significant factor prompting reform of the sector was the severe droughts, mentioned 
previously in section 3.2.1, that affected the country between 1982 and 1983 and again in the 
1990s. Coupled with sharp annual increases in electricity demand of between 10-15 per cent 
from 1982 to 1995, the need for transformation in the sector was brought into the spotlight 
(Edjekumhene and Navroz 2002). The second drought from 1993 to 1995, coupled with 
growing demand, intensified the need for complementing hydro with thermal power. 
At the time of negotiations between the Government of Ghana and the World Bank over a 
loan for the development of VRA's first bulk thermal plant, the bank's International 
Development Association (IDA) laid down conditions for sector reform. Although the bank 
was content to see the VRA remain a dominant generator, it expressed a desire to supplement 
generation capacity with independent power producers. The bank approved the loan on the 
proviso that the Power Sector Reform Committee (PSRC) would be established to deliberate 
the operational, legal and commercial implications of the reform agenda. 
Although the World Bank expressed its desire to see reforms in the sector, the changes that it 
had envisioned were limited. It therefore came as a surprise to the bank when the government 
replied with a comprehensive policy framework that was much more extensive than the bank 
had prescribed. Contracting in a Chilean firm, SYNEX Consulting Engineers, as consultants, 
the PSRC submitted their recommendations to the Government of Ghana in a report detailing 
how generation, transmission and distribution sectors should be transformed. Transmission 
would be unbundled from the VRA to form a state-owned grid company, allowing open and 
non-discriminatory access to both generators and large wholesale users. On the generation 
side, although the PSRC had no desire to see a reorganisation in the hydropower business of 
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the VRA, it did recommend relying on private public partnerships to augment capacity while 
allowing generators to sell power directly to large consumers in a wholesale market, in 
addition to distributors through a grid company. Five regional distributors were proposed to 
supply power to consumers with consumption ofless than 5MW. Consumers using more than 
5MW would be eligible to participate in the wholesale power market. The NED would be 
unbundled from the VRA and, along with the ECG, be transformed into the five distributors, 
with private concessions for these distributors envisaged at a later date. 84 
The PSRC also recommended instituting an independent regulatory body responsible for the 
issuing of licences and tariff setting. The cabinet accepted the recommendations of the PSRC 
and in 1997, through Act 538, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) was 
created with the authority to set tariffs. This was followed by Act 541 which led to the 
establishment of the Energy Commission, an advisory body to the ministry with the mandate 
of licensing and development of rules for the technical operation of the sector. 85 
Although the VRA agreed in principle with the need to reform, senior officials in the 
organisation severely criticised the scope of the reforms proposed, arguing that the 
unbundling of the VRA would weaken the sector and that the model proposed, which 
resembles the Chilean electricity market, would not yield similar results due to the small size 
of the sector in Ghana (Edjekumhene, Amadu et al. 2002). 
Despite the bold initial reform agenda, few developments have taken place. The generation 
and distribution sub-sectors remain dominated by the SOEs, VRA and ECG, and have not 
been unbundled, and while a regulator has been established and one IPP investment has been 
made, up until 2008, no new large-scale plant had been commissioned. 
84 The distribution sector has long been a focus of reform, although efforts to improve operations at the 
ECG have met with limited success. In addition to a management contract with the Electricity Supply 
Board (ESB) of Ireland in the early 1990s to revamp the organizational structure of the utility, in 1994 
the ECG also contracted Electricite de France (EDF) and Societe d'Amenagement Urbain et Rural 
(SAUR-Bouygues) to help improve the performance of its customer service and collections divisions 
over a four year period (World Bank \995). Although short-term improvements were achieved, they 
were not sustained. 
85 The Energy Commission was modelled on the erstwhile National Energy Board, which had a strong 
policy advisory role and was seen as a specialised, quasi-independent 'department' in the Ministry of 
Energy. 
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3.3.2 Tariffs 
Although the VRA was pessimistic about the sweeping reforms, it did welcome the 
establishment of the PURe, with its mandate to: 
"build a credible regulatory regime that will respond adequately to stakeholder 
concerns and ensure fairness, tramparency. reliability and equity in the 
provision of utility services" (PURe 1997). 
Since tariff setting had been a controversial issue in the sector for a long time, it was hoped 
that the commission's independence would bring greater credibility to the tariff setting 
process. Historically, the government has been reluctant, for political reasons, to raise tariffs 
to economic levels and remove subsidies. In 1997, prior to the establishment of PURe, the 
government had attempted to raise tariffs by 300 per cent86, but the public outcry resulted in a 
presidential intervention to abate the fears of the general public and stop the tariff increase. 
The crisis fast tracked the establishment of the PURe in that year (initially only scheduled to 
be instituted in the following year). Surprisingly, this body managed to pass through a series 
of staggered increases cumulatively totalling a 300 per cent increase in 1998 through the 
establishment of a transitional plan for tariff increases (Edjekumhene and Navroz 2002).87 
Mindful of the link between electricity tariffs and the socio-economic climate in Ghana as 
well as its mandate and responsibility toward suppliers and their sponsors, the electricity 
regulator has sought a middle path in setting tariff levels. The PURe defends its low tariff 
increases, saying that the VRA should look internally to make efficiency gains and reduce 
losses, as opposed to looking solely for their rate of return in the tariff. It is expected that 
upon completion of the W AGP, which has experienced considerable delays, electricity 
production costs will drop significantly since most of the expenditure associated with thermal 
power production is attributed to fuel costs. 
86 Raising tariffs to a level whereby at least costs are recovered was one of the World Bank's IDA 
lending conditions. 
87 The reason for the wider acceptance of the increases was due to the prolonged drought of 1997, 
which came as a realisation to the public that these increases were in fact necessary to ensure 
sustainability in the long run. The increases were approved in tandem with a comprehensive 
communication programme to consumers (Edjekumhene and Navroz 2002). It should be noted that 
inflation, largely fuelled by devaluation in currency, gnawed away at the benefits of tariff increases. 
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In the meantime, however, tariffs will probably continue to remain a contentious issue, as the 
VRA wants to see them closer to the LRMC and consumers want 'affordable' rates. The 
government has intervened on more than one occasion by partially absorbing tariff increases 
to consumers by subventions to various categories of users. At times, these subsidies have 
been slow in making their way back to the VRA, often hampering its ability to make timely 
payments, including purchases from Cote d' Ivoire and Takoradi II, the IPP. 
In September 2006, government froze residential tariff increases but allowed increases to 
industry to continue. In August 2007, it appeared that the state would make the sector more 
sustainable when the chairman of the PURC disclosed that the government intended to 
increase tariffs and remove subsidies by the end of that year to facilitate entry of private 
sector participants and make tariffs more cost-reflective (Gongo News 2007). It came as a 
shock to the PURC Chairman, therefore, after it had announced a 35 per cent tariff increase in 
November 2007, when the government subsequently announced that it was increasing the 
lifeline tariff band to consumers threefold (from 0-50 kWh to 0-150 kWh), effectively 
neutral ising the effect of the tariff increase. The review by government of the structure of 
electricity tariffs resulted in an outcry from the regulator and played a major part in the 
resignation of the PURC Chairman, the government's announcement being considered the last 
straw (Ghana Districts 2007). 
a) The Volta Aluminium Company 
The agreement between the VRA and the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO) since the 
start of the Akosombo dam project was another reason why VRA revenues were low. The 
establishment of VALCO was the raison d'etre of the VRA and this, together with the 
construction of the Akosombo hydroelectric station, were the two key components of the 
Volta River Project. 88 The historic relationship between the two organisations indicated a 
strong co-dependence especially during the early years while residential demand was low and 
VALCO consumed the bulk of the VRA's supply. 
In 1968, more than three quarters of the power generated by the VRA was consumed by 
V ALCO (Brew-Hammond 1997). The VRA, earning its revenues from V ALCO in hard 
currency, was largely insulated from the country's fiscal turmoil and eroding currency, the 
88 At the time of the development of the Volta River Project, V ALCO was 90 per cent owned by Kaiser 
Aluminium and Chemical Corporation and 10 per cent by Reynolds Metals. 
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effects of which were felt by the rest of the Ghanaian economy.89 It was primarily due to the 
foreign currency earned from V ALCO that the VRA could historically maintain its 
operational capacity and, to an extent, the capacity of the sector. By 1995, electricity 
generation supplied to VALCO dropped to below 40 per cent as domestic demand for power 
increased. By that time Ghana, which had traditionally been an exporter of power to its 
neighbours, became an importer of electricity from Cote d'ivoire as its energy demand 
increased, as noted in section 3.2.2 (World Bank 1995c). The increasing electricity demand 
driven by economic expansion and, coupled with tariff structures which were based on the 
relatively cheap and amortised hydroelectricity, did not reflect the marginal cost of new 
power. The low tariffs did not help in sending the right price signals to consumers to manage 
the growth in electricity demand and encourage energy efficient behaviour. 
During the drought years, supply to V ALCO was significantly cut. In 1994, a dispute over 
power cuts and the VRA contractual obligation to supply V ALCO eventually led to an out-of-
court settlement between V ALCO and the VRA. What was clear to the Government of Ghana 
and to the VRA was that the tariff paid by V ALCO was not sustainable since V ALCO was 
paying very much less for its power than other consumers in Ghana. In 200 I, Kaiser 
Aluminum, V ALCO's parent company, experienced financial difficulties and filed for 
bankruptcy.9o Disputes related to the tariff that V ALCO was entitled to in tenns of the 
agreement signed in the 1960s continued. The government's position was that the preferential 
power purchase contract that was entered into with V ALCO was for 30 years and expired in 
1997, and that considering the significantly altered conditions of the sector, V ALCO should 
be charged at a rate commensurate with that of other large bulk consumers, who were paying 
two to three times the rate of V ALCO. The VRA bulk electricity tariff to V ALCO until 2003 
was 1.65-1.80 US cents per kWh whilst the approved bulk supply tariff to other customers 
was about 4.5 cents per kWh (Energy Commission 2005).91 This invariably led to the 
XC) Between 1988 and 1992, foreign exchange revenues accounted for more than 75 per cent of total 
VRA revenues (accounting for nearly 10 per cent of Ghana's foreign exchange earnings), dropping to 
40 per cent in 1995 (Brew-Hammond 1997:5.10). Electricity was Ghana's fourth largest foreign 
exchange earner after gold, cocoa, and timber. 
go Reasons for this action, as cited by Kramer (2003), include a slump in the global aluminium market, 
costly asbestos litigation lawsuits, rising obligatory retirement pension payments and costly medical 
obligations. 
91 At that time in 2003, the generation mix had swung to 65 per cent thermal and 35 per cent hydro as 
opposed to virtually all hydropower in 1967 when the power purchase contract was signed 
(Government of Ghana 2003). 
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subsidization of V ALCO by US$40-60m in 2002 (ibid). In October 2004, after lengthy 
disputes, the Ghanaian government decided to buyout the shares of V ALCO and assume 
ownership of the company. 
Gradually the power demand and supply situation grew worse until there was hardly any 
power left in the system to supply V ALCO without inducing large scale blackouts throughout 
the country. In March 2007, the government shut down VALCO completely. The sector had 
lost its single largest consumer, and, with a diminishing contribution of hydro to the 
generation mix, was left with costly obligations to buy thermal power. 
3.4 Private Sector Participation in Generation 
During the drought of 1993-1994, Ghana planned to install thermal capacity to mitigate the 
risks of dependence on variable hydropower, as mentioned in section 3.2.1. A plan was 
passed to develop a thermal plant in the western region of Ghana near Sekondi-Takoradi, the 
country's third largest city and industrial and commercial center. 
The VRA was poised to be the champion of the project on the basis of its past success and 
involvement in the sector. 92 The project consisted of the construction of 330 MW of 
combined-cycle generation capacity, made up of two combustion light crude oil fired turbine 
generator sets of 110 MW each, a heat recovery boiler, a steam turbine driven generator to 
produce an additional 110 MW of generation, and the associated transmission and sub-station 
infrastructure. Construction of Takoradi I commenced in 1996 and the first simple cycle unit 
(110 MW combustion turbine) became operational in December 1997. The commercial 
operation of the second simple cycle unit began in January 1998 and commissioning activities 
on the combined cycle, including the steam turbine and generator, commenced in April 1999 
(Jacobs-Gibb 200 I). The World Bank issued an IDA loan and was the principal lender to the 
project on the condition that the next investment into the generation sector would be that of a 
private investor. The publicly funded Takoradi I (330MW combined cycle gas plant) was 
considered the first of a two-phase project, with Takoradi II (a 330 MW extension) expected 
to be privately financed. 
92 In its 1995 Staff Appraisal Report the World Bank described the VRA as 'a relatively well-run public 
utility with few institutional and financial problems'. 
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3.4.1 The Takoradi International Company (TICO) 
[n an effort to raise investor interest in Takoradi II, the former President of Ghana, during a 
trip to the U.S. State of Michigan, engaged Consumer Michigan Services (CMS) in 
discussions. At the time, CMS had no investment experience in Ghana; however, it was 
involved in [PP deals in India and North Africa (including Morocco's 10rf Lasfar [PP). An 
international competitive bid (ICB) was passed over for a negotiated deal, with reasons cited 
that an [CB would have taken too long. Given the urgent need for power, time was of the 
essence (CMS pers.com. 2007; Energy Commission pers. com. 2007; PURC pers. com. 
2007). 
Although the initial plan was for CMS and the VRA to have an equal shareholding in the 
private company, at that time shortly after the drought, the financial situation of the VRA did 
not lend itself to such a major investment. The lower sales due to the drought and the higher 
cost of thermal production had strained the financial reserves of the utility. It was agreed, 
therefore, that CMS would take a 90 per cent stake in the project and that the VRA share 
would be reduced to 10 per cent with the option of increasing it to 50 per cent should the 
VRA's financial situation improve. It was also agreed that the first phase of the project, i.e. 
the two single cycle gas turbines, should be undertaken initially although the debt financing 
had not been finalised for the second phase of the project which comprised the steam cycle 
and its associated components. 
Shortly after project closure at the end of 1998, the Takoradi International Company (TICO) 
was registered as the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to assume the development of the 
project. Construction started the following year with the first turbine coming into operation in 
March 2000 and the second turbine six months later. 93 This concluded the first phase which 
saw 220MW of single cycle light crude oil (LCO) fired generation coming on line at a cost of 
US$IIOm. The second phase of the Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) scheme, which 
would consist of a heat recovery unit and a steam turbine, was to be debt financed. This, 
however, did not materialise since the Ghanaian government and project sponsors could not 
"3 CMS contracted Black & Veatch (US) and Overland Contracting Incorporated (a subsidiary of Black 
& Veatch) as the Equipment Procurement Contractor (EPC) to supply the main plant hardware for the 
installation enabling both firms to execute their first major power project in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
Operating and Maintenance (O&M) responsibilities remained with the major shareholder through CMS 
International Operating Company, a subsidiary set up by the CMS parent company. 
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agree on the terms of the deal and, until present, the project has remained entirely financed by 
the shareholders' equity and operates without the steam cycle. 
In March 2007, after experiencing financial difficulties in its home market, CMS announced 
that it would sell its share in TICO to TAQA, the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company.'!4 
The sale formed part of the company's wider divestiture strategy to exit emerging markets 
and refocus its operations on its domicile market. [t was anticipated that the sale would allow 
CMS to reduce its corporate debt burden and strengthen its balance sheet (Berenson 2002; 
CMS pers.com. 2007; Ghana News 2007a). 
CMS and T AQA were long-term allies and had partnered on infrastructure projects before. 
Although the takeover was a friendly one, the Government of Ghana protested, arguing that if 
CMS wanted to give up its share in the plant, it and the VRA (as co-shareholder) wanted to be 
informed of the negotiations and be given first option to purchase the shares. [n addition, it 
argued that CMS should have sought its consent prior to setting up the new arrangement. The 
government went as far as claiming that it would refuse to recognize T AQA as a legitimate 
shareholder of Takoradi II (Awuni 2007; The Times 2007; Ghana News 2007b). While CMS 
acted within their rights in terms of the agreement, the Government of Ghana expressed its 
fierce resentment with the manner in which the deal was handled, describing it as improper 
and pronouncing that CMS was forcing Ghana into partnering with a company that it did not 
know. In addition, it was reported that the government was not happy with the US$3m a 
month capacity charge that the deal benefited from (whether the power was used or not) and 
the controlling rights that the private investor enjoyed in the company (due to its majority 
shareholding), as these agreements were entered into by a previous political regime. The 
Government of Ghana advised CMS to hive otfthe Takoradi transaction from their talks with 
T AQA (The Chronicle 2007). Although the government had made an announcement of its 
intentions to acquire the total shares of the plant, the deal between CMS and T AQA was 
already near to completion (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2007). The 
government did offer T AQA US$30m to increase its shareholding in the plant to 50 per cent 
as per the initial shareholding agreement with CMS , but despite increasing its equity to 50 
94 Listed on the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange, T AQA is a global energy investment company 
specialising in infrastructure projects in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Africa. The sale of Takoradi 
[) to T AQA was part of a larger transaction which comprised shareholdings in two large power and 
desalination projects in the United Arab Emirates, the Jubail Energy Company in Saudi Arabia, the ST 
CMS Company in India, and the Jorf Las far Energy Company in Morocco. 
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per cent, it reportedly was still eager to takeover the entire shareholding of the plant by mid-
2008 (GGEA 2008; Yeboah 2008).95 
3.4.2 Project Agreements Cementing the IPP Deal 
The absence of debt on the project and the large stake that CMS acquired meant that CMS has 
shouldered most of the investment risk. A long-term PPA of 25 years linked to a minimum 
availability ensured that the investors would be able to recoup their investment and make a 
return on the transaction. Like most IPPs in developing countries, PPA charges are dollar 
denominated to protect investors against currency devaluation. The PPA consists ofa variable 
energy charge and fixed capacity charge (to which O&M is added). The project was also 
backed by a government guarantee. 
The design of the original Takoradi site was such to provide for the Takoradi II expansion and 
to effectively double the facility's output from 330 MW to 660 MW.96 The fuel arrangement 
for Takoradi I was also extended to accommodate the expansion, with the VRA assuming 
responsibility for the fuel supply to the IPP, since it was already supplying fuel to its own 
plant. The fuel is purchased by the VRA on international tender, supplied by tankers and 
piped to a single point mooring where it is stored in tanks for consumption. Since TICO 
would have no more control over fuel prices than would the VRA, it was agreed that the VRA 
procure the fuel for TlCO in an attempt to synergize and avoid the duplication of logistics and 
procurement efforts. The responsibility rests on the VRA to procure the correct fuel 
specification to be burned by TlCO and on the latter for ensuring that the fuel is burned in 
accordance with the heat rate curves as stipulated in the contract. The VRA being fuel 
supplier and power off-taker effectively reduced the arrangement to a tolling agreement with 
TlCO and the sponsor, therefore, does not bear any risk for the delivery or quality of the fuel. 
It is expected that the plant will run on natural gas when the West African Gas Pipeline 
becomes fully operational. 
<)5 By the end of 2008, the shareholding in Takoradi II was still a 50/50 split between Taqa and the 
VRA. 
%The expansion of the Takoradi site required a Supplementary Environmental Impact Assessment in 
1999 from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the Republic of Ghana before the start of 
construction. 
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As part of the security package, provision was made for arbitration in the event of a dispute 
that could not be resolved internaIly between the parties involved. Arbitration provision is at 
the London Court of International Arbitration and covers the entire contract duration. With 
the urgent need for power, investors felt comfortable with the market risk since the demand 
for electricity was significant. A letter of credit with a value of US$3m was, however, 
provided by the government. These security arrangements went a long way to securing the 
investment and attracting Ghana's first large-scale private power producer. 
At an estimated 20.5 per cent rate of return on the project equity, the investor CMS reported 
that it was happy with the investment and, generaIly, with the outcome of the project (ECA 
2003:28; CMS pers.com. 2007). There were no delays or major problems during the power 
station construction and thus far the plant has been operating well. 
3.5 An Analysis of the Ghanaian Hybrid Market and its Performance 
The electricity supply situation in Ghana has evolved over three decades from a situation 
where the country had an abundance of generation capacity and was the main exporter of 
electricity in the region to one where the country cannot meet its domestic electricity demand 
despite imports from its neighbours. A decade of power sector reforms (1998-2008) has not 
resulted in a meaningful improvement in the power supply situation in Ghana; instead, the 
situation has deteriorated. This section provides an analysis of how post-reform frameworks 
have faIlen short of ensuring that adequate generation infrastructure is developed in a timely 
manner. 
3.5.1 The Evolution to a Hybrid Market 
The Ghanaian ESI has been subject to reforms since the mid- I 990s when the government 
responded to the World Bank's policy of conditional lending to electricity sector projects in 
developing countries. The Government of Ghana responded to the World Bank's shift in 
policy by establishing the PSRC to deliberate the country's future power sector frameworks. 
FoIl owing the government's statement on the change in policy, plans were initiated to 
establish the required conditions in Ghana to secure private sector investment and 
participation in the development of the country's power sector infrastructure. These plans 
included an improvement of the operational efficiencies of the state-owned utilities in the 
sector and streamlining tariff setting in order for the process to be more transparent and 
independent of political interference from government. Envisaged under the structural 
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changes within the ES[ was the unbundling of the sector and the gradual introduction of 
multiple generating companies, including [PPs, the creation of a number of distribution 
companies and the establishment of an independent regulator. Although the Ministry of 
Energy intended that a competitive power market would eveolve, this has not occurred. [n the 
generation sub sector, the VRA is still the dominant supplier of power and is complemented 
by one single [PP in the form of the Takoradi II thermal plant (by end-2008). The institutional 
reforms to accommodate the new policies comprised the corporatisation of the VRA, and the 
ECG under the Conversion to Companies Act. Furthermore, the hydro generation, thermal 
generation. and transmission functions were unbundled into distinctly separate departments 
within the VRA (RCEER 2005:29). While the VRA had been traditionally responsible for 
nearly all functions in the generation sector, with the new institutional arrangements, the 
mandate of licensing electricity operators, planning, and advising the Ministry of Energy 
became the responsibility of Energy Commission. The PURC assumed responsibility for 
economic regulation of electricity. 
The existence of a dominant generator in the form of the VRA. and one operational [PP in the 
power sector, is typical of the hybrid arrangements that have appeared in the ES[s of many 
African states. despite an initial reform agenda to introduce competitive generation markets 
where a number of players compete for sales by bidding in price. Having settled at this 
intermediate state of power sector reform, the Ghanaian power sector has found it difficult to 
overcome the problem of insufficient generation capacity that the reforms, advocated by 
many, hoped to address. 
3.5.2 Generation Planning: Changing of the Guard 
Prior to power sector reforms, the VRA was responsible for planning in the power sector. The 
utility also conducted its own procurement and contracting with infrastructure construction 
firms in the sector. From the time of the utility's inception up until the time of the power 
sector reforms, the VRA enjoyed a large degree of autonomy with respect to the development 
of the power sector. Coupled with this independence, its relatively healthy financial and 
technical performances in the 1970s and 1980s, enabled the utility to negotiate international 
borrowing for project development and construction and to take the initiative for regional 
planning in West Africa (Brew-Hammond 1997: 141). The VRA assumed responsibility for all 
aspects of project development and construction contracting as well as legal and financial 
arrangements to ensure fulfilment of power sector projects. [n addition to technological 
capabilities within the VRA's Technical Services and Engineering and Design and 
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Construction Departments, the utility also had personnel both within and outside of the 
engineering departments that focussed on legal counsel, finance, as well as planning (Brew-
Hammond 1997: 154). The VRA also comprised of a Project Management Unit that had 
overall responsibility for contract administration and construction management (1997: 192). 
With the reorganisation of the power sector, new institutions were set up to take over some 
functions from the VRA. For example, the overall planning function was moved from the 
VRA to the newly formed Energy Commission whose mandate also included the licensing of 
electricity utilities and setting up technical standards for operations in the sector. 
Although the VRA had assumed responsibility for planning and development up until the 
final commissioning of projects, the Energy Commission's planning mandate is, however, 
limited to indicative planning (RCEER 2005:28). Considering project proposals, conducting 
tender processes and awarding contracts to the successful bidders of generation infrastructure 
providers does not fall within the ambit of the Energy Commission's stated functions. The 
VRA, under the new power sector policy, is no longer a power supplier oflast resort and does 
not have any policy obligation or mandate to ensure adequate generation supplies for the 
country. Planning in the Energy Commission has not been extended to include responsibilities 
for financial, legal and environmental planning in ensuring that new generators come on line 
and otten the envisaged timelines for developing additional capacity are not realistic. 97 Under 
the hybrid arrangement, therefore, it is less clear who assumes responsibility for the actual 
procurement and contracting of additional generation capacity, and it appears that the 
institutional framework to ensure the links between planning and dispatching of power is 
lacking. Although the Ministry of Energy is facilitating the development of generation 
projects (Adda 2007:8), the contracting processes and responsibilities have remained 
nebulous. 
a) Allocating Generation Investment Opportunities: Private, Public or Both? 
Currently, there are no clearly stated and agreed on criteria for allocating new build 
opportunities between state institutions and the private sector. The state-owned power 
utilities (VRA and ECG) are cash-strapped with little financial capacity to meet investment 
needs. Despite these difficulties and given the problems in attracting private investors to the 
power sector, state-led development of generation expansion is now also being pursued by the 
97 As an example, the Energy Commission's Strategic national Energy Plan has Ghana's first unit of 
nuclear power scheduled for the year 2018 allowing only five years for planning and another five years 
for construction (Energy Commission 2005: 17). These arbitrary and optimistic schedules then form the 
basis for generation planning in Ghana. 
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government. Deciding on who will build new capacity additions, therefore, is not a function 
of clearly developed criteria for project allocation between public and private institutions, but 
rather, it appears to be the case where the government is campaigning for almost any 
investment, regardless of the developer. This is not surprising given the dearth of power 
generation due, in part, to the poor investment climate for private investors and the lack of 
funds of state-owned utilities. The government was not in a position to assist power sector 
development by making significant financial contributions due to limited resources for 
infrastructure spending that were already being depleted by outflows for electricity subsidies 
to residential consumers at the poorer end of a the affordability spectrum. The government 
did, however, find sufficient funds to exercise its share option and increase its share in TICO 
to 50 per cent and, in 2008, expressed its desire to take over the entire shareholding of the 
plant. This move for increased or complete state-ownership in the only operational IPP, rather 
than inviting other private investors to the project, is in contradiction to the initial PPI policy 
which calls for increased private sector participation in power generation; the rationale for 
increasing state ownership had not been systematically formulated and the move to increase 
public shareholding in Takoradi sits awkwardly within the broader power sector policy 
framework. 98 
3.5.3 Generation Procurement Frameworks 
Although generation capacity planning has been conducted in Ghana to indicate the types of 
plant that would be required in each phase of the country's power sector development and 
although these plans are updated and revised periodically by the Energy Commission, the 
follow-on actions, including the initiation of the procurement process and finalising the 
contracting arrangements, have been problematic. Ghana has not yet initiated an ICB to 
procure private generation capacity under a long-term PPA. The country's first IPP was a 
48 The government's seemingly hostile reaction to incoming T AQA as the new shareholder to Takoradi 
II has also informed investors' overall perceptions of Ghana as a foreign investment destination for 
infrastructure investment. Although the government may be able to reduce the power charges if it 
increases its shareholding in TICO, with the difficulty in attracting finances to invest in generation it 
may be expected that the government would rather use whatever funds it had at its disposal to build 
more power stations, not buy back existing plants from private investors at a time where the country 
was in the midst of a power crisis. Although the rationale for the decision may be to reduce charges 
over the long-term, it does raise some questions around the ability to attract affordable power and the 
charges of future IPP transactions (the extent to which charges can be reduced and the ability of the 
government to match investors' expectations) given the country and sector's risk profile. 
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negotiated deal and none of the subsequent proposals have been put on open tender for 
contracting generation, but were negotiated directly with project sponsors. Despite the 
establishment of the Energy Commission and the PURC, these regulatory institutions had no 
input into the establishment of the Takoradi II IPP since they became operational only after 
the deal had already been finalised between the government, the private sponsor, CMS, and 
the VRA. The Energy Commission did not have time to develop licence conditions for IPPs 
and by the time construction was completed and the start of commercial operation was 
imminent, a provisional licence was issued to TICO in order to assume operations. 99 
Established in 1997, but only becoming operational in 1998, PURC carried out an 
independent review of the fixed capacity charge the following year (1999), after financial 
closure was reached. Although the contract remained unchanged, it was concluded by the 
commission that the capacity charge should not be passed through in its entirety to consumers 
and thus it became a government contingency. Even if the PURC did have an opportunity to 
review the PPA during the early phase of the negotiations, it is doubtful whether a nascent 
regulatory institution would have possessed the necessary capacity and influence to effect any 
consequential changes to the agreements. With the energy crisis at its pinnacle, a review of 
the PPA could potentially have stalled the addition of the necessary capacity, a situation the 
government probably wanted to avoid at that time (PURC pers. com. 2007). 
A voiding potential delays in the development of the project was also a key reason for the 
procurement procedure followed in acquiring the much need generation capacity. The time 
constraint was one of the key reasons that Takoradi II was a negotiated deal as opposed to an 
ICB. It is, however, the government's intent that future plants are procured in an international 
competitive bid in order to attract the lowest priced power (Energy Commission pers. com. 
2007). Regardless of this intent, Ghana has never developed a large-scale power plant through 
an ICB process. Moreover, there are no concrete plans for competitive bidding for future 
plants, showing a divergence between the country's policy intent and implementation, as well 
as possible weaknesses in planning and implementation within the sector. 100 It is for this 
reason that a number of stop-gap emergency plants had to be contracted in by the government. 
09 The licensing framework for energy service providers was only finalised in December 2006, and 
only in 2007 could the commission issue permanent licences to service providers, including TICO. 
100 International competitive bidding is traditionally a long process despite its efficiency in obtaining an 
optimal price. Careful planning and effective implementation is therefore critical to ensure that power 
plants come online before demand outstrips supply. 
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Procurement processes have also been problematic for the acquisition of these short-term 
power acquisitions where the necessary processes were not followed by government 
ministries, leading to arbitration cases between sponsors and the Ghanaian government for 
non-payment of services. A good example is as evidenced in the case of Faroe Atlantic, where 
the Ministry of Finance, the representative of the government, did not follow due process in 
seeking approval for the transaction, taking the view that such approval was not necessary 
(Oxford and Beaumont 2006:2). 
While Takoradi II was a negotiated acquisition in 1998 when the power was desperately 
needed and a long tendering process may have delayed the commissioning of the plant, 
Ghana's more recent stated policies for the procurement of public infrastructure favour 
transparent and competitive bidding (PPA pers. com. 2008). The Ghana Public Procurement 
Authority is clear that, in accordance with the Public Procurement Act (Act 663 of 2003), 
where government procurement is concerned, goods should be competitively procured 
through a transparent tendering process. IOI This, however, does not appear to be the current 
practice in Ghana and it would appear that in terms of generation procurement, Ghana is in 
contravention of its own procurement policies. Given the concerns of investors around off-
taker financial ability to cover the PPA and the security arrangements required on the 
projects, it is expected that few investors would bid unless security arrangements are 
negotiated and clearly agreed on upfront. The government's stance is that it would prefer not 
to give government guarantees on lPPs as was done for Takoradi II. In the absence of such 
guarantees, it is understandable that significant time is spent in negotiations to allay the fears 
on investors. Often after long negotiations these projects still have not materialised as 
expected. The number of projects where negotiations have failed and project development 
stopped, are indicative of the problems in getting large generation infrastructure projects off 
the ground in a developing country such as Ghana. These include the Osagyefo project which 
still has to produce electricity despite the initial development having started more than decade 
ago and the plant completed in 1999, and the steam phase of the Takoradi II IPP for which 
negotiations were still ongoing a decade later. 
The government has clearly stated its policy of moving away from providing sovereign 
guarantees for privately contracted power plants, in contrast to TICO. It should be reiterated 
101 The law does make provision for specialised services where sole-source purchases are allowed (PPA 
pers. com. 2008). However, in the case single or combined cycle thermal plants are hardly considered 
specialised enough to be judged meeting the requirements for a sole-source acquisition. 
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here, however, that the sovereign guarantee for TICO was crucial in securing the deal. It is 
unlikely that CMS or any other investor would have entered into an agreement, given the fact 
that TICO was the first privately owned generator in Ghana, in a virgin regulatory 
environment, without such an assurance. In the generation planning process, a difficult 
investment environment has been created by moving away from government guarantees when 
the investment climate for infrastructure investment has not improved. Existing investment 
and contracting frameworks in Ghana's power sector do not work well in this environment. In 
part, this is due to the fact that it was not foreseen that the generation sector would be in a 
hybrid market arrangement for such a long period of time, as well as an expectation of an 
improved investment climate brought about the broader economic reforms of the country, 
which did not materialise as intended. 
3.5.4 Contracting Arrangements between VRA and TICO 
In the absence of an independent transmission system operator, the relationship between the 
state-owned utility and the IPP is vital since it is the YRA that is the off-taker of the power 
produced in accordance with a long-term PPA. This is typical of the hybrid arrangements in 
many African countries. In the case of the YRA and TICO, a number of factors have strained 
the sustainability of the contracting arrangements between the two parties and have 
undermined further investment in the sector due to a lack of finances on the part of the YRA 
and the subsequent wariness of potential private investors. 
a) The VRA: Deteriorating Performance and Management Problems 
The finances of the YRA were deteriorating at the time the Takoradi II IPP was negotiated. 
The drought situation (and as a result, lost revenue) as well as a severe currency devaluation 
were significant threats to the income stream that would recoup investors' outlays. In 
particular, the slow demise of YALCO, the traditional anchor to the Yolta River project that 
paid in hard currency, threatened the utility'S financial health, thereby putting the PPA, which 
was dollar denominated, at risk. The regulator put further pressure on the YRA's cash flows 
as it tried to find some degree of middle ground between protecting the public while ensuring 
the financial viability of the utility. 
Although TICO has always had its power charges paid by the YRA and no disputes have been 
entered into between the parties, there have been a few occasions where the YRA was unable 
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to meet payment deadlines due to cash shortages within the organisation. 102 In all cases, 
however. the charges were eventually settled by the VRA. 
Since COD, the Takoradi IPP has had an average availability factor of 94 per cent (CMS 
pers.com. 2007). In contrast to the good performance shown by the single cycle Takoradi II, 
both the financial and the technical performance of Takoradi I, the combined cycle plant 
operated by the VRA, give cause for concern. Reasons for this appear to be four-fold. First, 
during the first years after Takoradi I was built, the plant operated only as a single cycle plant, 
i.e. not combined cycle. which meant that the unit cost was higher than had it operated as a 
combined cycle. Secondly, availability figures for VRA's thermal plant have been falling over 
the last few years (up until 2007), which appears to be linked to technical problems 
experienced by the plant. A third factor relating to poor performance stems from the VRA's 
cumbersome processes for acquiring spare parts whereby procurement decisions are not 
allowed to be made at lower levels within the organisation in the event of unplanned 
maintenance (KNUST pel's. com. 2007; VRA pers.com. 2007).103 Finally, with the company's 
weak financial situation has also contributed to the plant's current lacklustre performance. 
The VRA has also suffered the impact of a management crisis. In 2002 and 2003, the 
company's Chief Executive came under heavy criticism from staff and middle management at 
the utility for his management style at a time of heightened concerns over the company's 
ability to supply the country with power. Amidst a sea of allegations of malfeasance and 
nepotism amongst other forms of corruption, increasing questions were asked with respect to 
the manner operations were conducted at the VRA and the sentiment was that the CEO was 
acting more in his own interest than in the interest of the utility.104 After mounting pressure 
102 This was mainly due to late payments by the government of subsidies granted to consumers (VRA 
pers.com. 2007). In 2003, subsidies owed to distribution utilities alone ranged from US$400,000 to 
US$I.4m (Asante 2006). 
103 Long-term service agreements for VRA's thermal have been proposed to remedy this situation. 
104 Amongst others. questions were raised by staff about two advisors. who had close connections to the 
Chief Executive and who were paid exorbitant monthly salaries. VRA staff also questioned the 
awarding of contracts for the renovation of the VRA headquarters in Accra and the revamping of VRA 
subsidiaries. The CEO came under criticism when he acquired a fleet of luxury sedans and 4X4s for the 
use of his senior management team in spite of the company's weak financial position. Further concerns 
were raised about the CEO's refusal to heed field officers' advice about the continued use of the 
Akosombo hydroelectric dam despite low water inflow. It was also alleged that the CEO had been 
involved in an extra-marital affair with a female employee from the VRA and had granted her unfair 
103 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
from VRA staff to investigate, the government set up a committee of inquiry to probe these 
reports. Workers demanded his removal from office through protests and industrial action. At 
the pinnacle of the conflict between management and labour, the discord eventually resulted 
in the resignation of the CEO (after being prompted by his superiors) and the establishment of 
an Interim Management Committee to oversee operations until the management situation 
could be normalised (VRA Annual Report 2003). This period of instability at the VRA has 
certainly had some effect on the overall health of the organisation - in four years (between 
200 I and 2005) the utility has seen as many leaders at the helm, during very difficult times. 
b) PPA Charges and Generation Costs 
In contrast to the VRA thennal plant, the performance of TICO is supported by a guaranteed 
revenue stream due to the long-term power purchase agreement. The absence of project debt 
meant that the required rate of return (ROR) on the project was higher than would be the case 
if the weighted average cost of capital were to include the sizable portions of debt that are 
almost synonymous with classic project financing. Proportionally higher returns commanded 
by shareholders contributed to exerting upward pressure on tariffs. The 20.5 per cent return on 
equity reported on the Takoradi II project developed by CMS is not surprising given the level 
of risk of the country's first IPP. It has to be borne in mind that the intended project finance 
developments did not materialise, and had the project been refinanced with debt to expand the 
plant to incorporate the steam phase, a lower rate of return on the project would have been 
possible. 
Since Takoradi II operates in single cycle mode, fuel costs remain by far the most significant 
component of generation costs, accounting for more than 75 per cent of charges (ECA 
2003:39). The increasing fuel prices in recent years have had a significant impact on charges 
to TICO. In 1998, when the project was negotiated, world crude oil prices averaged between 
US$II-12 per barrel. The situation in 2008 has changed dramatically, with oil prices having 
increased substantially. It is estimated that in mid-2008 monthly charges more than trebled 
since COD, and have increased more than fivefold when using fuel figures based on the price 
of crude oil at the time that the project reached financial closure in 1998 (see Figure 3.2). [n 
comparison to the country's dominant hydro resources, this marks a significant increase in 
generation costs. More disturbingly, in cedi terms the charges increased more than six fold 
benefits. It was also alleged that the former CEO froze promotions for managers who questioned his 
authorisation of what appeared to be fraudulent transactions in awarding of contracts (Ghana News 
2002-2008: Dossier - Dr Charles Wereko Brobby). 
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The po<Jr fin.l1lCiai ,tate of lile VRA result~d in inslltlicielli fll nd, being available for 
,,,,klil;o,,,,] 1'"""mliun i,we,lmeni by Ihe lIlilily ali<I ill \W) lillie capilal expan,ioll "T~I 
r~tilrh<,hment pro.iects hcil11' realised. "".'hile the IPP is ",,,,,cd or its rCYWUCS. [he VRA 1",-, 
had to accept 10'" tariff incre""es. the dfe"t of "hich "as eroded by high i ntiatioll. Illcre05ing 
fucl costs lor tf><: VRfI 's them"'l ph"'ls as wcll as thc Iud costs that "re 1'''''00 [[Hough lor the 
IPI' have been for the VRA', account and laid claim to revell"" that were decr"'lSing due to 
dfOughts arKI. 'is a "'SUll. h,,,cr "",lcs, The gOYOrilment's Mci,ion to increase the life-lille 
electricil), tariff band (for "hich domestic consumers do oot pay) has alw "lueeLcd the 
utility' s li"a""e" Thcse arrangcments have m"de il hardcr for the gm crnment and the VIt ... 
05 oll:wker to attr""t "nd ensure funhe, iny~:;(menl in gCn<:raliun ,in,·c thc ,cctur "ilS 
techlli<:ali) bankrupt. 
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c) Tllirtl-l'(lr(~' Acce" "'''I/)i'I'~ld'i''K 
AlthOlllOh there we re some privale 'punsors woo wer~ ' Iil l ke~n to in"esl in the ",ctor. finding 
"Ilt'mato ar""'lOom"n[, to socure Ih~i, revenlLe ,t ream, proved to be difticult. 0,,,, c~amrle is 
the ca,e of lhe mi,." thai w~re ",hc"dy iml\OC(cd hy (Ilt- eleclric ity cri,is in Ihe cnun lry ~l1J 
I"'-'Po'ed th e d~\ dnpmont nf all I PP to "", ist in I"'wer prod lLCtioo for their own lllld~"aki ng'_ 
Th~ Ashant ilKM R pi""1 de,crih ed in se" lion 3,2,2 diJ 11 01 m,ue,ialise JlI~ 10 Ihe VRA 00( 
,,]lowin!,- tht- 'pu nsOf', to ,,-,II any of the exce" c"poc it) gonerak d to VRA c11s tomo,,_ III 
OO<Iit;on AsIHlIltn-,'K \ 1R ami the V RI\ 's VRI\ cOlLld not :>gr~e on ~ t'~ns mi "ion pri co to " , 1lt'C1 
power lhro ugh the grid to sel l the excess caracity onto neighbnur ing cOlllllries_ [)1L~ to fail~d 
negotialions wilh Ihe Vlt,\. Iht- projecl did nol cont inl';. The I\sh~nliiK~.JR project i, one 
"X~]!II~e of ho'W (ho ,ingle buy~r arrangement can he rrobl.matic when tho hLLlW i, al'" 
,eller orpnwer mKi Ihi' conniel of i ~(crcq frustrat e, i,,, e'lmeni. 'I hi, " 1Io w~J Ih~ VRI\ Ihe 
'-'P I>or[un ity 10 sc,e~n nlL( 'I\(] n"", 'WI\(] "'ant to ""II I"'wor djr~ct l) to VR,\ ClLsto",~r' b) 
m<ling wheeling charge' Ih "t m,,1;.e I"okct' un"cooomi •. Sin,e IraTlSlTlissioo tariff pricing 
was pcrlonned ;nl~TI\all) in IOC V~,\. it h:>d a gr~~t dc~ 1 o Lcontrol o'Cr who coulJ em..,- the 
market and. ill ,n doing. disco umged pri""le entr) ill10 the m"rk cl. Soch behavioll r is nfi en 
ob,,,,' ed "·h",, inaJe' luatc gO\orn~nce arr~ngol110nts ha,~ been mad" 10 p,event thi ' kind OL 
hehavioor hy SOh. It I"" 10 be bom. ill miJKi, hnwever, IIl"t tho ,1"",la,,1 model nr rerorm 
eTwis"g~J Ih at lr,.-"mi"ion '-'Po,atinn, and ra)"""m "y,klll' wO lLlJ ha,o be~n coml.\ic(ely 
indepcndenl ,md rillg-rell c~d fro m sl"te'owned g""orl'lo", howe'~r. J,Jt' to sWgnaled rdonm 
Ih i' hi» not hal.\p<'ned_ I[ I", "llo,,~d hdm,'iollT hy SO!' , that co uld ullder mine tile nbjecti ve 
erL,lIring ,ldeqLmte g"n~r~tinn capac ily Ihrou!,-h rOloTlm. 
3.6 Condusion 
Tn slLmmary. Gil"IU'" hybrid power m,.-k~1 emerged wilh lilt- hLl ildillg or the co u~t,y', n"t 
11'1', which ,,'" de,el'-'P""IIx:rore any ,ub'tantial in ' li\lL( inn al ch~ngL'" in lhe ,0Clor can.; into 
dti;c(_ Th~ cnunt r), institllted pnwer 'eclm rerorm, in pm1 10 de,,1 with Ih. problem' 
,,,,oci~(ed ",ilh unde,· i", e,1 ",onl and a 'hMage 0 f eloctric iTy in tho ,OUI Lll), rhe lirst ph",,, 
or the T,",or",1i II II'I' "as ins(alled 'al\iJl y ~I toc 'e'I"", 1 OL V RI\ anJ Ihe Mini'I'}, or \1ines 
and Ener£) to meet emergency powe, , hortag"' th"t existed ill 1'198. The urgent n"ed lor 
power in ll,10,,,,ed tho [>roclLr.",ont and cnntraclillg nplion, chose n by- Ihe gnVertlLllent li-..- the 
projec l ~JKi "' ~y h~'e ploc""llhe nl"f-t"~er in ~ d i ,,,,j,ant~goo u' ]Xl,ilion JlIrin g n~goTiation ' 
wilh eM';, III aJdilion 10 Ihi, kinlO the nest 11'1' in a 'OClor in th o th",'" nf roLonn. lhe 
investment dimrne ill the CO Ullt,y w,.; les, Ihan 1 '~H}U,~hl" at the timo. ~",I Ih~ pnw~r off-
take", li",meial p<l<i(ioll was p,,,-,,u-ious,,c Ilt-s l. ",·ve"hele". " ithout privale ," pi lallO timd 
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the first phase of Tak"radi II. hod shedding ",nuld p,"hdhly havc heel1 mmc il1 Glmn", n", 
Ghanai"" gowrnment lherdo", agreed to the terill s of tile plant SlXlL1SOrs ,,00 hel1efit~d trom 
an attracti,e return 011 the i LweslmeLU aLld a .'tate guaranlee . A 111,"'gli tra'l',fOrrn,.1 i"Il ,,,,d I he 
est"blishmcnl ofref,'rmcd in,tituli,,\1S ,,"ly de, eloped in earn.st aher the de,.lopmellt oftl'" 
Takoradi !lIPP, the tiloctiolli Ll~ of the re~lliatot)' and institllli,,"al f,amewn.-'" have been 
largel) "n'llCc.ssr,,1 in ellabling (be "Un",ti,'n or further illveslmel1l c"pi(al for a<ldi(ional 
gelleralioll cap"";t~ 
Lh"pile f'O"er sector rcforrn.' to spcarhc"d priv"le inve,lmcl11 in generatiol1. (he dwll. nge "I' 
a((rocling iLwestors 011 eq ui table terms remains formidahle. SlLbsequen( (0 the Tako",ji 1111'1'. 
"" ''''" pr i"atel) nl1J'lecd I ,,,~e_sc"lc plant IIl<, beel1 ,-omilli ssiol1ed wid (he di'lribUlion ,ub-
seclor I"" nm he"n primed for private ,ector participatioLl as initially iLltended, The llumber of 
planls Ilut were neg"tidled;" Glmn" bul 'lever re"li""d al f"riod; "Ii.n Iii. IX",er ,,," b,,,l ly 
Llee<led. further 'lLppon, the jlLdgment that the eLlablin~ ellv iromnent for IPPs had LlOt heell 
creal.,!. 
In'liMiollal fmme"orks "l1<1 (heir hmc(;oning have heeLl inepl at secLLrillg a,le'Ill<lIe 
im eslmeTll in and cO Lltracting of ~el1"ratioll capacity, rhe J'<"qlli red governaoce timctiolls to 
iml"o"e ,1"le-o"n"d "Iili(y perronnance have be"" I"dillg in crilica l "rea' ","'i have 
cont rillllted to the prolonged umlerpetiormaLlce ill operatioLl', Inadeqm,te ,Me 'UPIXlrt for the 
ol"era(;on"1 he"IIIL of Ihese ul ilil;es llit, "Iso nol helped 10 ; Illprove tile;r (ec lmical ""d I1mr",;"1 
performance, Despite the establishment nf ;ndepemleLlt reguloto,!' inst itLltim,.; In nversee tI", 
,ector fUllctionillg '\I,d "nsme POSilll'" 101lg-(erm opemti",wl perlormaro;;e, tile emsion of Ih.i, 
indepc,><ience ha, turned lilelll ;Oln blum il1.,trulllents for rub"", .'IWllping Ihe p" l;t;cal 
inleresl, of tile mliLlg party in GI"lLla, rather than ensur iLl!; the ,ustaim,bi lity oftlle ,ector. n,. 
real value nf tariff il1crea"" ha, been er<>ded by il igh i"nalinl1 al'.d, in c"niu"cli nn with 
s(.ep l), i r.:re",illg f ud price" (he g"vernmenl" "Prarel1l need I" proleci consU!TIers from high 
tariff.' thmugil .,uhsid;c, h~, ""m mixcd ,ig'''']' in Iii . n, n(.,1 ,,1' i(s 'I'~ed mi'.''',n In 'Iriv. 
10",",,1 cos l rel1ec(;ve (arifb and m"ke the sector linaociall)' ""llt ill"hle to attract additioLlal 
i ,,"estl1lcnL 
The tr"n,fer "f funclions rel"liLl~ to plarmillg.. proc uremem ami commeting of IXl,,'er sec lor 
illirastructure to the Fnerg~ enlllllli',.,ion fmlll the VilA il as also rc,",lrcd;11 a I",,~ nfciarity 
","I c"nf",i,," ",;Ih respeci (0 "gellcie, that "r" respollSib le lor Ihe allocalion oflle", bllii<1 
OPIXlrt'LLlitie" as well a, procureillem and CnLllroctiL1f\ frameworks for nc" i,,"eslmcm. TI", 
lock nf clcarly "llncille<1 re'pon,;b<lili., f,'r pwc"rement "rod cOTlinleling "I' add;liOTwl 
generation 11a' crc"l.d oPI"orl"n;(ies I;,r ir",om;,tenci., k(ween policies ""d praclice, Tile 
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lad ~f "" ,n(kre L1d~L1I ,ysl,,'n op"mlor llIay aiso l, aH' cO ll trib ul ed 10 Ihe problelll of 
ins ll nicieTli g" Tl<'nHinn capae il)'. II ~vi n l!, (he VRA a, off-t aker" h ilc a( tho s~me ti me all,m inl!, 
it to inn"",IC< Ihinl"parl), "ceo.", mal have res lI lkd ill al Icasl one p"'ieCl (K M I{/.o\ ,hanl i) '"'' 
going ~head d u~ 10 a po« i bl,' contl iel o r ;TIl"T<sl, 
Incl ud~d in lile (iovernme nt or (J h'Hl "'S 2004 n~'" po l iCl rrt~ lIewnrk ["" re [mOl ; n Ihe pow~r 
,",clor. W"' Ih. objecli,e 10 bec,'>! ne a lie' pm"er ex porl ~r hy 200R (KlI, ; 2(05). Ohjeo:;tiw, 
like Ilwsc ha\'c been mi, ,,,d ami ",II CO L1li n ll~ to me m,,,~d unl"" policy. regul ator, ami 
institution"1 frame"ork> are " ]I,'reu 10 T<l p()]xi 10 Ibc <on,j ;lions Ih ,,1 " re r~411 i"~II O promo,e 
IIIC i "' prM ed fut "'ti ~niL1g ~f II", hyb rid power ,nark,,!. .'p,'ciaily wilh Tega rd 10 more dkc liw 
pbnning. pTOCllTe lTl eT1l and co nlrael ing 0 [new power. 
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CHAPTER ..j. 
POWER SECTOR REP'ORM IN COTE I)'IVOIRE 
COle d'hoire i, 011<' of Ih. f"w "'''lnlrie" in Sub_Saharan Aji'ica 11"'1 h~s traniformed ils 
pmwr l",lor 10 a slaKe where Illere i" '10 stale imohclnwi i" lhe dail)' "SI,,('I.I' '!f ulilily 
opera/iom. fwo difficull ro"nd,s of inslilUlion(11 "e/imns hUL'e helped Ille power seclor 10 )',el 
0" lY<Jd 'flier pour r",rjimnances regislert'd i" Ihe 191)1) •. C'nli"," m(1ny oll .. r A/ri<'an 
<'oumrie" where 11110 SO£< are domin,"'/ (1nd /1'1'" op<!rwe on the [>.!ri[lkry. Ille hulk of 
hooria" !"'l>W prodll('lion il (1c('o",,,ed /iir hy 11' I's und Ihe remainder is supplied b)' (1 priwle 
conlraClor Ihal operule,' f"Mer sector assels 0" behalf of II .. lla'" IhY(JUKh a long-Icrm le",e 
agreemelil. Hwce, all power is pmduced hy pri,.ale O{JCralor,I' in (he "edor. Tili" ammgeme,,1 
IJre,I'enl,I' a differem /iwm of tile h)'hrid mOlkl ji'01il fl,," norm in AfriC(1n pm''<!/" "um,"" and 
ailo"s /0.. an imeresli"g "V(1IU(1lion of Inc pdi<y. reguiulm:,' alld i""lillllional fram"works 
Ih'" hm'e h"d u" impacl ,m lhe sec/or's (1biiily 10 "",oum;:e im-ellme,,1 in )',eneralirJn_ 
Wilh Ih" .\'lule '" involvrmem limited 10 overleej"g OpfYalio!1.'J ill "governance role, lhe daily 
(1(X!tulimu of lhe seclor hm'e been depolilici,·"d p(lvi"g Ih" way fi."' incenl il-el m jaciliMe 
perfortl"'''c" impnJl'"mm/., in Ih., ledonical aml/in""'-'i,,1 ~rell'",- Tile powCO' se('lot has "E'I/ 
Iwo round.\' ,,/ in.,/ilUliond r<!jiJrms Illal have maNed il 10 respm,d "w"maf,fy ll-ell 10 IIIe 
challenges of h)'brid mm'k"1l (1mllh,' a/lnJCIicm (if'im-e,wnelU in )',enerulio,,- The deparlm"ms 
n',lpon,lib/" lor planning and r"","-'uremml,' tIIld~r Ihe domin/In! SOt: model in grneralion 
were retained 10 provide a silililarfunciion l>h,'n pri"(1le We/or purli<'ir",lilln was ,",hered in, 
Ih""'(1(i('r /11Ii,e lun('lio,,-, were "imr11y I,'an,,/erred 10 slale agencies r<'pOl'li"g '" Ih .. ,\ finislr), 
(JjEnerl(Y 
The ill>'olvcmenl <1'[wllllliiIJlII 11I1i/liiaieral and bilal"ral d"""lopm,'nI finance inslilUlir!lls hal'e 
sh(1!"d P"IX'w'"menl I"W·(',IS<'.I' of lhew aKeliciel and, in some "'''}~ ' have ensur .. d Ihal Ih,n 
are <>dequale govcmullce mecllanism.' 10 "'ISUO'", Ihal Ih.· singl .. huyer ji-ame",or' respollds 
McqUaid)' 10 lhe challe"g"s of Ih .. markel (1m1 creale.l' luj/ieielil ",,"!ailily 10 stlSlain 
im-elton - i",~,'e.l'1 in Ille generulion .<eclor 
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4.1 Introduction 
The R~I>ublic MC6te Li'[voirc is ono of the pioneors (,n thc '\/';oon "011li""01 w;lll rcs['<'<t tD 
rot"rllls ,n nNwD"" industri •. ' and private pmt icipal,C4' in pllb lic infra'tmctllrc. A, rar ha,,~ '" 
14.IY. hotc"c thc (O lllltry', it-.:lopoMc,\o;;e. Iho cily or Abidiao I"",,,,!,.,d an imernatil'llal t~ll(kr 
(to F rench CDmpani~s) lD manage II", city', wmer distrih uti on .'ystem (I ."vi~lIo I 999:83). Ilw 
CDo lrac·1 w,,, a""" rd,-d 10 S/)"i~~" d'A mcnagclL1e11l Urbain ~t Rural (SA U R) of Fr"nc~ who. ill 
!Wil, c't"hlishcd COle d'[voire', lirst privale \\'ator di,~ribllli(", "'>1"pall). SODECl (S<.>c. i ~te 
d,- Dislribution d'b", dc COIC d'I"Dire) to provid~ ""ne r serv,c~s ,n AhiLijarl."" The city', 
wotOI' "."",~, ,h()",~Li signilic" nl illlpr"'~lllem, from tho predo u, 'Ute·corl~f('II..J lllility ,md 
thc Outoom. or the "ew loog-Ierm I"a," agreemcnt was regarded as largely ,",ce<sful. In 
1~74. "hon the central gm.rnllle nt ""LLIll<"Li I'CSI)()II,ih il,ty ror ~hc "'aler ,"otnr, it was dccKled 
10 c,' rand ~he wa~.r leas~ ab'rceL1WnllO ",,,·.r olher IVDr;"" citic, as w~11 and SODECI , igrled 
a 15-y~ar ica", agl'e~lllcnt with tl,., (iowmmcnt ofCi) lo d'[vo;rc, Th. oomp,my ,usrai""d a 
,~.ad) iocrea,ing porrorm,mee. pT<",;ding high walel 4UJli ly, attaining h i ~h workcr 
prt>d"ctivity. ochieving high coll~ctiDn rates trom pflvale (ons umer.'. aliLi roducing s),~cm 
lo"c, 10 a mini~ll1m /I, 0 rc, " I~. Ih e ,c>n~me~ '"'' rCL1ew~d in 1~87 ror a furtil er twenty y~",s 
([lay Ii" ~OOI), 
Cote d'ivoire w".s not unly the first African country to im ite I,,"ivatc -"cct'" paniciralioL1 in i~s 
",Wer se'e IOr.;1 W", "Iso ~he r,,,~ Alri",o oounlry ID i11lrod llce private sector par<ic ipat ion in it, 
powcr .'~ctor in I 'J9(), "hen th~ Ill'ltlage ment of th~ country's olectri city uli I i I Y "os h,,,,dcd 
('wr W a pri "ale ('peralc>r, By 19'94, [!,!" wcr~ ' tarting to contrihllt~ 10 tho countr)', 
olectndt) ~cnoration ond, by 2007. I ~I" ,,,,,,,,,,ntcd ror nearly IwO third s of nat;onal 
dectricity prodlictiDn, By 2008, Ihe Government Df Cille d'lvD;re \\'''' also in Ihe pre"'." 01' 
prcporing bids for a third privatcly controctoLi p""cr plant. J(Jr "hieh c·ol1Str<lCtiun i, 
""h..Ju led 1(' , Iart later in 200'l, 
l)c'rit. thc pr<'gros> mado in Ihc p(,,,"or Se'e lor (lVer thc I",t Iwo d",·ade.'. ret,,,ms Liid not 
come wiliMll " "nc challengc" Th" C(' Ul l1Ty ha, c.'re ri~",,~d s<v~re dro ll glm .. sign ificant 
curn",oy d~valumion illlmedim~ly prc-I!'!'" pDlit ic" l unrest. and ~ ,u,pcn, ion or 0 brge part 
Df ~venlte hom pDwer sales for an eMended I"'riod 
;0, UtlTilThen, Ir",litiorx.ll} Hlllilicipalitie> h.d bee n "" I'"",;b l. loc Ih,' u" "'"'er '"1'1'1)' ,crvicc> bu, 
due <0 i"'LlIT"iellt nll.,><;ol ""d «<IUlie"1 "''"''",,", ",ere lI,,"bl<' ,,, "I'cro'e 'he '),Slclm cftk.,ntIY.1] 
I[\'~' pmvi,i"" for '},'l'm ekp""'ioo (h:eTf20()O:5). 
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rhi, d~\PI~T ~\'ajuates th~ I.ori" n expo..,.'.""" ill attr""lil1!; inveslinCtll f'" gctlCm\ion " '1(1 is 
l"lLctlLrC{i into 1'0 '" I" ""· 1 1ll",~dialcly "n~r th is br ier introdoclion, un 0\,"";"", is g;,'en oj 
Ih~ d",,(rici ly "'ppi y ind ust ry, the ma in swkehol d~" and the reto n", thal have laken riacc 10 
(l~t", Thereatier. !he 'lLb",q~nt ,"ct iot! ("'m ill the I~~' Ihal ha,,~ "'rriie{i p<Jwcr to lh~ 
~"lion.a l gri,i sin<;. reform, w.r~ in i lim~d in lh~ s.elor, In the tinal sectiol1, an anal},,,, j, 
made of the faClors .... hich have conir ih"lCd W. or b",," him"'r~d. pri,"te inv~'tm~nl in 
ge neration carac ity. Th. spec itic challenge, th ai "";se in hyorid r<mcT 1ll"""Cl "ro i de n! ilied 
The i11l(mn"I;011 pr,,,ented il1lhi, charie r d,",,, on dClaiie<1 ;,"er- jew, ,,·jlll , cO' 'taKcnui<lcrs 
in ,he Ivorian j""wr "'ctor {luring a country vi,it. Inter.iew, wer~ conducl~d "ith 
repre,.mative, from the Mini<lry of ~!ine, an d HlCrgy i" Cotc d'ivoirc, lhc Compagnie 
IvoiricntlC d'FI",viciIC ((,IE). Ihe COlTlp");nie !"oiri~nne d~ l'rod'K'tion d'EI .clric i l~ 
(CI~REL). A/ilo F.nergic, and Ihe A" lori l~ "mion"l~ d~ Regul"tion (A"ARE). Sul>s. quenl 
corresponMnce was conducted to clarifY di,clMio n points and to prohc hLtthcr i"",,, wilh 
Ihe "Nwl]l entioned r~pres~mati.~s. iocluding stall from the Worl J !lallk that have heen 
involved ill, and ohserYed, the ,. torm, in Cote d·lvo ire. ThrolLghout the tc'{[, st" ,elllll,\e" 
ha>c 'l<JI """n id~nlili~d by n"me bllt only by organismiona l "rtili"tion. 
4.2 The Ivorian Ele("trici ty Supply Industr)' 
From", early", 1952 and lLntil 1'J90. the 'tale o"ned "Iil il}, Encrg ic Ek clri qlLe <Ie Cole 
d'lvo ire (EFe l), e~erci,e<1 " 'nonofl<Jly OvCr Ihe gencmlion. transmi"ion "nd distribution or 
power in the COlLlll')·."'· From the pcriod hdorc in(\ercndcncc unlil 19811. Ihc ulil ity orcratcd 
rC:l>onah ly we ll "ilto rd"livdy );",--,<1 technica l "nd fil""C ial performance and few inst itulional 
protMm,. ~oor rcr formance ' tarle d 10 cree p i" dluing Ille early 1980, ami "ors~""d untillh. 
eml or th"t <Ieca<ie. Sinc~ 1<)'1() , rej'orm, ill the rower ,eclor ilave ilelped to put lhe lLti lit} 011 a 
firmer fool ing with 'ignilic"nt pri v"te p"nicip"tion. 
4.2.1 G("nrratiO Il 
At th~ tim,> of Cote d- I .oir" s imlependence ill I <)60 the installed gcnemtion ~apaCil} "''"' "I 
35MW. Alier {he country" i ndepen den ~~, pl"n, ,,·cre pUl in placc to <i<"clop Cole d'ivoirc', 
h)dm 1l<Jlential. DI"ing th~ 197{h;, however, most oj' the gro" th w as attrihlLted to 
"" Pr"" to 11", 19«"- ",,,in mllil 'oi ral 'dc, we .. e respo",ible for electrical gC'lCra!iu<l ",,,I <i i,lri" LL,i"" 
{L"'gno 1'l99:g.l) 
'" 
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Energy 2006). IPPs, therefore, accounted for approximately two thirds of national production 
in 2006. Table 4.1 gives a breakdown of the installed capacity in Cote d'Ivoire as of2007. 
Table 4.1: Installed Electricity capacity in COte d'Ivoire 
Plant Year Installed Capacity Type 
Ayame I 1959 20 Hydro 
Ayame II 1965 30 Hydro 
Kossou 1972 174 Hydro 
Taabo 1979 210 Hydro 
8uyo 1980 165 Hydro 
Faye 1983 5 Hydro 
Vridi I 1984 88 Thermal 
CIPREIIPP 1995 210 Thermal 
Azito IPP 2000 300 Thermal 
Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy (2008) 
Despite the recent growth in thermal power generation resources, hydro remains an important 
actual and potential source for electricity production in Cote d'Ivoire. The state is presently 
planning a new hydro plant, Soubre, with a nominal capacity of 300-350MW, which is 
expected to be bid out to the private sector and be the country's first hydro IPP. This project 
has, however. met with considerable delays due to the civil conflict and is now expected to be 
operational only in 2014. provided negotiations are successful (IWP&DC 2006; Ministry of 
Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). 
Meanwhile, as of 2007, the state has engaged the two existing IPP consortia in negotiations 
for additional generation. CIPREL has already started the conceptual development of the next 
phases of thermal capacity. Should the company be given the go-ahead to develop the next 
tranche of thermal capacity. it will consist of another IIOMW open cycle gas turbine by 
General Electric, which would constitute the third phase of the project (with phases one and 
two detailed later in section 4.4). A fourth phase is planned where exhaust gases from the two 
existing IIOMW turbines will be combined to be used in a steam cycle, adding another 
IIOMW to the plant's output. If this is realised, CIPREL would be among the largest gas-
fired IPPs in West Africa with an output of 540MW. The state has also been in discussions 
with Azito Energie to expand its capacity through the development of a steam cycle, which 
would use the exhaust gases from its two gas turbines. 
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4.2.2 Transmission and Distribution 
Cote d'Ivoire is electrically linked to its immediate neighbours through regional transmission 
interconnections. l07 While coping with a stagnant domestic demand market between 1999 and 
2004, the state has benefited from these regional transmission exchanges by exporting power 
to Ghana, Togo, Benin, Mali and Burkina Faso (Am una, Modey et al. 2002; Ahoussou 
2005).108 In fact, Cote d'Ivoire has gone from a net importer of power in the 1980s and early 
1990s to being the main electricity exporter in the West African region. In 2005, more than a 
quarter of the national production was exported to the country's neighbors, and it is the 
government's policy to maintain the country's status as a power provider to the region 
(Ministry of Mines and Energy 2006). 
Although regional power exchanges allow Cote d'lvoire's neighbours to benefit, a large pat1 
of the country's population has not been fortunate enough to gain access to electricity. In 
2005, roughly a quarter of the rural population had access to electricity compared to 77 per 
cent in urban centres, with Abidjan having an access rate of 88 per cent (AIDB/OECD 
2006:240). Roughly 72 per cent of villages in the country have access to electricity; however, 
due to low penetration rates this equates to only 30 per cent of the total population having 
access (Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007).109 Although rural electrification plans 
were initiated in the early 1980s, serious difficulties experienced in the management of the 
sector, the economic crisis of the 1980s and the severe droughts forced the suspension of 
these programmes for several years (Diaz and Perault 2002). The rural electrification 
programmes resumed again only in 1991, gaining momentum when a Special Group for Rural 
Electrification, GSPER (Groupement Special Pour l'Electrification Rurale) was formed in 
March 1995 to oversee implementation. After the 1998 restructuring (described in section 
4.3), an Ivorian Electricity Operations Company, SOPIE (Societe d'Operation Ivoirienne 
d'Electricite), was mandated to oversee the implementation of the rural electritication 
programme as part of its mandate of network planning (Vanie 2000). 
107 The country operates a transmission system at the 225kV and 90kV level (Vei 1999). 
108 After the political coup in December 1999, demand for electricity was dampened due to the socio-
political tensions that erupted in the country. 
109 Despite the seemingly low access rates, they represent a steady increase in electrification since the 
country's independence in 1960 when only 14 towns and villages had access. This number increased to 
108 in 1970,475 in 1980, 1027 in 1990, and 1400 in 1997 when electrification was expanded to cover 
all of the sixteen administration regions in Cote d'lvoire (N'Guessan 2000:27). 
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4.2.3 Fuelling the Power Sector 
Petroleum discoveries in Cote d' Ivoire were made as early as 1952 when geographical 
surveys were conducted by the Bureau de Recherche Petrolieres (BRP) and the Societe 
Africaine des Petroles (SAP). Drilling continued until 1962 when these organisations 
withdrew after drilling ten dry wells onshore (UNDP/World Bank 1985:13). Offshore 
discoveries have occurred since the 1950s, but these were limited until the 1970s when large 
reserves of oil were found. Although exploration efforts first discovered large reserves of 
natural gas, along with oil, in the 1980s, it was not until the mid-1990s that the natural gas 
resource was developed for power generation (EIA 2008). Since 1990, with assistance from 
the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Japanese government, the 
Government of Cote d'ivoire has sustained interest in the country's hydrocarbon sector with 
exploration incentives and promotion campaigns (World Bank 1995c:3). Both IPPs use 
natural gas as the primary energy for power production along with the state owned Vridi I, 
and presently the electricity supply industry (ESI) constitutes about 97 per cent of the national 
gas demand (ANARE pers.com. 2007). 
It is estimated that Cote d'ivoire's proven gas reserves (at 1.1 trillion cubic feet) are sufficient 
to fire the existing plants for the next two decades. The plan for new plants, including those 
noted in section 4.2.1, however, reduces the proven reserve life to approximately 10 years 
(AIDB/OECD 2004; Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). Thus, either significant 
growth in the country's gas exploration is needed or other alternatives must be identified to 
fuel the growing number of generators. 
It is envisaged that the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP), which will distribute Nigerian 
gas to Ghana, Benin and Togo, may eventually be extended to other coastal West African 
countries, including Cote d'ivoire. This could help relieve the state of its obligations to ensure 
that domestic gas fields remain dedicated to power production and IPPs, for which it (the 
state) assumes the fuel risk. In addition, the extension of the pipeline would also afford Cote 
d'ivoire the opportunity to sell its gas to neighbouring countries. 11o In the meantime, that is, 
110 In April 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between Cote d'Ivoire and 
Ghana for a feasibility study to build a gas pipeline between the two countries (NIGC 200 I). After the 
coup d'etat in December 1999, progress on the MoU came to a halt, and Ghana decided to put all its 
efforts behind the development of the W AGP. 
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until such time that W AGP provides a viable alternative, domestic exploration efforts 
continue. 
Figure 4.2: Cote d'ivoire Natural Gas Production (1995-2006) 
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Source: International Energy Agency (2007) 
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, gas production increased steadily from the mid-1990s until the 
end of 1999 when a coup stopped most significant exploration and development projects in 
the sector. The domestic gas industry, which to date has been critical in containing electricity 
prices by avoiding more costly imports, is made up of three main suppliers: Devon, Canadian 
Natural Resources (CNR) and Foxtrot (with Bouygues and EDF as shareholders).111 All three 
firms contract directly with the state, which manages fuel contracts for all plants, including 
the two IPPs. 
4.2.4 Tariffs and Revenues 
Tariffs are set by the state, primarily by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, taking into 
account an array of factors such as the financial viability of the power sector and consumer 
affordability. Tariff setting has generally sought to achieve a balance between revenue and 
III Devon operates two offshore gas fields, viz. Lion and Panthere in Jacqueville, Foxtrot International 
operates the Foxtrot gas field (the largest gas field in Cote d'lvoire) in the same zone, and CNR 
operates the Espoir field west of Abidjan (CIPREL 2006). The Espoir field operated by CNR provides 
both oil and gas whereas the fields developed by Foxtrot and Devon provide only gas (ANARE 
pers.com. 2007). Devon was formerly known as Ocean Energy and Foxtrot was known as Apache. 
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total costs in the sector, including provision for rural electrification, network expansion, debt 
service and payment of the various operators in the sector, although more recently, revenues 
have been insufficient to cover rural electrification, transmission network expansion, and 
other large capital projects in the sector (N'Guessan 2000:30-31). 
Electricity tariffs in Cote d'lvoire were increased in 2001 (ANARE pers.com. 2007; CIE pers. 
com. 2007) when the sector saw a cumulative deficit due, in part, to a tariff structure that was 
not cost reflective and arrears in payments by Ghana's Volta River Authority (AIDB/OECD 
2004 ).112 Since the 200 I tariff adj ustment, however, no further action was taken to reflect the 
increased cost of production, until February 2008, when tariffs were increased to partially 
reflect increasing fuel costs. l13 In spite of the increase, tariffs are still considered low and 
ultimately do not reflect the LRMC; while operating costs of the utility, private producers and 
fuel suppliers are covered, revenue from tariffs does not cover the cost of additional 
investment in infrastructure (Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). Finally, it 
should be noted that the government subsidises consumption for all residential customers 
(regardless of income) up to 80 kWh over two months, which amounts to a rate of roughly 35 
FCFA/kWh (AIDB/OECD 2006).114 
In addition to the relatively low tariffs, since the period of civil unrest which started in 
September 2002, roughly 15 per cent of the utility's revenue has not been forthcoming; 
customers residing in the northern area, controlled by the rebels, have ceased paying their 
bills. This has resulted in large losses for the utility and edged the electricity sector's finances 
into the red for the first time since privatisation (AIDB/OECD 2004). Following the ceasefire 
peace agreement (signed in early 2007), money is slowly starting to trickle in again. However, 
a significant turnaround in the situation is only expected after a prolonged period of political 
stability (Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). 
As previously noted, Cote d'Ivoire has benefited from its neighbours' electricity supply 
crises. During this time of revenue loss and stagnant growth in domestic demand, greater 
112 The tariff basket was reorganised to make tariffs more socially acceptable after the 1999 coup d'etat, 
which involved a 10 per cent weighted increase (ANARE pers.com. 2007). 
II, The price of gas is normally indexed to the price of crude oil and is paid for in foreign currency. [n 
2001. the average price of crude oil was US$23 a barrel. [n January 2008, it was more than US$80 a 
barrel. 
114 I€ = 656 eFA francs. 
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amounts of energy were available for export, with payment for electrical power made in hard 
currency. In 2005, exports totalled 1397 GWh (Ministry of Mines and Energy 2006). This 
nearly equalled the guaranteed capacity of CIPREL, which is 1410 GWh per year. 
4.3. Power Sector Reforms 
Private participation in Cote d'ivoire's power sector may be attributed to a number of factors 
including its strained economic conditions, and its long relationship with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Nevertheless, like its neighbour, Ghana, it was a 
severe drought that played a significant role in prompting the country to embark on reforms. 
4.3.1 Drivers of Reform 
Although the EECI had operated reasonably well until 1980, a series of events adversely 
affected the financial and technical performance of the utility. Severe droughts between 1983 
and 1985 led to a significant reduction in sales and put the utility in a precarious financial 
situation. The prolonged drought undermined peaking capacity as the minimum levels in the 
reservoirs were depleted and could not support peak loads (UNDP/World Bank 1985:x). In 
addition to the low sales associated with the drought, the acquisition of four emergency 
turbines, exacerbated the already dire fiscal state of the utility.115 Despite tariffs being 
115 During the first two decades after Cote d'Ivoire's independence, the country enjoyed strong 
economic growth, averaging 7 per cent per annum. Between 1972 and 1980, demand for electricity 
grew at an average rate of 13 per cent per annum, mainly driven by industry and commerce, which 
represented an increase of 14.5 per cent in the medium to high voltage categories. This increase in 
demand was met by an increasing contribution of hydro-electricity. By 1981, hydro generation 
responded to roughly 80 percent of national demand compared to 30 per cent in 1972 (UNDP/World 
Bank 1985:7). Economic growth and electricity demand stopped when a worldwide recession in the 
early 1980s impeded the growth of Ivorian exports. A precipitous drop in the country's primary export 
commodities, viz. cocoa and coffee, led to a sharp decrease in government revenues, which were 
normally accumulated, from tariffs levied on external trade. Coffee and cocoa dropped by more than 50 
percent in 1980 from the peak reached two years earlier (UNDP/World Bank 1985: 1). By 1983, the 
country had experienced three years of negative GDP growth totalling a 20 per cent decrease in GDP 
per capita between 1980 and 1983, and, by 1983, the country's external debt equalled its GDP. The 
effects of the drought in 1983 resulted in an over-reliance on imported petroleum products for 
electricity production and increasing fuel prices contributed to the fiscal problems of the EECI, 
accounting for a major portion of the consolidated debt of the public sector (UNDP/World Bank 
1985: 10). In 1984, the government announced a series of austerity measures aimed at increasing the 
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adjusted upward in 1984 to offset the increasing operating and fuel expenditures, the utility 
could not cope with the financial strain that the drought and global economic downturn had 
on the power sector (UNDP/World Bank 1985:iv). 
In addition, the power sector's institutional arrangements were considered too weak to cope 
with strategic issues, especially in the context of the unfavourable conditions that the sector 
was in at the time. A joint UNDP/World Bank report noted that "The energy sector in the 
Ivmy Coast suffers FOIn a weak and poorly coordinated institutional inji-astructure. No one 
institution has been given primary responsibility for energy planning and policy form ulation. 
Areas (?f responsibility are divided among various ministries. Institutional issues involving 
coordination among public and semi-public enterprises need to be resolved, particularly in 
the key suh-sectors, power and hydrocarbons" (1985:xviii). 
From 1985 to 1990, a number of multilateral and bilateral lending agencies strongly 
recommended restructuring of the EECI. While management overlooked most of the 
recommendations for improved financial management, the Government of Cote d'lvoire did 
institute legal changes to the ESI through the enactment of law No. 85-583 of 29 July 1985 
(Republic of Cote d'Ivoire 1985)."6 
The law ended the state monopoly in generation and authorised the entry of IPPs provided 
that electricity was generated and distributed locally using production sources and facilities 
authorised by the state (articles 3 and 8c). The law also made provision for concession 
agreements for private operators to manage the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity (article 5). 
Interestingly, since at the time the most pressing problem was the lack of funds to sustain the 
power sector, the law obliged the sector to balance tariffs with all charges (articles 8a and 9), 
including payments to private operators and charges for network expansion and 
electrification. N'Guessan (2000:33) notes that, "The only specific goals assigned to power 
sector reform were to stop the /inancialmismanagement and restore .financial equilihrium in 
fiscal status of the public sector. They included cuts in government spending, wage freeze provisions 
for public servants, and restructuring of various tariffs and prices (UNDP/World Bank 1985:2). 
116 Interestingly, the law made provision for private sector participation in the ESI a few years before 
the UK, considered one of the earliest reform pioneers, enacted legislation to privatise its power sector. 
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the sector". Despite the legal changes introduced to usher in reforms, it took a further five 
years before structural changes to the power sector were realised. 
By 1988, the country was forced to suspend its electrification programme due to insufficient 
funds and, despite having amongst the highest tariffs in the world at that time, with the 
organisation's losses almost equalling its operating revenues, it could not repay its debts and 
had difficulty paying its workforce (Diaz and Perault 2002:7; Jones, Jammal et ai. 2002: 1-13). 
In 1990, the EECI's debt totalled about US$350m; its billing rate was under 85 per cent, and 
the billing recovery rate stood at 70 per cent (ANARE 2005b). The World Bank's Staff 
Appraisal Report (1995c:5) states that by the end of the 1980s, the EECI was insolvent with 
losses totalling more than US$240m. The multiple causes included the country's economic 
crises, 117 overexpansion, and mismanagement in the electricity sector. I 18 
By this time, pressure was also mounting on the state to take action to address the 
mismanagement of public enterprises. Being one of the largest state-owned companies, the 
restructuring of the EECI was one of the most important priorities for multilateral lending 
agencies, including the World Bank, the main lenders to the Ivorian power sector (N'Guessan 
2000:32). 
With no domestic financial reserves to spare, the country turned to the World Bank and the 
IMF for assistance. On the bank's recommendation, it was decided that Cote d'Ivoire would 
engage private sector participation and reform and restructure its electricity industry. Hopeful 
of replicating the success that had been seen in the country's water sector, the president acted 
swiftly and started negotiations with Bouygues of France in May 1990. Within six months an 
agreement was reached with Bouygues and on 20 October of that same year the agreement 
was signed for a new private operator to take charge of the management of the national utility. 
Societe d'Amenagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR - which was involved in a long-term lease 
agreement in the water sector), an affiliate of the Bouygues Group, together with Electricite 
de France (EDF) agreed to take over the management of the utility for a period of IS years, 
117 At the time, cocoa and other export commodity prices dropped sharply, and the country's debt 
situation made it difficult for the state to aid the utility financially. 
118 Brew-Hammond (1997:309, 314) notes that the financial losses of the EECI were tolerated and 
overlooked for a long period since its politically powerful CEO enjoyed protection afforded to him by 
his close relationship with the president. 
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with the contract renewable twice for three years (Ahoussou, 2005).119 Compagnie Ivoirienne 
d' Electricite (CIE) was formed with SAUR and EDF assuming 51 per cent of the shares to 
have controlling rights in the company (Fall 2004). Of the remaining 49 per cent, 20 per cent 
is retained by the Government of Cote d'Ivoire and 29 per cent by private and employee 
investors (Yei 1999; NIGC 2001). 
The scope of CIE's contractual obligations included the operation and maintenance of the 
utility's assets, but the company was not obliged to undertake major refurbishments and 
capital expansions - these responsibilities remain with the state. The turnaround in 
performance with CIE was almost immediate with no retrenchments happening during or after 
the takeover. 120 
Although the private companies brought in the necessary funds for the utility to operate 
satisfactorily again, helped in part by improved hydrology, the threat of adverse weather 
conditions and inadequate supply remained, with the utility operating just one thermal plant at 
the time. In keeping with the overall reform and restructuring goal first espoused in 1985, in 
1994, the government turned to Bouygues, and negotiated Cote d'Ivoire's and Sub-Saharan 
Africa's first IPP, Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production d'Electricite (CIPREL). IPPs came at 
a critical juncture in 1995, which saw the culmination of the number of events; the president 
was to stand for re-election in October 1995 and his goal was to ensure the security of 
electrical supply for the elections since power outages were one of the main causes of the 
social unrest which had erupted in certain areas in Abidjan l21 ; substantial quantities of natural 
gas were found off the Ivorian coast which, instead of being flared, could be used for thermal 
power generation; and the four turbines at the Yridi plant could be rapidly converted to burn 
natural gas (N'Guessan 2000:36). Less than two years after CIPREL was commissioned, the 
government contracted a second IPP, Azito, to satisfy the country's electricity demand that 
was fuelled by bullish economic growth. 122 
119 A new contract was signed between the Government of Cote d'ivoire and CIE for another 15 years, 
on October 12,2005 (CIE Annual Report 2005). 
120 Jones, Jammal and Gokgur (2002:1-6) elaborate how the company retrained excess female workers 
as bill collectors on the premise that it was hard to say no to a young woman. 
121 Any unplanned outages led to pervasive load shedding commensurate with that experienced during 
the droughts of 1983 and 1984. 
122 In December 1999, however, the country experienced a coup, after which economic decline, 
political unrest and instability followed. It is only since 2004 that Cote d'ivoire has seen positive 
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4.3.2 Institutional Reforms 
With the ClE assuming responsibility for the management and operation of the national 
utility, the role of the EECl was reduced to: oversight and expansion of the assets; of the 
technical operations of ClE; and management of the finances and general accounting of the 
power sector. To this end, the Government of Cote d'lvoire set up three structures: an 
oversight organisation to supervise and coordinate the activities of the ClE; a technical 
commission responsible for preparing tender documents, evaluating submissions, and drafting 
contracts 123; and a national supervisory function to oversee the activities of the EECI relating 
to engineering projects in the power sector (N'Guessan 2000:41). 
Given that the finances of the power sector was the main driver of reform, on 28 April 1994 
the Government of Cote d'lvoire enacted a further decree for the establishment of the 
National Electric Energy Fund, FNEE (Fonds Nationale de l'Energie Electrique), with the 
primary purpose of ensuring that the finances of the power sector were healthy and that 
charges were covered by tariffs (FNEE 1994).124 The reporting structure of the power sector 
was also modified to enable the Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Finance to have joint 
responsibility for the sector: the Ministry of Energy to ensure that the technical planning and 
operations of the sector are adequately provided for, and the Ministry of Finance to ensure its 
financial stability. 
In May 1994, another department was created within the Ministry of Energy to implement the 
national policy for the development and management of electricity and renewable energy. The 
economic growth, and the government negotiating additional IPP expansion (2008), as described 
further in section 4.2.1. 
123 This commission comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Energy's National Bureau of 
Technical Studies and Development, BNETD (Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques et de 
Developpement) and the EECI. 
124 The FNEE was incorporated as part of the Caisse Autonome d' Am0l1issement (CAA); a state bank 
charged with raising foreign currency and the management of the country's foreign debt. The main 
purposes of the FNEE were to ensure the payment of EECI debt, raise funds for the development of the 
power sector, and to oversee payments made to the state by CIE. The FNEE was administered by a 
Managing Committee comprised of officials from the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Finance, the 
CAA, the BNETD, and the EECI, with further representatives from the Ministry of Energy, the 
BNETD, the EECI, and the CIE forming a technical committee which assisted the Managing 
Committee on an advisory basis (N'Guessan 2000:41). 
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Elecnicity and Renewahlc Enel'RY DepartL"cnl. DIoIoN (I" Di,.clion de rt:n"'gie Elect,iqlLe et 
de, b)<",gie> NOLL' .Iles). had a number of re'IIOmi bi lilie, in~1 "ding; compiling and updating 
the natior",1 energ: progra"",,..; c,caling ",xl maintaining a dmarn.'" on en"'gy: definiTlg a'Kj 
ov .. "e .. ing a stratcgy for I>OW'" sect", deveiopmeTlt: drafting rLiles "f ,,[X'raling in the powe, 
,ector: o,·cr;.ceing "TKi i"'plcme~ ling Ihe various ag,.ement, between the government ",.J 
op<",mors in the sector: con1l"ihulln~ to the sect"" ., flTlaTlci"1 IlHlTl"gcmcnt by ""i,ling in 
>cUing I",i[f,; promoting investment in Ihe Ixmer scctor: outliTling a f''''"c'",rk f,,,-
imernati"'lal coo[lCratioll with "',£,<,CI I" i Iltc"'onnc~li"n "f nmional transmi" ion networb in 
tnc Wcsi African r .. gion; promoting <"ncrgy COnscl'vation and Ihe u."'ge of rCT-.:wabie encrgics; 
and enslLring thaI the Tlalioll"1 cncrgy programme ,cmain, in h",mony "itb envi,onmcntal 
1''''lc~li''n "b]igaliom (N'Guessan 2000:·j2). 
T hc M ini,I,)' of Ionc,~' wenl furtbe' in \-lJTch 1995 by .stahlisll ing the S[X'ci"1 C:rolLP for thc 
Rmal EI.ctrilicJti"'l Programme, C:SPER (Cror,pc Spcd"k I'rngm mmc t:lcCI,i licati", 
Rurale). "b"se Ill"in objcctive ",a, to crcate ttle best couditions for the count,,'s rural 
electrification pro!',mmmc. Among othcr ""tivilie,. IIli, gn,,,p "'"' charged with pl"'ming and 
execu ling the "",lUal activitie, of the ,ural electrificatioTl pr"!',mmme: a,>cs; iTl R bid,jing 
documents and c""tract,: I'ro~"',i[(g C"TllraC1s; ",xl "wrsccing p"yrT1enb ma<1e W c()(llactors 
(NGue"an 2000:·12).'" 11 also estJhlishcd Ihe E,"'r.'l..1 Project C,roup. C,PE (C"KLPC l'rojcl 
EncrgiCj. 10 o,'Cr;ce It-.: fm""Cillg fr!)llllhc World l3ank for powe, ,Cctor projects (including 
d-.: "'Jlltlt,y', li"t [PPj and to coordinate the xliom of ali the technic" I "'R"ni,ations "itll ill 
the scopc covercd by It-.: V,'",ld I3Jnk', IDA loan. By June in thm same year. tile CPE 
activities were c},]1Il.TlJed 10 incllLde: tl>~ cvaluali"" of all problems rdillcd I!) cap""ily and 
adc<I<HICY of g.')<,,'"tion and Imnsmi",ion i Ilfrastructure : the su[X']"vi.,i"'l of issllC.' rel"tin!', to 
iml>o'tJt io1l alld e"IIOrt"lion "f cleClricily; and p,""viding "dvi," 10 thc g!)WmmClll on all 
h,,-.:, rclal ing 10 Ihc ]l<'" C, sec l", (2000:·13 I. '" 
'" 10C GSPER coml'ri .. d of oft;ci.l, from tho \1inist,}" of F "",,'gy. tho Min;slry ofl'in"" •• ,he DLLN. 
lhe 1l"·EDT. lhe ClE, 'he EEl!. tile gov<mm<llf, Puhlic ",,',,'o1<n', ])IP [Direction Im'<>t""01 on1< 
Public,) and PlIhl,c M..-ht>. ])MP (n;",ctioll rl .. Ma<d";s Publi"l der"'I01.o" .• 'fid ,he Cu"",,,s 
office. 
'06 Wilhin ,i, month, tho (il'E had " 'olwo Irom., 10m"",.,)" >1nlClure i",o "I""",.,nent mgo"i,ati<." 
",ilh repre,ent"ion Ii'om 'ho ~f,ni>1ry ofFnergy. Ih< tF\·!:'t D. lhe LLCl. 'he ClL and PLTI(X:l. 
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Fi~ul" ~.J: Stru'-turo of [JR- huri"" 1',,>1,,- Sed", "I' lI"lil D,o,-,'mb.,,- 19'~8 
; , 
s.,,,,,,.,, V. i ( I W'I: 1 ~ ) and N'Q".",all (20ilO:44) 
It ,,,on became denr to the ,{ate th at govcmmenml orgn ni ,"!i"",, which h.,1 bee n ~, Iabli,h"d 
to malmg. Ihe po,," r 'eclor "'~r. num e",,,, wilh overl"p' in their exec"l i,.. and governanc. 
fUllctions . as illustrated in r ig ll .. ~_] In ad dition_ "hil. th ere was cons iderable ()versight ror 
(X)W"' '"ClOT fuoclion, ill rhemy. il wa' ()~~n confLlsing as In who accepled ",erall 
re,po nsibility for each governance tillle lion. N'U uessan (2000:~]A8i l);)le, that (lie 
profc,,;on"is who ",C rO in charge of and p"ni, ipalc<i ill Ino'l of loc," organisali ons we'. 
oneil the sam" P",wns from the ~ I iniSlr)' of Ene rgy. the EECI ",Id th e ElNETD. O"e observer 
in 100 power '"C lOT noled Ihal '-e<l<'h pri"""" operator ",n li/erally pid rile f!,overnmelll b("~,, 
,.ilh It'ilidl it i.< cllmjor/ub/e in order 10 .wlve il.< prahlem wilh Iii" {,,,,,",,/ p<",I'ihh ri,,*", 
(&lj.kumhe"" ami N"lTo/ 2002; 1 23 J, 
By i '1<17. 11 Ie need for " more stre"mli ned i '''til<J tion"1 fr"me" "r, in lh,' ro"~r ""elor saw th" 
gov.,nm<Jnt making plans for an organisalional o,e rhaul .'" 011" thm sought t() ,eparate the 
re~ll l"l"ry "IXI ",,"Nighl f,,,'cti()n, from thc managemcnt "nd oper"lion ofille physic" i "ss"ls. 
On i (, I >Cco mi:>er I '19~. II,., governmen l " d,, ~"d a new in,1 it lIt ion"i """ng"ment ji,. the power 
'$:;lor. ", d"picte,1 in ~ig"re 4.4, " hich made provi,ion for lh,,'" slale ag" ncl ~s th rough 
decree No, 98-725. 
'" A World !Jan, fin"need >Iudy ",os jn ilioled 10 eron a more >tillable jnslilul;onai arrangemenll!)T the 
1>0"'" "'tlor. 
'" 
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Fi~"r< 4.~, Stn"'t,, ... , of the huri"n Pu,..er Sec,"1' "in« [locomhcl' Iq9S 
Firstly, the "ational Electrje it~ SeClOr ReglLlatory AlLthority. ANARC (AlLtmilt' 'iationale de 
Regulation. de I' I'lemie ite). was c."al1li.'hed tn reglL late Ihe sector, t!l be an an)ill'atnr hctwecil 
,cct!lr partic ipan ts, and In l>rotect the intere't' of c!lmume", Unlike traditional el""trie ity 
regulator>. ANA R f. has Lln tariff stn ing 1"'"e", and it' mandatc in tcrms of priec rcgulation. 
i.' limil ed 10 the advisory r!lle that il Ilbys 10 the "I inistry of Mine, and Energc,'. Second. an 
f.iectricity Scct'" A"ct ~Ianagcmcill C"mpany, SO(jEn; (Sc",i.l" de (jestioll du Palrimoine 
du Sccteur d. l'Elemicit';). was establi shed to mauage the state's ass~ts in the [lOWel ,ectnr. 
tn oversee all d ","''''ge Ihe flna""es of th. sector, 10 raise "'Ilital for power ,eclOr 
i",cstment'. and to ensure financ ial c·ontrol in til e sector (S()(JFPf. 2()()~) 
At the <ame tim e that th e new institutio nal arrangements "ere ushered ill, th e slate al« , 
ad0pled a new priority payment order fi,lT operalors in the sector. whic h was ad mi nistered hy 
soc,rpl'. Thi, Ltvour, rrivate operal ors si"ce Ihey [,a," first claim t" fund, from the 
revenues c·olleeted by the lIf., as ill u.,trated in FiglLre 4..1 A fter the private utility le."ee. ga, 
slLprlk rs, and IPrs arc paid, timds are allocaled to administrat i\'e flL""lion< in the ,ee lor, 
major plant reflLr~i ,hl1lenl '. network expans ion. rural elect ri ticm ion and new proj ect" 
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- , , . CIE Remuneration 
Customers 
• 
5 Netwa<l:: Expan~ol1~ I 
S,'Ufl'l': Simo" r)(II)6j 
L~,1I;, .1[\ I V()fi~n Electric ity Operatio,," Comp/my, SOPIr (Soc iete d'Operation Ivo irienJ"" 
d'Ekctri ci!e), was ,"I up 10 coordinate llO"er nows in tile national grid. includillg ilTl po m ~n<1 
~"rons 10 and from neighhouril1g ,""mtri~s. ,md to pl~n rOT both new gel""""ti on requi,.ement, 
and capilal ,md major r~ ruTbi,llITlCnt flCoject' in the ,eclor (V~ i 19')'):22), 
4.4 Indepelldellt Power I'rmluce rs 
TI"" i m pro\'~menb elTeckd ill Ih" iinm"" LlI and technical flCriormance of the llatioll ,,1 ut ility 
by SA I. R and [lDr. alier takil1 g owr the m''''''g"'Tl"nl in I~ <,>(l . led the srote to consider tl"" 
"'nJ~ ",-, "son ium for the devel<>rl1lem of gene ratiol1 infrastru cl uTe , Ha"ing ho.:J firsl hand 
eXI,,-',,;e])::e or lhe I"or i,," row~" ,ector C1[\d ha ving made rea",nabl e rrofl!, 'os the ~ounn; " 
fl"i privllW uti lity orcrator. SAUl{ ami EDb' w~re prompi",IIO doydop ,lite d'1\oi"' " tirst 
IPP As ticst ~'r<'"s~d lhrough I h" I"gis lal ion in I 9~5 ull1hoci, ing ent ')' of privme g~n~rmors. 
,,,,,I ill ac'"-'rdan"" with tl"" prererellc~s and cOl1ditioo, of ("'velorm~nl finance ins lituti ons 
(most 110Iabl;. tI," I>"or ld Ilm,L), pri vate participation ill g~n~rm ion look shal"" 
4.4. 1 C ollllllignic h 'oi r ic ,mc rJc I' n rr h, cli rHl rJ' Elec i ri ci le I C IPIU. L) 
Forme,l in I ()<!~. (,]PREI. ,tarted OIlt with tJ~ followillg sh"r~holding: 8~ f,er cent \\a, o\\'l""d 
0; SAl' R Int eTl'Il,1 iOl1al I hrOll~h V"len",.. ,1 comran; set uf' to m,mage tho shares or SA II R (115 
rcr c~nt) ,u,d EDF (35 per c~nl) (ClI'RFI, rc"- com ~()I)7)_ The rem ain il1 i! 12 I~T cent was 
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held by Agence Franyaise de Developpement (AFD)128 through its subsidiary, Promotion et 
Participation pour la Cooperation economique (PROPARCO), as well as the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the West African Development Bank, BOAD (Banque Ouest 
Africaine de Developpement).129 Although a selective tender process was administered by 
EDF and SAUR for the EPC contract, it should be noted that the substation and transmission 
system expansion as well as Phase II of CIPREL were procured through an international 
competitive bid (ICB) (IDA 1995; World Bank 1995c). 
In 2005, the smaller equity partners (AFD/PROPARCO and IFC) sold their shares in CIPREL 
along with EDF, and a holding company, Fina Gestion, was created to oversee the equity in 
CIPREL (CIPREL pers. com. 2007). uo At the same time in 2005, SAUR International was 
dissolved. By 2008, the shares in Fina Gestion were entirely held by the parent company, 
SAUR Group, with CIPREL's shareholders being Fina Gestion (98 per cent) and BOAD (2 
per cent). 
The plant comprises four open cycle gas turbines with a combined capacity of210MW. Three 
of the gas turbines have a capacity of 33MW each and were commissioned in March 1995. 13\ 
The fourth gas turbine has a capacity of I II MW and was commissioned in June 1997 
(CIPREL 2006). \32 The plant runs on natural gas, which may be provided by one of three gas 
suppliers (detailed in section 2.3), and, as a backup, may also run on heavy vacuum oil (HVO) 
or distillate diesel oil (DDO). The plant initially used liquid fuel when it was first 
commissioned until the gas infrastructure was developed in November 1995 (CIPREL pers. 
com. 2007). The plant has performed well; since its commercial operation date (COD), its 
availability has been approximately 95 per cent (CIPREL pers. com. 2007). 
128 Formerly Caisse Franr;aise de Developpement (CFD). 
129 Established in November 1973 and headquartered in Lome, Togo, BOAD is a development finance 
institution of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, UEMOA (Union Economique et 
Monetaire Ouest Africaine). 
110 Although it offloaded its shareholding position, EDF is still involved in CIPREL in a technical 
capacity. 
131 The plant was officially inaugurated on April 27th 1995. 
132 General Electric (GE) is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the four turbines and the 
company uses GE, Alstom and other OEMs for specialised maintenance. General maintenance is 
normally subcontracted to local Ivorian companies, viz. Friedlander, Pictor and even CIE (CIPREL, 
2006). 
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a) Project Financing and Incentives 
CIPREL was initially built in two phases (with plans for two subsequent phases by 2008). The 
debt equity ratio at the end of the first phase was 75:25, with debt arranged by the IFC and 
BOAD. I33 By the end of the second phase, the ratio moved to 86: 14. For the second phase, the 
World Bank extended an IDA low-interest loan to the Government of Cote d'ivoire which it, 
in turn, lent to CIPREL (CIPREL 2007, pers. comm., 29 March). The on-lending duration 
term of 17 years means that the maturity of the US$50m loan coincides with end of the 
concession term. 134 The agreement also contains a five year grace period as a contingency to 
allow for the debt service payment of CIPREL' s first phase, which had an amortization period 
of 10 years (World Bank 1995c: 16). As an extra security cushion for the lenders to CIPREL, a 
six month equivalent of debt service payments were to be held in an off-shore escrow facility 
(World Bank 1995c). 
The project was exempt from all taxes and import duties on equipment. In addition, a tax 
holiday was granted to CIPREL over a five year phase-out period (World Bank 1995c). By 
year-six, CIPREL was expected to pay the full tax at the company rate (of 27 per cent). The 
V A T exemptions on plant equipment and the five year income tax holiday went a long way in 
making the terms of the deal sufficiently attractive to engage investors. 
b) The Power Purchase Agreement 
The PPA is rather simple in that it is not linked to a minimum availability as has been the 
custom in other African IPPs (as was the case in Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia). The 
arrangement comprises a take-or-pay contract for 1410GWh of power per annum (CIPREL, 
2006). In accordance with the agreement, CIPREL is obliged to supply a minimum of 
1410GWh a year, but may be asked by the state to increase this amount to 1460GWh a year 
(Diaw 2004). Payment of the additional power is invoiced at 8 per cent of its nominal value 
for the first 48GWh and 38 per cent for that over and above the additional 48GWh (CIPREL 
2007, pers. comm., 29 March). The contract duration is 19 years and transfer is expected in 
August 2013 in accordance with the Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) agreement. After 
ten years of operation, the state has the right to buy back CIPREL (World Bank 1995c). 
133 This loan was in the form of an US$79.66 million IDA loan with a maturity of 40 years and a ten-
year grace period. US$50 million would be lent to the CIPREL project and the remaining US$79.66 
million would remain with the government to fund the complementary sector investments and the 
institutional building components of the project (World Bank 1995c). 
134 The loan attracts 8 per cent interest per year (World Bank 1995c: 16). 
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Compensation for the assets, the foregone dividends and the take-over of the remaining debt 
would be included in a negotiated agreement, were the state to exercise this option. 
Despite CIE being the physical off-taker of the actual power generated, the contractual 
agreements are between the Government of Cote d'lvoire and CIPREL for purchased power. 
Hence, as far as CIPREL is concerned, it is the government that is the customer in terms of 
financial and contractual matters. 135 
4.4.2 Azito Energie 
Unlike the country's first IPP, Azito was initiated under an international competitive bid 
launched in October 1996. This occurred at a time when growth in electricity demand was 
more than 7 per cent per annum. In June 1997, after the bid adjudication process was 
complete, Azito was awarded to a consortium of five firms, which formed three shareholdings 
companies to share the equity in the project, as described below (Nandjee 2006). The plant 
consists of two 147MW gas turbines operated in an open cycle mode. At the project's 
inception, it was planned that the plant would include a combined cycle unit composed of two 
heat recovery boilers and a steam turbine with a condenser. To date, however, the steam cycle 
has not been realised. 136 Project agreements were signed by July 1998 and construction started 
immediately although the final financial closure occurred only in January 1999 (Project 
Finance and Guarantees 1999). Commercial operations started in February 2000. 
a) Project Stakeholders and Financing 
The winning consortium of the bid consisted ofCinergy (a holding company comprising ASS 
and EDF), Industrial Promotion Services West Africa (IPS) and the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC). Initially, CDC was a lender to the project with a debt-to-
equity swap option, which was exercised in 2002 (Azito pers. com. 2007). 
135 The mandate of CIE is limited to managing the utility, distributing power and collecting revenues; 
hence, it is not in a position to undertake any long-term financial and contractual commitments on its 
balance sheet. 
136 From the time of the coup in December 1999, discussions on the completion of the steam phase of 
Azito were suspended. 
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The shareholding is as follows: 
• Cinergy Holding Company (EDF and ASS) 137 
• Azito Energie Holding (Aga Khan and IPS West Africa) J38 
• CDC Globeleq l39 
65.7% 
23.1% 
11.2% 
The US$45m equity invested by the shareholders represented approximately 20 per cent of 
the total project cost, which amounted to US$223m for the plant and associated transmission 
infrastructure. 140 ASS was the EPC contractor to the project and EDF and ASS the operators 
of the plant. 
The lenders to the project were as follows: 
Senior Debt 
• IFC A loan l41 
• IFC Sloan 
• Commercial Sanks 
• CDC Club 
US$32m 
US$30m 
US$30m 
US$48m 
14 years maturity 
10 years maturity 
12 years maturity 
12 years maturity 
137 Although EDF and Alstom (one of the three shortlisted consortia) lost the bid, EDF was still 
included in the final shareholding after high level political negotiations (Azito pers. com. 2007). At the 
time, EDF had undertaken an aggressive strategy to expand its operations outside of Europe and had 
invested in power developments in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Amuku 2002). 
138 Active in Cote d'Ivoire for over 30 years, IPS West Africa's investment in Azito was, however, its 
first in the country's power sector (AKDN 2007; Azito pers. com. 2007). Furthermore, although owned 
by Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED), IPS West Africa and AKFED each hold 
separate shares in the Ivorian Azito Energie Holding Company, 69 per cent and 31 per cent, 
respectively, with the Holding Company in turn being a 23 per cent shareholder in Azito (Azito 2004). 
139 Most of CDC's equity shares in projects were replaced by Globeleq, which was spun off from the 
CDC Group in 2002 and established to invest in power projects in Africa, the Americas and Asia. It 
should be noted, however, that Globeleq remains entirely owned by CDC. 
140 The shareholders also committed US$17m to the project as a contingency measure (Project Finance 
and Guarantees, 1999). 
141 IFC A loan refers to IFC's own account, whereas IFC B loan refers to an IFC syndicated loan. 
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Subordinated debt 
• IFC Fixed 
• IFC Convertible 
• CDC Club 
• CDC Fixed 
US$4m 
US$4m 
US$6m 
US$6m 
The CDC Club senior debt was funded by a number of bilateral and multilateral institutions 
including the African Development Bank, the Netherlands Development Finance Company 
(FMO) and the German Investment and Development Company (DEG). In addition to the 
equity and debt funding, US$18m from operations (after the first gas turbine was 
commissioned) went towards financing the project (Project Finance and Guarantees 1999). 
The amount of US$30m in loans from commercial banks was underwritten by an IDA Partial 
Risk Guarantee (PRG) and syndicated by Societe Generale of France (Gaba, 200 1).142 The 
PRG payment obligations include capacity and termination payments for breach of contract of 
the Concession Agreement including the Power Purchase Agreement and the Gas Supply 
Agreement: changes in law, political force majeure events and natural force majeure events 
(relating to the gas pipeline and the transmission facility). In parallel, the Government of 
Cote d'lvoire has provided a counter guarantee to IDA through which the latter would be 
indemnified in the event of a call on the IDA Guarantee, thereby making the Ivorian 
government ultimately responsible for its own performance. The lenders also received Letters 
of Comfort from the Government of Cote d' Ivoire (Gaba 200 I). 
b) Power Purchase Agreement and Project Incentives 
The PPA is on a take-or-pay basis and consists of a capacity charge (±80 per cent) and an 
energy charge (±20 per cent). The contract is for 24 years, including the first two years of 
construction. Unlike CIPREL where a specific volume of power is contracted annually, Azito 
is required to adhere to a guaranteed minimum availability factor of 87.6 per cent (Azito pers. 
com., 2007). According to the agreement, the first 13 years will be charged at 18 CF A 
142 IDA was brought on board when the government extended the scope of the financing to include the 
transmission infrastructure and requested the sponsors to finance the additional cost. Azito was the first 
power project in Sub-Saharan Africa to borrow privately from a syndicate of commercial banks (World 
Bank 2003a:29). 
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franc/kWh (±2.7€ cents per kWh) and the following 11 years will attract a charge of II CFA 
franc/kWh (±1.7€ cents per kWh). The average charge (excluding fuel) is, therefore, around 
15 CFA franc/kWh (2.2€ cents per kWh). 
Like CIPREL, Azito was exempted from all taxes and import duties on the equipment for the 
plant in accordance with the country's investment incentive framework (Simon 2006). In 
accordance with the BOOT agreement, the plant will be transferred to the state after 24 years 
of operation (in 2022). The economic rate of return on the project was estimated to be in the 
order of 20 per cent for a low growth scenario (World Bank 1998), which made the project 
attractive from an investor perspective. 
c) Fuel and Project Performance 
As described in Section 4.2.3, Azito runs on natural gas with the government assuming 
responsibility for gas provision, as it does for CIPREL. A back-up supply of distillate diesel 
oil is kept on site (sufficient for five days). Unlike CIPREL, which had to wait for nearly a 
year for the gas infrastructure to be completely developed, Azito utilised domestic gas from 
the first day of operations. As of yet, no problems have been encountered with regard to fuel 
supply for the plant. 
Despite civil conflict coinciding with the timing of COD and prompting several contractors to 
flee the country, Azito was completed within budget and within a relatively short project 
time-table. Shortly after commissioning, Azito supplied more than 40 per cent of the 
country's domestic demand. Even in the midst of political turmoil, the project continued to 
operate and all charges have been paid to date in spite of foreign exchange transfer 
restrictions being imposed for a period of one week five days after President Bedie's 
government was overthrown (Oaba 200 I ).143 
4.5 An Analysis of Ivorian Hybrid Power Arrangements 
Cote d'lvoire is a rare example of a power sector in Sub-Saharan Africa where there are no 
traditional SOE utilities responsible for the day to day operation of the electricity system. 
IPPs account for nearly two thirds of production and the remainder is provided by CIE, the 
management operator of the national utility. Although there is some uncertainty about the 
143 A temporary debt moratorium was also announced the second week after the coup d'etat, but was 
lifted one week later (Gaba 2001). 
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future energy policy, largely as a result of the country's political uncertainty, there is a clear 
sense that the investment environment that predominated in the 1990s and the policy and 
planning frameworks introduced during this time have gone a long way in contributing to the 
country having sufficient electricity resources. The factors contributing to these outcomes are 
explored in the following sections. 
4.5.1 Evolving Power Sector Reforms and Resulting Hybrid Arrangement 
Like many other African countries that have embarked on power sector reforms, Cote 
d'Ivoire's reform trajectory was prompted by both internal and external forces. These include 
the deteriorating financial and technical performance of the national utility and pressure from 
development finance institutions, such as the World Bank. The drought that compounded the 
problems of the sector forced the government to institute reforms. 144 
These forces also informed the government's electricity policy framework. Thermal power 
plants and local gas resources were developed to curb over-reliance on hydro and expensive 
imported fuels. Through the Electric Energy Act 85-583 of 1985, the power sector was legally 
obligated to maintain financial equilibrium (i.e. for revenues to cover costs). Furthermore, due 
to the financial constraints of the state and the national utility, the private sector was invited to 
developed power plants. Finally, an explicit policy was developed to make Cote d'Ivoire an 
electricity hub for the region (Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). 
Unlike the formation of other hybrid markets described in this thesis, the Ivorian ESI took a 
bold step to reduce the state's involvement from an operator in the sector to that of providing 
oversight and dealing with longer term strategic issues. The introduction of the private 
management operator depoliticised the daily operations of the utility and paved the way for 
operational performances to improve. In addition to the lack of previous experience in 
crafting a new institutional framework for the sector, the speed at which the decision to invite 
private sector participation was taken and the resulting entry of the private operator (within 
six months), gave policy makers and administrators little time to deliberate the mechanics of 
how the sector as a whole would and could operate to meet the objectives of the reforms. 
144 The impact of the drought was multi-fold. First, with drought affecting the country's agricultural 
outputs, Cote d'lvoire saw a significant decline in foreign currency earnings. Drought also impacted the 
largely hydro-dependent electricity sector and prompted a move to thermal. This move and the 
procurement of fuel from international markets further strained the country's balance of payments. 
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It is, therefore, not surprising that the institutional arrangements created initially in the early 
1990s were sub-optimal in terms of improving sector performance. At the time that most 
power sectors in developing countries were only starting to consider power sector reforms and 
private participation in infrastructure (PPI), Cote d'lvoire was well into its second round of 
power sector institutional reforms to optimise the functioning of the sector and deal with the 
challenges of securing sufficient and affordable generation capacity. 
Nearly two thirds of electricity generated is from two IPPs with long-term PPAs and this 
percentage is set to increase in the future. The high degree of private sector participation 
differentiates the Ivorian power sector from others in Africa where IPPs operate only on the 
fringes and SOEs are responsible for the bulk of electricity supply; and in the lvorian case the 
SOE is not an operator in the sector, but only an owner of the assets. This unique organisation 
of actors in the generation sector allows for an interesting evaluation of hybrid arrangements 
that impact on attracting investment into generation and securing capacity. 
4.5.2 Power Sector Planning 
Prior to the reforms introduced in 1990, responsibility for planning resided with the state-
owned EECI. This remained the case after the introduction of CIE in 1990 when the role of 
the EECI was reduced as explained above. The role of sector institutions, including the EECI, 
continued to evolve as the sector tried to find the optimal institutional framework to meet its 
objectives. The end result was a simplified institutional framework in the form of the present 
structure (although, it has to be said, the institutional arrangements are still quite complex and 
could be further rationalised). 
The period between the two rounds of institutional reforms from 1990 to 1998 when the 
sector was still searching for an optimal institutional arrangement does not appear to have 
hampered investment in the sector. At the core, the legal framework and tariff structures were 
deemed adequate to facilitate the required amount of generation investment (until the political 
coup). The development of CIPREL and Azito during this period suggests that, although 
institutional coordination could have been compromised, the operation of CIE under a long-
term lease agreement and the government's commitment to reforms and PPI gave investors 
the assurance that the sector was on a positive trajectory. 
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a) The Planning Context 
The planning and project development context has also enjoyed a more favourable 
environment than was the case in Ghana. Firstly, although structural economic adjustments 
were in progress and the currency was devalued by half at the time of CIPREL's negotiations 
(in 1994). investors anticipated that this planned devaluation would stimulate growth in the 
economy. and that this would impact positively on the power sector. As it turned out, the 
devaluation of the CF A franc did contribute to a surge in economic growth and a 
corresponding increase in demand for electricity mainly due to industrial customers 
supporting export-oriented sectors. After the devaluation. tariffs increased by approximately 
20 per cent (Lavigne 1999). Despite a tariff increase in devalued CF A franc terms, revenues 
to CIE decreased in real terms initially; however. CIE was. eventually able to improve its 
financial accounts, primarily by revenue gained from exporting power to neighbouring states 
(Jammal and Jones 2005).145 
Secondly, by the time that the Azito investment was concluded. the country was well on its 
way to sustaining robust industrial growth, and, hence, there was huge interest from investors 
in the development the country's second IPP. despite negative global IPP experiences. Interest 
in the sector was at such a level that the government was able to change its approach from a 
negotiated agreement (as was the case with CIPREL), to awarding the contract for the second 
plant to the lowest bidder after an in international competitive bidding process. The positive 
experience with CIPREL, Africa's first IPP, gave momentum to the country's PPI drive and 
facilitated the development of the second plant. 
Thirdly. due to the fact that the CFA franc is pegged to the Euro (historically through the 
French franc). Cote d'lvoire has not experienced the problem of severe local currency 
devaluation and increases in electricity tariffs linked to the foreign currency earnings of IPPs, 
as in the case of other African countries (e.g. Egypt and Ghana). Traditionally, inflation and 
devaluation of local currencies have threatened the income streams for power providers in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, Cote d'ivoire's inflation is considered relatively low (at 
approximately 4 per cent in 2007) with the Central Bank of West African States, BCEAO 
(Banque Centrale des Etats de I' Afrique de I 'Ouest). following a tight monetary policy in 
UEMOA countries. The currency devaluation occurred before CIPREL started commercial 
operations, and the PPA took this into consideration in its planning. 
145 Wages. an important input component of the cost of electricity, decreased with the devaluation of 
the CF A franc (Plane 1999). 
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Lastly, electricity exports, as noted throughout, have been a mainstay for the sector in the last 
decade. They have helped mitigate large demand and supply mismatches, especially during 
the period of civil unrest when national consumption decreased from 86 per cent of national 
production in 1995 to 70 per cent in 2002 (AIDB/OECD 2004).146 More specifically, as the 
construction of Azito was being completed, political events in the country took a turn for the 
worse. The demand for power, among other things, was dampened, which threatened to choke 
the estimated income stream that formed the economic basis for the plant. The silver lining 
for Cote d'Ivoire came in the misfortunes of its neighbours who were experiencing power 
deficits due to droughts and a general lack of generation capacity. Exports to neighbouring 
countries, mainly Ghana, which accounted for more than 60 per cent of exported power in 
2005, meant that income from electricity generated continued to flow in. 
The country's policy to become a major power exporter in the region has contributed to 
flexible planning strategies since it has allowed the country to develop excess generation 
capacity without bearing the burden of stranded generation. In this case, should there be 
delays in the development of future capacity additions, as was the case after the coup d'etat, 
the country will have time to adapt to the new circumstances and develop alternative 
strategies to develop additional power production facilities, as reserve capacity would take 
longer to be run down. 
b) Regulatory Framework 
While the general policy and planning frameworks have contributed to positive outcomes, it 
would seem that the role of the independent regulator, ANARE, has not been significant. 
Following the French legal tradition, regulation has, in effect, been embedded in contracts, for 
example, in the lease agreement with the private operator, as well as in the PPA contracts with 
the IPPs. 
Since ANARE became operational only after the IPP deals had been signed, it had no role in 
the licensing of the IPPs or approval of PPAs. Furthermore, apart from acting in an advisory 
capacity to the state, the energy regulator has no legal mandate to effect substantial changes to 
contracts with IPPs or even to regulate prices - usually a core function of regulators. It 
appears unlikely that ANARE will be given any opportunity to impact the terms of the 
146 It should be noted that national production in 1995 did not include the Azito IPP since this was 
commissioned in 1999. 
136 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
agreements in the next round of negotiations with IPPs (ANARE pers.com. 2007).147 While it 
may be argued that IPPs are subject to less regulatory risk in this context and that this bodes 
well for attracting investment, it is often argued that in the absence of an active, empowered 
and independent regulator, IPPs may mean that the possibility of political interference is 
greater. In the case of Cote d'lvoire, the extent to which political interference could have been 
experienced was perhaps moderated by the legal requirements for financial equilibrium in the 
sector as far as tariff setting is concerned. In addition, the presence of a private utility operator 
whose incentives are motivated by performance rather than by political considerations and 
which ultimately has to collect sufficient revenues to cover the charges from IPPs are 
important factors. Finally, IPPs are regulated by their contracts with the Ministry of Energy. 
These are fixed for the duration of the PPA term making the need for any ongoing regulation 
after agreements have been reached largely unnecessary, unless there is a need for mediating 
disputes. 
c) Benefits of Contracting Out the Utili(V FUl1ctiol1 
Although Cote d'lvoire has seen a marked change in its ESI, primarily via IPPs but also 
through the private management of its utility, at the end of 2008, there was no official long-
term strategy for the management of the electricity utility beyond the expiry of the current 
contract in 2020. Undecided is whether the long-term lease agreement with CIE will continue 
beyond the expiry date or whether the state will resume responsibility for the operations of the 
national utility (Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. 2007). 
In many respects, the lease agreement for management of the utility has been beneficial in 
that it has facilitated the introduction of IPPs, which, in turn, have been critical in ensuring 
security of supply for Cote d'lvoire and providing increased energy availability for the region. 
Without CIE at the helm during this process, it is possible that new generation could have 
been seriously delayed or not built at all (Jammal and Jones 2005). It is also widely 
acknowledged that the management company contributed to the utility's financial turn-
around. For instance, there has been a marked improvement in the utility'S technical and 
financial performance since private participation began. Billing recovery for collections 
147 This may be due to the French legal framework for public infrastructure. French (civil) law differs 
from common law with regard to transactions for public services. Public service contracts under French 
law constitute a guarantee of public service commitments by the state, even within the context of 
opening up markets such as electricity. Thus, from a strictly legal perspective, the dominant role that 
the state plays is justified as the notion of public service is the principal criterion (Fournier 2005; ES[ 
Africa 2006). 
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increased from 70 per cent before CIE was instituted in 1990 to 98 per cent in 2004 (ANARE 
2005a). CIE has put the utility on an improved financial footing; this has helped improve 
confidence in the sector and the attraction of private capital for generation projects. 
A question to be considered is: "Over the longer-term, has the private operator outlived its 
usefulness or is such an operator necessary to maintain solvency and efficiency?" For the 
foreseeable future, the management of the utility under the lease agreement will probably help 
keep the sector out of the red and bolster support for investments by lPPs, which will continue 
to play an important role in bringing in additional capacity, since neither the state nor the 
utility has sufficient funds to invest in additional generation capacity. 148 Stakeholders in the 
Ivorian power sector interviewed for this thesis have indicated that the decision to sign 
another IS year contract with the CIE in 2005 may have been the most prudent, given the 
political uncertainty and diminishing electricity generating reserves. Continuation of the 
contract may have restored investment confidence, not only in the electricity sector, but also 
in other sectors to which the CIE has been a reliable supplier and distributor of power. 
4.5.3 Generation Procurement 
The same departments that had been responsible for generation procurement prior to the 
reorganisation of the sector in 1990 remained with the EECI when the new operator assumed 
operations in the form of the CIE. Since the CIE had no mandate or contractual responsibility 
to ensure additional capital expansions in generation and the rest of the power sector, 
planning and procurement remained roles of the state. During the second round of 
institutional reforms in 1998, the same departments were transferred to SOPIE (and 
SOGEPE) and continued their respective functions under the new institutional framework. 
SOPIE, which reports to both the Ministry of Energy, has as its prime mission the 
responsibility to co-ordinate and balance the supply and demand of electricity. It is also 
required to manage financial aspects of public sector investment that uses state funds, such as 
the country's rural electrification programme. For private sector projects such as IPPs, SOPIE 
148 At the inception of the country's IPP programme, it was intended that the government would 
institute a tariff adjustment framework that would cover 20 per cent financing of the investment 
programme over and above the operating costs and debt service (World Bank 1995c:23). This would 
translate to an 8 per cent rate of return on assets for the power sector. Up until December 1999, this was 
the case. Since the coup in 1999, however, this policy has not been strictly followed (Ministry of Mines 
and Energy pers. com. 2007). 
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advertises present and future projects through various media (including its web portal) to 
inform private investors of opportunities for investment in the sector, and ensure transparency 
in investment and procurement processes. Both SOPIE and SOGEPE, another agency created 
as part of ongoing reforms, evolved as departments within the former EECI, taking on 
responsibility for almost all aspects of financial, legal and technical planning. This meant that 
the planning and generation procurement functions enjoyed a measure of continuity 
throughout the reform process, and was not left unchecked as was experienced in the power 
sector in Ghana. 
Having worked closely with institutions such as the World Bank and other development 
finance institutions, Cote d'ivoire had familiarised itself with lending conditions (such as 
competitive bidding) which shaped its tendering and procurement processes for infrastructure 
investment. It had been assisted with procurement support since the country was obliged to 
apply internationally accepted procurement and contracting processes for infrastructure 
development projects which benefited from World Bank financial support. 149 The two IPPs 
also benefited from other incentives from the World Bank such as the low interest loan that 
was extended for CIPREL and translated into a lower cost of capital for the project, and the 
PRG that was underwritten by the World Bank and served as a catalyst for securing additional 
commercial debt for Azito. 
A further example of how World Bank financial support influenced procurement was with the 
acquisition of equipment for CIPREL. Even though the CIPREL IPP was a negotiated deal 
between the government and the EDF / SAUR consortium, World Bank procedures still called 
149 Cote d'lvoire has a long history of working with the Bretton Woods institutions and, in general, 
adopting their policies. The country had known private participation in its infrastructure industries for a 
number of decades and was thus receptive to the idea of private investors if accompanied by an 
improvement in services without unnecessarily increasing costs significantly. In addition, since 1990, 
the country had privatised 44 of the 61 entities earmarked for privatisation (NIGC 2001). The country's 
first leader since independence, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, adopted a liberal economic system 
to gain the confidence of foreign investors, most notably, French investors, some of whom had been 
present before Cote d'Ivoire's independence. In addition to the country being relatively friendly to 
foreign investment, the head of state during the time that the two IPPs were developed (1993 -1999), 
President Aime Henri Konan Bedie, who was instrumental in shaping sector privatisation policies, has 
also had a long history with the Bretton Woods institutions. While Minister of Finance of the republic, 
he became the first chairman of the IMF and World Bank's Joint Development Committee from 1974 
to 1976 and worked as special advisor to the World Bank's IFC from 1978 to 1980 (PDCI-RDA 2005). 
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for the EPC contract to be put out on open tender. To this end, gas turbines with a range of 
75-105MW for ClPREL were chosen to allow the maximum number of manufacturers to 
participate in the bidding process (World Bank 1995d: 19). It was anticipated that this would 
put downward pressure on OEM tenders to supply the main plant hardware for the power 
station (1995d: 15).150 
4.5.4 Contracting Arrangements 
Contracting arrangements for privately generated power are between the Ministry of Energy 
and lPP sponsors; the ClE as utility operator does not enter into any contracts with private 
generators. The payment priority order for suppliers to the ESI also favours private investors 
since they have first claim to funds from the revenues collected by the ClEo After the private 
utility lessee, gas suppliers and lPPs are the first to receive revenues collected from electricity 
sales. Thereafter, funds are allocated to administrative functions, major plant refurbishments, 
network expansion, rural electrification and new projects. The general contracting framework, 
therefore, favours private investment in generation since it gives greater assurances to 
investors and lenders to privately financed generation projects and, in so doing, assists in 
securing sufficient generation capacity in Cote d'lvoire. This is one of the factors that has 
contributed to current lPPs having expressed their willingness to expand their interests in the 
generation sector despite the political turmoil that erupted in the country after the coup d'etat 
and which resulted in revenue losses for the sector. 
In addition to the security from the priority payment order in the sector, for Azito, the 
commercial lenders are insured against default of payments through an IDA Partial Risk 
Guarantee. Commercial funds were more easily mobilised towards completion of the project 
due to the presence of such a guarantee. This and government counter guarantees assisted in 
lowering the cost of capital, which resulted in more affordable power for consumers (UNDP 
2003). The inclusion of large prominent multilateral and bilateral lenders such as CDC, FMO, 
DEG, lFC and the World Bank extended an added assurance to investors and commercial 
banks. 
150 The technology choice was also based on anticipation of domestic gas, which ultimately has gone a 
long way in keeping power prices down. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced a number of exogenous events before and during the period of Cote-
D'lvoire's ESI reforms, namely, severe droughts, significant currency devaluation 
immediately pre-IPPs, political unrest, and suspension of a large part of revenue from power 
sales for an extended period due to the civil war. Despite these events, interest in the 
country's power sector has not been quelled - with both the existing IPPs keen to expand their 
interest in the generation sector. Few countries' power sectors would have sustained all these 
exogenous shocks. Why has Cote d'lvoire fared so well? 
The overriding policy objective that formed part of the reforms in the 1990s was to ensure 
financial equilibrium in the sector. This was legislated in a decree and, by law, institutional 
stakeholders have an obligation to meet this fundamental objective. It may be argued that a 
stable currency that has been pegged to the French franc since January 1994 and to the euro 
since 2002 means that revenue assurances in terms of exchange rate risks are more robust 
than has been typical of most Sub-Saharan African IPPs, as well as in other developing 
regions. A more coherent power sector planning approach after the droughts of the 1980s has 
resulted in the country achieving an optimal mix of hydro and thermal power sources, 
sufficient power to supply itself and assist its neighbours during generation crises (thereby 
generating further revenue), and giving it greater flexibil ity in its future generation 
I . lSI P annmg. 
Having the state removed from the daily operations in the power sector means that it can 
focus more clearly on long-term and strategic issues such as power sector planning, and fulfill 
its governance role. SOPIE's main objective is to ensure that adequate electricity is available 
in the country and that its responsibilities for planning and procurement are fulfilled. SOPIE 
and SOGEPE understand their roles in ensuring adequate generation and have the mandates 
and authorisations to execute this responsibility, benefiting from the legal framework that 
supports them in their mission. Having these two institutions independent of the national 
util ity assists in avoiding conflicts of interest in the single buyer market framework and helps 
to create the transparency and certainty for potential investors. thereby facilitating new private 
investment in generation. 
lSI The presence of domestic gas has helped keep power prices down relative to countries that have no 
domestic fuel resources and has helped the country to be among the least costly providers of electricity 
in the region (AIDB/OEeD 2004: 115). 
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CHAPTERS 
POWER SECTOR REFORM IN MOROCCO 
Although Morocco has seen a significant increase in private participation in its ESI at the 
generation level (and also at the distribution level) with IP Ps accounting for more than two 
thirds of domestic production, the country's experience in attracting investment into 
generation has been mixed. Between 1989, when rej(Jrms were initiated, and 2005, Morocco 
was successful in reducing its domestic production shortage and attracting IPPs. Since 2005, 
when the country's third IP P was commissioned, however, Morocco has encountered a 
number of problems with respect to the development of additional generation plants. 
Generation supply side planning and commissioning has been out of sync with demand side 
increases during the period of executing the countlY's aggressive rural electrijication 
programme, which substantially boosted demandfor electricity. Despite not adding s~!fJicient 
amounts of generation production to the national grid, regional integration through 
transmission links with Spain, and to a lesser extent with Algeria, have assisted in sourcing 
the much needed power imports to make up for the shortage of domestic electricity 
production. 
Problems around fuel security for one of the country's proposed power stations and 
environmental concerns over pollutants in another anticipated plant have stifled the 
development of new generation capacity resulting in the country facing a crisis if critical 
remedial actions are not implemented as a matter of urgency. Planning, therefiJre, has not 
adequately anticipated risks related to the development of these projects. Furthermore, since 
2004, the national utility has experienced financial troubles largely due to insufficient tariff 
increases over the years to accommodate the increasing costs of power production. This has 
impacted on the attractiveness qf Morocco as an investment destination for IPPs. In the 
absence of credible governance institutions to ensure financial sustainability and sl{fficient 
planning oversight, it is unlikely that the objective of attracting investment and 
commissioning adequate generation in a timely manner will be attained or sustained. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Prior to structural reforms in the 1980s, the Kingdom of Morocco financed infrastructure 
investments, including electricity, mainly through concessionary loans from multilateral 
institutions. Imprudent fiscal practices, together with a series of currency devaluations, led 
Morocco into a spiral of debt. By the mid 1980s, external debt exceeded the country's annual 
GOP, and much of the country's revenue went toward servicing this debt. Under the guidance 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Morocco turned to project finance, 
as part of a broader structural adjustment programme, to procure the much needed new 
electricity generation capacity for the country's development. The goal was to reduce 
government debt and increase overall economic growth, primarily by limiting government 
spending and reducing the state's involvement in the economy. Privatisation of existing state-
owned enterprises featured prominently on the reform agenda, together with liberalisation of 
foreign trade and tariffs, opening the economy to new foreign investment and overhauling the 
country's fiscal system. In 1989, the requisite legislation was passed through law no.39-89 to 
allow the transfer of public assets to the private sector, with the aim of raising funds to payoff 
government loans, transferring skills and technology, and achieving efficiency gains. 152 
Private participation in the ESI represented one component of the larger economic reform 
programme and included the following specific aims. Firstly, it was expected to free up 
government funds to service more pressing areas of social spending as well as aid in relieving 
the state's debt burden from power sector investments. The national utility could then focus 
on rolling out the necessary infrastructure to take power to rural areas where, at the start of 
power sector reforms in 1994, only 17 per cent of the rural population had access to 
electricity. Secondly, in conjunction with a broader Iiberalisation programme including tax 
reductions and efficiency improvements, it was anticipated that privatisation would decrease 
the cost of power, thereby making the country as a whole more competitive and attractive to 
investors. This, in turn, would help facilitate other development infrastructure investment 
programmes rolled out by government. Private participation in generation was seen as among 
the first steps in achieving these goals. 
152 Between 1993 and 2003, 66 of the 114 entities that were initially earmarked for privatisation were 
transferred to the private sector, which resulted in an additional MAD54 billion in income for the state 
(Ministry of Finance and Privatisation 2004:9). Based on an annualised averaged exchange rate, this 
translates into approximately US$5.54billion. 
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Between 1994 and 2008, three IPPs have been commissioned in Morocco. An examination of 
Morocco's experience in attracting investment in this context is, therefore, particularly 
important. In addition, as these projects have been noted for their successes, they may hold 
wider lessons for the development of future IPPs. As is noted in this chapter, the three 
projects are very different in nature. Through the first project, the Jorf Lasfar Energy 
Company (JLEC) and presently Africa's largest IPP, the country placed nearly two thirds of 
Morocco's electricity production in the hands of private producers. The second project, 
Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CEO), which brought about further diversification of the 
electricity production mix by harnessing Morocco's wind energy potential, is a record setter 
in that it represents the first wind farm in Africa that is entirely privately financed. Energie 
Electrique de Tahaddart (EET), the third IPP, served to introduce the first combined cycle gas 
plant to Morocco, and is fuelled from the pipeline that delivers Algerian gas to Spain. Another 
outstanding feature of EET is that the majority of project financing was sourced from local 
Moroccan banks. Among the key elements that explain project successes is that the Moroccan 
dirham (MAD) has remained relatively stable in a low inflation environment since the 
inception of the contracts, and, in the case of EET, charges are significantly shielded from 
foreign currency risks. 
Although Morocco was able to reduce its deficit in electricity generation (which was made up 
for by imports) up until 2005 when EET was developed, more recent delays in planning and 
developing additional generation capacity have resulted in the country increasing its 
dependence on power imports, which constituted more than 9 per cent of demand in 2007. 
The chapter is structured into three parts. Following this introduction, the next section 
provides a description of the electricity supply industry in Morocco and the reforms that have 
taken place in this sector. The third section describes the three independent power projects 
that have been supplying power to the national grid since power sector reform started and the 
contractual agreements that have been reached by the various stakeholders. The last section 
discusses some of the key elements that affected reform outcomes and played a part in the 
country's experiences attracting investment in generation. 
The information presented in this chapter draws on literature searches and detailed interviews 
with key stakeholders in the Moroccan ESI. Interviews, including written queries and 
responses, were conducted with several industry stakeholders in Morocco throughout 2006. 
Interviews were followed by email correspondence to clarify discussion points through 2008. 
Stakeholder interviews included representatives from the Office Nationale de I' Electricite 
(ONE), Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC), Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CEO), La 
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Compagnio Ju V~m (~ company established (0 perform m"illlo"'ILKe OLl CED plant) and 
rrlcrgic Flcclrique ue Tornlddarl (EEn. Throughout tho t~xt. stakeholders have 11 01 l>ceLl 
id~lllillod b~ Llame but so lely by their org~Il ;'''tin''''l afll l iatiun. 
S.2 The Moroccan Electricity Suppl:y Industry 
rhi' ",ction p",vides a def>Cr iptioll of the hislory of 11", eleclricity supply illdustry ill 
Mo",cco. 11 gi.es "Ll ove,view of tile reform, that ha\"~ t~ken pia"" to cL:ue and nutli,,,,s the 
ovo lution of the g~neration. transmissinn ond di,lri billion su h·""clc..,. 
5.2.1 Evulution of the I'ower Sector 
III I ~23. ELlergie Electrique du "-lar"" (rF\1 J. ~ f"i\"~I~ I imited I iobi I il Y cfHnrony. ".,,, ,.,.e"leU 
to rer"lor Ihe r"blic ""r'ike of eiec"ll"ioily ),.'Cllt'raliu" allu uimibution in \lurocco (Dohbarh 
2(06), At tho timo of the cuunt!)" , indepe n d~'lCe in "b,ch 1956. "n like II", experierloes ill 
marly olher Africall countri.s. the state uid not eITect any maim changes ill the electrioilY 
indllst')' "ith rEM mai ll ("illi1]g " IJri,'alo mOLlOpoly ill goLl~"'tion. transmission and 
ui,lriblliion uf eloctricity, "lore th:m >e,en years later. however. II", state tnok CfHllrrH of wlM! 
was rcrceiwd tn b., a \ll'ologic ewn<.lI Tlic "'~tor ''''u c",ateu Ihe Oflice Nalional~ de 
ITleolTicil" (ONE) by decree 1-63-226 of 5 Augu't 1%3. 
A numbe-,- of challenge, hampered aun'lCement of the count,y's energy sedor in II", 1"0 
decades th:\! followed, ir",lllding <I", wu,,(ri, Wf", Il W'",O un foroigll ~omlnorcial PTLL"'''Y 
oLlorK' allJ its economic difticultie,. 131' the early 19RO" "011, f<>r illlf"Med ",Ol<>r 
"nordill"tioll 'lilU plaLlnillg forceu a ro-oYal"alio" of in""'tm~nt priorities in tile energy >ector 
''''u unUerscored {h" n,-,cd to mength,.n rianning at lhe eil lerf"ise ~nd oentrol goverllment 
le~el, (World !lank 19R4). In 11", decode 11'-11 fo ll nwed. ,,1Il'm'gh ill<Oro ,,," an i,,,"roa,od IOcu, 
ol1l~dlLlicall'laomi " g at a util ity level. Ill<" cOlmtry rem .. ,ir",d riagl",d hy irladeqlLtlle don"'Slio 
eleolric ity reserves. i",,,loquolo r,,,,,,,co for gOLlo",lillfl ilwe,llnon\. fro'l"enlloHd ,hedding. ,mJ 
in,uflicient ac""" to electricity by' {ile go"o",1 pnrul"tin" (e'llC"ci" lly i" """I "re,")]" ULllil 
'" III I'!~I. " SCI'O'" Jrou~bl ,(,.i<l,d II>.: "I,,"d)' dimeull ci""",,t""CC' af Ihc powe.,- ,ce'tOr aoo 
,,,"mlr)- .,. "bo lo. I'rom Illh lilno Illrougb ta 19S4, 85 p"r cent nftl>e com",,,,,i.1 ,oc'rgy con,u",ed in 
l\-1()('OC,0 was (["iv,d from ItllpoTlcJ ail which comu",,,d lO"gbl)' 40 por "'nl oi'lho country' , 10t. 1 
OWOIt ."",in~' (\>. orld ila<l' I ')S4: 13), 111 addition. tbe .\'c'"gc pricc at whicb clectricit) wa< >ok] 00 
10 c"""utl",,, W,,", o<ll)' 60 to 70 por ce"t oftllC ,,,i""Led co" ofe lcctricity (Wnrld flall~ 19~4 19). The 
'''lCCOH()[l\ic larilh cllarged .I,t) colltribut, d to ll", '"rid grm"h in co",ul1lf',io"; "'"c<, til< ",{ion,1 
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1494, ONE had ])""n ,o l ~l} ''''ro",iblo rCM' producl ion, transmission and distrib ut ioo 01' 
eleclricil) in \lorocco_I." Primaril, due to li n",lei"1 ,lifilc li liio, i" ()~I" " ,horlo!',e of 
clectricity proo"ctiuLl. ""d Iho "oeu {o comro l pllbli c spending. IIle govenlmeLlt llmlerwok a 
majo' organi_,ational overhaul ul' Ihe " Ii lil y ond inv ited the priv'M ,",clor to develop large 
_"ale ]Xl"er rrojec i' ( ICiA 200 i a::'iJ_ The_", aClion, helped OK lO reg" iLl prolitabili l) in I~Y~. 
lUlU in lho u,,,adc that lollo"eu (IY95-2(10~) privaie uperotu" ;"c,",,,-, in gly uomi natcd the 
genc'otion and dislrib ulion ,"cIO," in lho FSL Allhoug,h privaIe participatio n in the sector is 
I"e,-o le,,( al the generation luxl ui,lr ibulioll le,el" b) 200R, O~E i,; ,;{ ill a _,tato-ownod 
companj', overseen by II", \lin;'lry ofM i"o, a"d Enorgy, figure 5,1 ,lepiCls the la,oul ofth" 
High Volt. go 
C<)nS"""''' 
Solf P'OOLlC&t'II 
" OW ... t', I 
Low and Medium Volta", Coosurners 
III I 995, wilh the objec li, " 0 I' furthe' improvi ng (he ol"-'ral ion 'Uld compeliti, ene" of 11", lOS L 
Ihe gOWnlll"'LlI 1'1",,,,ou 10 in't i1lLte" r"gu latory ,),\eln 10 go.-o", (he fomoiniLl!', li i>cralisat;o n 
of {he seelor (Loll"li 200.1 :9) _ Ailo r hav ing smui",1 the rel'll law,),- sy'I~TTI' in n """,b", or 
""ci,leni countr ics, a reg"lator)-, fmmewor' w(l-' labl ed ror illlrodlict ion imo the sector arou nd 
2005 "nd 2()(16. Sin"e lhen_ hOWOVCf, linl. h"' [),,~Ll done wi lh r~,pecl l o Ih o irllplo"",ntfllion 
or th. governmenl-, re);UlnIOl'j' rlan_ with the , tale ,(i ii "'''''ning Ihe d~ Cacto ro le or 
",,lit) wa< Ll nahlc '0 I; mmee ,ile rc~ l ui"xI gru"'1h in .'pall,i,", "11(1 n" ith", \\'., II,,' ,laL" i"" po:; il io<l 10 
all'_'L "dil the G"urnr~ -, rO!~ i ~" dcll, p<a, ing at a hi'I",-; ,,,1 I l.l p-cr ,nil 01' GDP_ 
',", P,;"r 1(, 11K challge ,o"odoc«1 irl IW4. pr;" a" ",-,ItCp ,-"dlJ,t'r< wero, Ix'''n'' a llowed to g<""note 
c lt'micity pro,- ide<! Lhei, OUlpli L rcm"i,,<d 1>< 10'" 300,W 
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regulator.''< In occordallce w jth the lIew i'ra",ewo,k, th e ,ector "ould b< progrossiwly op"r.,d 
1" compelition. "ilh tw " ~uS((Ifll"r ci a,,,,, wh",,, c riteri" "re expecte<1 lo evolve ,,·ith lime. 
L"rge users ofeleclfic ity. pmticlll"rly those in the high vo l!agc calegoric,. wo uld b< ~bl. 10 
"" lecI their "'pplier of ch,>icc, " il h prices del~rmi Jl "d by th~ ll1"rk~t. C u stom~r.; elig ible to 
cll()()Se the ir suppl ier would compele ill an open mar\..et eitl"'r th rough all cleC!ricily e,d"on ge 
Or Inrough bilal ~r"1 CO<l IH"'ts. l\on-<iigibl" (s maller) cllStomers would remain ill a regulated 
mao-let with ONE ~, Ihe cxc lu,iw "' rpl i~r. 11", ,egulate<1 marht i, int~Il{I e<1 to ,upply 
~u'lou",rs. fo, whom oleetricity cOllstitute," h",ic serv ice. at the 10'" voltage lew l and th is 
service wou ld hc guarantecd hy the SI~1C. For thi' ,"""m. il " '" il1l" '1<;kd Ih"1 thi , ll1"rk~t "i ll 
b< ,"ppli~d mainly by tho pow~r , ("tions ","Iis~d iu the 1,"n1e"'ork of" purcha,e guarantee. 
1111 current I PI', ill Momcc~'. (I",rofore. "ould. 0p"ral ~ in thi s regulated marke t (J~rjini 2(02). 
T"rifts for the ",tie of electricity to dimi lmto rs and I, nal c,"I.'tJlner;, wou ld he rcgulated and 
ddlr", d b)' ,1 "CTe~ by tho oftice of the Prime Minister. HOkin g into oc count existin g contracts 
Ii" the production and pri ,ate di,tr ihu!ion 01' eleclric il y. 
5.2.2 Generation 
AI II", timo of \-lorocc,,', inJepende llce ill 1956. there were tell h} dr""lectri< plmm (",eeti ng 
roughl y ~) pcr CC< lt 01' I he coulll,y" d"",and). ("0 co" l- nred plants, a",1 two oi l- fired plants. 
"hich altogether sup plied arp ro~i mmely YO GWh "I' cledri"ily I'"r )'~" (ONE :>003::>3). 
Wilil (\cmand doubling approximal"ly over} tOil y""rs. in the two ,lec",le, th:( ti'llowed. 
addi! iotwl piam, were I .... "ugill on lin e tn meel tI'" need, or indumin l ,wld dom~,(i~ 
wnsulllcr,; 11(, ,,·e"er. "ilh If'" COlH tll)· S hydro '"s~"o, lar .... ly oxh'KlSleu. ""w c"pocity was 
mainly tl"'rm al.h",cd.
'
''' Figure 5.2 ,how> Ihe evolulion of 100 co unlry's ol"d,idty 
g<:llCralio ll mix. 
'" I ihera",,,,i,,,, ~r ,he ~cncr"l;'-'n ,'nd di>lr'k,liun "'''or> arc [lOW on ly schedule d li>< 20 I ~ (De bh..-h 
2006:~~). AlLhuugh Ihe nc,," regula",,)' ')' >10m wa, pl allrlOd to Ix: imrodHocd in l00.l .'2()H6. i[ i, oot 
clenr at tbi, ,tage ,,"bether tl 'l< ro£"I"to"y P"oc<s>o< 0111(1 romel;"ns will "" "lid .. 11>. 'ulel.,~e ,)1' th. 
Min i<try of ~1 ill" "nd Fnergy N if"" i",l.pendenl j"",Mi"" "i II t>e lurmcd tu 1\, lli l lhi> lunCl'on. 
"'Yen th< ,",,,,,ing r.g~","1 i"teg,m iotl. the c,"."iu" ur n .\I . dilcrr,,,,,,,,n-M nghrcb po,,"cr nwkcl by 
20 I O. ,,,,d the O!1_!.<' illg Iih.r.,1 i""i,)" ~f th e "'elN. the ercmi"" 01 n more ind cp;;[l(knt 'n>li ILl l'''' ' nw)' 
be rc'I"'red (r,RTE 2006; H"II 200g) 
,,. AIUx." 'gb lbe -150\1\\' A/"u,,, pump "omg' h;-,Im sch.m. h" be.n C<'n"n i" ion.d , ince lhen. it 
I"" n ncl nCl""ive OllCf!,)' "Hlpu' 
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De'p ile [ts chull ellges, ~he Mmoccan I-:SI fLLr\cli on~d re lat ive l)' well ur 11 ntil ti1e carl)' Inlh_ 
I\ ~ Ihal t im", a eombi na,ion of droughts, un incre,,," in ekclrici l), ,lc m"ml. "nd lad, or 
in fr.lst""'ture tinunc ing begun to s(m ill Ihe' de'C lric il y 'ySk"'_ W i~il a ')" te,,, uqlCnocm on 
h),d ro j(" , ,ign ili eant l\art of it' prod,,,,li"n. the drougllt s or I ')g3- 1 ~g5, and "g"in in I yn-
1~9J , required Lnc","",d l""ge or ~hermal r l~n 1s_ Til i, led to mi ni ", al ,mimen"nce be ing 
conducle-d on th e equirment und, in (U Ll1 , an inere"", ill incidenccs ('"cll a, generahlr Ir ip,) ' Xl 
these lInit" In addition v' Ih" u n ';Ch" J ,d ~u olltage,_ uemanJ " ,'" ~mwin g at u rapi d rate at (he 
lime, Teach jn~af()lLnd 8)kr cent growth ill 1992 (Hou),"d 200 1 ;7), A," rcs"l l. I"ad ,he~kli ng 
beea"", u common '",currcnce in ~'om,,~ o, Wilh lina ncing hard to come by_ ne,,' IX',,-el 
projecb wcr" uclay~d _ iOvenlllally, emergcncy gas IlI rb ine, werc "rdeTed and in,I"l1ed fo r 
po"'~r ~L",eratioll, but no\ beF-Jrc Ihc impaci of the erj,i, Ind made ~ ,ign itic ant impact on the 
dail), Ii w S of l1lost ~ loroccan._ 
T l", elc'C~rjc il y cri,i. in tl", mid I~RO, and early 19 '10 , rmmp\oo policy lllakcrs 10 relh i,,~ 
\ lomcco's de)kndence on hydropower. Coal, a1 Ihe lim;; aC",-H llLli ll g I'.ll' on ly ~ i"" ' ttll ~ or 
production, w,,, con;; idcTed ~l1lon~ 11", l\Cst altel'tl~t j\'es 10 help di,,,rs ity the product ion 
mi, '" 
,,- Aduiti()ml cOHI cuu ld be ;o Llrced f",on II., )"",1> ,-",11;,,10 ill 1~)11 1 .. ",( Morocc<', whic h wa, 
di",(),..-"i ill 1927 '''~ I put into prod",tioLl iLl 193" b, the local co,l ,ortlpa")' CI""bo",oa~., Ju 
\la",e_ 11Igh '1",,1;1), " ,,(llI'ad l. w", "' ind fm", tl, i, Iflorlm I; elu_ aoo in Ihe cnrl, 1 ' ~!lf; ;1 "a, 
prwLlo;"g 600 OW roll' (>Or yc"" II """ ,I", ollly ,-o.lmine in the coo"'r;- LLll\i1 the "", ill "",,,-b (,<><11)-
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To facilitate efforts at diversification and meeting the increasing demand, a decree was 
introduced in 1994, which opened the door to private participation in the generation sector. 
With Moroccan law dictating that private firms may not own electricity infrastructure, 
arrangements were pre-specified as BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) schemes (Badawi 
200 I: 10).158 Furthermore, ONE was designated as the exclusive buyer of all power above 10 
MW through decree no. 2-94-503 of 23 September 1994 (Benhima 1999:34; Debbarh 2006). 
Shortly thereafter bidding for the first IPP commenced, the details of which will be discussed 
in section 5.3 together with those relating to the country's other two IPPs. 
With the addition of IPPs that have come on line since 2000, as well as a number of upgrades 
to ONE's generation capacity, Morocco's installed generation capacity has been increased to 
5232 MW, responding to a demand of 19822 GWh in 2006 (ONE Annual Report 2006). Of 
the installed capacity, thermal plants account for roughly 69 per cent, hydro, 30 per cent and 
the remainder is made up by wind farms. Important to note, however, is that actual generation 
from hydro, has accounted for less than 10 per cent of national production since 2004. With 
the country's poor hydrological conditions over the past few years, hydro generation has 
experienced a notable drop of 18 per cent between 2004 and 2007, with its share in the 
generation mix reducing to 6 per cent in 2007 (World Bank 2008c). Table 5.1 gives a 
breakdown of Morocco's installed generation capacity in 2007. 
closed in 2001 after many years of declining output. The mine mainly supplied ONE's lerrada Thermal 
Power Station until it closed. 
158 This is different to the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) schemes which have been more common 
around the world. The transfer of generation assets to the state utility allows private operators to 
manage the assets while ownership remains with the state. 
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Table 5. 1: Installed Generation Capacity in Morocco in 2007 
Production Units Installed Capacity (MW) Total (MW) 
26 Hydro 1265 
Pump Storage Scheme 464 
Total Hydro 1729 
2 Coal-fired plants 1785 
3 Fuel-oil plants 600 
Gas-fired plants 999 
Diesel-fired plants 69 
Total Thermal 3453 
Wind turbines 110 110 
Combined Capacity 5292 
Sources: ONE Annual Reports 
The move to diversify away from hydro and so moderate the effects of drought has proved to 
be a challenging task with the country having limited domestic fossil fuels. Although 
Morocco possesses oil and gas wells, generally speaking, the calorific value of the fuels or the 
quantities estimated are too low to make exploration economic. A number of foreign 
exploration companies (20+) have exploration concessions and continue to search for oil and 
gas deposits both on and off shore. In 1998, Morocco's gas reserves were estimated at about 
l,4m3 billion, its proven oil reserves were estimated at around two million barrels, while 
recoverable coal reserves represented approximately six millions tons (African Energy 
1999:5). The country, therefore, has virtually no known indigenous coal. oil or gas reserves. 
importing roughly 96 per cent of commercial energy requirements. The remaining 4 per cent 
from domestic sources is mainly composed of hydro generation (Boutaleb 2005: 16; Ministry 
of Mines and Energy 2008a:5). 
In 1996, the Maghreb-European gas pipeline was commissioned to transport Algerian gas to 
Spain (Debbarh 2006:78). Construction of this gas infrastructure paved the way for 
Morocco's third IPP which employs a combined cycle facility to generate electricity. 
Despite the increases in electricity production, growth in demand for power has once again 
outstripped the country's ability to acquire sufficient generation capacity. Power imports from 
Spain have increased from 3,4 per cent in 2005 to more than 9 per cent in 2007, with no large 
scale facilities to be commissioned before 2009/20 I O. 
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5.2.3 Future Plants and Fuel 
Morocco's windy coastline has led to its keen interest in wind energy. Having adopted the 
Kyoto Protocol in January 2002, the ratification of the Clean Development Mechanism has 
opened up new sources of financing for renewable energy projects and the promotion of green 
energy (TERNA 2004:8). In addition to the country's second IPP, ONE commissioned a 60 
MW wind farm in the Essaouira region in April 2007. 159 Morocco has plans to develop more 
wind farms, having launched a Request for Proposal (Rfp) in 2006 for the next wind project 
for a 140 MW plant in Tangier, which is in its construction phase in 2008 and expected to be 
operational in 2009. The country also has plans to develop the Touahar a Taza wind farm, 
with an expected capacity output of 100 MW. It is the country's intention to eventually have 
14 wind farms at various locations to exploit the kingdom's wind potential and bring the wind 
capacity to 1000 MW (ONE 2007b). 
In 2006, ONE also invited expressions of interest to develop a 1320 MW coal fired IPP in 
Cap Ghir under a 30 year PPA with ONE assuming responsibility for fuel procurement (Blum 
2008). In February 2007, 15 companies were pre-qualified, out of an initial 30 companies that 
responded to the bid for the project, which was estimated to cost in the region of US$I.5 
billion (U.S. Commercial Service Morocco 2007). In October 2007, it was reported that the 
project at Cap Ghir had been scrapped due to environmental challenges and concerns about 
the impact of the power station on the local tourism industry, and that ONE was investigating 
an alternate site to develop the plant (MEED 2007a). The project, which was already a year 
late before a sponsor was selected to develop the plant, has since identified a new site. Despite 
moving to this new location in order to address the initial environmental concerns, it is 
intended for the plant to have clean coal technologies installed pushing up the price by 
approximately US$300 million (MEED 2008). At the alternate location a new coal terminal 
would need to be developed, and while construction on the terminal could start as early as 
early as March 2009, it would take at least 40 months to complete, threatening the 
commissioning deadline of the new plant, which was set for 2011 in 2006 (Africa Electra 
2007). As a result of the time lost and despite the plant initially scheduled to be commissioned 
in 20 I 0, ONE has had to revise its energy plan, with the commissioning schedule postponed 
to 2012 and 2013 (ONE 2008). 
Isq Apart from the three IPPs that were developed since power sector reforms were initiated in 1994, by 
2008, the 60 MW wind farm was the only capacity addition commissioned by ONE. 
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Cap Ghir was not the only project to have experienced delays so early in its development. 
Although bids were submitted in March 2006 for the construction of the AI-Wahda combined 
cycle power plant, plans for this plant have also fallen behind schedule due to Morocco's 
insufficient domestic energy resources and political tensions with neighbouring Algeria which 
would supply the gas required to feed the plant. 160 The importation of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) from Nigeria has since been considered as an alternative. Even if this proves possible, 
it would still take a considerable amount of time since a LNG receiving terminal would first 
have to be developed, delaying the development of the much needed capacity (MEED 2007b). 
As a result of the fuel supply issues, the development and commissioning of the AI-Wahda 
faci I ity has been pushed back until 20 I I. 
A second combined cycle plant unit was planned to come on stream at Tahaddart in 20 I 0 
(Boutaleb 2005). It was hoped that this plant would optimise the use of the Maghreb-Europe 
pipeline traversing Morocco and the royalties paid by Algeria, and further diversify 
Morocco's primary energy mix for power generation. At this stage, however, it is uncertain 
whether this unit will be an IPP. If problems relating to fuel concerns persist, it may be 
necessary to build a LNG terminal, creating a delay which could set the project back by five 
to six years (Ministry of Mines and Energy 2007:25). 
Morocco thus continues to face uncertainty over the availability of fuel to supply current and 
future plants (North Africa Infrastructure Development 2007:49). Still conscious of its 
vulnerability in terms of energy dependence, Morocco's efforts to further diversify its energy 
sources have commenced with studies to investigate the feasibility of generating electricity 
from commercial nuclear reactors 161. It is not foreseen that these units will become part of the 
160 Historically, tensions between the two nations have been over the phosphate-rich territory of 
Western Sahara. In addition to the Sand War which was fought over mineral rich border territory as far 
back as 1963 and 1964, since 1975 when Morocco took control over Western Sahara, Algeria has 
overtly backed the Polisario Front freedom movement to gain their independence from Morocco. 
Although Morocco has no oil reserves, through Western Sahara it controls over two thirds of the 
world's rock phosphate, an essential nutrient in global fertiliser supply, which experienced a price 
increase of 300 per cent in 2007 (The Oil Drum 2008). 
161 An agreement signed with the French in the early 1980s has facilitated the initiation of these studies. 
The Sidi Boulbra site between Safi and Essaouira has already been identified as the best option for the 
plant. Although Morocco's experience with nuclear power has been limited to its 2 MW experimental 
nuclear plant in Maamora (African Energy 1999), its domestic energy shortages have left policy 
makers with few alternatives in the long run. 
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ONE fleet in the near to medium future due to the size of commercial units available and the 
relative small size of the Moroccan transmission network. Although the option of medium 
sized reactors is being considered, such reactors would only be economically viable if a 
programme of successive units were to come on line (Bencheqroun 2005). 
5.2.4 Transmission and Distribution 
Since independence, Morocco has had transmission links with neighbouring Algeria. 
Traditionally. the country was an exporter of electricity to Algeria until 1974, after reaching a 
peak in exports in 1968. This exchange of power was resumed in 1988 when the transmission 
grid was connected to the Algerian network at the 225kV level. this time with power flows 
reversed as Morocco faced a shortage of power due to the drought that had strained hydro 
generation. The initial exchange capacity was restricted to 200 MW until a second line was 
installed in 1992, with imports reaching a peak in the following year. At the same time, the 
government of Morocco also started negotiations with the Spanish power utility, Red 
Electrica de Espana (REE), to develop transmission links with Morocco in order to help 
overcome Morocco's power deficit. 162 By 1997, Spain took over from Algeria as the main 
electricity exporter to Morocco and trade with Algeria has since been limited to mutual spot 
back-up to balance supply and demand (Morocco Country Profile 1998; Debbarh 2006:70). In 
2006, the capacity of the 400kV interconnection with Spain was doubled to relieve domestic 
electricity supply shortages, and. in anticipation of potential future power shortages. a third 
400kV interconnection was established with Algeria (Debbarh 2006:87). 
The existence of the abovementioned transmission interconnections have proved to be of 
great importance to the country. Since power sector reforms were first introduced in 1994, 
Morocco has been unable to meet its electricity demand through domestic production alone 
and has had to source electricity imports to overcome the shortages. Despite adding capacity 
from IPPs to the country's grid, in 2007 Morocco still had a sh0l1age of electricity, importing 
more than 9 per cent of the country's electricity requirements. a figure which is above the 
average volume of electricity imported during the last decade, and a sharp increase from the 
3.4 per cent of national demand volume imported in 2005 (ONE 2006a; ONE 2008). Were it 
not. therefore. for the ability to import power from its neighbours through these transmission 
interconnections, the consequences of Morocco's power shortages would have been more 
162 The contract for the initial interconnection was signed by ONE and Red Electrica de Espana (REE) 
in July 1993 when Morocco was suffering from a severe energy crisis. 
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severe. Despite the cost of power imports being more than the cost of domestic production, in 
all probability, imports will be the primary means used to manage the shortfall in electricity 
production in the short to medium term, as has been the case since 1988. 
More recently, expansion of the national distribution networks have been mainly at the lower 
voltage levels and largely driven by the goals of the country's Rural Electrification 
Programme, PERG (Programme d'Electrification Rurale Global), which was expected to be 
completed by the end of2007. [n 2007, rural electrification rates were recorded at 93 per cent, 
up from 18 per cent in 1995, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. This notable performance in rural 
electrification puts Morocco amongst the countries that have the highest electrification access 
rates on the A frican continent. 
Figure 5. 3: Rural Electrification Rate between 1995 and 2007 
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At the end of 2006, ONE accounted for approximately 37 per cent of the total distribution 
market amongst medium and low voltage consumers (ONE Annual Report 2006: 16). Seven 
regional municipal distributors made up about 15 per cent. The remainder, approximately half 
of the country's distribution market, is controlled via long-term contracts by three private 
firms, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and Urban Centres (Jerj ini 2002). 
Lydec is the largest of the three private distributors, holding the rights to provide electricity 
services for 30 years for Casablanca (since 1997) and represented almost 40 per cent of the 
country's total distribution sales in 2006. Redal has held a 30-year contract for Rabat since 
1999 and, in 2006, represented 17 per cent of the distribution sales. Finally, since 2002, 
Amendis has been active in Tangiers and Tetouan under two 25-year contracts, and represents 
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about 9 per cent of the country's distribution sales (ONE Annual Report 2004; ONE Annual 
Report 2006: 19). 
5.3 Independent Power Producers 
As previously noted, IPPs have helped to change the face of Morocco's ESI, providing much 
needed generation after the troubled years of the mid-1980s and early 1990s. This section 
describes the three independent power projects that have come on line since the start of the 
reform programme. The projects are distinct in size, fuel source, and construction costs, as 
illustrated in Table 5.2 below. The first IPP, the Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC) uses 
coal and consists of both a brownfield and greenfield transaction. The second IPP, Compagnie 
Eolienne de Detroit (CEO), is a wind farm. The third plant, Energie Electrique de Tahaddart 
(EET) uses gas from neighbouring Algeria to run the country's first combined cycle gas plant. 
Table 5. 2: Summary of Moroccan IPPs 
Nominal Capacity 680 + 680 MW 50MW 384 MW 
PP A Duration 30 years 19 years 20 years 
Fuel Type Coal Wind Natural gas 
Debt Foreign Foreign Local 
Equity Foreign Foreign Local/Foreign 
Although technologically varied, these projects had a standard set of investment incentives, 
including V A T and customs duty exemptions on all equipment that could not be sourced 
locally and a five year holiday on property tax. In tenns of corporate income tax, there was a 
slight variation among the three projects. For Jorf Lasfar. the first IPP, a full exemption was 
granted for the first five years of operation, followed by a 50 per cent reduction from year-six 
to year-ten. For CEO, the second project, the firm received only a 50 per cent exemption 
during the first five years, after which the normal tax rate of 35 per cent applied. Finally, the 
fact that EET was located in one of the region's investment zones meant that it qualified for a 
16~ In local currency~ this amounts to roughly MAD 3013 111illion. 
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75 per cent income tax exemption during the first five years. 1M From year six to ten, a 50 per 
cent exemption is scheduled, similar to that given to JLEC. All exemptions were scheduled to 
start from COD and thereby reduce overall financing charges facilitating investment in 
generation infrastructure. 
5.3.1 The Jorf Lasfar Energy Company 
aJ Project Overview 
Unlike any of the other projects described in this thesis, Morocco's first IPP, a 1360 MW 
coal-fired plant, was both a brownfield and greenfield development. Shortly after the first and 
second units, consisting of 340 MW each, came into service in October 1994, the government 
launched an international competitive bid (lCB) for additional capacity. The deal consisted of 
building two more units (as well as expanding the coal supply terminal) and operating the 
power plant (including units one and two) for a period of 30 years under a BTO agreement. 
The three consortia that responded were: 
• Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and CMS 
• AES and General Electric (GE) 
• Alstom l65 
The CMS/ABB consortium was ultimately selected in 1995, in part due to ABB's track record 
in Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) and CMS's recognised expertise in 
Operations & Maintenance (O&M). The firms had partnered in a number of IPPs 
internationally and, thus, together, the two companies were able to demonstrate that they 
could adequately share the technical and project management risks normally associated with 
large projects of this nature. 
Negotiations with the ABB/CMS consortium continued until April 1996, when agreement 
was reached on the draft PPA. The PPA was finalized in September 1997 when negotiations 
164 The Tahaddart plant is located in a free trade zone in Tangiers which is open to both Moroccan and 
foreign companies. Companies located in the zone may import goods duty-free and qualify for certain 
tax exemptions depending on the business concern. 
165 Alstom was the EPC contractor for the first two units of Jorf Lasfar and, therefore, had previous 
experience with the power station. 
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for the O&M agreement. the EPC agreement and the financing arrangements were concluded. 
A performance bond of US$50 million was posted by ABB/CMS as a guarantee that they 
could arrange the project financing. 
In January 1997, the Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC) was incorporated as a Moroccan 
company to start operating units one and two for which JLEC paid US$263 million to 
ONE.166 Many personnel for the operation of the plant were subsequently transferred from 
ONE to the new company and a series of new support functions for JLEC was established. 
For units three and four, work began in September of 1997, and was scheduled to be 
completed approximately three years later. With the project slightly ahead of schedule, COD 
for unit three was reached in June 2000 and for unit four in February 2001. 
b) Financing 
The brownfield and the greenfield components of the deal were treated as one transaction. 
Equity, accounting for US$500 million or approximately 33 per cent of total financing, was 
made up of two tranches: US$300 million provided initially as a shareholder loan and then 
converted into equity, and US$200 million from surplus cash flows from the operations of 
units one and two. The project debt of US$I billion was made up of five sets of loan 
agreements, with interest rates varying between 5.7 per cent and 10 per cent depending on the 
loan facility. 
The US Export Import Bank (US Exlm) is a senior lender with US$200 million of loans 
issued at an interest rate of 7.2 per cent. An additional US$200 million credit facility was 
extended by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The commercial bank 
loans are backed by political risk guarantees from the Italian Export Credit Agency, SACE 
(Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero),167 the Swiss Export Risk Guarantee (ERG)168 
166 Exemption on corporate income tax referenced earlier included income from the two brownfield 
units. 
167 SACE S.p.A. is a joint-stock company fully owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
Their commitments are guaranteed by the Republic of Italy. The insurance company supports Italian 
business throughout the world and insures, reinsures and guarantees political and commercial risks 
affecting Italian enterprises in their export or investment activities. 
168 The Export Risk Guarantee (ERG) is a Swiss federal government scheme designed to make it easier 
for exporters to do business in countries where political or economic instability could jeopardise receipt 
of payment. The ERG is a legally dependent, self-supporting fund managed by the Swiss federal 
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and the World Bank. After syndication, the project started with 50 commercial banks. This 
number has since been reduced to less than 45 due to mergers and buyouts. As security for 
these loans, the Government of Morocco issued JLEC with a letter guaranteeing it the right to 
operate the power station and, in the event of default, that ONE would make the termination 
payments. The fact that transfer took place before operations commenced was very important 
to investors and lenders in the BTO context given their concerns regarding the risk 
expropriation as described in section 2.4. 
c) The Power Purchase Agreement 
Although the above noted security arrangements helped to sweeten the deal, it was the PPA 
that supported the whole transaction. The PPA tariff schedule was front-end loaded with the 
tariff peaking in the fifth year and tapering off to year thirty. Payments are based on the 
energy that JLEC makes available for dispatching, with the PPA stipulating that JLEC 
guarantees a minimum energy availability factor of 82 per cent. As is standard for IPPs 
globally, these payments include a capacity charge, an O&M charge, and an energy charge 
based on the cost of the primary energy consumed in accordance with the prescribed heat rate 
curves for the plant hardware. At the end of the 30-year contract, ONE will automatically 
assume operations for the full installation with no financial payment. Thereafter, the decision 
to extend the period of plant operation will be up to ONE. 
Included in the terms of the PPA was an escrow facility equivalent to one month of invoicing. 
The agreement also contains a clause stating that if no payment dispute is entered into during 
the first four years of the contract, ONE could request a reduction to zero in this cash escrow 
account, which is what happened. As security against a payment default, the PPA requires 
ONE to establish and maintain a letter of credit in favour of JLEC equal to two months of 
invoicing. 
d) Fuel Supply and Agreement 
All four units use coal for which JLEC is reimbursed according to the following formula: 
• 80 per cent - the average cost of coal procured by JLEC 
• 20 per cent - the average cost of coal imported into the European Union. 
government. It derives its Income from guarantee fees and borrowers' repayments from debt 
rescheduling. 
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This arrangement acts as an incentive for JLEC to procure coal at a competitive rate. As 
mentioned earlier, with Morocco having virtually no indigenous coal supply, all of JLEC's 
coal supply is imported (mostly from South Africa). Thirty-five days of stockpiling is 
required in terms of the fuel security agreement. The choice of coal as fuel was linked to three 
factors: the existing two units already used coal as the source of primary energy, the 
proximity of the Jorf Lasfar coal terminal, and the competitiveness of the fuel type. 
5.3.2 Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CED) 
As the largest IPP in Africa, Jorf Lasfar towers over every other project, especially 
Compagnie Eolienne de Detroit (CEO), Morocco's second IPP at only 50 MW (or less than 4 
per cent of JLEC's installed capacity). CEO is. however. a pioneer in its own right as Africa's 
first privately financed wind farm, and, therefore, is important to discuss in the context of 
both Morocco's and the continent's evolving power development. 
a) Project Overview 
Morocco's efforts at harnessing wind power date back to the 1980s when, in 1986, the 
Renewable Energy Development Centre, COER (Centre de Development d'Energie 
Renouvelable) in Marrakech published the first wind atlas for the country. Four years later, 
COER launched a special wind measurement programme. supported by the German 
Development Agency's Technical Expertise for Renewable Energy Application (TERNA) 
programme, to identify the most promising sites for wind energy utilisation. 169 The results of 
this programme. published in March 1995, indicated mean annual wind speeds of 11.5 m/s in 
the Tetouan region, near Tangiers in northern Morocco. Encouraged by these findings, which 
qualified the site as one of the best in the world. ONE subsequently created a programme for 
the development and promotion of wind energy. The goal of the programme was twofold: 
diversify Morocco's electricity sources and develop more sustainable energy alternatives. 
The first wind project was a 3.5 MW demonstration wind farm at the Al Koudi Al Ba'ldi 
site.I7O To finance the project, the German Development Bank, Kreditanstalt fUr 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), provided a low interest loan ofE 4.35 million to ONE. Following what 
was deemed a successful demonstration and in keeping with the government's initiative to 
169 Germany's Gesellschaft fijI' Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) sponsored TERNA which, in turn, 
supports partner countries in the assessment and utilisation of their wind energy potential. 
170 This is in the province of Tetouan, 40 km east of Tangiers. 
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draw on private capital to finance infrastructure projects, ONE began discussions with Genna, 
the French wind energy consulting company, as a first step to developing a 50 MW wind 
project. The discussions with Genna resulted in the wind consultancy being given the 
opportunity to share in the project's equity. To supply the equipment for the project, however, 
the government subsequently conducted an lCB hoping that the equipment supplier would 
take the remaining equity stake in the project. The lCB attracted bids from Nordex and 
Enercon, the German equipment suppliers, and Vestas, the Danish equipment supplier. 
Vestas, although providing the winning bid, indicated that its involvement would be limited to 
the construction of the plant, and that it had no interest in acquiring an equity stake. With 
Vestas' interest limited to that of equipment supplier, Germa entered into discussions with 
Electricite de France (EDF) and Paribas Merchant Bank since it needed equity partners for the 
project. The inclusion of these partners resulted in all the equity for the project being of 
French origin. 
Project equity, which accounted for 30 per cent of total project costs, was therefore agreed to 
as follows: EDF 49 per cent; Paribas 35.5 per cent and Germa 15.5 per cent. Thereafter, CEO 
was established as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to realise the project, with first priority 
given to arranging debt financing. The European Investment Bank (EIB), senior lender to the 
project, provided a loan of €24.4 million for the €45.7 million project. Secondary lenders in 
the loan syndication were, among others, Credit Agricole (now Calyon) and the French 
development agency, Societe de Promotion et la Participation pour la Cooperation 
Economique (PROPACO). 
b) Localised Financing and Payments 
As with JLEC, ownership of the IPP ultimately resides with the state, and the 19-year PPA, 
which was finalized in 1997, specified a BTO arrangement. In a departure from thermal lPPs, 
however, only a capacity charge (i.e. no energy charge), is detailed in the PPA. Initially this 
payment is made in the form of a 70:30 ratio of US$:MAD. With project debt paid off in the 
first ten years of operation, this payment ratio will gradually change so that towards the end of 
the PPA period most of the payment will be made in local currency. 
Provision is made in the PPA for arbitration in Morocco in the case of any party failing to 
honour its commitments as stipulated in the agreement. Furthermore, according to the terms 
of the PPA, ONE has the right to take over the operation of the wind farm, but is obligated to 
pay CEO an amount equal to the book value of the assets and the calculated future cash flows 
from the operation for the remainder of the PPA duration. 
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5.3.3. Energie Electrique de Tahaddart 
As the country's first plant using combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology Morocco's 
third IPP also maintains the status of a national record setter. Of perhaps greater significance, 
however, is the fact that Energie Electrique de Tahaddart (EET) is the first power plant in all 
of Africa where all the entire project debt was financed by local banks in local currency. 
aJ Project Overview 
There were several factors that coalesced and led to the realisation of EET. First, in terms of 
fuel, the Moroccan government has the right to 7 per cent of the gas that passes through from 
Algeria to Spain (EET pers.com. 2006). Prior to the inception of EET, royalties were paid to 
the government in cash. With increasing electricity demand and pressure to diversify the 
supply mix, a decision was made to accept the gas commodity as payment as opposed to cash. 
The Government of Morocco was also motivated by the fact that the use of gas would help 
reduce the country's foreign currency demands and, albeit to a much lesser degree, minimise 
foreign exchange exposure, since the vast majority of Morocco's energy needs are purchased 
in foreign currency. Finally, the decommissioning of existing plant meant, quite simply, that 
new generation was needed. 
With more than half of the country's electricity generation output produced by IPPs, ONE 
made a strategic decision to limit its retreat from the generation sector and become a 
shareholding partner in EET. Initially ONE engaged in talks with EDF and Empresa Nacional 
de Electricidad S.A. (ENDESA); however, EDF's interest was limited and shott-lived and the 
firm soon opted out. These discussions, like those conducted in the early days of CED, were 
meant to prepare the terrain for the ICB by helping ONE to find partners who could assist in 
facilitating the tender and, ultimately, in carrying part of the project equity. In 1999, assisted 
by ENDESA, ONE issued an RfP for an EPC contract and an O&M contract. It was agreed by 
ONE and ENDESA that the successful bidder would take a 20 per cent equity stake. GE, 
ABB and Siemens pre-qualified, with Siemens ultimately chosen for both the construction 
and O&M contracts. The equity split was, therefore, as follows: ONE 48 per cent, ENDESA 
32 per cent and Siemens 20 per cent. 171 In addition to the other record setting aspects noted 
above. EET thus became the first shareholding partnership between ONE and private 
171 Initially. ONE would only take a 20 per cent stake in the project. EDF a 30 per cent stake and 
ENDESA a 30 per cent stake. This changed when EDF left the negotiations (Morocco Country Profile 
1998). 
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companies in Morocco's ESI. Construction started in February 2003 and COD occurred 
approximately two years later on 25 March 2005. A 20-year PPA, under BTO terms, specifies 
that ONE is the sole off-taker, as with both JLEC and CEO, and that EET must guarantee 
minimum availability. 
b) Financing 
The project cost, amounting to €285 million, was made up by 25 per cent equity and 75 per 
cent debt, which represents a larger debt component than in any of the previous IPPs (with 67 
per cent for JLEC and 70 per cent for CEO). Debt was provided by a suite of Moroccan 
banks: Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP) provided MADI300 million in loans; and a 
consortium of banks, which included BCP as the lead lender, the Banque Marocaine pour Ie 
Commerce Exteriere (BMCE) and Credit Agricole (CNCA), provided an additional 
MAD960m in loans. 172 Part of the debt is tied to a fixed interest rate at 7.6 per cent, and part 
varies with the prime interest rate. Although the debt is payable within the first 12 years of 
operation, a grace period of three years has been negotiated. This flexibility gives ONE the 
option of extending its payment schedule from 12 to 15 years in the event that its financial 
situation changes to an extent where it has to restructure its repayments. Apart from a letter of 
credit issued by a local bank (equal to one month's payment), there are no escrow facility 
requirements or any other security arrangements. In the case of default, however, the PPA 
does make provision for international arbitration at the International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration in Geneva, Switzerland. 
5.4 An Analysis of the Hybrid Power Market and its Outcomes in 
Morocco 
Morocco has seen a significant increase in private participation in generation where private 
operators today supply the bulk of the country's power. Private participation is also prevalent 
in the distribution sector where private distributors service the major urban centres. Despite 
the changes that have occurred, the realisation of a competitive power market resembling the 
standard model remains elusive. This section provides an analysis of how post-reform power 
sector frameworks have impacted on the development of generation infrastructure. 
172 The average exchange rate for the Moroccan dirham in 2003, the year that construction started, was 
I 0.95MAD= I.OOEUR (Interbank Rate). 
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5.4.1 Post-Reform Electricity Market Evolution 
As with many hydro-dependent systems, it was droughts in the 1980s and early 1990s that, in 
part prompted policy makers to initiate changes to electricity policy in Morocco. Prior to this, 
between the 1950s and early I 970s, hydro had met the lion's share of the country's demands 
and policy makers had come to take weather reliability for granted. 173 Although ONE's 
thermal capacity was on the increase in the 1980s and 1990s, new investment did not keep 
pace with demand. which, compounded with the drought, resulted in power shortages and 
significant load shedding. These power scarcities served as a wake up call to the country and 
to policy makers, ushering in a new awareness of the importance of strategic planning and the 
need for the diversification of fuel resources, as well as a call for additional financing of 
generation investment. In addition. poor utility financial and technical performance 
contributed to the need for transformation in the sector. The enactment of legislation ending 
ONE's monopoly in 1989 paved the way for private producers to supply more than 70 per 
cent of the country's production by 2005. This has resulted in a hybrid arrangement where 
private producers and the state-owned utility together supply electricity, but where the utility 
is also the off-taker of electricity from IPPs. 
ONE has undergone a transformation from a traditional SOE to a public corporation that is 
operated under Moroccan commercial law (World Bank 2008c). Despite corporatisation, the 
performance of ONE is still unsatisfactory largely due to the current financial difficulties 
within the organisation. Although the sector has seen significant changes since power sector 
reforms were initiated. institutionally there have been few changes to accommodate the new 
market structure and operational arrangements. The overall institutional framework, therefore, 
resembles that of the sector prior to reforms: there is no independent regulator and most of the 
initiatives and functional responsibilities, including planning, procurement of generation and 
dispatching. are spearheaded by the national utility under the tutelage of the Ministry of 
Energy. 
Although the evolution toward the standard model with competitive wholesale markets is still 
in the pipeline for the Moroccan ESI, delays have been experienced in its implementation and 
the transition towards competition in the sector has meet met with numerous challenges as 
outlined by Woolf and Halpern (2001) in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
m The early 1970s marked the first time that fossil fuels accounted for more than renewable or hydro 
facilities for electricity supply in Morocco (ONE 2003:89). 
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5.4.2 Power Sector Planning 
Prior to reforms, power sector planning was the responsibility of ONE. Unlike in the two 
previous cases, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, where the planning function was taken away from 
the state utility and given to new institutions set up for this and other functions, the planning 
function has remained with ONE since reforms first started in 1989. Although domestic 
production did not increase sufficiently to meet the demand between 1989 and 2005, there 
was a decrease in the shortfall as a percentage of national demand. After 2005, the deficit has 
once again started to increase and, despite nearly 20 years of ongoing reforms, Morocco has 
been unable to eliminate its net deficit in generation through domestic generation sources. 
The question that arises is: Why, despite so many years of reform, is the electricity sector 
seeing its largest deficit between national demand and national power generation? While there 
has been relative continuity in the planning function in the transition between the pre and post 
reform periods, the outcome appears to be mixed when one compares the period up until the 
last IPP (EET commissioned in 2005) when the generation shortfall was decreasing, with the 
period thereafter where it has been on the increase. During the latter, ONE has been unable to 
meet domestic demand without a substantial increase in the amount of power imported from 
neighbouring Spain. Despite indications that the pace of supply side additions was falling 
behind, Morocco continued to pursue its ambitious rural electrification programme which 
significantly increased demand. The PERG was considered a priority: sufficient funds were 
secured for the PERG, but not enough for additional generation investment. 174 In addition, 
assigning the bulk of the operational responsibility for electricity production to private 
producers enabled ONE to remain operationally focused on PERG. The utility's DSM 
programmes that were rolled out to encourage energy efficiency as a means to curb demand 
growth were only instituted when the supply situation reached crisis proportions in 2008. The 
timing of these actions, therefore, suggests that inadequate planning to balance demand and 
supply was a problem in the sector. This continued to be a problem in 2008 when the 
transmission and distribution networks failed to ensure a reliable supply of electricity supply 
to all consumers resulting in costly disruptions to industry and the economy in general. 
174 The increase in rural electrification rates has helped counter the rapid urban migration, which was 
prompted, in part, by the droughts during the mid-1980s and early 1990s. PERG also has contributed to 
the economic, social and educational development that resulted from electrifying remote settlements. 
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a) Generation Project Planning 
There have also been shortcomings in the assessment of project related risks. Environmental 
risk assessment emerged as a weak point within generation planning with the Cap Ghir plant 
being delayed due to environmental concerns over air pollution and the impact that it would 
have on tourism in the area. The risk assessment of upstream fuel security emerged as the 
weakness in planning for the Al Warda plant, with the government and utility failing to secure 
sufficient fuel in time for the development of the project and construction of the plant. In the 
case of the Cap Ghir plant and with Morocco's historical environmental performance in the 
power sector, it may be deduced that environmental concerns were not high enough on the 
agenda for project planners and that critical links between the planners and environmental 
agencies were insufficient. 175 Although the plant would be built by the private sector, the site 
selection still remained the responsibility of ONE and the state. It would appear that ONE had 
not kept up-to-date with modern environmental requirements for coal-fired plants. 176 The 
initial planning also failed to take into consideration the increased costs of dealing with the 
environmental concerns, including the installation of clean coal technologies as noted in 
Section 5.2.3. For the Al Wahda plant, negotiations for fuel should have been done at a 
governmental level since the associated problems were political in nature. rather than 
technical. environmental or commercial. Given the critical nature of the country's dependence 
on foreign energy imports. it is startling that the importance of fuel security was 
underestimated. 
b) Fiexibili(v in Planning 
Although there have been problems relating to the planning of generation projects. the overall 
planning with respect to electricity provision appears to have been flexible enough to 
overcome these problems - at least to some extent. Regional integration with respect to 
transmission interconnections has helped Morocco to maintain adequate electricity to meet 
demand. The utility, supported by the state and the World Bank, has been proactive in further 
integrating its transmission networks with those of Spain and Algeria so as to import 
electricity instead of fuel used for power generation. This arrangement has helped the country 
deal with its immediate electricity shortages. Over the medium to long term, however, this 
alternative as a single solution has a problem of its own: the existing transmission grid in 
175 Prior to CMS/ABB taking over the 10rf Lasfar plant, waste fly ash was not disposed of in an 
environmentally friendly manner but simply pumped into the sea. 
176 The last coal-fired power station planned by ONE was more than two decades prior to the planned 
construction of the Cap Ghir plant. 
165 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
Morocco is overloaded and, in many areas, is already operating at the limits of its capacity. 
Voltage and frequency drops have made the transmission system unstable and ONE is 
experiencing high transmission losses due to demand load centres being far from supply. This 
situation is expected to deteriorate unless the transmission system is strengthened. According 
to a World Bank report detailing the status of the Moroccan ESI, transmission strengthening 
is required before any new power plants are commissioned (2008c:107). Either way, the 
country has to spend money on transmission infrastructure reinforcements to stabilise the 
network and make provision for future growth in both power supply and demand. 177 
Meanwhile, the government and ONE have also crafted a strategy to deal with the domestic 
power shortages in the short to medium term. In a press release in July 2008, the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy stated that it planned to develop over 1000 MW of wind energy or roughly 
20 per cent of 2008 capacity by April 20 I O. It also plans to augment the transmission capacity 
from Spain by 700MW by installing a third undersea cable, while at the same time reinforcing 
its transmission grid infrastructure. Included in the planning schedule is a DSM programme to 
reduce demand and another programme to improve the performance of ONE generation plants 
(ONE Annual Report 2006; Ministry of Mines and Energy 2008b). A law permitting self 
producers to operate installations above 10 MW has also been approved with self producers 
now able to install generators with a capacity up to 50 MW (ONE 2008: 10). While these 
measures may help in alleviating the problems of capacity shortages, on their own it is 
uncertain whether Morocco will be able to weather the storm. 
c) Financial Planning 
Growth in electricity demand has accelerated from 6 per cent per annum between 1997 and 
2002 to more than 8 per cent per annum between 2003 and 2007, and is expected to continue 
growing at a relatively bullish rate until 2015 (World Bank 2008c). ONE has been struggling 
to survive financially mainly due to rising fuel costs which have not been matched by 
corresponding increases in tariffs; the World Bank described ONE's need to redress its 
financial situation as its most pressing and immediate challenge (World Bank 2008c).178 
177 ONE has applied to the World Bank for a loan to enable the necessary upgrades to the transmission 
infrastructure to cope with fast growing demand and meet the quality and security requirements. 
178 While fuel prices have more than doubled between 2004 and 2008, the average taritfincreased from 
US$8.8 cents in 2004 to US$ 9.5 cents in 2007. This represents less than an 8 per cent increase over the 
four years (World Bank 2008c). Between 2003 and 2005, the cost of charges from Jorf Lasfar and 
Spain rose by an average of 14 per cent (Barbut 2006: 16). 
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Although ONE has requested a tariff increase along with a complete overhaul of the tariff 
structure. electricity tariff increases are a socially sensitive issue and the state's view is that 
these must be accompanied by and coordinated with measures to protect the poor. Current 
tariff structures only allow for minimal absorption of increasing operating costs among the 
lower income groups that have been granted access as part of the country's rural 
electrification programme. The tariff issue is further exacerbated because the majority of 
users fall into the lower income category. Only a 7 per cent tariff increase was approved in 
2006, the first tariff increase since 1997, and it was almost insignificant when compared to the 
escalation of costs at the utility (Barbut 2006: 16-17). 
ONE's borrowing expenses have increased by 26 per cent from 2004 to 2007 and the utility's 
debt in 2007 represented around two thirds of its balance sheet. Assets include accounts 
receivable, amounting to more than US$230m and which have proved to be hard to recover. 179 
By early 2008. ONE had also requested the Government of Morocco to write off its debt and, 
by mid-2008. ONE and the Government of Morocco were in discussions on a fiscal recovery 
plan for the financially stricken utility. Current projections show that ONE will continue 
showing a loss well into 2012 unless changes are brought about to the tariff structure or 
adjustments are made to the SOE's balance sheet. through capital injections, amongst other 
things (World Bank 2008c). 
5.4.3 Procurement of Generation 
The country's first IPP, JLEC, was procured through an ICB and, although only three 
consortia responded to the bid invitation. it did provide for some degree of competition 
amongst bidding consortia putting downward pressure on tender price submissions. The 
World Bank had posted a guarantee and with its involvement in the Moroccan ESI, ONE, the 
state, and other project stakeholders were obliged to conform to the bank's procurement 
policies for projects that relate to infrastructure spending. 
For the second IPP, tenders invited for the development of the project were not for the entire 
equity on the project. Since Genna had already done much of the feasibility study on the 
development of the wind farm, the project lead was awarded to the consultancy by ONE and 
179 Long standing arrears from previous municipalities that historically serviced the Casablanca and 
Tetouan regions amount to MAD 1062 million with short-term overdraft financing costs for these 
accounts receivable estimated to be in the region of MAD 80 million (World Bank 2008c:182). 
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the state. Although the main developer had already been chosen, it was still required that the 
bulk of CED's project costs, the EPC, be procured by international tender in accordance with 
the prescriptions of the lenders to the project. 
A similar arrangement was used in the development of the country's third IPP. ONE had 
decided from the onset that it would take an equity stake in the project. It then selected the 
equity holders it wanted as partners in the deal. ONE and its selected partner, Endesa, put out 
a tender for the EPC contract, with the idea that the winner would be an equity partner in the 
development of EET. This made ONE a co-supplier and off-taker of the power generated 
through the IPP arrangement purchase agreement. Nevertheless, ICBs for the three IPPs that 
were commissioned assisted in lowering costs to the utility and ultimately consumers. At the 
time shortly after commissioning Morocco's first IPP, the Global Environmental Facility 
reported that the power charges to JLEC amounted to 4.8 US$ cents per kWh which 
compared favourably to the costs of ONE plants, which were slightly higher at around 6 
US$ cents per kWh (GEF 1999:9).180 The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development has disclosed that the generation price for CED was calculated at MAD 0.40 to 
0.60 per kWh (3.9 to 5.9 € cents per kWh), placing it in the range of the average production 
costs of conventional plants in Morocco and comparing favourably with green energy prices 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean region (GTZ 2002: 155).181 Finally, EET also fared quite well 
with an estimated tariff of around 3 US$ cents per kWh (excluding the gas), which compares 
well with similar projects in the region (Sadiq 200 I; Euro-Med Energy Forum 2008:8).182 
180 One of the ways in which ONE contractually tried to keep costs down was to give JLEC an 
incentive during coal procurement. For JLEC to attain or exceed expected Return on Equity (ROE), it 
needed to procure coal at a less costly rate than purchasing coal imported into the European Union. 
Although ONE, as the off-taker, has control neither over the fuel supplier nor over the international 
coal price, the utility has created an incentive for JLEC to keep primary energy costs down, exerting 
downward pressure on the cost of a kWh. 
181 Of significance in CEO's power charges is the way in which the capacity charges are paid. As there 
is no primary energy charge, ONE was able to negotiate up to 30 per cent of the capacity charge to be 
denominated in local currency at the onset of the agreement, thereby decreasing foreign exchange 
exposure. 
182From a currency perspective, EET may ultimately prove to have among the most stable power 
charges of any project on the continent largely due to local financing. As has been previously 
discussed, all the debt for the project was locally sourced, and in local currency and nearly half of the 
project's equity is domestically held. The lead lenders for the debt were local banks which were 
previously state owned and still had a significant degree of state involvement at the time the financing 
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When JLEC came on line, it supplied roughly two thirds of national electricity production. 
Similarly, when EET came on line, it represented approximately II per cent of the country's 
installed capacity and roughly 17 per cent of total domestic generation output. Accounting for 
the bulk of the country's electricity production, IPPs do not appear to have caused price 
increases in local currency in Morocco, unlike elsewhere in Africa (namely in Egypt, Ghana, 
and Tanzania).183 Instead, during the period that IPPs have been developed, ONE was actually 
able to reduce electricity tariffs. Table 5.3 shows the reductions in the various voltage 
categories recorded in nominal terms, with real term reductions for medium and high voltage 
categories measuring 44.4 per cent and 36.4 per cent, respectively, for the same period. These 
reductions have helped to make the economy more competitive, among other things, and 
attract business to Morocco (Debbarh 2006:81). However, as noted above, more recently, 
tariffs have not kept up with costs and have led to financial difficulties for ONE. 
Table 5. 3: Tariffs in MAD cents per kWh. 
Tariff Category 1997 2004 % Reduction 
High Voltage 81.7 61 25% 
Medium Voltage 101.8 69.9 31% 
Low Voltage 93.2 86.4 7% 
Residential 78.79 73.9 6% 
Source: ONE Annual Report (2004:21) 
Although the presence of ONE as an equity partner in the third IPP had clear benefits when it 
came to arranging local finance from Moroccan banks (since ONE is backed by the state), the 
equity arrangement in the EET IPP was a departure from the norm of full private sector 
participation in IPPs in Morocco since ONE assumed nearly half the equity in the project. 
Other than the fact that ONE had some financial reserves to invest in the project's equity, it is 
unclear why it decided to get involved in the project since general criteria for the allocation of 
new build opportunities for SOEs and the private sector have not been made public by the 
utility or the state. 
arrangements were negotiated. It is, therefore, doubtful whether similar local debt financing would 
have been realised with historically private banks alone and without the influence of the state. 
Nevertheless, the arrangement has helped significantly in doing away with the currency risks that have 
plagued similar projects in other emerging countries. 
[8J At least this was the case when fuel costs remained relatively constant. 
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Again, it is ONE that will develop the next wind farm despite the fact that the utility's 
finances are now in a dire state. Recent experiences have shown that the private sector's 
appetite for IPPs appears to have waned in Morocco with no private bidders being interested 
in the Ain Beni Maihar plant (World Bank 2008c). Given this, it is understandable that the 
state has had to take a more direct lead. However, if the sector's finances were in a better 
state, it is likely that greater interest would be expressed by private sponsors. 
5.4.4 Contracting Arrangements 
As the primary off-taker of power in the sector, ONE has entered into contracts with all IPPs 
in accordance with the country's legal framework. 
Both parties are bound by the conditions of the contracts which make provision for dispute 
resolution. Contract terms serve as the primary regulatory mechanism for meeting the 
objectives of both stakeholders (sponsor and off-taker) in a transparent manner. Investment 
contexts, however, often change from the conditions experienced at the inception of contracts 
and such changes have the potential to put stresses on existing contracts and impact on the 
nature of future ones. From the time that the contracts for the three IPPs were entered into, 
much has changed. The utility's financial performance has deteriorated significantly. As 
noted previously, poor hydrological condition have resulted in a significant decrease in hydro 
generation and the utility's costs have seen a marked increase mainly due to escalating fuel 
costs over recent years. Meanwhile, tariffs approved by the state have not seen an increase 
sufficient to cover increased costs. This has contributed to the utility's poor financial 
performance. '84 The deteriorating financial situation may potentially impact on the utility'S 
ability to make timely payments to IPPs thus discouraging future investments by IPP 
sponsors. 
a) PPA Charges 
One element in the PPAs is that charges are heavily loaded in the early years of the contract 
and reduced later. Charges paid to JLEC peak in year-five and slowly taper off to the end of 
184 Unfortunately, in Morocco, reductions in tariffs during the period from 1997 to 2004 were not 
matched by a corresponding increase in tariffs when costs started to escalate. In some cases, prices of a 
number of energy commodities were frozen to avoid social unrest, and subsidies remained during the 
time of increasing global energy commodity prices despite Morocco's policy of gradually doing away 
with subsidies (World Bank 2008c:73). 
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the PPA period. In the case of CEO, although the PPA duration is 19 years, the project debt is 
scheduled to be paid within the first 10 years of operation. Similarly with Tahaddart's 20 year 
PPA, the debt is scheduled to be paid within the first 12 years, with a debt rescheduling buffer 
option consisting of an additional 3 years. Although this type of arrangement reduces overall 
financing costs and decreases both the currency risks associated with future long-term 
payment schedules and the average price per kWh generated. it could have a negative effect 
on cash flows for an off-taker such as ONE during the early years. This problem would be 
exacerbated when a number of IPPs are required to come on stream in quick succession. 
Planners. therefore. need to give adequate attention to the potential overall impact of IPP 
charges. especially when payment profiles are not uniform and are concentrated over the 
front -end of the contract. 
5.4.5 Governance and Oversight 
Electricity policy and de facto regulation in Morocco has always been centralised under the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy, although the Ministry of Finance is also involved in the setting 
of retail tariffs. It may be argued that it was the lack of independent oversight and governance 
that contributed to the system failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, from 
1994 to 2004, . without de jure regulatory oversight. it appears that the power sector 
performed relatively well with the ushering in of private participation at the generation and 
distribution levels, the progress made with rural electrification. and the turnaround made in 
ONE's financial and technical performance. It could be inferred that in the absence of a 
regulator. there have been fewer regulatory hurdles for private investors, and tighter 
coordination with respect to power sector functions (since ONE was for all practical purposes 
the only actor IPPs had to deal with as it assumed responsibility for nearly all procurement 
and contracting functions), and this paved the way for the unfettered progress that was made 
during this period (CEO pers. com. 2006; JLEC pers. com. 2006). As for the power projects 
developed. the absence of an independent regulator appears to have had little effect. All 
stakeholders interviewed involved in the development of the projects describe the tendering 
and procurement processes followed as fair and transparent. In terms of regulatory 
involvement during the tendering process for IPPs, it is not clear. therefore. whether the 
presence of an independent regulator would have further reduced the prices or changed the 
purchase conditions of the power provided by the IPPs. which won their bids through 
competitive tenders. Once the agreements were finalised. the IPPs had long term contracts in 
place and were 'regulated' by the conditions of their contracts. 
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It is in the period after 2004, however, where the lack of oversight and necessary remedial 
action may have contributed to the financial deterioration of the utility and an increasing 
shortage of domestic electricity generation capacity. While the utility has done well to grant 
electricity access to almost all its rural population, in so doing, it has generated strong demand 
for power. The pace at which generators were added did not keep up with the increasing 
demand, partly because of difficulties with the environmental concerns of plant locations, and 
concerns over primary energy availability and security as previously mentioned in section 
5.2.3. In addition, the mismatch between the tariff structure and increasing fuel costs has 
contributed to the poor financial state of the utility as events unfolded between 2005 and 
2008. The effects of these outcomes may have been reduced had an independent and credible 
regulator been involved in the tariff setting process proving oversight of power sector 
planning and implementation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that Morocco's experience with power sector reforms appears to 
be mixed. During the earlier years, from the mid-1990s until 2005, this sector developed 
quickly in addressing its problem of insufficient capacity despite a bold electrification access 
programme. Morocco's private power innovations have registered successful outcomes. 
Reliable and relatively affordable power is being supplied, and investors appear to be satisfied 
(CEO pers. com. 2006; EET pers.com. 2006; JLEC pers. com. 2006), with some signalling 
interest in further investments, provided conditions remain favourable. At the country-level, 
much has been done to help diversify Morocco's electricity supply in the aftermath of the 
droughts. Although having no significant resources of its own, Morocco has established itself 
as the energy link between Europe and Africa through the 400kY interconnection with Spain 
and the gas pipeline. Through both these means, Morocco has been able to satisfy its energy 
demand simply through its proximity to Europe and its neighbour's abundance of energy 
resources. This has enabled Morocco to increase its diversification not only of its primary 
energy through EET and the gas pipeline, but also adding electricity as a final product, 
through the transmission links that Morocco has with Algeria and with Spain. 
Since 2005, however, the country does not seem to have been able to keep up its initial 
momentum to the point, in 2009, where it was expected to import more than 10 per cent of its 
electricity needs. Political and environmental issues have delayed the development of plants 
and have resulted in an increasing gap between domestic supply and demand, the largest in 
the ESI's post reform history. Insufficient emphasis was given to environmental acceptability 
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and fuel security during the planning phases of the projects, resulting in delays in getting the 
much needed generation capacity on line. This indicates that planning needs to include 
environmental risk assessments, fuel security and financing to ensure that generation capacity 
comes on line timeously. While greater capacity interconnections with Spain means that 
Morocco can import more electricity and make up for the shorfall, this is a medium term 
solution to deal with the long standing problem of insufficient domestic generation capacity. 
In 2005, for the growth trajectory experienced from 2004 to 2007, the government planned to 
have an installed capacity of 6230 MW, nearly 1000 MW more than what was available 
(Berzard 2005). This deficit between actual and planned capacity (compensated for by 
imports) is indicative of the difficulties the county has experienced since 2005 in contracting 
and developing adequate generation infrastructure despite the state's desire to be less 
dependent on its neighbours for power imports. 
ONE's financial situation has deteriorated since 2004 and it IS expected that without a 
significant improvement. this could suppress investor appetite for further IPPs. 185 This is 
I ikely to be the case if a low tariff environment is sustained while costs continue to escalate. 186 
Some analysts have predicted an electricity crisis in Morocco in 2009 and 2010 if immediate 
steps addressed at financial sustainability and energy security are not implemented urgently 
(Agence de Presse Algerienne 2007). 
The absence of a credible governance and regulatory framework with the objective of 
establishing financial equilibrium in the sector has also contributed to the sector's fiscal 
dilemma. Greater oversight of key sector indicators could have highlighted potential problems 
well before the crisis by analysing risks future generation projects may face in the sector, 
modelling risk scenario trajectories, and assessing their impact on the power sector at large. In 
the absence of institutions dedicated to fulfilling these functions, it is probable that the 
problems of capacity shortages in Morocco will persist. 
185 Although the government ultimately wants more private sector investment in generation, it can still 
action ONE to develop further generation capacity additions, as a supplier of last resort. With external 
debt levels having come down, from more than 110 per cent of GDP during the mid-1980s to around 
30 per cent in 2005. the pressure for private financing is considerably less, giving the government more 
flexibility in a strategy to finance generation infrastructure from its own accounts. 
186 Although there has been an increase in tariffs, it has been insufficient to cover increasing costs; in 
line with the social role that electricity plays, below energy inflation increases have been approved in 
Morocco (Boushaba 2007). 
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Morocco's early IPP experience shows that generation planning, procurement and contracting 
functions can be adequately undertaken by the incumbent state-owned utility (i.e. ONE), 
provided that the SOE itself is reformed and is operating effectively. But has Morocco's more 
recent experience underlines, these planning, procurement and contracting functions can be 
far from optimal when the SOE itself is experiencing financial and operating difficulties. 
As long as hybrid arrangements are not accompanied and serviced by more adaptive 
frameworks that better respond to their challenges, certain aspects of power sector planning, 
governance and contracting will continue to undermine the objective of sustainable power 
sectors that execute adequate and timely investment in generation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POWER SECTOR REFORM IN TUNISIA 
Tunisia is a rare case in A/i-ica. In this North A/i-ican country, power sector reforms to invite 
private participation in generation, were instituted despite the national utility showing a 
healthy performance in both technical andfinancial areas of operation. The emerging hybrid 
market arrangements in the Tunisian ESI appear to have been managed well and have 
facilitated investment in generation infi-astructure. The power sector has seen few 
institutional reforms and remains vertically integrated with only one large scale IPP 
supplying approximately 20 per cent of national production. 
Power sector planning has remained with the SOE utility and planning in the Tunisian 
context is sufficiently flexible to cater for evolving market conditions. Tunisia's energy sector 
illustrates that the ability to adapt to changing conditions is facilitated by the use of power 
generation technologies that are: relatively quick to construct; are less prone to having 
environmental risks and other causes of delays; the availability of loll' cost.filel; strategically 
sound DSM progralllmes; and transmission networks which are integrated with that of 
neighbouring countries. 
In Tunisia, international competitive bidding practices for the procurement of large scale 
generation infi-astructure is mandated by law, and procurement oversight is provided as part 
of the legal./i"amell'ork. The utility bene.fitsfiY}1Il a credible tariff regime supported by the state 
to ensure financial equilibrium in the power sector. Its good performance track record has 
contributed to its providing of the most affordable electricity in the Mediterranean and North 
Afi-ican regions. 
In SUIllIllGlY.. the Tunisian power sector has been able to adequately respond to the 
challenges of the hybrid arrangements, creating sufficient certainty for potential investors 
andfacilitating new private and public investlllent. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Starting in 1987, the Tunisian government, with support from the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, engaged in a series of structural reforms, covering nearly all 
aspects of the country's economy. One of the main arms of this reform programme included a 
privatisation initiative, with respect to certain government controlled industries and state-
d . 187 owne enterprises. 
Although the government sought to open up the economy to increase efficiency, privatisation 
did not mean the absence or elimination of government. The goal was, and continues to be, to 
create a partnership between public and private institutions, reducing the state's direct 
involvement in certain industries, but maintaining state control of policy formulation and 
regulation. 18s Specific attention was given to reducing the state's debt burden, which had been 
steadily increasing during the early 1980s, as well as shifting the burden of skills development 
and training to private entities, a cost that had been carried almost wholly by the state until 
then (Tunisian Privatisation 2004). 
Under the reform programme, privatisation presented itself in a number of different forms in 
the manifold sectors of the Tunisian economy.189 In the hydrocarbon sector, private 
exploration had been present for many years. When the power sector was opened in 1996, 
IPPs were the first manifestation of privatisation participation. The country's first IPP was 
developed under a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) framework and included a long-term PPA with 
187 These reforms covered nearly all the functional domains of the economy and included, amongst 
others, economic regulation, fiscal policy formulation, price controls, foreign trade and investments and 
banking and financial systems. Legislation for the privatization programme was enacted by law no. 89-
9 on I February 1989. This was modified by law no. 94-102 on I April 1994, law no. 96-74 on 29 July 
1996, and law no. 99-38 on 3 May 1999, and was completed by law no. 2001-33 on 29 March 200 I 
(Tunisian Privatisation 2004). 
188 Public companies to be privatised were defined as companies where government held at least 50 per 
cent direct interest. By 1994, 46 of the 189 public companies that had been earmarked for privatisation 
were completely or partially privati sed either through issuing shares or through the sale of assets, and, 
by 2005, more than 160 state-owned enterprises had at least been partially privatised. 
189 These forms included: selling active business units within a larger company; selling a percentage 
share of the entity (with government retaining the remainder); selling shares in the business and listing 
on a stock exchange; mergers and take-overs; and, finally, granting the right for private generators to 
sell electricity to the state-owned utility (the means through which IPPs would be developed). 
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the state-owned national utility, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz (STEG). The 
second IPP was developed as part of the country's hydrocarbon framework. The hydrocarbon 
framework sought to attract exploration companies to the power sector by allowing them to 
sell to STEG electricity produced from gas that had previously been flared. Although both 
IPPs use natural gas as primary energy, the two projects vary in size, fuel supply 
arrangements, power purchase agreements, and the legal frameworks under which they were 
developed. With Rades II, the country's first IPP, loans were indexed to multiple currencies 
and. to date, charges to the utility remain affordable. This is partly due to the fact that the 
Tunisian dinar (TND) has been relatively stable since the inception of the contracts - unlike in 
other emerging economies where currency devaluations have resulted in significant increases 
in charges. With EI Biban, the country's second IPP, fuel supply problems have interrupted 
production for extended periods, impacting on overall plant performance and revenue. While 
the loss in revenue obviously threatens the financial viability of the plant. impact on the off-
taker. the national utility, has not been significant for the following reason: EI Biban 
represents less than I % of the country's installed capacity with no guaranteed availability in 
terms of its contract with the off-taker. Nevertheless, the plant is crucial in understanding 
Tunisia's overall experience and is particularly relevant to other countries throughout Africa, 
which have developed, or plan to develop, power plants as part of larger gas infrastructure 
projects. 
This chapter explores Tunisia experience of attracting generation investment, and is structured 
into three parts. Following this introduction, the next section provides a brief description of 
the Tunisian energy sector, particular, the electricity supply industry. It also examines the 
reforms undertaken towards liberalising this sector of the economy. The section which 
follows describes the two independent power projects that have been supplying power to the 
national grid since power sector reform started, and the contractual agreements that have been 
reached by the various stakeholders. The last section discusses some of the key elements that 
affected reform outcomes as they relate to the problem of insufficient investment in 
generation infrastructure. 
The information presented in this chapter draws on structured literature searches, followed by 
a country visit and detailed interviews with key stakeholders in the Tunisian ESI. Interviews 
and written queries were conducted with eight stakeholders throughout 2006 in Tunisia. 
Interviews were followed by numerous correspondences to clarify discussion points up until 
the time of producing this thesis in 2008. Stakeholder interviews included representatives 
from the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz 
(STEG), Carthage Power Company (CPC), Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban (SEEB) and 
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academics from the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management at the University of 
Tunis. Due to the sensitivity of data, stakeholders have not been identified by name and are 
only identified in the text by organisational affiliation. 
6.2 The Tunisian Electricity Supply Industry 
Electricity production in Tunisia started in 1930 and by the time of the country's 
independence in 1956, seven private companies were producing and distributing electricity, 
with the country boasting an installed capacity of 100 MW, comprising of four water turbines 
totalling 27 MW and a number of dispersed diesel plants (STEG 2006).190 These seven 
companies were nationalised in 1962 to form one electricity company responsible for the 
generation, transmission (including importing and exporting) and distribution of electricity 
and gas. This consolidation brought about the establishment of the national utility Societe 
Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz (STEG), which was granted exclusive rights for 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity (UNDP 2004).191 
From 1962 up until 1996, STEG, which remained a publicly owned company, was the sole 
entity allowed to provide electricity services - this excluded self-generating plants which in 
1962 constituted less than 1 per cent of the country's installed capacity. In 1996, through law 
no. 96-27, the state authorised private investors to generate and sell electricity to STEG. 192 It 
was the 1996 legislation that opened the door to Rades 11 - the country's first IPp. 193 The 
country's second [PP, EI Biban, came through a different door. As indicated in the previous 
section, in addition to luring exploration companies to the country's hydrocarbon sector, the 
Hydrocarbon Law of 1999 also permitted gas extraction companies to operate gas-fired power 
plants without a bidding procedure and to sell the electricity generated to STEG. 
190 Some references cite that there were eight companies but it is believed that two of these companies 
had one owner. 
191 Nationalisation decree, bill no. 62-8 of 3 April 1962, which was subsequently ratified by bill no. 62-
16 of 24 May 1962, outlined STEG's position as exclusive provider of electricity and gas. 
192 The detailed terms and procedures for the granting of rights to private generating companies were 
laid down in ordinance no. 96-1125 of20 June 1996. 
193 Rades I, commissioned in the 1980s, is owned and operated by STEG and is situated in the same 
industrial zone as Rades II. 
178 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Despite these steps to open up the electricity market, little unbundling has occurred in the 
utility. STEG remains a vertically integrated state-owned utility, albeit with separate 
accounting systems for generation, transmission and distribution, respectively. Separate 
accounting systems have also been cascaded down to different business units within the 
utility.194 Furthermore, it is unlikely that supplementary substantial sector reforms will be 
introduced with respect to unbundling in the short to medium term. With the relatively small 
size of the market coupled with the apparent lack of compelling drivers for such reforms, no 
significant benefits for the sector can be seen at present (Ministry of Industry and Energy 
pel's. com. 2006). It should be noted in this context that STEG is a commercially viable and 
technically efficient utility, as will be described further in Section 6.2.1 below, and not 
dependent on the state for financial aid. 
6.2.1 Generation 
In 2007, Tunisia produced 13146 GWh of electricity, with hydro and wind accounting for 0.5 
per cent and 0.4 per cent of production respectively. The remaining generation was from 
fossil fuels. Natural gas accounted for the bulk thereof.195 Although a net energy importer, 
most of the fuel used for power generation is produced from Tunisian sources. IPPs 
represented just over 15 per cent of installed thermal capacity in 2007, but accounted for 
roughly 22 per cent of Tunisia's electricity production in 2007 (STEG Annual Report 
2007: 10). The installed capacity in Tunisia totalled 3 313 MW in 2007. Of this total, only 2.4 
per cent was from renewable sources, which comprised 62 MW of hydroelectric power plants 
and 19 MW of wind farms. The majority of the country's installed capacity is, therefore, in 
the form of thermal power stations. Table 6.1 below lists the installed capacity in Tunisia in 
2007. 
194 The same applies for the gas divisions within STEG. 
195 It is estimated that in addition, self producers generated approximately 776 GWh or 5.9 per cent of 
national production (STEG Annual Report 2007: 1 0). Self producers comprise mainly generation 
controlled by the Tunisian phosphate industry, which sells excess capacity to STEG (Ford 2004). 
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Table 6. 1: Installed Generation Capacity in Tunisia 
Plant Capacity (MW) 
STEG Thermal Plants 2734 
STEG Hydro 62 
STEG Wind 19 
IPP - Rades II 471 
IPP - SEEB 27 
Total 3313 
Source: STEG Annual Report (2007: 16) 
STEG, an ISO-900 I compliant company, is generally considered an efficient state-owned 
enterprise and its generation plants are perceived to be well managed, with average plant 
availabilities in the order of 90 per cent. Efficiency improvements have been amongst the 
objectives in all areas of the utility's business over the last decade and results have been 
admirable, especially in the technical arenas. In addition to the technical improvements made 
over the years, the utility has managed to decrease its number of employees from 9487 in 
2004 to 9249, a reduction of 2.S per cent, while during the same period increasing its number 
of low voltage customers by more than 10 per cent or 2S0 000 customers (STEG Annual 
Report 2007: 12-13). 
Between 1997 and 200 I, electricity consumption increased by an average of 7.7 per cent per 
annum (TERNA 2004). In 2002, the rate slowed to about 3.S per cent, with similar growth 
recorded through to 2007. Although it was originally thought that IPPs would primarily 
respond to growing demand, since the development of the country's first IPP, state-sponsored 
plants have recently been on the increase. In addition, while the state is still committed to its 
policy objectives of opening up the economy, attracting private investment and limiting its 
debt in infrastructure projects, the Ministry of Industry and Energy and STEG have indicated 
that there is no plan to fix the percentage of privately contracted power, i.e. IPPs would be 
developed on a case-by-case basis. Relevant factors such as timing and fuel supply security, 
amongst others, would be important considerations in deciding on the sponsors of future 
plants (Ministry of Industry and Energy pers. com. 2006; STEG pers. com. 2006). 
On 26 May 2003, the British Gas Group (BG) and the Tunisian government entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding for the development of the Barca project, a SOO MW 
combined cycle gas plant (BG Group Press Release 2004). The Barca project was intended to 
use untreated gas supplied by BG to meet Tunisia's increasing power needs (Flin 2003:66). 
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Negotiations with BG stopped in June 2004, however, as a result of concerns related to the 
gas supply guarantee for the project. Due to time constraints, the government gave STEG the 
go-ahead to develop the next tranche of power generation. 196 
A feasibility study was also initiated to build a 1200 MW IPP in the north of the country with 
approximately two-thirds of the capacity earmarked for export to Italy. Although this study is 
still in its infancy. should the results of the study prove positive. COD would be scheduled for 
2011/2012. With an interconnection to Italy, such a project would go a long way toward 
strengthening the Mediterranean grid. enhancing links with neighbouring countries, and 
represent one more step towards a Mediterranean power market. 
As part of its tenth development plan (2003-2007), the Tunisian government is also planning 
the construction of wind farms with a capacity of about 120 MW. The RfP is signed and bid 
evaluation was scheduled for early 2007. The country's eleventh development plan. for the 
period from 2008 to 20 11, provides for the construction of a further 200 MW by private 
investors on a purely competitive basis (TERNA 2004). 
As stated earlier. since the inception of the country's two IPPs. STEG developed all additional 
generation capacity. The utility has since commissioned gas turbines at the Feriana and 
Goulette power stations in June and July 2005 respectively (STEG Annual Report 2005:8, I 0). 
Following on this. STEG received authorisation to develop the 120MW expansion at the 
Thyna power station. In 2007, the Thyna expansion was commissioned. the Sidi Daoud Wind 
Farm was expanded to capacity with the addition of 35MW, and STEG initiated a bidding 
process to install a further 120MW of wind power in the Bizerte region. Further, STEG has 
completed a technical analysis for the realisation ofa 400 MW combined cycle gas-fired plant 
at Ghannouch. with construction expected to start in 2009. Technical studies have also started 
for another base-load plant, which is scheduled for development around 2011-2012. 
As recently as November 2008, STEG signed an agreement wit the Islamic Development 
Bank to lend the utility TND 250 m for the construction of two power stations; one at Feriana 
in Kasserine with a capacity of 126 MW, and the other at Thyna in the Sfax region. 
Guaranteed by the state, the loan is over a term of 20 years with a three-year grace period. 
1% The bidding contractors to the Barca project would be Enelpower and Ansaldo Energia of Italy, and 
Alstom of France (Flin 2003:67). 
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In the expectation of an annual increase in demand of between 5 and 8 per cent (Agence 
Tunis Afrique Presse 2008), STEG has initiated a tender for a turnkey contract for a 380-450 
MW combined cycle gas plant. At the same time the Ministry of Industry and Energy has 
initiated a tender process for the development of a 350-500 MW combined cycle gas plant to 
be operated on a BOO basis by an IPP (Ministry of Industry and Energy 2008). Mindful of its 
decreasing natural gas resources, the country has started the process of establishing a nuclear 
industry for power generation, with the construction of the first units scheduled for the period 
2016 to 2023, and for operations to commenced in 2024 (Kriaa 2008). 
6.2.2 Transmission and Distribution 
Tunisia has a well-developed electricity grid across the country, especially in the northern and 
central areas. The system is interconnected with algeria and libya at the 400 kv and 225 kv 
levels. On 29 june 2007, the ministry of industry and energy signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the italian ministry of economic development with the aim of jointly 
creating a company to develop a transmission interconnection between the two countries, as 
alluded to in section 6.2.1 (STEG Annual Report 2007:23). Although the tunisian network is 
already linked to the european network through the algerian and moroccan networks, this 
interconnection will strengthen the mediterranean grid and bring further power exchange 
opportunities to tunisia. 
When the country's rural electrification programme was launched in the 1970s, only 6 per 
cent of the rural population had access to electricity. Emphasising rural electrification as a 
pillar for integrated rural development, education and improved health services, the 
government made rural access and electrification a top priority in its social and economic 
development plans (Cecelski, Ounalli et al. 2005: I). The distribution system has been 
expanded over wide areas to meet the national electrification goals, which has resulted in 
Tunisia being the top ranking country on the continent in terms of national electrification. The 
combined electrification rate (rural and urban) is approximately 99.5 per cent for the 
country's 10.5 million inhabitants. 
The country's rural electrification programme went hand-in-hand with a DSM programme to 
curb demand, and despite the completion of the rural electrification programme, DSM 
initiatives continue. In addition to encouraging efficient energy use and creating awareness 
about the benefit of energy-efficient appliances, the Ministry of Industry and Energy launched 
a programme to promote the use of cleaner fuels such as natural gas and liquid petroleum gas 
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(LPG) as opposed to heavy fuel oil (HFO) and diesel. Co-generation schemes are encouraged 
and energy efficiency audits are conducted on large industrial users, which have helped to 
keep demand in tone. It should be noted that it is often difficult to accurately assess the 
effectiveness of such programmes, considering the myriad factors that impact on demand. 
However, given a decrease in the consumption growth rate in the last three years, despite 
robust GOP growth, there does appear to be evidence that DSM is having some impact. A 6 
per cent increase in gas supply versus a 3.5 per cent increase in electricity demand may well 
indicate that there is a shift towards gas as opposed to electricity (STEG Annual Report 
2007:30,33). Of the most profound changes to reduce electricity demand has been the recent 
introduction of daylight savings in the country in 2007. The government has effected a change 
in the country's time stamp from GMT+l to GMT+2 from March to October effectively 
shaving of 53GWh or 0.47 per cent of demand (STEG Annual Report 2007:8). 
6.2.3 Fuelling the Tunisian Power Sector 
During the last four decades, the energy sector has played an important role in Tunisia's 
economy. Throughout the 1970s, oil represented 50 per cent of the country's total expolis, 
making a considerable contribution to financing social and economic development initiatives, 
as well as launching heavy industrial projects (Ministry of Industry and Energy 1999:35). Oil 
production did not, however, keep pace with energy demand. In 1999, to counter this trend, 
the government introduced the country's Hydrocarbon law, which specifies royalties of 10 per 
cent for oil and 8 per cent for gas to foreign companies for successful explorations. The aim 
was to attract foreign investors who otherwise overlook Tunisia, especially for Tunisia's 
energy-rich neighbours, Algeria and Libya. 197 A reduction in the tax rate from 75 per cent to 
50 per cent for foreign firms has also been offered to lure investors, provided the state-owned 
oil company, Entreprise Tunisienne d'Activites Petrolieres (ETAP), takes a 40 per cent share 
in the deal (EIA 2004b). Despite these incentives to encourage exploration and increase 
domestic oil production, by 2000, the country became a net oil importer (Ford 2003). In 2005, 
it was estimated that Tunisia had a modest 1.7 billion barrels of oil reserves (CIA World 
Factbook 2008); in that year Tunisia produced around 75 000 barrels of crude oil per day, 37 
per cent down from its peak of 120 000 barrels per day between 1982 and 1984 (Belloumi 
2006). 
197 Although operating on a smaller scale, oil companIes from France, the UK, Italy, Germany, 
Hungary, Canada and Saudi Arabia amongst others are all currently active in Tunisia; furthermore, 
Tunisia has known private participation in its hydrocarbon industry since exploration first began. 
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Despite modest new oil finds, production in Tunisian oil fields continues to decline, and the 
country is increasingly turning to natural gas to feed its domestic demand. Tunisia has 2.8 
trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, and it is estimated that this constitutes 
47 per cent of its fossil fuel reserves (Ford 2003; Belloumi 2006). The British Gas Group 
(BG), the largest single investor in Tunisia's gas-energy fields, produced around half of 
Tunisia's gas consumption in 2007 with the bulk of the remaining supply coming from 
Algeria (STEG Annual Report 2007:31 ).198 
An abundance of local gas resources coupled with access to gas from the Trans-Tunisia gas 
pipeline has helped shape Tunisia's electricity landscape in terms of fuel and generation 
technology choice, with most of Tunisia's electricity being produced from natural gas. In 
1982 a gas pipeline connecting Algeria to Europe via Tunisia was developed and, in 1994, the 
export capacity of the pipeline was doubled (STEG 2006). The country receives between 5.25 
and 6.75 per cent of the Algerian gas in the Trans-Mediterranean pipeline, which links Sicily 
with Cap Bon, in the north of Tunisia (Belloumi 2006:22). In 2003, Tunisia and Libya agreed 
on a plan to build a pipeline to transport natural gas from the Melitah area to the southern 
areas and industrial zone of Gabes in Tunisia. Although there has been a delay in the 
development of the pipeline, servitude royalties are expected to help Tunisia make up for 
future increases in demand. As of 2007, natural gas accounted for 98 per cent of all fossil 
fuels used in electricity production. 
198 BG has agreed to supply a large amount of domestic gas requirements for Tunisia through 2020 
while expanding the Miskar offshore gas field in the south-east. This field produced approximately 41 
per cent of the country's gas supply in 2007, in comparison with 2003 when it produced 65 per cent of 
the country's yearly gas supply. It is currently being expanded through several phases (Ford 2004; 
STEG Annual Report 2007). 
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Unlike many other African countries, the Tunisian government has displayed a credible 
commitment to the financial sustainability of the power sector by allowing tariff increases on 
sound economic bases. In an effort to maintain sustainability, efforts have been underway to 
reduce cross-subsidisation and reflect the economic cost of power. Due to increasing fuel 
costs, there have been periodic increases over the last few years with two increases in 2005 
and a 6 per cent increase in 2006 (STEG Annual Report 2006:8). Further escalating fuel costs 
have translated into two additional tariff increases in 2007: the first an increase of 6 per cent 
for electricity and gas in July 2007 and the second an increase of 6.9 per cent for electricity 
and 8.3 per cent for gas in December 2007 (STEG Annual Report 2007:8). Despite upward 
pressure on tariffs due to increases in fuel prices, tariffs remain low by European standards 
and within the African and Mediterranean regions. 20o 
6.3 Independent Power Producers 
Early in 1995. when broader macro-economic reforms, described in Section 6.1, were 
underway. the government conducted a feasibility study to assess the potential for private 
participation in the Tunisian ESI. The feasibility study was carried out by the IPP Group, a 
small team of high level managers from STEG, under the direct authority of the Minister of 
Industry and Energy. 
This study concluded. within a few months, that IPPs may indeed have a favourable impact. 
As a result. the government's Structural Adjustment Plan, aimed at decreasing the budget 
deficit and especially the percentage of foreign debt, opted to include IPPs in its portfolio. 
The Ministry of Industry and Energy also posited that the introduction of private capital in the 
electricity sector would send a strong signal to the international investment community that 
Tunisia was committed to opening up its economy and liberalising its markets. 
Losing no time, in June 1995, the government invited international investors to propose a 
range of projects. The ESI soon emerged as the most sought after sector, with 84 potential 
investors indicating interest. With the feasibility study. noted above. serving as a general 
200 Tunisia's industrial and residential tariffs were seen to be competitive with those in Greece, Italy, 
France. Spain, Belgium. and Portugal, and also with those in Morocco and Canada (Toronto) (STEG 
2004a; STEG Annual Report 2007). 
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framework, the IPP Group subsequently prepared pre-qualification and call-for-bid 
documents. 201 
6.3.1 Carthage Power Company, Rades II 
In 1997, two years after conducting the feasibility study, the Ministry of Industry and Energy 
launched an ICB to build the Rades II power station, a combined cycle natural gas-fired plant 
of 400-500 MW. A series of standard investment incentives were extended including: VAT 
and customs duties exemptions on all imported equipment that could not be sourced locally 
(pre- COD); and a 5-year tax holiday on companies' income tax (post-COD), which was to 
facilitate loan repayment. In addition, the government committed to support permit 
applications in order to minimise any potential delays on the project. 
Seventeen consortia responded to the pre-qualification bid, which stipulated that the project 
consortium have extensive experience in the construction, project management, maintenance 
and operation of power plants. Sponsors were also required to be experienced in non-recourse 
project financing and have the capacity to finance the specified equity component of the 
required capital and raise debt financing for the remainder. Ten firms were short-listed, and in 
the final assessment, the following three consortia were retained: 
• Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) (USA) / Marubeni (Japan) / Sithe (USA) 
• National Power (UK) / Marathon (USA) 
• Intergen (USA) / Endesar (Spain) 
The selection criteria were based primarily on the price per MWh for which the electricity 
would be sold to STEG, over the course of 20 years. To ease the evaluation process, in the 
RfP for the BOO project, the Ministry of Industry and Energy specified acceptable interest 
rates, currency exchange rates, inflation rates, discount rates, fuel price and load profiles. This 
would later also facilitate bid comparison and adjudication. 
The PSEG / Marubeni / Sithe consortium ultimately offered the lowest price per MWh, and 
the Ministry of Industry and Energy subsequently started negotiations with this triumvirate. 202 
201 K&M, a US based consulting company with extensive experience in contracting private power, 
selected by tender from the short list were appointed as consultants to prepare pre-qualification and call 
for bid documents and assist the IPP Group during negotiations. 
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It should be added that each of the partners in the consortium had a good reputation for 
executing these types of projects as well as a favourable balance sheet to fund the equity 
component of the capital. The firms' technical, project and financial track records meant that 
they also were in a favourable position to negotiate rates with the lending financial 
institutions. 
In March 1999. after seventeen months of negotiations, the project agreements were signed, 
and financial closure was reached in August of the same year. Total funding came to 
US$ 260.7 million, with debt constituting 70 per cent of capital (Turki 1999).203 Soon 
thereafter. the Carthage Power Company (Pty) Ltd (CPC) was registered as the special 
purpose vehicle to develop the project. Although the targeted COD was for September 200 I, 
the time lost. due to extended negotiations, meant that the plant came online eight months 
later than originally foreseen. 
Delays may be partly attributed to issues related to land. The site where the plant was to be 
built belonged to the state and had been leased to STEG. Tunisian law specifies that 
equipment that is constructed on land belonging to the state falls under state ownership. Thus, 
in order to assuage lenders and investors alike against possible expropriation, a decree was 
issued. changing the land to the private domain. which allowed the sub-lessor (CPC) to grant 
rights on the equipment to the lenders. 
a) Rades II: The Agreements 
Like most African IPPs, the project was backed by a long-term PPA. which ensured that 
equity and debt holders would recoup the US$ 260.7 million in addition to a favourable 
return. through the fixed capacity charge. tied to a minimum availability of 90 per cent. 204 
The 20-year PPA is front-end loaded with the debt paid off during the first ten years (although 
eight years after COD since repayment starts in the first two years of construction). All 
cOe The second and third ranked bidding consortia were, however, kept on standby in the event of 
negotiations failing with the first. 
e03 The project agreements were signed on 24 April 1999 and came into force on 30 April 1999. 
204 The charges may be broken into five components: I) a fixed capacity charge linked to the plant's 
required guaranteed availability (of 90 per cent), which is how investors recoup their investment; 2) a 
fixed charge for the maintenance and operation of the plant; 3) a variable fuel charge that is a pass-
through cost to STEG since the fuel is purchased from STEG; 4) a variable charge for the operating and 
maintenance of the plant; 5) other variable components such as insurance and start-up costs. 
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charges in the PPA are payable in Tunisian dinars, and are indexed to a basket of currencies 
proposed by the Tunisian Central Bank. Since the introduction of the euro currency in 2002, 
this has translated roughly into a 60:40 split in €/US$ currencies. 
The fuel agreement was simplified by the fact that STEG is the exclusive buyer and 
distributor of natural gas in Tunisia. With gas supplied by STEG, there are no take-or-pay 
obligations on the fuel and the costs are passed through to STEG in accordance with the 
governing agreements in the PPA (including that CPC is responsible for complying with the 
stipulated heat rates). 
Provision was made for arbitration by Tunisian law at the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Geneva until the entire debt payment would be settled. Finally, an escrow 
facility is a requirement of the PPA; however, figures were not made public. 
b) Rodes II: The Stakeholders 
The stakeholders in Rades II are numerous with changes noted in CPC since project 
inception. During construction, Sithe exited the project due to internal restructuring within the 
company.20S Thereafter the initial split between PSEG, Marubeni and Sithe of 35 per cent, 
32.5 per cent and 32.5 per cent, respectively, changed. Sithe's shares were absorbed by the 
two remaining partners, and the arrangement changed to a 60/40 split between PSEG and 
Marubeni. 
The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (formerly Export-Import Bank of Japan) JBIC, 
(40 per cent) and Banque Nationale de Paris and Sanwa Bank, BNP/Sanwa (60 per cent) were 
the lead lenders to the project, injecting 70 per cent of the project costs along with other 
commercial banks. ABB and Alstom won the engineering, procurement and construction 
contract for the supply and installation of the gas and steam turbines respectively (along with 
completion and output guarantees) and GE International was awarded an initial six-year 
maintenance contract for the plant. 
In 2004, PSEG announced the sale of its 60 per cent shareholding in CPC to BTU Ventures, a 
regional energy investment group with financing from both public and private sources in the 
205 A number of energy companies globally were restructuring during this period as they were 
consolidating their positions after negative IPP experiences at the time, partly as a result of the Asian 
and Latin American financial crises. 
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Gulf Cooperation Council states (PSEG Press Release 2004). BTU formed a joint venture 
with STEAG of Germany, an O&M service provider to form BTU STEAG O&M Services 
Company, which has taken over from GE and is now overseeing the maintenance and 
operating functions of the plant. Although offloading their position, PSEG described Tunisia 
as "an excellent place to do business" and confirmed that "the sale in no way reflects any 
unhappiness with [our] experience in Tunisia", but rather is in keeping with the company's 
"stated strategy of reducing its international risks by selectively selling assets if [we] can 
obtain an attractive price," (African Energy 2004b). 
6.3.2 Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban 
Rades II was not alone in changing the face of power in Tunisia. A second IPP, the EI Biban 
Electricity Company, SEEB (Societe d'Electricite d'EI Biban) has also contributed, albeit on 
a much smaller scale. A Ithough the plant only accounts for approximately I per cent of total 
generation, it provides several lessons in terms of fuel supply security and investor returns. It 
is also relevant to countries, such as Nigeria for example, seeking to commercialise stranded 
natural gas. 
SEEB was the outgrowth of legislation enacted by the Government of Tunisia to encourage 
the development of marginal oil and gas fields by foreign independents for use in the power 
sector, for generating capacities below 40 MW.206 Within this framework, in contrast to the 
first. the Ministry of Industry and Energy agreed that a selective tender, rather than 
international competitive bid be conducted. 207 Investment incentives extended were as 
follows: a five-year tax holiday, which was to facilitate debt repayment (to approximately five 
years): customs and import duties exemptions on all imported equipment and spares and VAT 
exemption. A further boon for all parties, but especially state actors, was that the project, by 
using previously flared gas, represented a significant environmental benefit. It is important to 
note that the SEEB plant runs only on natural gas. A significant modification would be 
:'06 Marginal gas fields are defined as gas located too far from the gas supply network or where the 
quality is too low to be sold commercially. This initiative was spelled out in the Hydrocarbon Code law 
no. 99-93 of 17 August 1999 and amended by law no. 2002-23 of 14 February 2002. 
:'07 IPPs developed through the 1999 Hydrocarbon law do not need to go through an ICB procedure as 
in the case of Rades II. This flexibility was favoured in the context of attracting exploration companies 
to prospect and operate in Tunisia and not as part of large scale capacity additions required due to 
national demand. 
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required to convert the plant to use an alternate fuel source; this stands in contrast to most of 
STEG's thermal stations, which can use an alternate fuel type as a back-up - the significance 
of which will emerge later in this chapter. 
a) SEER: The Stakeholders 
The selective tender resulted in CME, a US-based energy company specializing in 
development, construction and financing of energy-related projects worldwide, being chosen 
as the initial developer for a 27 MW gas-fired plant. CME subsequently set up the BOO deal 
with Centurion Energy, an international oil and gas company, headquartered in Canada, and 
Caterpillar Power Ventures, as equity holders. Together these three firms developed the 
project - both power station and related gas infrastructure, including the pipeline to the well -
for a total cost of US$30 million. 
Caterpillar was the EPC contractor through their Power Ventures group as well as the O&M 
contractor in the form of Energy Services International, a Caterpillar subsidiary created 
specifically to operate and maintain Caterpillar plants worldwide. 
The US$20.2 million debt for the project was split equally between ABS International Bank, a 
British lender with a Libyan majority shareholding, and Amen Bank, a local Tunisian private 
bank. The equity was split in the same manner between Caterpillar and Centurion Energy, 
giving each a 50 per cent shareholding in the project. Although CME was the lead promoter 
of the project, the firm does not have any shareholding in the project; when the ROR on the 
project exceeds 13 per cent, however, CME starts sharing in the profits. Finally, as with CPC, 
STEG is the exclusive buyer of the electricity generated. 
As with Rades II, there has been some equity turnover. In September 2005, Centurion sold its 
share in the project to Candax, a Canadian based exploration company operating in the 
offshore El Biban and Zarzis oil fields. 208 
b) SEER: The Agreements 
The price of electricity in terms of the PPA was calculated as the avoided cost to STEG of 
producing the power and was indexed to the international oil price (low sulphur content heavy 
208 The main reason cited for Centurion's withdrawal was to concentrate the firm's efforts on its 
Egyptian activities, not fuel supply issues. 
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fuel oil), but was capped at US$130 per MT.209 The bottom limit was set at US$99 per MT.2IO 
These limits, which correspond roughly to US$19-25 dollars per barrel, were set in the wake 
of an announcement made by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
2002 stating that OPEC member countries would manage production so that oil prices would 
remain trading in this band (Guerbaa 2005:14). Early in 2002, during the PPA negotiations, 
the international oil price per metric ton ranged between US$99 and 1 05 (or US$19 and 20 
dollars per barrel). With most of the costs of the electricity produced coming from operating 
the plant, energy charges are minimal. It was estimated in 2003 that profit after tax would 
earn Centurion approximately US$I.8million per year with oil prices averaging US$22.50 per 
barrel (Canadian Dollar Equities 2006).211 
Other key terms of the PPA are as follows. The duration of the PPA is 20 years, depending on 
gas availability. In contrast to most IPPs, there is no guaranteed availability required in terms 
of the contract with STEG. Provision is also made in the PPA for arbitration, subject to 
Tunisian law in the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 
By December 2002, the agreements had all been signed, including the power purchase 
agreement and the land lease agreement, and on 9 May 2003 SEEB commenced commercial 
. 212 
operations. 
c) SEER: Gas Supp(V Problems 
In April 2004, nearly a year after COD, problems arose with SEEB's gas supply. The gas was 
contaminated with hydrocarbon liquids, and the separators were not effective in removing the 
liquids from the gas to the specified humidity required by the plant hardware. This damaged 
the ejectors and resulted in degradation of the turbines, which, in turn, impacted on plant 
performance. Disputes between the gas supplier and the plant operator, regarding who was 
20Q Due to the confidential nature of the PPA, actual charges to STEG were not made known to the 
author. I barrel = 159 litres = 0.145 MT. 
210 This pricing formula was unique to SEEB and did not form part of a general pricing framework. 
211 The gas price was fixed by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in a manner that both the gas 
provider (the gas previously flared) and project company may remain interested in the project. As a 
result. the outcome for the project company is still favourable despite the ceiling price for electricity 
produced. 
212 The official inauguration was in July 2003. 
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responsible for removing the excess liquid from the gas, were resolved four months later 
when more efficient separators were procured and installed on the plant. 
In August 2005, the plant came to a halt again when water entered the gas well and the gas 
could not be extracted. The new shareholder, Candax, initiated plans to drill two additional 
wells to alleviate the fuel supply problem. To this end, in May 2006, Candax awarded two 
contracts for the onshore and offshore engineering work of the El Biban redevelopment 
project. The scope included the fabrication of two new platforms and a modification to the 
existing platform. Despite the action by shareholders, there were, however, delays in bringing 
fuel production back within the scheduled timeframe. Among the many causes of the delays 
linked to procurement problems, a strong demand for exploration barges at the time meant 
that there was a long waiting list that Candax Energy had to join before being able to drill the 
wells; and when the work eventually started, much re-fabrication of work that originally 
failed to comply with the required safety and quality certification standards was required, 
delaying the return to production of the wells (Candax Energy News Release 2006). 
Meanwhile, SEEB has been out of operation since August 2005 and the wells were drilled 
only in the second quarter of 2008. For the time that the plant has been out of production no 
money has exchanged hands between STEG and SEEB, and the project has been unable to 
meet its scheduled loan repayment, which shareholders had to renegotiate with the project 
lenders (Candax Energy 2006). By the second quarter in 2008, the plant was still shut down, 
which means the plant had been out of service for nearly three years since it was captive to a 
single supply well. 
6.4. An Analysis of the Hybrid Power Market and Outcomes in 
Tunisia 
The story of power sector reform in Tunisia, and the county's ability to commission 
generation capacity in a timely manner, generally appears to be more positive than the other 
three country cases examined in this thesis. This section analyses how Tunisia as responded to 
the changes of hybrid power markers. 
6.4.1 Getting to the Hybrid Market Structure 
Similar to the other three countries described in this thesis, Tunisia's resolve to reform its 
power sector was, for the most part, prompted by broader macro-economic policy changes 
with the objective of liberalising the economy and reducing the state's debt burden. Unlike 
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the ESI reforms in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco, however, poor performance of the 
national utility was not a factor influencing the decision to reform since STEG was a 
considered a well managed SOE exhibiting positive technical and financial performance. 213 
The introduction of IPPs, therefore, was not specifically to improve the performance of the 
sector, but rather to assist the state in relieving its debt burden. Prior to private investment in 
generation in Tunisia's ESI, the state borrowed money and on lent these funds to STEG to 
develop generation infrastructure.214 Since the reduction of the state's debt was a major 
objective of structural reforms, the decision was made to invite IPPs into the generation 
market as described in section 6.2.1. 
What is also different to the other cases examined in this thesis is the two distinct ways in 
which IPPs can enter the generation sector in Tunisia; the tirst being as part of the country's 
IPP policy and the other, as part of the country's hydrocarbon policy. To date, however, only 
one IPP was developed under each of the frameworks and the country's power sector is still 
characterised by a dominant vertically integrated state-owned utility, with two IPPs entering 
on the margin. 
STEG has retained major responsibilities and functions in the sector, such as planning. The 
responsibilities of procurement of IPPs, however, have been assumed by the state, through the 
IPP Group in the Ministry of Industry and Energy, although it is assisted by STEG in many 
ways. One other feature that differentiates the Tunisian ESI from the previous cases is the fact 
that the off-taker and national utility is also the exclusive provider of gas, the fuel used to 
generate almost all the electricity produced in Tunisia. including gas used for IPPs. 
6.4.2 Power Sector Planning 
Although privately-financed power was seen as the way of the future by many donors and 
policy makers worldwide, the Ministry of Industry and Energy was not overly ambitious in 
the early days of opening up the sector to IPP investments. The state and STEG retained the 
ei1 In terms of Rades II. public stakeholders have indicated that IPP charges are reasonable, and that 
had STEG built a similar project the rates would have been comparable (Ministry of Industry and 
Energy pers. com. 2006), meaning that STEG could have been equally efficient at developing and 
operating the Rades II power station. 
el4 This is still a practice in the ESI. In November 2008 STEG borrowed TND215m (with a guarantee 
from the state) from the Islamic Development Bank for the construction of two additional power plants. 
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option of making further investments in generation. As an example, STEG could go ahead 
and develop the next power station after the government ceased negotiations with BG on the 
Barca project when fuel supply guarantees could not be obtained. Therefore, although Tunisia 
made a credible commitment to private participation in generation, it proceeded with due 
caution. To this end, despite policy and legal reforms preparing the way for the introduction 
of IPPs and taking away STEG's monopoly, STEG has retained the responsibility of power 
sector planning. 
There has been almost seamless coordination between IPP sponsors, STEG and the Ministry 
of Industry and Energy.215 In addition, having the fuel supplier and the power off-taker in the 
same utility also facilitated efficient coordination between stakeholders during planning and 
implementation phases. The fuel arrangements have also been instrumental in helping to 
reduce fuel risk and keep costs down. STEG is the exclusive distributor of gas in Tunisia and, 
therefore, was the only possible fuel supplier for the Rades II plant. It was agreed that the cost 
of the fuel would be passed through with no take-or-pay obligations (on either side) for the 
following reason. This arrangement has facilitated upstream fuel planning, not only because 
STEG is the only gas distributor in Tunisia and the supplier to all gas-fired plants, but also 
because it is the off-taker of the power generated. 
Power sector planning has been performed in the context of the country's diminishing fossil 
fuel resources and its desire to decrease its carbon footprint. Within the Hydrocarbon IPP 
framework in which SEEB was developed, the Ministry of Industry and Energy has taken an 
explicit stance of limiting non-guaranteed IPP capacities to less than 40 MW, while at the 
same time encouraging investment in generation capacity and decreasing CO2 emissions.216 
The expansion of the country's wind generation capacity has also meant that the country 
would be modestly less dependent on fossil fuels, as the rate at which renewable energies are 
expected to grow exceeds the rate at which fossil fuel power generation production capacity is 
expected to grow in the coming years. Lastly, nuclear power has been chosen as an option 
over the longer term to decrease its dependence on fossil fuels. 
215 The appointment of a former senior manager from STEG to the head of the IPP Group in the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy facilitated the coordination since he was well versed with the utility'S 
processes and clear about the government's goals on private participation in electricity. 
216 The gas supply problems experienced by SEEB have also informed the government's negotiations 
on BG's Barca IPP, which would have used untreated gas for power generation. 
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aj Brillgillg Flexihili(v illto Plallllillg 
A number of options are available to generation planners and the use of many of these options 
has helped to bring flexibility to the planning process. At the time of negotiating the country's 
first IPP, although the contracting process took longer than would have been the case if STEG 
had developed the Rades II plant, the utility was successful in maintaining a sufficient amount 
of generation reserves to overcome the delay (Ministry of Industry and Energy pers. com. 
2006).217 Also, despite the delays and subsequent cancellation of the Barca project, the 
planning was flexible and timely enough to initiate a process whereby STEG could develop 
the next capacity addition without eroding the country's generation reserve margins to critical 
levels.218 
Gas distribution network expansion projects have given the utility greater flexibility to switch 
between energy sources, i.e. electricity and gas, should there be significant pressure on the 
ability to supply either. In addition to doubling the number of gas consumers between 2000 
and 2007, the expansion of the gas distribution network is still ongoing and, in future, will 
give more consumers the option to switch between electricity and gas energy sources. 
Moreover, good management of the country's electricity demand profile with the utility'S 
other DSM programmes has meant that demand has been curbed giving the utility room for 
potential delays in developing future generation capacity. 
Tunisia's geographic location has also contributed to its good f0l1unes in its ESI. In addition 
to having domestic energy resources, it is neighboured by two of the most energy rich 
countries in Africa. Unlike Morocco, relatively favourable relations with its neighbours have 
meant that it enjoys access to vast amounts of natural gas for power production. Not only does 
it have access to the gas, it receives royalties for a percentage of the gas that flows to Italy 
from Algeria and Tunisia's gas pipeline infrastructure is extensive, well developed, and linked 
to its neighbours to receive natural gas for domestic use, including non-electricity generation 
consumption. Having neighbours that are rich in energy resources has also translated into 
having neighbours that have adequate amounts of electricity for exchanges in the unlikely 
217 The legal concerns regarding the land for the Rades 1\ project was the single biggest source of delay 
on the project. 
218 The delays that were experienced in private and not in public infrastructure investments also 
underlines how differences in public and private project development bring to the fore new challenges, 
especially for power sectors that are new to private investment and emphasises to the need for 
strategies to be flexible enough to accommodate such setbacks. 
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event that one of the countries experiences a shortfall; however, with STEG's conservative 
electricity planning the utility has had enough reserves to export to neighbours when required. 
Not only has the country's proximity to Europe helped it to earn royalties for gas exports via 
Algeria, but it was also the trigger for initiating the proposed transmission link to Italy. 
Tunisia plans to be an exporter of power to the European transmission grid via the proposed 
link with Italy and STEG is poised to perform well selling power to the Italian electricity 
market since its tariff structures are competitive with that of the European Union. More 
importantly, the ability to supply power to Italy means that the country will have excess 
generation capacity, over and above what is needed to meet domestic demand. This will also 
give the utility greater flexibility in generation planning in the future. 219 
Since the utility uses natural gas as its prime fuel source for electricity production, the fuel 
choice lends itself to power generation technologies that are relatively quick to develop, since 
gas-fired power stations of the sizes required for the Tunisian grid can typically be 
constructed within a relatively short period - typically in the region of 18 - 24 months. In 
addition to its short construction times, its high efficiencies and clean burning characteristics 
make natural-gas fired plants less prone to delays due to environmental issues. This 
technology and fuel choice, coupled with an extensive gas distribution network, has allowed 
Tunisia to be more flexible in its planning strategy to construct and commission additional 
generation. Even when negotiations for the Barca plant were suspended and the project 
halted, in a relatively short period of time, plans by STEG to develop the next generation 
capacity were easily fast tracked to avoid capacity shortages and ensure adequate generation 
reserves. 
b) Project Planning and Risk Assessment 
Although the SEEB IPP was developed under a framework inspired outside the power sector, 
viz. the hydrocarbon sector, and Tunisia has managed the risks associated with non-
guaranteed power outputs by limiting the capacity to 40 MW, the project risks still hold 
lessons for countries planning to develop power sector projects using stranded gas, as 
previously noted. Project risks for the SEEB project were underestimated with regards to the 
fuel supply, and although the consequence of not being able to fuel the plant was small to 
STEG, for countries planning to develop similar projects as part of the country's main 
219 Transmission links with Europe not only allows for power exports but also for imports should the 
country experience a shortage of electricity. 
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electricity supply sources with relatively larger capacities, the consequences can potentially 
be devastating, for investors and off-takers alike. The fact that the gas for the EI Biban power 
plant only had one source has surfaced as a latent weakness in the development of the project. 
The plant being captive to one single well meant that SEEB's financial viability was 
inextricably linked to the well's ability to feed the plant with primary energy - a risk that was 
probably underestimated. 
With the gas supply compromised in 2005 and again from 2006 through to 2008, the 
outcomes have been less favourable than with Rades [I. For investors, although there were no 
penalties payable to STEG for non-delivery of power. the absence of revenue means that there 
was no income for shareholder dividends or loan repayment, which has forced the project 
company to renegotiate its loans with its lenders. With respect to the state-utility, in addition 
to not receiving any power during the time that the plant was struggling with its fuel 
problems. it has not been able to take advantage from the lower priced fuel arrangement - as 
world oil prices have increased significantly since the parties reached settlement on the agreed 
rate. 
Insufficient attention also appears to have been given to how the equipment would react to the 
fuel quality. More specifically, since EI Biban could not effectively process the gas with the 
original separators, new stronger separators had to be installed. This led to a significant loss in 
revenue as the plant was shut down for a four-month period while the problems were 
investigated and the new separators were procured. Additional problems were caused by 
water entering the well and impeding gas extraction. Another area related to the project 
sponsor arrangements that may have contributed to the project related risks, is the role of the 
lead promoter. CME, although responsible for the front-end risk analysis, does not have any 
exposure to the project's losses. Instead, the firm shares only in its gains when the rate of 
return exceeds 13 per cent. The fact that there was a huge upside opportunity but insignificant 
downside risk for CME could help in explaining why fuel risk, which is at the core of the 
project. may have been inadequately assessed and mitigated against. 
Off-takers of power in countries planning to implement similar arrangements using stranded 
gas. like in Tunisia, therefore, need to pay due diligence to project related risks and 
incentives. since in the hybrid market, various incentive arrangements could potentially hold 
different risks for stakeholders in public and private generators. Even if guarantees are 
obtained and penalties are in order for non-delivery of power, the consequences of power 
shortages due to a large scale loss of production at existing facilities could hold dire 
consequences for the economy and potentially could cause political and social unrest. 
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6.4.3 Generation Procurement 
Although IPP procurement was vested in the Ministry of Industry and Energy, to facilitate the 
development of IPPs, as well as introduce a new level of transparency in the contracting of 
the new generation capacity, two new commissions were introduced. When STEG's 
monopoly ended on I April 1996, decree no. 96-1125 of 20 June 1996 stipulated that 
internationally accepted ICB practices should be followed for all new generation projects and 
oversight would rest with the Higher Commission for Independent Power Production, CSPIE 
(Commission Superieure de la Production Independante d' Electricite) and its lower-tiered 
partner, the Interdepartmental Commission for Independent Power Production, CIPIE 
(Commission Interdepartementale de la Production Independante d'Electricite).220 
The roles of the two commissions are summarised as follows: the CSPIE was an inter-
ministerial body primarily responsible for selecting the winning bid for each IPP, based on 
internationally accepted ICB practices. The CIPIE was tasked with providing input for the 
preparation of terms of references and the issuance of tender documents together with the 
evaluation of bids. The CIPIE was also charged with following up negotiations and 
ascertaining the various incentives to be granted by the state on a case-by-case basis. 
These two commissions, which were set up in 1996 just before the tender for Rades II was 
issued, were answerable to the Ministry of Industry and Energy but retained some degree of 
independence and ultimately served as the de facto regulators during the early days of the first 
IPP.22i 222 Both the CSPIE and the CIPIE, which were temporary commissions that operated 
up until all project contracts were signed, may be credited with what has been deemed a well 
220 Since the law mandates ICB practices for infrastructure large-scale power sector procurement, 
unsolicited bids are not considered in the procurement framework. While the Barca project was 
negotiated between BG, the Ministry of Industry and Energy and STEG, an ICB for the procurement of 
the project would have been a requirement. A change to the legal procurement framework would be 
required to advance a large-scale generation project (more than 40 MW) in the power sector without an 
ICB. 
221 It should be noted that the IPP Group, as previously introduced, within the Ministry of Industry and 
Energy prepared the documents to be discussed by CIPIE and negotiated the project agreements under 
the supervision of the CIPIE. 
222 An additional need for these bodies is because STEG's contracts are subject to public tender 
legislation, which do not provide for long-term contracts. 
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organised and ultimately fair and constructive bid. As one illustration, the CSPIE and CIPIE 
working together with the Ministry of Industry and Energy and other government agencies, 
were responsible for arranging one of the critical elements of the PPA in the case of CPC, 
namely mitigating currency risk by ensuring that capacity charges were pegged to a basket of 
currencies. 
A sound investment climate may, in part. be credited with attracting IPP investors. Despite 
the fact that the Rades II bid occurred at a time when private investment in generation 
infrastructure in developing countries was beginning to taper off, there were 17 tenders 
submitted for prequalification. This level of competition helped to drive down prices, 
resulting in more competitive charges for the IPP. As noted previously, power charges for 
Rades II appear to be competitive and availability seems to be relatively high. Due to more 
advanced technology and higher operating efficiencies, it has been estimated that the Rades II 
IPP could produce electricity at a bulk cost (excluding fuel) 20 percent lower than plants 
operated by STEG (Muller-Jentsch 200 I :52). In 2003 it was reported that CPC supplied 20 
per cent of the country's electrical power to STEG at a price of US$I.54 cents per kWh, 
excluding the cost of fuel COME 2003:21), which compares well with other similar plants 
constructed in developing regions. 
The World Bank commended the Rades II independent power project, describing it as one of 
the best-managed projects at the time that the deals were negotiated (Halawi 2003; CPC pers. 
com. 2006; Ministry of Industry and Energy pers. com. 2006). 
6.4.4 Contracting and Governance 
As in the all prevIous country cases, IPPs are regulated by the contracting arrangements 
entered into with off-takers and/or the state. During the bid and tender procedures, there 
appeared to be adequate governance mechanisms put in place to ensure that bidding, tender, 
and procurement processes were fair and efficient. Once the contracts were signed, regulation 
was purely by contract; i.e. there is no independent regulator in Tunisia. While there are no 
hard and fast criteria for allocation of new build opportunities between IPPs and SOEs, 
outcomes with respect to the power sector's ability to meet electricity demand remain 
positive. A number of factors may playa part in deciding which entity will be allocated the 
opportunity to build future plant; these include the ability to raise finance. the cost of finance. 
the interest from IPP sponsors, and the timing of the projects. Since a number of factors playa 
part in the allocation of new build opportunities. decisions on public or private investment and 
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development of generation projects are done on a case-by-case basis (Ministry of Industry and 
Energy pers. com. 2006). 
The sound policy and governance environment also contributed to the credibility that STEG 
earned as power off-taker in the IPP context. STEG is a well run public company with notable 
technical and operational efficiency. Since reforms in the power sector were initiated, the 
company has continued to register profits and enjoy credible government commitment with 
respect to tariff increases and support for its initiatives in the energy sector. This has gone a 
long way in attracting investors to the power sector. 
6.S Conclusion 
The decision to introduce IPPs in Tunisia was prompted by broader macro-economic policy 
goals, in particular to reduce the government's debt burden. The introduction of IPPs appears 
to have contributed to these goals, namely helping to relieve the state of assuming more debt, 
focus limited state funding on social infrastructure,223 and attract foreign investment. More 
specifically with regard to FDI, the projects have helped enhance Tunisia's image 
internationally as an investment destination and demonstrated that the country is able to 
facilitate large privately financed infrastructure projects. 
To recap, for Rades II, the bidding was based on a competitive tendering process with the 
primary consideration being the price per kWh. With ten short-listed bidders, competition 
helped drive down prices. Competitive tendering is a legal requirement in accordance with the 
country's procurement framework for large scale plant. Explicit bid and tender processes have 
therefore been put in place to ensure transparency and clarity in procurement and contracting 
processes. 
In terms of the EI Biban plant, it arose within a separate legal arrangement (namely, the 1999 
Hydrocarbon law), which was to encourage the development of marginal gas fields by foreign 
independents, and also contribute to a reduction in gas flaring. No competitive tender was 
required, but STEG did specify that it would buy electricity only at a tariff indexed to the 
avoided cost of heavy fuel oil to STEG in the range of approximately $19-25 dollars per 
barrel. The two major shutdowns have led to STEG not receiving power and the project not 
223 This is evidenced in the growing middle class, a reduction In poverty levels and a marked 
improvement in a number of social indicators. 
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receiving revenue as intended. However, with the plant capacity at 27MW, less than 1 per 
cent of national installed capacity, this is not considered significant from STEG's perspective. 
The same cannot be said for the investors, who have had to renegotiate loan payments. Still, 
all is not lost. New investors have drilled back-up wells and there is an expectation of a 
reasonable return going forward. 
In terms of the actual project performance, based on the analysis, it appears to be favourable 
in the case of Rades II and less favourably in the case of SEEB, where there is room to 
speculate that the partnering arrangements and project risk assessments may have been 
incomplete. Fuel security and quality for SEEB has been the Achilles heel of the project, 
which has the potential to inform other similar projects, particularly new gas-to-power 
projects in both East and West Africa. 
In the Tunisian case, many factors have contributed to the country being able to adequately 
attract sufficient investment in generation; in addition to a relatively positive investment 
climate, these include a well functioning national utility, continuity in planning, a flexible 
planning regime that is responsive to changes in power sector circumstances - the use of 
power generation technologies that are relatively quick to construct and commission and are 
less prone to having environmental risks and other causes of delay; procurement oversight 
obligated by a legal framework; the availability of low cost fuel; and a tariff regime 
supported by the state to ensure financial equilibrium in the power sector. 
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7.1 Synopsis 
CHAPTER 7 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As has been illustrated throughout this thesis, the experiences of African countries in 
attracting investment and developing sufficient generation capacities are varied and complex. 
Despite power sector reforms and the implementation of policies aimed at increasing 
investment in generation, the challenges in attracting adequate investment on competitive and 
sustainable terms remain formidable. Private investment in generation was conceived within 
the broader framework of power sector reforms to assist and relieve state-owned utilities of 
the burden of financing new power stations - an undertaking that the balance sheets of many 
public utilities did not allow them to do. Although the private sector stepped in to assist, 
investment has not kept up with demand and many countries still face power scarcities. 
Power sector reform has been widespread, although mostly not as deep as originally foreseen 
or intended. There have been attempts to improve the performance of state-owned utilities, 
new regulatory agencies have been created and private investment has been sought in the 
form of IPPs but nowhere in Africa do we find fully unbundled, privatised or competitive 
electricity markets as sought in the new standard reform model. Instead what has emerged in 
many developing countries has been hybrid electricity markets where the incumbent SOE has 
retained a dominant market position while IPPs have been introduced on the margin, The 
development of IPPs, as described in this thesis, has offered an important opportunity to 
critically evaluate and synthesise the lessons learnt by power sector reform in Africa and other 
developing countries, and to identify the specific challenges that have emerged in terms of 
attracting new investment. 
This thesis has sought to investigate the challenges that SOEs and IPPs face in meeting the 
objective of providing adequate generation services to developing countries in Africa. The 
main questions have been to what extent the emergence of hybrid electricity markets have 
created new challenges in attracting investment into generation capacity in Africa; how 
policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks have frustrated investment in generation; and 
how planning and contracting challenges have contributed to the problem of insufficient 
generation capacity in Africa. The dissertation has further considered how to respond more 
effectively to these challenges faced by hybrid electricity generation markets. 
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This final chapter has three primary goals. Firstly, it gives a brief recap of IPP investments in 
the countries as described in this thesis. Secondly, it integrates the analysis of power sector 
reform, IPPs and the challenges of attracting new investment, from each of the case study 
countries in the previous chapters. By contrasting experiences across the different case study 
countries, general conclusions are drawn around the specific challenges that arise from hybrid 
power markets in relation to attracting new investment and how these challenges and 
problems might be overcome. Lastly, the thesis returns to the overall theoretical framework 
employed in this thesis (first introduced in Chapter 2), and seeks extend the frontiers of our 
understanding of the ontology of hybrid markets with relation to the conundrum of 
insufficient generation capacity. 
7.2 A Recap of Country IPP Experiences 
In this thesis, detailed reviews of eight projects in four countries have been completed. 
Although the number of projects is small, it represents half of the installed IPP capacity in 
Africa. In addition to the eight studied IPPs that were actually commissioned, descriptions 
have also been given in the empirical chapters of plants that were planned, negotiated and 
sometimes partially developed, but which did not enter into operation as planned. An example 
is the Western Power IPP in Ghana, which went all the way to the completion of the 
construction phase of the project without the plant producing a single megawatt. The SIIF 
Accra and AES Sirocco IPPs in Ghana, as well as the Barca IPP in Tunisia, stopped short of 
closing agreements being signed between stakeholders. Further examples problematic 
investments include the Cap Ghir and AIWahda plants III Morocco which are still in the 
planning stages. 
Two of the eight plants investigated in detail in this thesis were commissioned but never fully 
developed in their entirety, despite having entered their operational phases. These were the 
Takoradi IPP in Ghana (where on-going negotiations to complete the steam phase and operate 
the plant in combined-cycle mode have stalled due to the high power charges expected by 
sponsors and the lack of guarantees from the government); and the Azito plant in Cote 
d'lvoire (which has also been waiting for a steam phase to operate as a combined cycle plant 
after a political coup in 1999 left the future of the power station, the power sector and the 
country uncertain). 
A number of the existing IPP plants were delayed in their development. These included the 
Rades II IPP in Tunisia, where commissioning was delayed by approximately eight months 
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mainly due to concerns over the land rights and subsequent rights on the plant equipment; the 
AI Wahda and Cap Ghir plants in Morocco, which have been delayed due to fuel and 
environmental concerns, respectively; and virtually all of Ghana's plants scheduled after 
Takoradi II have seen delays for a host of reasons, including the revived Bui hydro plant that 
has been on and off the cards since 1966. 
In the countries that were studied, only Ghana has experienced severe electricity blackouts as 
a result of insufficient generation capacity over the last decade. [n addition, the country has 
faced disputes and arbitration on three stop-gap emergency plants ordered to curb the rolling 
blackouts experienced in the country during the droughts of the 1990s, but which never 
produced power due to later improvements in the hydrological conditions in the country. Cote 
d'lvoire has been able to maintain adequate reserves, despite a civil war, and has been able to 
export to neighbouring Ghana in its time of need. Morocco, like Ghana, has not been able to 
maintain adequate domestic power reserves, but has imported sufficient power from Spain to 
avert load-shedding. Lastly, Tunisia has been successful in maintaining adequate generation 
reserves, despite BG's setback in developing the Barca [PP. 
These similarities and differences give rise to the following questions: What were the factors 
that led to the different outcomes for the four cases described? What were the forces that 
assisted a country like Tunisia to ensure sufficient generation, and how did the presence or 
absence of these forces work against a country like Ghana in attracting adequate investment in 
generation? Perhaps, more importantly, how could countries like Ghana (and many other 
countries like it in Sub-Saharan Africa) respond more effectively to ongoing challenges which 
frustrate attempts to meet growing needs for power? 
The following sections analyse the factors that contributed to the countries' capacities to 
attract adequate generation, and how they have converged to bring about the diverse outcomes 
in each of the power sectors. These sections describe the experiences of governments and 
project sponsors in each country and propose what they could have done differently, in certain 
cases, to achieve more promising outcomes. It therefore considers both past and future 
possibilities. 
206 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
7.3 An Analysis of Factors Contributing to Insufficient Generation 
Capacity 
A common theme that emerges from the analyses in the previous case study chapters is the 
failure of many hybrid power markets to deal effectively with timely and efficient 
procurement of new power. A number of functions which used to be undertaken by the state-
owned util ity now "fall between the cracks" and are either neglected or performed 
inadequately. This section discusses the generation planning, procurement and contracting 
challenges that emerge in hybrid markets. 
7.3.1 Generation Planning in Hybrid Markets 
The purpose of explicit planning in the generation power sector is to develop clear strategies 
to guard against both over-capacity and under-capacity. Over-capacity can result in 
consumers paying for generation capacity they do not need, whereas under-capacity can result 
in consumers not being supplied with adequate quantities of electricity. Given that there are a 
multitude of forecast inputs required for generation planning, coupled with the number of 
hurdles that have to be successfully negotiated even before a power station is constructed, the 
potential for getting planning wrong is significant. Many who operate at the decision-making 
level are often confronted with optimal generation plant mix decisions, as well as problems 
related to securing adequate financial resources for investment, realigning tariff structures to 
accommodate generation expansions, and negative consumer reaction to the upward 
adjustment of tariffs. Despite these challenges, generation expansion planning remains 
essential. 
In the past, the incumbent state-owned power utility generally assumed responsibility for 
generation expansion planning, and because these utilities were generally run by engineers, 
the tendency was to plan conservatively, i.e. to build more capacity than was actually needed 
in order to ensure that the lights never went out. In many cases, these utilities ran into 
financial difficulties; investment costs were high and tariffs were insufficient to fund the 
required new investment. Power sector policy reforms resulted in IPPs coming into the 
market so that private investment could supplement the utilities' efforts. However, in these 
hybrid markets it often became unclear who was responsible for generation expansion 
planning. Would the private sector, or "the market", simply respond to needs for more power? 
What was the role of planning? And, if planning was still necessary and important, who was 
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responsible - the utility, the regulator, or the government? And if the government takes over 
this function, does it have the capacity to undertake timely, flexible and relevant planning? 
With the introduction of IPPs, planning also needed to take into consideration a host of 
additional legal and financial issues. Private finance assesses risk precisely and additional 
security and risk mitigation measures become necessary. In addition, the linkages between 
planning and investment needed to be dealt with differently. Previously, national utilities 
undertook planning, investment and procurement. Now, in hybrid markets, government (and 
sometimes also state utilities) would undertake generation expansion planning - but then new, 
explicit processes would need to be put in place to procure private investment. Consequently, 
generation planning in the power sector has been elevated to a level of complexity different to 
that utilities were used to a few decades ago before power reforms were initiated. 
a) Evolving Planning Frameworks 
The experiences in planning of generation in the four cases have been diverse. In Ghana, 
power sector reforms brought about a change in planning accountability when the VRA no 
longer had sole responsibility for planning and the Energy Commission became the new 
overall custodian of the country's planning function. The VRA performed detailed power 
sector planning prior to reforms, whereas the Energy Commission's mandate was limited to 
indicative planning, since its establishment. Apart from indicating the size, type and timing of 
generation capacity needed in the power sector, the Energy Commission has no obligation or 
mandate to take development beyond this phase. Administering project proposals, initiating 
tender processes and awarding contracts to successful bidders of generation infrastructure 
providers does not fall within the ambit of the Commission's stated functions. As a result, 
planning, within the scope of the Energy Commission, has not been extended to include 
preparations for ensuring that financial, legal and environmental requirements will be met. In 
many cases, planning in the Ghanaian context has been shown to be unrealistic with timelines 
that do not take into consideration the real challenges of the related planning and execution 
functions in developing generation projects?24 Although the Ministry of Energy facilitates the 
development of generation projects, the project planning processes for additional generation 
plants has seen the involvement of the VRA, ECG and the Ministry of Energy since all three 
entities have undertaken commitments to enter into PPAs with private generators. In addition 
224 An example previously stated is the Energy Commission's Strategic National Energy Plan which 
has Ghana's first unit of nuclear power scheduled for the year 2018, allowing only five years for 
project preparation and another five years for construction. In addition, the planning document does not 
describe how financing of generation plants wi II be realised. 
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to a lack of coordination between these organisations. in the absence of clear and enforceable 
rules for project procurement, each entity is left to follow a procurement route that roughly 
suits its own preference. This leaves the door wide open to irregularities and inconsistencies 
in the procurement process and impacts on the efficiency and timeliness of generation 
procurement. 
In the case of Cote d'lvoire, planning remained with the EECI when the utility handed over 
the management of the operations to a private operator. The same departments that had been 
responsible for planning in the EECI evolved through the reforms to take the form of SOP IE, 
and. to a lesser extent. SOGEPE, when the EECI was dissolved and the sector's new 
institutional arrangements established. Unlike Ghana, planning, therefore, remained with a 
specific entity. In part, this was facilitated by the specific form of private participation 
introduced in Cote d'lvoire. The private concessionaire was primary responsible for operation 
of the electricity system, but not for new investment. This responsibility remained with the 
state including, as mentioned above, the planning function. The state was clear about its 
responsibilities and there appears to have been sufficient foresight regarding future power 
needs. It was the first country in Africa to procure an IPP and followed this milestone with the 
successful procurement of a second IPP. Cote d'lvoire continued to enjoy surplus capacity 
(facilitated in part by depressed demand during the civil war) and was able even to export 
power. The surplus capacity is currently diminishing and in keeping with its strategy of being 
a major power exporter in the region, Cote d'Ivoire has started the process of procuring 
additional generation capacity.225 
Since hardly any institutional reforms occurred in the power sector in either Morocco or 
Tunisia when IPPs were introduced, there was little change of responsibilities and planning 
remained with the national utilities. In Morocco, despite the utility no longer being solely 
responsible for new generation. it assumed responsibility for translating planning into bidding 
and procurement processes for IPPs. As a result, planning functions that extend through to the 
ccS A cost effective option is to complete the steam phase of Azitio since this would not require 
additional fuel resources (and the plant design has been completed for more than a decade). The 
Ministry of Mines and Energy has therefore engaged the shareholders of Azito in talks to complete the 
steam phase that was planned at the outset of the project's development. The state is also in discussions 
with C[PREL to expand its capacity by adding a steam phase since this would be a more affordable 
option (for similar reasons to that of Azitio's expansion). [n addition to these, other longer-term 
thermal and hydro generation projects are also currently being planned by the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. For the time being, however, there is still sufficient generation capacity available. 
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commissioning and operational phases of projects have largely remained intact. This was 
made possible by strong political leadership and purposeful state action: i.e. the national 
utility was told that IPPs were necessary to bring in private investment, but it was also given 
direct responsibility to make sure that it happened.226 Under the BTO framework (as opposed 
to BOT arrangement) in Morocco, the utility is the owner of the generation assets despite 
private operation of the plant. All large scale generation assets, therefore, belong to the state, 
and this may have resulted in less jostling for market share (in terms of ownership) and more 
willingness and commitment by ONE to ensure that developments continue without 
unnecessary delays. 
The data suggests that power sectors that have transferred their generation planning functions 
to new institutions risk experiencing new problems in ensuring timely and effective 
procurement of lPPs. It would seem that the propensity for certain aspects of planning risk 
being missed or falling through the cracks increases with extensive reforms (and subsequent 
reshuffling of responsibilities among sector institutions), especially where insufficient 
consideration is given to how the planning, procurement and contracting processes will unfold 
under the new institutional arrangements. The Ghanaian case is, therefore, a good example of 
how institutional frameworks and planning arrangements have not responded adequately to 
the needs of the hybrid market. It should be noted that the frameworks were instituted with 
the intent of being adapted to the standard model of reform (i.e. a fully unbundled, privatised 
and competitive market) and not a hybrid arrangement as found at present. However, instead 
of a transition step towards the standard model, the hybrid model has become the reality and 
perhaps even the 'end state'. It is clear that hybrid markets present very specific challenges 
with regard to generation planning. Not only does clear institutional responsibility need to be 
allocated, but the linkages between planning, investment and procurement of lPPs need to be 
explicit. Strong state and political leadership seems to be crucial to ensure that the incumbent 
utility works positively with the state to achieve national goals and objectives - even though 
some of these may require new space for lPPs. 
226 It should be noted, however, that the positive experience in Morocco has been somewhat tarnished 
by delays in environmental permits and also fuel supply problems. 
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b) Flexibili(v in Generation Planning 
Power sector planning requires a degree of flexibility to make provision for unexpected issues 
which can emerge and delay the provision of electricity services. Contingency provisions are, 
therefore, retained as options to assist in periods when setbacks challenge security of supply. 
In Ghana, the number of plants that were halted in the planning stages without realising 
construction demonstrates the difficulty in planning generation projects when there are 
multiple constraints. Ghana has more generation power projects in the pipeline than any of the 
other countries included in this thesis. Given its low success rate in bringing projects to 
completion, it is easy to appreciate the approach that the government has taken, i.e. to 
increase the number of planned projects in the face of attrition. While this approach may 
increase the chances of adding generation capacity, the benefit of a more carefully crafted and 
targeted approach with fewer projects may hold greater potential for increased investment. A 
more focused and systematic approach would serve to dislodge the 'hit or miss' perception 
amongst private investors. Potentially, negotiating with numerous IPP sponsors could have 
brought flexibility to Ghana's project planning and development processes, since a significant 
delay or cancellation of one project could have been compensated for by fast-tracking another 
project. However, it probably did more harm than good to the country's reputation as an 
investment destination for infrastructure since more projects were cancelled than were 
developed thereby sending an unfavourable signal to the investment community. 
Cote d'lvoire, on the other hand, has adopted a strategy that gives it greater flexibility in 
generation planning. With the discovery of natural gas and realising that it could benefit from 
the problems of insufficient capacity in neighbouring West African states, it started the 
tendering process for the country's second IPP and exported surplus capacity to neighbouring 
countries, a strategy that Tunisia will also follow. In 2006, Cote d'lvoire exported to 
neighbouring countries the equivalent of almost all the electricity produced by the Azito IPP. 
The benefit of this strategy could be seen in 1999, when the coup d'etat brought significant 
political uncertainty to investments in the power sector, giving it some breathing space to 
regroup and craft a more informed strategy, one that took into account the changing 
circumstances around future investment decisions. This not only ensured generous capacity 
reserve margins without the problem of stranded capacity (due to the high regional demand in 
West African states), it has also brought in much needed hard currency for Cote d'lvoire, 
reflecting favourably on its foreign account. The transmission links between neighbouring 
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countries and Cote d'Ivoire have played a role and given some flexibility In generation 
planning, without the hangovers generally associated with over-capacity.227 
Transmission links between North Africa and Europe have also played a significant role in 
bringing flexibility to planning in the Moroccan case where delayed contracting and 
commissioning of power stations resulted in more than 9 per cent of the country's electricity 
requirements being imported in 2007. Imports are expected to be in excess of 12 per cent in 
2009, after the strengthening of the interconnection. The reason for this record increase in 
power imports is due to other planning problems (environmental concerns in the case of the 
Cap Ghir coal-fired power plant and the securing of fuel for the Al Wahda combined cycle 
gas plant). 
The most favourable of the four cases, Tunisia, has been able to exercise relatively prudent 
planning. Prior to the country's power sector reforms, Tunisia appeared to have fared well 
compared to the other three countries in this study, possessing adequate generation capacity to 
meet electricity demand. Well aware of the fact that private investment would be a first for 
the country, the utility made sure that it had sufficient generation reserve capacity in the event 
of potential delays in the contracting process. When the contacting process took longer than 
anticipated due to issues over land rights (and the rights of equipment on the land), the utility 
dealt with the delay without any adverse consequences with respect to electricity supply 
provisions to the country. Many countries take longer than expected to procure their first 
tranche of private capacity (mainly due to inexperience in private contracting) and Tunisia did 
well to have the foresight to cater for this by having adequate reserves before contracting its 
first IPP. 
In addition to the reserves, transmission links with neighbouring Algeria and Libya meant that 
Tunisia had added defences against the risk of insufficient capacity since it could import 
power from its neighbours, if needed. Tunisia also has domestic natural gas to fuel its power 
m In contrast to Ghana, planning and forecasting in Cote d'lvoire has not only been facilitated by the 
presence of domestic fuel but also by a relatively more stable currency, showing that the environment 
in which planning occurs is as much a contributor to successful planning outcomes as the planning 
process itself. Planning, therefore, needs to take cognisance of the context in which the function is to be 
executed. A similar contrast can be made with respect to Ghana and Morocco; although the latter had 
hardly any domestic primary energy resources, its stable economy provided leverage to attract 
investment. 
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stations and has access to the gas networks of its neighbours. Since Rades II was developed, 
the country has extensively expanded its gas distribution infrastructure making it easy for 
electricity and gas consumers to switch between the two modes of energy supply, should this 
be necessary. These factors have given Tunisia greater flexibility in its planning strategy to 
procure generation capacity, allowing the utility greater ease with lower generation reserves 
than if electricity had been the only large scale source of commercial energy. The natural gas 
also guided the generation technology choices of the utility and, since natural gas plants have 
the shorter lead times for development and commissioning of generation capacity, it puts the 
utility in a less challenging situation than those utilities that have to procure technologies that 
carry longer planning and development phases and are more prone to environmental 
constraints, as was found in Morocco with the Cap Ghir coal-fired plant. 
Flexibility can be achieved in various ways and countries would do well to consider all 
options as resources to allow more flexible planning strategies. Flexibility, however, only 
buys power sectors time and planning frameworks cannot escape the necessity to be 
underpinned by sound fundamentals which will allow large scale expansions to be timeously 
developed. 
c) Project Planning ami Risk Evaluation 
In hybrid markets, project planning and appraisal is often left to newly formed institutions 
that lack the capacity to execute these functions effectively. In some case, these institutions 
inherit functions for which they do not have the human resource skills (financial, legal, 
environmentaL and engineering) to conduct adequate risk assessments during the planning 
and appraisal phase of the projects' development. 228 Even where the same institutions retain 
the planning functions, a lack of proficiency can lead to inadequate risk assessment, 
especially when certain aspects of the project are new. This is often the case when projects are 
initiated by private sponsors and subsequently negotiated with the government and the off-
228 Governments and off-taker utilities often leave project appraisal to consultants, private sponsors of 
IPPs, and negotiators, all of whom may have different incentives to close the deal. This is particularly 
the case when upside opportunity incentives are significantly overshadowed by the downside risks. In 
the case of Tunisia's SEEB, for example, CME, the lead promoter of the project, shared in the earnings 
from the deal once the earnings exceed a certain rate of return, but did not share in the losses. Given 
that the hybrid market increasingly makes use of private investors who are often represented by 
negotiators whose incentives may cause them to be swayed towards failing to see potential downside 
risks, risk recognitions and evaluations should be incorporated in the off-takers' planning frameworks. 
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taker utility, which have less knowledge about the technology and potential drawbacks. In 
many cases, the urgency with which power is required also contributes to risk evaluations 
being hurried and inadequately performed. 
In Ghana, while the Takoradi II IPP had sponsors with considerable experience in developing 
IPPs and operating power stations, the same cannot be said for the Western Power IPP which 
was built without generating a single kWh. The main project sponsor for the latter was the 
state-owned oil company, the GNPC, which had no prior experience in the appraisal of 
generation power projects and was entering a new business environment with the 
development of IPPs. The irony was that the sponsor, whose main business it was to explore 
fuel options and secure and make available commercial fuels for Ghana, was unable to secure 
the fuel to operate the plant. 
Although one of the main sponsors of Tunisia's second IPP. SEEB, had prior experience in 
the development and operation of IPPs, the kind of project, where off-shore untreated gas 
which had previously been flared was used for power generation, was new to the sponsors as 
well as to STEG. It is often assumed that fuel risk can be mitigated by having the fuel supplier 
take a stake in the project since it has a greater incentive to see the project succeed in the 
absence of fuel guarantees. [t is, therefore, also ironic in Tunisia's case that having the fuel 
supplier as project sponsor did not lead to favourable outcomes with respect to fuel 
availability and a loss of generation for the plant. [n the cases of Western Power and SEEB, it 
could well be that because the fuel suppliers were project sponsors, it was taken for granted 
that fuel risks as part of the projects would be addressed. 
The Western Power and SEEB [PPs were not the only projects described in this thesis where 
upstream fuel issues effected outcomes. During the earlier years of the operating life of 
Takoradi II, there were problems with fuel availability and quality, lowering the expected 
output from the plant. Although resolved when the fuel specification was changed, these 
problems contributed to insufficient generation capacity. Similarly, in Morocco, fuel 
availability continues to cast a shadow on the development of the Al Wahda IPP designed to 
use natural gas from Algeria. 
These examples draw attention to the importance of the capacity needed for project appraisal 
in all facets of generation projects and demonstrate the potential for lapses in risk 
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management in critical components of the projects and how they can contribute to the 
problem of insufficient generation capacity.22'J 
d) Demand Side Management Planning 
Institutional coordination and agreement In dealing with the problem of insufficient 
generation capacity has been shown to be poor in the cases of Ghana. In Ghana, the fact that it 
took four years for the government to implement a specific DSM programme that could have 
significantly changed the electricity demand load profile and limit the amount of load-
shedding that occurred, is indicative of the obstacles faced in coordinating the DSM strategy 
to systematically deal with the problem of insufficient generation. For the DSM programme to 
have proceeded smoothly, agreement was required from the EFG, the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy and the Ministry of Finance. During this time. the country was in no small way 
bearing the burden of power shortages. 
In Morocco. the rural electrification programme was a high priority for the national utility, the 
power sector and the country, with funds committed to the programme from the state, ONE, 
and local municipalities - and this, when no funds were available for additional generation 
expansions. Despite the country heading for power shortages, rather than retard the rate of 
electrification to help reduce demand which was fuelled in part by a low tariff structure at the 
residential leveL the programme was accelerated to be completed earlier than initially 
scheduled. This example illustrates the importance of integrating electrification planning with 
generation planning. 
Thus power sector planning is no trivial task. Adequate systems, human resources and 
institutional capacity need to be secured and nurtured. Hybrid power markets create 
additional challenges of integrating public and private options. incorporating risk 
management requirements as well as flexibility to ensure security of supply. Thus any power 
sector reforms that bring in IPPs while maintaining the incumbent state-owned utility need to 
deal with these challenges explicitly and purposefully. In addition. there need to be clear 
criteria whereby new-build opportunities are allocated to either the national utility or to IPPs. 
In hybrid power markets, the incumbent state-owned utility often continues to invest in new 
generation capacity in parallel to IPPs coming into the market. or if they have not built new 
cc9 A further example is the difficulties experienced in developing the Cap Ghir and AI Wahda plants in 
Morocco. which underscores the importance of coordinating planning with environmental objectives 
and fuel supply guarantees from an early stage in the planning process. 
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generation for some time, they often continue to harbour ambitions for doing so. In these 
contexts, the planning function needs to develop transparent criteria which make clear what 
the state utility will do in the future and which projects will be bid out to the private sector. 
The latter process is, in itself, also fraught with challenges and it is to these that we now turn. 
7.3.2 Generation Procurement 
Procurement of generation infrastructure requires specified processes to be followed to 
optimise procurement costs and the total cost of the acquisition, to minimise opportunities for 
corruption, and to make plain the rules of the game to stakeholders involved. Procurement can 
be a long process spanning a number of years and, hence, efficiency and transparency are key 
determinants in the timely acquisition of generation capacity. Delays or irregularities in the 
procurement process can result in delayed construction and commissioning of power plants, 
exacerbating the problems of insufficient electricity generation. Efficient and transparent 
procurement frameworks are, thus, pivotal in the acquisition of new capacity, and the manner 
in which procurement is conducted has the potential to attract or discourage investment and 
commissioning of generation, as is elaborated in the section below. 
a) Procurement Procedures and Adherence 
Procurement of new generation capacity generally needs to be done in accordance with 
established rules and regulations governing procurement opportunities, bidding and awarding 
of contracts. A lack of guidelines for how funds are to be spent can lead to a number of 
problems in procurement. Equally distressing is the non-adherence to policies and guidelines 
since this can also lead to a number of problems, as evidenced in Ghana. Here, despite a 
policy of contracting large infrastructure projects through international competitive bidding 
(ICB) procedures, no ICBs have been launched for any generation projects developed; to date, 
all generation projects have been initiated through negotiated deals, despite the country's 
procurement policies favouring competitive tendering. Failure to adhere to domestic policies 
creates the impression of inconsistency within government departments and such behaviour 
may prompt investors and lenders to withdraw from deals, further contributing to the problem 
of insufficient capacity. Non-adherence to procedures can result in problems for investors 
even when it is the state that does not follow its own prescriptions as evidenced in the 
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example with Faroe Atlantic which lost its arbitration case against the Government of Ghana 
for non-payment of services (see Section 3.5.3).230 
Part of the problem may be the number of actors that are independently involved in the 
allocation of opportunities for IPPs. In Ghana, IPPs have been negotiated by the VRA, the 
ECG. and the Ministry of Energy, with all three entities entering separate purchase 
agreements with potential IPPs. It may be argued that the number of possible off-takers in 
Ghana has contributed to the problem with each entity following a process deemed adequate 
for their purposes. and with little regard for national procurement procedures. In the relative 
absence of enforceable rules and accountability on the part of the off-takers in executing the 
procurement function, many potential IPP sponsors have engaged directly with an entity that 
it feels comfortable with, to propose and negotiate a possible IPP. The other part of the 
problem is the lack of governance around procurement where no external regulatory agency 
enforces procurement rules on utilities and the state. While the Ghana Public Procurement 
Authority has been established to set standards for public procurement in Ghana, it appears 
that this body has insufficient authority to enforce these standards on the power sector. 
The extent to which countries are consistent in applying their policy prescriptions can attract 
or deter private investment, and inconsistencies, as evidenced in the case of Ghana, make 
investors wary of generation investments in countries where procurement standards are 
blurred and their adherence and enforcement arbitrary. 
b) The Influence of Development Finance Institutions ami ICB Benefits 
In contrast to Ghana, the other three countries have all followed competitive bidding 
processes for the procurement of their plants, with the exception of Tunisia's SEES, where 
:30 To recap. in the case of Faroe Atlantic Company from the UK, the Ghanaian government entered 
into a PPA with the firm to provide additional capacity. Although the Ministry of Finance represented 
the Ghanaian government in the deal, internal parliamentary approval had not been sought by the 
Ministry of Finance, despite this being a requirement for such large-scale projects. On Faroe's court 
action, the High Court first ruled in Faroe's favour the sum of US$6.3m plus interest. The government 
then appealed, but the case was dismissed by the Appeals Court leaving the government with the bill 
for damages. When the government appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis of the legality of the 
transaction, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the government based on its obligation to uphold the 
constitution (and the laws of the country). The Supreme Court ruled that the agreement was 
unenforceable due to lack of mandatory parliamentary approval and concluded that the absence of 
parliamentary approval rendered the contract null and void. 
217 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
competitive bidding is not required under the country's hydrocarbon framework. Apart from 
SEEB, all the projects examined in detail in this thesis in Cote d'lvoire, Morocco and Tunisia 
had loan assistance from development finance institutions. Nearly all development finance 
institutions have clearly stated lending conditions for the procurement of infrastructure 
projects to which they provide financial assistance. The World Bank, for example, makes 
additional financial assistance available to countries that have difficulty in meeting the pre-
conditions for accessing finance to help them to establish the required procurement practices. 
Tunisia has gone as far as legislating competitive tendering as a requirement for generation 
infrastructure acquisitions and, as a result, no provision exists for unsolicited proposals within 
the power sector's generation procurement framework. Here, governance arrangements 
during IPP procurement also work well to ensure adequate oversight when negotiating and 
contracting the country's first IPP. The creation of quasi oversight institutions such as the 
CSPIE and the CIPIE gave credibility to the contracting process and allowed for a number of 
stakeholders to review and provide input to various aspects of the procurement process. These 
temporary institutions were credited with including the mechanisms for mitigating the 
currency risks in the Rades II deal by indexing the capacity charges to a basket of currencies 
rather than a single hard currency. 
Development finance institutions have embraced competitive tendering since it promotes 
fairness and transparency and generally attracts more affordable charges. In Tunisia's case, it 
has laid a sound foundation for future private investments and demonstrated that the country 
is able to execute efficient procurement of large and complex private infrastructure 
transactions. The procurement of Rades I I was lauded by the World Bank as one of the best 
IPP deals executed at the time. The project attracted considerable interest amongst IPP 
sponsors, with seventeen consortia responding to the tender invitations. More or less the same 
sentiments hold for Morocco's Jorf Lasfar plant; albeit with less interest shown from foreign 
investors for Africa's largest IPP transaction to date, the record deal set the stage for future 
investments in the form of the CED and Tahaddart IPPs. Through competitive bidding, Cote 
d'lvoire, Morocco and Tunisia were not only able to gauge the attractiveness of the power 
sector to investors by investor responses to tenders, by stipulating general criteria for plant 
requirements, they gave potential sponsors the opportunity to develop innovative and 
affordable ways of meeting these requirements. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the government 
set the range for the turbines for CIPREL at 75-1 05MW allowing more companies to compete 
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in the bidding process, and facilitating the achievement of lower power charges in the PPA. 231 
The involvement of the World Bank also determined the procurement procedures for Azito, 
the country's second IPP, when the ICB method of contracting produced an even lower power 
charge than that for the first IPP. The same cannot be said for Ghana's Takoradi II where an 
ICB was passed over for a direct negotiated deal with the IPP sponsor where, after the deal 
was finalised, it was decided that the full energy charge should not be passed through to 
consumers due to the elevated cost. FUlihermore, the government's insistence on buying the 
remaining 50 per cent shareholding from T AQA suggests that a much lower charge could be 
realised under different (more transparent and competitive) circumstances. One of the main 
reasons for the government using funds to buy existing plants back from IPPs, rather than 
putting the scarce resources to better use by developing new capacity at a time when it is 
much needed, is because the Kufuor administration felt that the charges were too high - a 
situation brought about partly due to non-transparent procurement processes and the absence 
of competition. A change in ownership from private to public, thus, allows the state to review 
the contract terms and reduce power charges (Awuni 2007).232 
c) Competitive Bidding with a Twist 
For certain projects in Cote d'lvoire and Morocco, ICBs were not executed for the entire 
turnkey contract. In the case of CIPREL in Cote d'lvoire and the CEO and EET in Morocco, 
sponsors were first selected by the off-takers and, thereafter, the EPC and O&M contracts 
were put out on tender in an ICB. Although this practice effectively has the same effect of 
pushing down the price of power through competition for supply tenders, there is no 
competition amongst potential equity partners and the off-taker has to negotiate the IPP 
sponsors' return on the project. By pre-selecting plant sponsors, off-takers of power rule out 
other potential sponsors who may have reduced internal rates of return and lower project costs 
lower returns on equity, including local sponsors who may introduce a new wave of domestic 
private investment in power generation. Although IPP sponsors may be pre-selected for 
211 Competitive bidding also allowed CIPREL to attract reputable EPC partners and put downward 
pressure on the price of a kWh. 
232 The government was unhappy with the contract signed during the reign of the National Democratic 
Congress government under President Rawlings, which guaranteed CMS a monthly energy charge of 
US$3m, irrespective of whether the energy was used or not (Awuni 2007). 
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strategic reasons by governments and off-takers, pre-selection could exclude other potential 
sources of investment.233 
d) Allocation oj Generation Investment Opportunities 
No country examined in this thesis has ruled out state sponsored investment in generation and 
SOEs still remain an option to expand generation capacity. In all of the country cases, except 
for Tunisia, the main driver for private investment still persists: SOEs lack sufficient finances 
to fund additional expansion. Private investment will, therefore, continue to playa crucial role 
in the development of additional generation infrastructure. The countries examined in this 
thesis, however, lack clearly stated criteria for allocation of investment opportunities. Having 
clear criteria for investments can help to develop a more predictable environment for 
investors, thereby making investment processes more transparent and bringing credibility to 
decision-making processes. Investors are expected to react more favourably to such an 
environment and this, in turn, could facilitate further investment. 234 The random allocation of 
generation opportunities to private sponsors and SOEs exemplifies the reality that criteria for 
private or public investment under a hybrid arrangement are lacking.235 
In Ghana, despite the government announcing its intention to increase private ownership in 
generation, the VRA took over an increasing share in the Takoradi II IPP. Although the 
national utility does not directly have the funds to increase its shareholding further, the 
government is still trying to buy back the remaining shares in the plant from the foreign 
sponsors. The Ghanaian government's diatribe against CMS for not allowing it first option to 
take over the remaining shares in TICO may be perceived as hostility towards foreign 
investment in the power sector, and a preference for domestic or state ownership.236 
m As an example, it is reported that domestic sponsors have indicated interest to participate m 
Morocco's generation sector through IPPs (EET pers.com. 2006). 
234 Certain investors, for example, would only enter a market if there were an opportunity for increased 
market share and growth. 
~35 Such guidelines may not have been necessary had the sector been able to evolve into the standard 
model since different factors would have largely determined which entities would be allocated 
investment opportunities. However, when power sector reforms were instituted in the 1990s, it was not 
foreseen that the sector would still be in a 'transition' state. 
236 In the case of Ghana, the country has a long history of hostility toward foreign investment dating 
back to the time of its independence when its first president, K warne Nkrumah, who did not want 
Ghana to drift into neo-colonialism, fervently followed ideals of non-alignment and Pan Africanism, 
thereby promoting economic nationalism and reducing dependence on foreign technology, material 
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In Morocco, the country's next renewable energy project, a wind farm, will also be developed 
by the national utility despite ONE not having the financial resources to invest in additional 
generation infrastructure or to maintain the existing power sector infrastructure. Private 
investors have stated their interest in wind energy projects if sufficient securities can be 
provided (CEO pers. com. 2006: 1-14), but allocation criteria for such renewable projects are 
not in the public domain and their absence might deter such investment. 
What might these allocation criteria be? Various possibilities exist. Where finance is a 
temporary constraint government might announce that IPPs will be sought over a specified 
period and then the national utility will resume responsibility. Or perhaps the national utility 
has expertise in hydro but not thermal plants and IPPs would explicitly be sought to meet fuel 
diversity targets. Or government, or the planning authorities, might discuss the 20 year power 
expansion plan with the national utility and agree up front which options it would take 
responsibility for and which would be bid out to the private sector. The point here is not so 
much the actual allocation criteria themselves, but rather that there is a transparent allocation 
of responsibilities that creates clear and certain investment opportunities for IPPs. 
Transparency in allocation criteria also implies that the incumbent national utility knows what 
its own responsibilities are. The split in responsibilities between the national utility and IPPs 
obviously also needs to be backed by strong and consistent political leadership and state 
action. 
7.3.3 Generation Contracting 
In most cases, IPP contracts extend over a long period of time and typical contracts can range 
from 15 to 30 years. The length of the contract is considered both a strength and a weakness: 
the length of the contract makes it possible for the sponsor to regain their investments and 
service debt with long tenors; conversely, in an environment of liberalisation, both parties can 
goods and capital (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994). Although subsequent leaders later adopted 
policies that allowed foreign investment and ownership in state assets and economic sectors, these 
generally followed as a result of a lack of alternate available options to pull the country out of its 
economic problems. The difficulties in successfully implementing privatisation policies and transfer 
assets to foreign investors in various strategic economic sectors such as transport, water, 
telecommunications, and power, supports the belief that that this economic nationalism has propagated 
to modern day business in Ghana (Decker 2008). This is in stark contrast to the francophone countries 
included in this thesis, which did not make such significant attempts to revise colonial legacies, but, 
rather, to build on them (Ali and Wahabi 1995). 
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encounter problems with fixed long-term take-or-pay contracts if the various conditions under 
which the contracts are agreed upon change.237 Whilst all contracts between IPPs and utility 
off-takers in this thesis have been in the form of long-term PPAs, the legal and regulatory 
frameworks within which these contracts have been entered have differed resulting in diverse 
outcomes in each of the countries' power sectors. These frameworks which shape the degree 
of predictability and governance in the sector, ultimately impact on the manner and extent to 
which investment is facilitated in generation infrastructure. 
a) IPP Charges and Payback Periods 
The ability to keep power charges from IPPs competitive has an impact on a country's ability 
to attract more investment and is, therefore, linked to the problem of insufficient generation 
capacity.238 In addition to competition jar the market to put downward pressure on the price 
per MWh, the structuring of power charges, the ability to attract cheaper finance and keep 
interest payments low are all factors that have played a role in making private investment in 
generation more sustainable. Lower power charges resulting in lower tariffs to consumers 
make IPPs more acceptable to the public, especially when coupled with service 
improvements. By having lower power charges, the likelihood of stresses on contracts 
between IPPs and off-takers decreases. This sub-section illustrates how IPP contracting 
arrangements have impacted on IPP charges, and how the ability of off-takers to service these 
charges connects with further investment. 
In the case of Ghana, a number of factors contributed to the relatively high power costs of 
Takoradi " IPP. TICO was a 100 per cent equity investment and, thus, had no debt to reduce 
the total cost of capital from the 20.5 per cent return on equity asked by the project sponsors. 
Disagreement on the power charges asked by the sponsor, CMS, for the additional steam 
phase to be developed also concomitantly delayed the completion of this phase which would 
237 The ushering in of liberalisation may render long-term contract clauses burdensome to off-takers 
since they could force them to uphold non-competitive and uneconomic obligations at a later stage 
when prices (determined by demand and supply as well as other market factors) decrease. With long-
term PPAs, prices are determined and locked in for an extended period. In a study of IPP contracts 
under stress conducted by Covindassamy (2005), all contracts under stress in Africa were related to 
regulation and price issues. Sociopolitical and macro-economic issues were additional causes for the 
stresses on the projects that were evaluated. 
238 Lower IPP power charges are easier for off-takers to service and require lower consumer tariff 
increases. Adequate tariff increases help off-takers to stay afloat financially, making it easier for them 
to attract more investment. 
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have reduced the average cost of power.239 Additional factors that contributed to increased 
charges in local currency were the deteriorating currency exchange rate coupled with dollar 
denominated revenues for the investor and rising fuel costs paid for in hard currency. In a 
hybrid market, an accumulation of factors can easily make the contracting commitments 
burdensome. Stakeholders, therefore, should attempt to find ways in which contractual 
elements could be more flexible and less onerous on both sponsors and off-takers, such as 
grace periods on loans, as were negotiated as part of the contracts for Cote d'Ivoire's ClPREL 
and Morocco's EET. 
lPPs in Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and Tunisia have seen less upward pressure on power charges 
than was the case in Ghana. Low interest loans such the IDA loan that the Ivorian government 
secured from the World Bank and lent to ClPREL have also helped to reduce the charges by 
reducing the cost of debt on the project. Similarly, with Azito, the partial risk guarantee 
(PRG) from the World Bank for the loan syndication from commercial banks reduced the 
risks for commercial lenders, and the Government of Cote d' lvoire posted a counter guarantee 
resulting in favourable terms for the loan agreements. Shorter pay-back periods have also 
reduced overall project interest charges with the large capital payments made during the early 
years of the loan repayments tapering off toward the later years until the end of the repayment 
period for the lPPs in Cote d'lvoire, Morocco and Tunisia. 
While shorter payback periods may reduce overall finance charges, when they are not 
synchronised with tariffs to service interest and capital payments on the debt of lPPs projects, 
this can result in cash flow problems for off-taker utilities. Almost all debt for IPPs in Cote 
d' Ivoire, Morocco and Tunisia is heavily loaded in the first years of operation. Contracting 
arrangements between off-takers and IPPs, therefore, require charges paid to lPPs to be higher 
than the average price per kWh in the early years of the contract. When lPPs are required to 
come on stream in quick succession, payments can increase to levels that strain the cash flow 
of off-taker utilities, even if the average price for the power generated for the contract 
duration is considered low. When off-takers are experiencing cash flow problems, it is 
difficult to attract additional generation. Again, Morocco is an example of where three IPPs 
no While fuel makes up roughly 75 per cent of power costs in single cycle mode, the additional 
electricity provided by the steam cycle does not require fuel. For this reason, Cote d'Ivoire wants to 
expand its two existing IPPs to incorporate combined steam cycles (as opposed to building new plants). 
Morocco developed a combined cycle facility for the Tahaddart plant and decided on another combined 
cycle plant for the Al Wahda plant. In the same way, Tunisia decided on a combined cycle plant for the 
Rades II IPP. 
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were developed within five years, with collective payments to all IPPs reaching a peak at the 
J40 
end of year five.-
The above examples emphasise just some of the complexities in contracting IPPs effectively 
and competitively. The immediate implication is that government and national utilities require 
a great deal of specialised expertise in order to negotiate robust and competitive contracts. 
Private sponsors will often hire the best legal, financial and technical transaction advisors. 
Governments too need good people on their side of the table. Unfortunately this is often not 
the case and governments underestimate the need for specialised assistance. The whole 
experience of contracting IPPs is new for African governments: most countries have less that 
a decade of experience and some have none. Once again, this points to an area where hybrid 
power markets present new challenges that have to be dealt with consciously and 
purposefully. As with planning, contracting is not a trivial exercise. Governments need to 
allocate clear responsibility to either the national utility or a government agency to undertake 
this function. If the national utility is to be responsible then it is also critical that a ring-fenced 
contracting function is established separate from the utilities own generation or new build 
function - to avoid any conflicts of interest. Perhaps the best location is an independent 
system operator which also takes responsibility for planning which can then be integrated 
with the procurement function. In this case the system operator takes responsibility not only 
for short term balancing of the system but also long term security of supply. 
b) Regulatory and Governance Frameworks 
The standard model of reform for the power sector would include an independent, transparent 
and credible regulator to provide oversight and to promote efficient and fair markets. It would 
also maintain tariff structures that cover the cost of electricity generation and provide 
incentives for further investment. Using private sector financing for electricity infrastructure 
requires good regulatory systems to protect the interests of both investors and users, and to 
ensure the long-term interests of the power sector. These requirements are equally important 
in hybrid power markets. 
In the four country cases examined, only two countries have de jure electricity regulators -
Ghana and Cote d'lvoire. However, neither of these regulators were present or played a 
240 It was from this time onward (in 2004) that ONE did not register profits due to increasing charges 
from IPPs as a result of the debt payment profile on the projects, increasing fuel costs and low tariff 
structures. 
224 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
significant role in the development of the IPPs included in this thesis. An analysis of 
regulatory and governance functions in these four case studies suggests that the presence or 
absence of formal regulatory institutions has had little impact per se on the countries' abilities 
to attract sufficient generation capacity; instead, analysis of the data suggest that the extent to 
which de facto or de jure regulators have acted in a credible, transparent and consistent 
manner is important. In effect, it is the governance role that regulators (whether independent, 
or within government) play in ensuring transparency and predictability that helps to attract 
adequate investment in generation. 
In the case of Ghana, the PURC was instituted only after the Takoradi II IPP deal had been 
finalised. In its ex post review of the PPA, the PURC suggested that part of the capacity 
charge should become a government contingency; however, since the financial closure of the 
project had already taken place, there was little that the regulatory review could do to alter the 
charges from the sponsors.241 
In Ghana, the responsibilities for technical and financial regulation have been split between 
two separate entities, the Energy Commission and the PURC as the government did not want 
a single agency that would become too powerful (Energy Commission pel's. com. 2007). It 
would appear that this sentiment has led to the government undermining the PURC's 
objectives on a few occasions. Although PURC is legally mandated to be impartial in its 
operations. it is still dependent on the government for funding, raising questions about its 
independence. In some cases, PURC has succeeded in raising tariffs but the government has 
hampered its more recent efforts to have cost-reflective tariffs by changing the tariff structure 
and increasing the band of the lifeline tariff (which consumers do not pay for). The 
resignation of the PURC chairman following this debacle is an illustration of the frustration 
that regulators, as well as other stakeholders in the power sector. experience due to political 
meddling and related setbacks which detract from the objective of making the sector more 
sustainable and attracting further investment. A decade after the PURC has been instituted, 
the power sector is still subsidised by the government. which. on numerous occasions, has 
foregrounded short-term political interests ahead of power sector sustainability. Political 
interference has. therefore, hampered the regulator from discharging its mandate and 
241 While an ex ante review of the PPA may have led to continued negotiations to further decrease the 
charges. further negotiations would probably have meant prolonging the electricity crisis and continued 
load-shedding. a situation that the government probably wanted to avoid at the time (PURe pers. com. 
2007). 
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undermined the role that PURC could have, and should have, played in bringing credibility to 
the power sector. 
The split in responsibilities between PURC and the Energy Commission presents a number of 
potential contradictions and difficulties in procuring new power. The one agency is 
responsible for licensing new generation plant (and hence market entry) while the other is 
responsible for approving tariffs, including approval of pass-through provisions from the PPA 
through to captive customers. In this situation, there is the risk of one agency approving the 
entry of an IPP and the other effectively torpedoing the investment by not approving the tariff. 
This experience would indicate that a single, integrated regulatory function is preferable. 
In Cote d'lvoire, as in the case of Ghana, the regulator, ANARE, only became effective after 
the agreements for the two IPPs had already been finalised. Unlike PURC, however, ANARE 
has no tariff setting powers and its function is merely to monitor the various activities of 
operators in the power sector and to mediate between consumers and operators, as it protects 
the interests of consumers. It also plays an advisory role to the Ministry of Energy. Although 
ANARE would like to see its mandate expanded to include tariff setting, there is currently no 
plan by the Ministry of Energy to do so (ANARE pers.com. 2007). ANARE's sister 
institutions, SOGEPE and SOPIE provide oversight of, amongst other, the finances and the 
technical performance of the sector. SOGEPE was established precisely for the purpose of 
managing the sector's finances and ensuring financial control in the sector. SOGEPE's crisp 
mandate of ensuring the financial sustainability of the sector within a broader 'regulatory' 
framework contributed to an increased focus on tariffs. Given the fact that financial 
equilibrium of the sector was the most important feature of the reforms in 1994, and again in 
1998, this oversight function has helped the sector to give attention to a key aspect that had 
been neglected before 1990. Since the inceptions of reforms, revenues have at least covered 
the cost of production. As there are only private operators in the sector, which are mainly 
regulated by contracts, the role of the state has been reduced to oversight and planning more 
than in any of the other countries included in this thesis. Thus the nature of the "hybrid" 
power market is very different in Cote d'lvoire. While the national utility's assets remain 
public and the overall governance of the utility is controlled by state institutions, day-to-day 
management and operations are in private hands. Thus the country has few of the 
contradictions which potentially arise in other hybrid market where the state-owned and 
managed national utility often plays a contradictory role. It may be argued that Cote 
d'lvoire's arrangement has contributed to improved governance and regulation in the power 
sector, since the government is less inclined to be drawn into operational issues and can focus 
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on its governance and oversight mandate.242 In addition, the priority payment order which 
allows private operators first right to revenues collected from consumers, and the fact that 
there are only private operators in the power sector, makes it harder for the state to sustain a 
tariff schedule that does not cover the cost of power production.w 
The presence of three state agencies in Cote d'lvoire does not create the same contradictions 
as in the case of Ghana since their roles are more distinct. ANARE acts as an arbitrator and 
mediator between actors in the sector, SOGEPE manages the sector finances and provides 
input into the tariff setting process, and SOPIE does long-term strategic planning (including 
generation procurement) in the power sector. The Ministry of Mines and Energy still has 
overall responsibility for the power sector. It sets tariffs and approves plans for investment 
and hence the three state agencies do not perform their functions in isolation, but work 
coherently toward the achievement of common shared objectives in the power sector under its 
tutelage. The three entities in Cote d'lvoire perform their respective functions under a 
different legal framework (where financial equilibrium is mandated as the most important 
sector priority). Unlike PURC and the Energy Commission in Ghana, where tariff setting and 
licensing is done by these two 'independent' institutions, licensing and tariff setting remain 
the prerogative of the state in Cote d'lvoire, with the three institutions feeding into and 
coordinating these processes. 244 In addition to Cote d'lvoire's institutional and regulatory 
framework, therefore, the success with respect to power sector development, in part, 
continues to rely on the commitment and resolve of the state. 
In Morocco, the absence of a regulator during the reform process does not appear to have 
impacted negatively on investment during the first decade since power sector started, i.e. from 
1994 to 2004. However, the development of generation infrastructure appears to have been 
2~2 Having the state removed from day-to-day power sector operations helps to avoid conflicts of 
interest between it and potential private operators in the sector when [PPs want to enter the generation 
sector and state operators find ways to keep them out. As an example, the Ashanti/KMR plant 
described in section 3.2.2 did not materialise due to the VRA not allowing the sponsors to sell excess 
capacity on to VRA customers. The negotiations also failed because VRA wanted to charge a wheeling 
fee for the power that would make the project uneconomic for the sponsors. 
2~' This is in contrast to other power sectors where SOEs are dominant as operators in the sector and 
may, therefore. be neglected when political considerations by governments to keep tariffs low takes 
precedence over economy and sector sustainability. 
244 For example. licences are issued by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. not SOP[E. [n the same way, 
tariffs are set by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, not by ANARE or SOGEPE. 
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inadequate for the period commencing in 2005, as tariffs have not kept up with the cost of 
production, thereby creating financial troubles for the national utility, ONE. While the utility 
has done well to grant electricity access to almost all of its rural population, in so doing, it has 
allowed the demand for power to increase significantly due to the new connections and, in 
part, low tariffs. The pace at which generators were added did not keep up with the increasing 
demand. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the how the absence of an institutional regulator 
impacted on outcomes or on how the presence of a regulator would have influenced the final 
result. However, it is suggested that, with greater oversight and effective governance systems 
and institutions, many of these problems may have been avoided or the impact thereof may 
have been reduced. 
In some industrialised and developing countries, it has been found that if SOEs report to both 
the sector ministry and the Ministry of Finance, there is increased oversight of the SOE's 
finances as social and financial objectives are clearly separated and managed. In both Cote 
d'ivoire and Tunisia, the Ministry of Finance provides input to the setting of tariffs with the 
mandate of ensuring financial equilibrium in the sector. In the case of Morocco, however, the 
participation of the Ministry of Finance in the power sector through tariff setting does not 
appear to have yielded similar results, suggesting that social and political considerations 
played a larger role in this sphere than financial equilibrium and economic considerations. 
Tunisia, on the other hand, has seen consistent tariff increases reflecting the increasing cost of 
fuel and power production over the last three years (until 2008). Despite not having an 
independent electricity regulator the government, as the de facto regulator, has demonstrated 
commitment to supporting the financial health of the power sector. These tariff adjustments, 
however, have not come without counter pledges from the utility. STEG has improved its 
worker productivity and technical efficiency, thereby making it possible for it to meet the 
state half way with respect to the financial sustainability of the sector. It appears that there 
was no resistance from STEG to incoming IPPs, as was evidenced in Ghana. Tunisia stands 
out among African countries as one that has seen few problems in the development of its 
IPPs, with almost seamless coordination between IPP sponsors, STEG and the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy. Strong commitment from stakeholders has contributed to successful 
reforms in this North African country that saw little resistance to reforms from public 
stakeholders. Belev (2000:1-14) has conducted an in-depth examination of political control of 
privatisation and economic opening in Tunisia. He posits that the success of privatisation and 
liberalisation in Tunisia, in general, is as a result of illiberal means of enacting economic 
reforms and the greater political control of the central government. He argues that the greater 
the political control of the central government, the smaller the scope for the involvement of 
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actors (such as bureaucracy, public sector managers, private sector investors, labour or other 
agents) to participate in the liberalisation programme. This reduces the likelihood that such 
agents will be in a position to derail the programme if their goals and interests diverge from 
those of the central government. He concludes by advocating that liberalisation programmes 
have a higher likelihood of success if political interference in the economy (which is served 
by the various aspects of sector reform) is reduced or eliminated, since it lessens the burden 
on the government to follow through with reforms. Tunisia is noted for its intolerance towards 
objectors of the government and its policies. While the country has done well to achieve a 
well-functioning power sector through the enactment of reforms that are perceived as 
progressive, it may well be that success achieved in the country's power sector liberalisation 
and reform policies are, to some degree, as a result of its disallowing broader engagement of 
stakeholders in the sector. 245 
To summarise, regulatory risk, as first introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.2), does not 
appear to have impacted adversely on projects that were successfully commissioned and 
examined in detail in this thesis. This is because the IPPs are regulated by their contracts and 
the contracts were agreed on before regulators came into being in the cases of Ghana and Cote 
d'lvoire in West Africa, and because there have not been any regulators instituted in Morocco 
and Tunisia in North Africa. While there is an 'independent' regulator in Ghana, its autonomy 
and impartiality has been undermined by its financial dependence on the state which has 
meddled in tariff structures and adjustments on a few occasions. In Cote d'lvoire. despite the 
regulator'S limited powers, other oversight institutions in the sector as well as a credible sense 
of balancing finances has helped to sustain positive outcomes.246 In Morocco, the absence of 
an independent regulator does not appear to have adversely affected the country's ability to 
attract investment in generation in the early years of reform. More recently, however, with 
ONE having made losses for four consecutive years since 2004 and tariffs not having been 
increased to reflect the increased cost of production, it appears that sound fiscal governance 
has been lacking. In contrast, Tunisia has shown a stronger commitment to the financial 
credibility of the sector, understanding its implications for further investment in the sector. 
c45 Of the country's president, the Committee to Protect Journalists described him as a "dictator who 
has monopolized power for no less than 21 years. He runs Tunisia as a police state, where the country's 
large, Soviet-style press does little more than laud the despot and his tight-fisted regime" (Tunisia 
Watch 2008). 
c46 Since the coup d'etat in December 1999, however, it has been difficult to collect enough revenue to 
cover the cost of capital projects due to payments from the rebel-controlled areas in the north of the 
country having ceased. 
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In all, the data suggest that while having independent and transparent regulatory institutions is 
important for the sustainable functioning of the power sector, commitment to regulatory and 
governance functions, regardless of whether these are separate regulators or embedded in the 
state, is more important to the sustainable functioning of this sector and the attraction of 
adequate investment in generation infrastructure. The case of Tunisia, which has probably 
been the most successful of all African countries in its IPP programme, would seem to 
indicate that a crucial contributing factor is strong, purposeful political leadership and 
integrated governance, where the national utility is not only aligned to government policy but 
becomes and effective instrument in government realising that policy - for example in 
planning, procurement and contracting of IPPs. 
7.4 Revisiting the Analytical Framework 
To recap, the standard model of power sector reform was intended to introduce unbundling, 
privatisation and competition into the ESI, including the generation sector. Such competition 
was intended to drive down the price of power, which, in many state-owned utilities, was high 
due to a number of operational and financial inefficiencies. It was believed that corporate 
governance and investor oversight, as is prevalent in private generators, would encourage 
competence and efficiency, and that greater discipline would be applied to tinancial 
management. In addition, it was expected that the stronger profit motive in private investment 
would encourage more efficient investment in generation including in technology choices and 
timing of decisions. In all, private investment was expected to introduce a more efficient 
approach to generation planning and contracting, one based on sound market-based economic 
principles. State-owned generators, most of which were considered to be inefficient and 
lacking the financial resources for capacity expansions, would be unbundled, corporatised and 
compete against each other in this market. These developments would address the historically 
poor technical and fiscal performances that persisted in many African and other developing 
countries. The introduction of private capital through IPPs was seen as a convenient first step 
towards this market and could provide almost immediate relief to power systems that were 
short of capacity, since they could be introduced before actual market trading platforms were 
in place. The general notion that was widely held was that the private sector could procure 
and develop, maintain and operate generation assets more efficiently than the public sector. 
Private sector-led investment and operation, therefore, was expected to roll back the 
consequences of decades of inefficient state-led development and operation. 
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Although many developing countries in Africa and the rest of the developing world were 
sceptical about the appropriateness of the reforms in countries where the starting conditions 
were different to those in countries where reforms had been successfully implemented, with 
few alternatives available, many countries reluctantly proceeded in enacting reforms. 247 While 
a few cautionary voices warned against the transferability of reforms and how their success 
was strongly linked to the contexts in which power systems found themselves, the reform 
message spread as it was advocated by development finance institutions, international policy 
consultants, and, in some cases, domestic champions. Legislation was enacted to make 
provision for the reforms, state-owned utilities were corporatised, electricity regulators were 
established, and institutions were revamped to allow closer alignment in order to deal with the 
drivers and achieve the objectives of reform. 
7.4.1 Power Sector Reform and the Private Sector 
In each of the countries included in this thesis power sector reforms were undertaken with the 
possibility of achieving the end state of the standard model, as was done by the early 
reformers, as first described in Chapter 2. While some have made profound changes to their 
power sectors transforming these in many respects, no country has achieved the end state of 
the standard model. Indeed, nowhere in Africa is a fully unbundled, private or competitive 
electricity market to be found. Power sector reform in Africa and in many other developing 
countries has resulted in what this thesis defines as a hybrid model in generation where state-
owned utilities and IPPs operate side by side with virtually no competition between 
generators, in contrast to what was espoused by the standard model of reform. As exemplified 
in the case studies in this report, the introduction of power sector reforms has brought in its 
own challenges to achieving an end state where power markets, private investment, price 
signals, and other mechanisms would facilitate investment in generation infrastructure and 
help deal with the problems of insufficient electricity. It is interesting to note that, globally, no 
country that had reached the end state of competitive markets has reversed its decision (Hunt 
2002), which suggests that the functioning of the market itself, bar its imperfections, operates 
reasonably well and is sustainable. This is not to say that if, and when, developing countries 
247 Many of the early reformers had capacity excesses, differing substantially from many countries in 
Africa, which had very different drivers for reform as well as little experience with private participation 
in public infrastructure. The most pressing driver at the time of reform in African countries has often 
been to fill the gaps with urgently procured power rather than providing benchmarks for state-owned 
plants and enabling long-term sector efficiency. 
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achieve the end state of competitive power markets it will be relatively easy to sustain power 
sector developments. The problem for many countries, however, has been how to get there; 
the journey towards competitive power markets appears to have encountered a number of 
obstacles that have prevented developing countries from reaching the end state. Hybrid 
generation markets consisting of state-owned utilities and IPPs are expected to be around at 
least for the foreseeable future. Many countries have jettisoned the drive to move towards the 
standard model, and those that have not, are finding out how difficult it is to progress towards 
it. 
In the case of Ghana, competition in generation (and distribution) has not been realised as 
intended by the PSRC. Even in Cote d'lvoire that has hardly any state-involvement in the 
day-to-day operation of the utility, progress to the standard model has not been achieved. In 
Morocco, too, the implementation of a dual market proposed as a transition toward a 
competitive market, has seen delays. Tunisia has reverted to mostly public-funded plants 
operated by the national utility, STEG, after having developed only one large-scale IPP and 
finding itself in a different environment where the drivers for reform initiatives have 
relaxed?48 
Given that, in all probability, competitive generation power markets will not be realised as 
intended, at least in the foreseeable future, a key question to be addressed is: How should 
power sectors reorient reform initiatives in order to achieve the benefits of initial reform 
objectives? Moreover, if the de facto situation is a hybrid market, how can they be made to 
work so that the original objectives of increased investment and more efficient operation are 
obtained? 
The analysis of data collected for this project suggests that power sector improvements should 
focus on improving the conditions for continued and timely generation investments in the 
hybrid market. In many countries, since the ushering in of IPPs, national utilities are no longer 
suppliers of last resort and pre-reform planning and procurement frameworks residing with 
SOE utilities have been dismantled to make provision for new ones. In the absence of price 
signals for generation (as would be found under the standard model of reform), planning 
needs to be more carefully co-ordinated amongst institutions in the sector. It needs to 
encompass a wide range of functions (engineering, financial, legal, environmental) to 
adequately assess planning and project risks. Planning should be dynamic and reflect latest 
248 The country's debt levels have declined since reforms were first instituted. 
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market prices. In addition, planning should be flexible enough to accommodate setbacks in 
project development. This planning function should be well resourced and equipped to deal 
with the intricacies and challenges of private sector investment as described in this thesis. 
Serious consideration should be given to individual contexts and conditions in the power 
sector. Special attention should also be paid to the commitment of governments to the 
institutions that will enable power sectors to realise these improvements as discussed earlier 
in this chapter. 
Procurement and contracting should preferably be conducted by an institution that is 
independent of SOE generators - possibly an unbundled transmission company or system 
operator. The impartiality that this arrangement would provide would assist in minimising 
conflicts of interests between SOEs generators and potential lPPs. Clear and efficient bid and 
procurement rules should be developed for the acquisition of new capacity, and satisfactory 
oversight and enforcement over the procurement process is needed to ensure transparency and 
fairness. 
Many of the above points might seem obvious. Yet, what this thesis has shown is that they are 
often neglected. Hybrid power markets give rise to new challenges. Many functions 
previously undertaken within vertically-integrated, state-owned national utilities now fall 
between the cracks. The over-riding insight from these case studies is that hybrid markets 
require explicit and purposeful policy actions to deal with the challenges of integrated 
planning, allocation of new-build opportunities, linkages to investment. internationally 
competitive bidding and robust contracting of lPPs; and clear institutional responsibility 
needs to be assigned for these functions. 
7.4.2 State-Owned Enterprises 
Mostly the above analysis has focused on the interactions between state-owned utilities and 
lPPs in hybrid markets and the planning, procurement and contracting challenges that have to 
be addressed. But the specific nature and functioning of the dominant players in these hybrid 
markets. namely the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) also needs to be examined. The 
development role of SOEs in economic sectors of developing countries is arguably more 
important than the role they play in the economies of their industrialised counterparts. Given 
the influence that governments have over their existence, SOEs are useful vehicles to assist 
developing countries address social and economic predicaments and backlogs. The fact that 
SOEs of all sorts have remained prominent, even in many industrialised nations (especially in 
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strategic infrastructure sectors), is indicative of the benefits that state ownership can have as 
governments influence the role of public enterprises in the various economic sectors. The 
problem occurs when the development role that the SOE plays comes at the expense of its 
operational and financial performance and threatens its own survival and sustainability. It is 
for this reason that various governance mechanisms were advocated during the first round of 
reforms, introduced in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.3.2). In many cases, electricity utility SOEs, 
due to their public service nature, have continued to be organs of social and political 
patronage. 
In the case of Ghana, political control over the functions of institutions (regulator and utility) 
was evident when the government weakened the authority of the regulator, PURC, whose 
mandate it was to improve tariff structures and increase revenues for the ailing state-owned 
utilities. Despite the creation of an independent institution to administer tariff setting in a 
depoliticised environment, the temptation to interfere was too great for the government. This 
led to dissatisfaction on the part of the regulator and, in an outcry of frustration, the chairman 
tendered his resignation. For many years low tariffs have contributed to insufficient revenues 
for the national utility playing a part in its poor financial state. Technically bankrupt utilities 
find it hard to raise debt for, and attract investment in, infrastructure without state 
involvement and commitment through the issuance of securities. This has been a prime reason 
for the lack of adequate investment in generation in Ghana. With little support for the VRA in 
terms of tariff increases or securities provided by the government, the attractiveness of the 
SOE as off-taker was lacklustre.249 
Apart from the political inclination towards shielding consumers from the rising costs of 
power and, in so doing, maintaining favour with the voting masses, it is widely alleged that 
the appointment of the former CEO at the national utility, the VRA, was politically inspired, 
rather than based on his technical and management competence in power utility operations 
(Ghana News 2002-2008). His relationship with the political elite afforded him considerable 
leeway in the management of the company, and he was eventually asked to resign after long 
disputes (resulting in industrial action in a campaign for his removal from office) with VRA 
249 Weary of the difficulties that the VRA had in making timely payments for the power generated, 
TICO requested securities from the state for the development of the steam phase of Takoradi II during 
negotiations. Providing securities such as state guarantees was something that the government did not 
want to do. The sole security, therefore, would be the PPA, which terms the VRA was already having 
difficulty in meeting due to the fact that the utility itself was not financially self-sufficient but depended 
on the state for subsidies. 
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staff over his management style. The former CEO of the Ghana National Petroleum 
Company, the SOE responsible for the development of the Western Power IPP, was also 
described as 'the right hand man' of the former president and enjoyed considerable discretion 
in the management of the company, with weak operational oversight, governance and 
accountability (KNUST pers. com. 2007).250 Political appointees coupled with inadequate 
governance mechanisms to oversee and steer performance improvements in SOEs have 
contributed to insufficient focus on the operational and financial pillars that uphold and 
sustain an efficient ES I. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, the state-owned utility also displayed poor financial and operational 
performance in the 1980s. However, the granting of a private concession and the two 
institutional reform reorganisations established in 1990 and in 1998. have contributed to 
improved oversight in the power sector, leading to enhanced performances. 
The Government of Morocco encouraged tariff decreases between 1997 and 2004, but by 
2005. electricity costs had risen faster than had been predicted mainly due to increases in fuel 
costs. charges from IPPs and electricity imports. Social and political considerations also 
played a significant role in the government's push for universal access and low tariffs, while 
adequate governance arrangements to ensure financial stability in the sector and to minimise 
generation project risks to sustain adequate generation capacity has been lacking. 
A different picture has emerged in Tunisia where governance arrangements have worked 
towards the achievement of the objectives of the state-owned utility. with STEG having been 
able to make significant improvements in the expansion of its electricity and gas networks, 
building additional power plants, and increasing its efficiency. The state has also 
demonstrated its support to the SOE by allowing tariff increases reflective of the cost of 
electricity production and, in so doing, displayed its defence of the financial and technical 
well-being of the utility. 
Comparing the data from the four cases in this thesis, it is clear that government action 
demonstrating its commitment to public enterprises through allowing tariff increases, 
providing adequate governance arrangements, and enforcing accountability of SOEs, plays a 
c50 The weakened fiscal and operational state of other SOEs in the Ghanaian economy indicates that 
there was. in general, insufficient support given to SOEs to improve their performances and that 
adequate governance mechanisms to improve performances were lacking. 
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significant role in the ability of state-owned utilities to show positive performances. Positive 
performances enable public enterprises to act as credible power off-takers to IPPs or to self-
invest in generation infrastructure and through raising debt in domestic and foreign bond 
markets. 
In summary, SOEs can, and in many cases, should, be used as instruments of social 
advancement in developing countries; however, when political interests and considerations 
adversely impact on the SOE's ability to deliver services then the role of SOEs becomes 
problematic. In addition, when a government expects an SOE to operate in a manner that puts 
the utility's own well-being at risk, the relationship between the SOE and the state becomes 
problematic. It is the ability to strike a balance between development interests and SOE (and 
sector) sustainability, as well as make tough decisions when tempted to sway too much 
towards political interest that will determine the success of SOEs in advancing social and 
economic progress for African and other developing countries. 
This analysis of the new challenges that arise in hybrid power markets has also highlighted 
the important role that the national utility continues to play and that in many cases it continues 
to make sense to allocate core responsibilities to the utility for national planning and the 
procurement and contracting of IPPs. In many cases, governments do not have this expertise, 
and powerful national utilities can assist or take responsibility for these functions. This means 
that the imperative of SOE reform and ensuring well-performing national utilities remains as 
important has ever. Tunisia is a good example of how the national utility has been an effective 
instrument in enabling the creation and operation of an effective hybrid power market that has 
responded to power requirements and delivered new investment. Tunisia may be a special 
case because of its political and cultural history. Nevertheless, the de facto situation in most 
developing countries is that SOEs remain important. In situations where these institutions are 
not as closely aligned to state reform objectives as Tunisia, or where they are ambivalent 
about the introduction of IPPs and a hybrid market, then more careful thought needs to be 
given to institutional reform, such as ring-fencing or separation of the system operator 
function which could become the home of the integrated planning, procurement and 
contracting function so necessary for the effective functioning of hybrid power markets. In 
assigning and designing these functions, effective governance will remain an imperative. 
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7.4.3 Crafting a New Reform Framework 
Hybrid power markets are thus the defacto result of power sector reform in Africa and many 
other developing regions. This has profound implications not only for the way we think about 
power sector reform but also where further reform efforts are directed. It would now seem 
inappropriate. even futile, to retain the standard reform model or to measure power sector 
reform progress in terms of how many of the elements of the standard model have been 
obtained. The standard model is no longer the normative option or end goal. Much more 
productive is to recognise the reality of what power sectors actually look like in Africa and 
elsewhere and to respond to the specific challenges that emerge from these hybrid markets. 
What the previous section has emphasised is that we have to recognise that state owned 
enterprises are probably here to stay and thus SOE reform remains an imperative, even more 
so now that effective SOEs are crucial to the successful operation of hybrid markets, not only 
in the areas highlighted above (planning, procurement and conracting) but also in being 
credible off-takers for IPPs. 
For SOEs to perform well, there needs to be credible commitment from government to 
support their sustainability, and regulatory institutions and their functions need to be 
supported. In turn. there has to be accountability to the government by SOE managers and 
adequate governance mechanisms in place to provide oversight of their operations. In this 
way. SOEs can be steered towards practices associated with their development role without 
eroding their financial and technical integrity. The capability to attract IPPs, on the other 
hand. is dependent on a credible off-taker of power whose sustainability is supported by the 
government through the mechanisms mentioned above. Since the economic basis of any IPP 
is dependent on its ability to earn revenues from power off-takers (which are generally SOEs), 
the policy. regulatory and institutional frameworks need to be supportive of both IPPs and 
SOEs. 
While the private sector is certainly needed to assist in plugging shortages in generation 
capacity. developments within the power sector should be aimed also at state-owned utilities 
being financially self-sufficient, with efficient operations and good technical performances. 
For SOEs to improve and achieve this level of quasi self-dependence and sustainability, each 
country will need to examine its policy, regulatory and governance frameworks and identify 
gaps and weaknesses. The interventions required to overhaul the power sector and create 
sustainability may involve broader macro-economic policy changes, which, in many cases, 
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are having adverse effects in economic sectors other than the power sector. It is 
acknowledged that the political costs of such interventions may be high for certain 
governments. Without these changes, however, neither SOE reforms nor private sector 
participation is likely to be successful in improving performance since both require strong 
commitment from ruling governments to bring about transformation in earnest. 251 
Given the propensity for delays in generation projects in African countries, linkages between 
planning and implementation would require tightening, with governance frameworks 
providing oversight in these phases. Institutions responsible for planning should be adequately 
resourced for project evaluation to assess potential risks in project development, and 
management strategies should be directed at minimising delays in developing generation 
infrastructure projects. 
Guiding principles should be in line with the possible, and likely, generation technologies that 
countries may opt for, their potential obstacles during implementation, and the financial 
aspects that may impede the development of the projects. Given, that there are many specific 
project-related and country-related factors that have the potential to stall project development 
and even to cancel projects, strategies to manage project risk would require some degree of 
customisation for each project in each country. Policy and planning frameworks, therefore, 
need to take cognisance of a range of issues - financial, environmental, social and labour - as 
they are formulated and implemented. In addition, as the generation mixes of many countries 
are being guided by a few new fossil fuel discoveries, the future availability of these fuels 
globally, geo-political tensions, increasing environmental pressures, and the availability of 
new technologies252 would all be important considerations. 253 Where feasible, regional power 
251 The inference drawn is similar to that of Shirley (1999) who analysed the political economy of state 
enterprise reform and concluded that because privatisation has similar political costs as corporatisation 
(instituted in the first round of reforms from the 1960s to the 1980s), the two (privatisation and 
corporatisation) tend to succeed or fail together. She argued that where reform was politically feasible, 
desirable and credible, countries corporatised and privati sed successfully, whereas where countries 
were not politically ready to reform, substitute ownership strategies were not successful in improving 
performance. Shirley's comprehensive view of reforms is relevant here since earnest reforms are likely 
to reduce subsidies to customers, affect changes in management, and allow independent tariff reviews 
and adjustments, regardless of the impact on government ownership (1999: 128-129). 
252 A range of technology options allows for improved flexibility and each option comes with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. A combined cycle gas plant, for example, is more energy efficient than 
contemporary generation technologies, has a lower unit capital cost, can be operated in either base-load 
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pools. alternative energies and a host of other IRP options should continue to be promoted 
since they give flexibility to the planning process and allow for more options to deal with the 
problem of insufficient generation capacity. 
7.5 Contribution and Limitations of this Thesis 
This thesis makes a contribution by recognising the hybrid power market as a new model in 
itself. and not simply a transition to the end state envisaged in the standard reform model. By 
investigating SOEs and IPPs. the thesis has revealed critical elements essential to a successful 
symbiosis of state-owned and privately owned generators to facilitate the attraction of new 
investment in generation and assist in alleviating the problem of insufficient generation 
capacity. By identifying disconnects in the nexus between planning and implementation of 
generation power projects, the thesis elucidates the factors that contribute to delays and 
failures of electricity generation plants and how governments and power utilities can better 
respond to the challenges faced. The literature. which draws on various areas of power sector 
and SOE reform, project management, planning, procurement and contracting, synthesises 
these areas to provide a framework for African power sector development. Lastly, the thesis 
recognises the need for new planning, procurement and contracting frameworks and 
highlights critical areas where improvements could be made to facilitate timely investment 
and commissioning of generation. 
Like all case study research projects. this thesis is subject to a number of limitations. 
Although the research design had the benefit of increasing the explanatory power from the 
analytical generalisations of the empirical cases, it did entail a trade-off between the depth of 
the information required by each of the cases and the number of cases chosen for 
investigation. Although much of the information required for this thesis has been disclosed to 
the author. the proprietorship on some of the information on generation projects has meant 
or peaking modes. and is generally easier to site than coal and hydro plants. Coal is generally a lower 
priced fuel but its use triggers concerns about air and water quality when expensive treatments are not 
factored in to meet increasingly stringent emissions standards. Wind and solar have virtually no fuel 
costs but, apart from the relatively high capital costs, can be unsightly or impact negatively on animal 
life in ecologically sensitive areas. While nuclear plants do not emit greenhouse gases, there are 
unresolved questions around high capital costs and the long-term disposal of high-level waste. 
251 Ghana. Morocco and Tunisia have indicated strategic intents to develop nuclear power for 
commercial power production over the next two decades. 
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that it has not been in the public domain. 254 The availability of this information, especially 
which related to projects that were not developed fully or were cancelled, would have allowed 
a deeper analysis of the problems related to planning and contracting of generation capacity. 
Given the limitation experienced here, it may be beneficial if, in future, an analysis of such 
projects could be undertaken to further elucidate the issues relating to generation capacity 
shortages. 
254 Much of the information in IPP transactions such as the PPA, EPe, O&M and other agreements 
between stakeholders in the power sector are confidential documents and as a result have not been 
available to the author. 
240 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ADB (2004). Guarantee Products and Risk Sharing Partnerships - Directions for the Future. 
ADB Annual Meeting. Jeju Island. Republic of Korea. Asian Development Bank. 
Adda. J. (2007). Speech to Ghana Parliament by the Minister of Mines and Energy. Accra, 
Ghana. 
AEI (2002). ONE Fails in SOMELEC Grab. Africa Energy Intelligence. 
AIDB (2007). Tema Osonor Thermal Power Project: Executive Summary of Environmental 
and Social Impacts Assessment, African Development Bank. 
AIDB/OECD (2004). African Economic Outlook: Cote d'Ivoire - 2005, African Development 
Bank and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
AIDB/OECD (2006). African Economic Outlook: Cote d'lvoire - 2006, African Development 
Bank and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Africa Electra (2007). Morocco: ONE Courts Interest in Cap Ghir IPP. Africa Electra. 
African Energy (1999). New Wind, Hydro and Gas Fired Power for Morocco. Volume 1. 
African Energy (2004b). As PSEG Pulls Out of Tunisia's Model IPP, Ambitious Gulf-based 
BTU Moves In. African Energy. 
African Energy (2007). IPPs in the Works to Tackle Ghana's Power Crisis. African Energy: 
Oil, Gas. Power, Policy and Finance. 
Agence de Presse Algerienne (2007). Grave Crise d'Energie Electrique dans les Deux 
Prochaines Annees au Maroc, E-marrakech. 
Agence Tunis Afrique Presse (2008). La Tunisie Envisage l'Augmentation de sa Production 
d'Electricite. Tunis. 
241 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
ap
e T
ow
n
Aharoni, Y. (1981). "Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises: A Process 
Perspective." Management Science 27(11): 1340-1347. 
Ahoussou, J. (2005). Les Verites qu'on veut Cacher aux Ivoiriens. Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, 
L'inter Quotidien Ivorien d'Informations Nationales et Internationales. 
AKDN (2007). Aga Khan Development Network. 
Akinsanya, A. (1981). "Host Governments' Responses to Foreign Economic Control: The 
Experiences of Selected African Countries." The International and Comparative Law 
Ouarterly 30(4): 769-790. 
Albouy, Y. and R. Bousba (1998). "The Impact of IPPs in Developing Countries-Out of the 
Crisis and into the Future." Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank. 
Alexander, I. and A. Estache (1999). Infrastructure Restructuring and Regulation: Building a 
Base for Sustainable Growth. Growth and Investment in South Africa, Cape Town, 
South Africa, The World Bank. 
Ali, A. J. and R. Wahabi (1995). "Managerial Value Systems in Morocco." Journal of 
International Studies of Management & Organization Volume 25. 
Allen and Overy (2007). La Contractualisation: Situation Actuelle du Secteur au Maroc. 
Contractual Relations between Operators in the Electricity Sector: Issues, 
International Experiences and Perspectives, Casablanca, Office National de 
l'Electricite, the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, and the World Bank. 
Amuku, W. (2002). French Giant Gears Up for Africa. Nation Media Group, Business Week. 
Amuna, W., B. Modey, et al. (2002). Harmonised Automatic Frequency Load Shedding: Cote 
d'Ivoire-Ghana-Togo-Benin Power Pool. Annual East African Power Industry 
Convention, ESI Africa. 
Amundsen, E. S., L. Bergman, et al. (2006). The Nordic Market: Robust by Design? 
Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective. F. P. Sioshansi and W. 
Pfaffenberger, Elsevier Publishing. 
242 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ANARE (2005a). Presentation on Power Sector Refonn in Africa. Cape Town, South Africa, 
Autorite Nationale de Regulation d'Electricite. 
ANARE (2005b). Institutional Framework for the Ivorian Power Sector. Abidjan, Cote 
d'lvoire. L 'Autorite Nationale de Regulation du secteur de l'Electricite de Cote 
d'lvoire. 
ANARE pers.com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from Autorite Nationale de Regulation 
du Secteur de l'Electricite. Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. 
Anastassopoulos. J.-P. (1985). "State-Owned Enterprises between Autonomy and 
Dependency." Journal of Public Policy 5(4): 521-539. 
Anderson. D. (1972). "Models for Determining Least-Cost Investments in Electricity Supply." 
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3( I): 267-299. 
Andrews. C. J. (1995). "Evaluating Risk Management Strategies 111 Resource Planning." 
Power Systems 10( I): 420 - 426. 
Appiah-Kubi, K. (2001). "State-Owned Enterprises and Privatisation in Ghana." The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 39(2): 197-229. 
Arizu, B .. D. Gencer. et a1. (2006). "Centralized Purchasing Arrangements: International 
Practices and Lessons Learned on Variations to the Single Buyer Mode1." Energy and 
Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper, The World Bank Group(16). 
Asante, F. A. (2006). Ghana's Electricity Industry. ESI Africa. Institute of Statistical, Social 
& Economic Research and Ezekiel Attuquaye Clottey. Resource Centre for Energy 
Economics and Regulation, University of Ghana,. 
Auer, P. L. (1974). "An Integrated National Energy Research and Development Program." 
Energy Issue 184(4134): 295-301. 
Auffret, P. (2003). Catastrophe Insurance Market in the Caribbean Region: Market Failures 
and Recommendations for Public Sector Interventions. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2963. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
243 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
-----------~~~~.~------"., 
Awerbuch, S. (2006). "Portfolio-Based Electricity Generation Planning: Policy Implications 
For Renewables And Energy Security." Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change 11(3): 693-710. 
Awuni, A. (2007). TAQA is welcome but.. .. Accra, Joy Online: Inteview with Presidential 
Spokesperson on Joy FM. 
Ayoub-Geday, P. (2006). State Owned Enterprises. Cairo, American University in Cairo. 
Ayub, M. A. and S. O. Hegstad (1987). "Management of Public Industrial Enterprises." The 
World Bank Research Observer 2( I): 79-101. 
Azito (2004). Azito Energie Project Information. Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. 
Azito pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from Azito Energie. Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. 
Bacon (1995). "Lessons from Power Sector Reform in England and Wales." Public Policy for 
the Private Sector, The World Bank Note No.6l. 
Bacon, R. W. and J. Besant-Jones (2002). "Global Electric Power Reform, Privatization and 
Liberalization of the Electric Power Industry in Developing Countries." The Energy 
and Mining Sector Board, The World Bank Group. 
Badawi, M. (2001). Electricity Landscape and Market Globalisation: Options and Challenges 
for the Arab World. 18th Congress of the World Energy Council, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, Kuwait. 
Bajari, P., R. McMillan, et al. (2003). Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An 
Empirical Analysis. Stanford, California, National Science Foundation and the 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. 
Balkan Energy (2008). Ghana West Africa Power Project, Balkan Energy Company. 
Banerjee, S., A. B. Diallo, et al. (2007). "Measuring Trends in Access to Modern 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Results from Demographic and Health 
Surveys." Poverty Data, Measurement and Policy - Special Expanded Edition: The 
World Bank. 
244 
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Barbut. M. (2006). Morocco: Solar Based Thermal Power Plant. Washington D.C., Global 
Environmental Facility! The World Bank. 
Barry. M. and M. Roets (2004). Electricity Markets and Power Pools. Electricity Market 
Seminar, Eskom Conference Centre, Midrand. South Africa. 
Bayliss. K. (200 I). Water Privatisation in Africa: Lessons from Three Case Studies, Public 
Services International Research Unit, University of Greenwich. 
Bayliss. K. and D. Hall (2000). Privatisation of Water and Energy in Africa. London, United 
Kingdom, Public Services International Research Unit. 
Belev. B. (2000). Forcing Freedom: Political Control of Privatization and Economic Opening 
in Egypt and Tunisia. Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America. 
Belloumi. M. (2006). Energy Resources in Tunisia. French -Serbian European Summer 
University: Renewable Energy Sources and Environment-Multidisciplinary Aspect, 
Vrnjacka Banja. Serbia. 
Bencheqroun. A. (2005). Situation Energetique du Maroc: Des Defis et des Opportunites, 
Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
Benhima. D. (1999). "Les Reformes du Secteur Electrique: Le Ca du Maroc." Liaison 
Energie-Francophonie 44(3e Trimestre): 33-35. 
Berenson. A. (2002). Enron's Many Strands: The Energy Market; Power Giants Have Trouble 
Raising Cash for Plants. New York Times. 
Bergman, L. (2005). "Electricity Market Design and the Impact of Supply and Demand 
Shocks: Experiences from the Nord Pool System." International Energy Journal 6( 1). 
Berzard, A. (2005). Production et Distribution d'Electricite au Maroc. Fiche de Synthese. 
Cassablanca, Mission Economique - Ambassade de France au Maroc. 
Besant-Jones. J. E. (2004). "Lessons from Experience of Power Sector Reform." ADB-JBIC-
World Bank. 
245 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Besant-Jones, J. E. (2006). "Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have 
We Learnt?" Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper, The World Bank 
Group Paper No.19. 
Bettignies, J.-E. d. and T. W. Ross (2004). "The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships." 
Canadian Public Policy Journal 30(2): 135-154. 
BG Group Press Release (2004). Barca Power Project Update, British Gas. 
Blum, A. (2008). Chadbourne Represents Morocco State Utility in Revived IPP Tender for 
1,320 MW Coal-Fired Power Project with Cost Estimated at Over $2 Billion, 
Chadbourne and Parke. 
Blunt, M. E. (1970). "State Enterprise in Nigeria and Ghana: The End of an Era?" African 
Affairs 69(274): 27-43. 
Bos, D. and C. Lulfesmann (1996). "The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting." The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98( 1): 53-74. 
Bosec, R., G. Breton, et al. (2002). "The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises Revisited." 
Financial Accountability and Management 18: 383-407. 
Boushaba, A. (2007). Electricite: Crise sur Ie Pays. Electricite: Crise sur Ie Maroc. 
Boutaleb, M. (2005). Energy Policy in Morocco: Some Perspectives. Presentation by the 
Minister of Mines and Energy at the MBA Association of Morocco, Casablanca, 
Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
Bouyad, B. (200 I). Privatisation du Secteur de l'Electricite au Maroc: Evaluation a l'Aide de 
l'Approche du Vote Majoritaire. Colloque International du Reseau MaNDER, Paris, 
France, Universite Cadi Ayyad, Marrakech, Maroc et Universite Laval, Quebec, 
Canada. 
Brew-Hammond, A. (1997). Technological Accumulation and Electric Power Generation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa - The Case of Volta River Authority, Ghana. Science Policy 
Research Unit. University of Sussex, United Kingdom. 
246 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Canadian Dollar Equities (2006). Centurion Energy - A Backup Report. The Original Pencil 
Letter. JV Investment Advisors. 
Candax Energy (2006). Initiating Coverage: Large Potential Masked by Short-term Issues. 
Candax Energy MGI Report, Candax Energy. 
Candax Energy News Release (2006). Candax Provides Update on EI Bibane Redevelopment 
Project. Candax Energy. 
Cecelski. E .. A. Ounalli. et al. (2005). Rural Electrification in Tunisia: National Commitment, 
Efficient Implementation and Sound Finances. Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Programme. Washington D.C., Joint UNDP/World Bank ESMAP. 
CED pers. com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from Compagnie Eolienne du Detroit. 
Tangiers, Morocco. 
CEE (2002). Results of Electricity Sector Restructuring in Chile. New Era in Oil Gas and 
Power Value Creation. Center for Energy Economics, Bureau of Economic Geology, 
Jackson School of Geosciences, The University of Texas at Austin. 
CenPower pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from CenPower. Accra, Ghana. 
China Daily (2008). China-financed Power plant Project Launched in Ghana. Xinhua, 
People's Republic of China, BizChina Center. 
Christensen. P. F. (1998). "Performance and Divestment of State-owned Enterprises in 
Ghana." Public Administration and Development 18(3): 281-293. 
CIA World Factbook (2008). Tunisia: Economy, Central Intelligence Agency. 
CIE Annual Report (2005). Rapport Annuel 2005. Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. Compagnie 
Ivoirienne d'Electricite. 
CIE pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricite. 
Abidjan. Cote d'lvoire. 
247 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CIPREL (2006). Presentation Generale du Secteur Electrique en Cote d'lvoire: CIPREL -
Organisation et Fonctionnement. Abidjan, Compagnie Ivoirienne de Production 
d'Electricite. 
CIPREL pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Compagnie Ivoirienne de 
Production d'Electricite. Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. 
CMS pers.com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from CMS. Accra, Ghana. 
Cooper, M. C. (200 I). Implementing the "Modern Enterprise System" in Chinese SOEs: Case 
Studies from Shanghai. Harvard East Asia Society Graduate Student Conference, 
Harvard University, Yale University. 
Cosgrove-Davies, M. (2006). Energy Access in Sub-Saharan Africa - A World Bank Action 
Plan. Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (2001-2010), Geneva, 
Africa Energy Unit, The World Bank. 
Covindassamy, A. (2005). Power Projects Under Stress: What Happened and What Risks Call 
for Mitigating Measures. Washington D.C., World Bank Site Resources. 
CPC pers. com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from Carthage Power Company. Tunis. 
D'Sa, A. (2005). "Integrated Resource Planning (lRP) and Power Sector Reform in 
Developing Countries." Energy Policy 33( 1 0): 1271-1285. 
Dailami, M. and R. Hauswald (2001). Contract Risks and Credit Spread Determinants in the 
International Project Bond Market. Policy Research Working Paper Series, No.2712. 
Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
Dailami, M. and M. Klein (J 997). Government Support to Private Infrastructure Projects in 
Emerging Markets. Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure 
Projects: Averting a New-style Debt Crisis, Cartagena, Colombia. 
Dailami, M., I. Lipkovich, et al. (1999). INFRISK: A Computer Simulation Approach to Risk 
Management in Infrastructure Project Finance Transactions. Washington D.C., 
Regulatory Reform and Private Enterprise Division, Economic Development Institute 
of the World Bank. 
248 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Debbarh, A. M. (2006). l'Energie : Developpement Energetique au Maroc depuis 1955, 
Perspectives 2025. 50 Ans de Developpement Humain - Perspectives 2025. Morocco: 
63-90. 
Decker, S. (2008). "Building Up Goodwill: British Business, Development and Economic 
Nationalism in Ghana and Nigeria, 1945-1977." Enterprise and Society. 
De Oliveira, A. and J. Girod (1990). "Energy Diagnosis: Toward a Policy-Oriented Approach 
for Energy Planning in Developing Countries." World Development Journal 18(4): 
529-538. 
Diaw. I. M. (2004). Overview of the Power Sector Reform & PPA's in West Africa: PPA / 
Contracts Workshop and Regional Coordination for West Africa. Second Annual 
Global Regulatory Network Conference, Bamako,Mali, Economic Community Of 
West African States. 
Diaz, P. and J.-L. Perault (2002). Expertise et Prospective sur Ie Service Urbain de 
l'Electricite a Abidjan, Cote d'ivoire,. Seminaire Maitrise de l'Urbanisation et 
Developpement Durable, Rennes, France. 
Dickel, R. (2003). Experience of Power Generation Investment in Liberalised Markets: In the 
Middle of the Stream. Joint lEA / NEA Workshop on Power Generation Investment 
in Liberalised Electricity Markets, Paris, Energy Diversification Division, 
International Energy Agency. 
Dollar, D. (1990). "Economic Reform and Allocative Efficiency in China's State-Owned 
Industry." Economic Development and Cultural Change 39( I): 89-105. 
Dollar. D .. M. Hallward-Driemeier, et al. (2004). Investment Climate and International 
Integration. Policy Research Working Paper 3323. Washington D.C., The World 
Bank. 
Douglas. J. B. (2006). "Power Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Return to Basics." 
The Electricity Journal 19( I 0). 
249 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
Dyner, I., S. Arango, et al. (2006). Understanding the Argentinian and Columbian Electricity 
Markets. Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective. F. P. Sioshansi and 
W. Pfaffenberger, Elsevier Publishing. 
Eberhard, A. (1992). Integrated Energy Planning: A Methodology for Policy Analysis and 
Research. South African Energy Policy Research and Training Project, Paper No.2. 
Cape Town, Energy for Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Eberhard, A. (2003). Electricity Sector Reforms: Timing Sequencing, Pre-conditions and 
Advancing Public Benefits. The World Bank Group Evaluation Workshop on 
Electricity Sector Reforms and Private Participation: Experiences, Lessons and 
Outlook, Manila, Philippines. 
Eberhard, A. (2006). Infrastructure Regulation in Developing Countries. African Forum of 
Utilities Regulators, Third Annual Conference, Windhoek, Namibia. 
Eberhard, A. (2007). Matching Regulatory Design to Country Circumstances: The Potential 
of Hybrid and Transitional Models. Gridlines, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility, The World Bank. Note No. 23. 
Eberhard, A., V. Foster, et al. (2008). "Review of the State of the Power Sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa." Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, The World Bank. 
Eberhard, A. and K. Gratwick (2007). "From State to Market and back Again: Egypt's 
Experiment with Independent Power Projects." Journal of Energy 32(5): 724-738. 
Eberhard, A. and K. N. Gratwick (2007). Take 4: the Contribution and Evolution of 
Independent Power Projects in Kenya. Cape Town, Management Programme III 
Infrastructure Reform and Regulation, Graduate School of Business, University of 
Cape Town. 
Eberhard, A. and J. Kapika (2008). Plugging the Demand-Supply Gap: Challenges in 
Planning, Procurement and Contracting of New Power. Fifth RERA Annual 
Conference, Arusha, Tanzania, Management Programme in Infrastructure Reform 
and Regulation. 
250 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ECA (2003). Ghana Power Sector: Review of Reform Programme. Accra, Ghana, Economic 
Consulting Associates Limited. 
Edjekumhene. I.. M. B. Amadu. et al. (2002). Power Sector Reform in Ghana in the 1990s: 
The Untold Story of a Divided Country versus a Divided World Bank. Kumasi, 
Ghana. Kumasi Institute of Technology. Energy and Environment. 
Edjekumhene, I. and K. D. Navroz (2002). Ghana: Achieving Public Benefits by Default. 
Power Politics: Equity and Environment in Electricity Reform. Washington D.C., 
World Resources Institute. 
EET pers.com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from Energie Electrique de Tahaddart. 
Tangiers. Morocco. 
EFG pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Energy Foundation of Ghana. 
Accra. Ghana. 
Eggleston. F. W. (193 I). "State Enterprises and Their Organisation." Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 158: 228-235. 
EIA (2003). West African Gas Pipeline Project. Energy Information Administration, US 
Department of Energy. 
EIA (2004a). Arab Maghreb Union: Morocco. Country Analysis Briefs. Energy Information 
Administration. Washington D.C., United States Department of Energy. 2005. 
EIA (2004b). Arab Maghreb Union - Country Analysis Briefs, US Department of Energy: 
Energy Information Administration. 
EIA (2005). International Electricity Installed Capacity, Energy Information Administration. 
EIA (2008). Country Analysis Briefs: Cote d'lvoire, Energy Information Administration, 
United States Department of Energy. 
EIA (2008). Short-Term Energy Outlook. US Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration. 
251 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Energy Commission (2005). Energy Supply to the Economy, Strategic National Energy Plan 
2006 - 2020. Volume 2 - Part I. Accra Ghana, Ministry of Energy, Government of 
Ghana. 
Energy Commission pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Energy 
Commission. Accra, Ghana. 
Escay, J. R. (1990). "Summary Data Sheets of 1987 Power and Commercial Energy Statistics 
for 100 Developing Countries." Industry and Energy Department Working Paper 
No.23, The World Bank Group. 
ESI Africa (2006). Interview with Prof. Joseph ASSI Benie, Director General of ANARE, 
Issue 3, ESI Africa. 
Estache, A. (2005). "What do we know about Sub-Saharan Africa's Infrastructure and the 
Impact of its 1990s Reforms?" Draft Working Paper, The World Bankand ECARES, 
Universite Libre de Bruxelles. 
Estache, A. and D. Martimort (1999). Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of 
Regulatory Institutions. Policy Research Working Paper No. 2073. Washington D.C., 
The World Bank. 
Estache, A. and M. Rodriguez-Pardina (1998). Light and Lightning at the End of the Public 
Tunnel: The Reform of the Electricity Sector in the Southern Cone. Washington D.C., 
The World Bank. 
Euro-Med Energy Forum (2008). Revue des Politiques et des actions de Cooperation dans les 
Pays sud- et est-Mediterraneens: Rapport Pays Maroc. Assistance Technique au 
Groupe d'Experts du Forum Euro-Mediterraneen de l'Energie et pour I'integration des 
marches Euro-Mediterraneens de l'Energie, Euro-Med Energy Forum. 
Fall, A. (2004). Energy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, Global Energy. 
Fehr, N.-H. M. v. d., E. S. Amundsen, et al. (2004). "The Nordic Market: Signs of Stress?" 
European Regulation Forum on Electricity Reforms. 
252 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
f C
a
e T
ow
n
Feng, F., Q. Sun, et al. (2004). "Do Government-linked Companies Underperform?" Journal 
of Banking and Finance 28( I 0): 2461-2492. 
Fischer, R. and A. Galetovic (2000). "Regulatory Governance and Chile's 1998-1999 
Electricity Shortage." World Bank Institute. 
Fischer, R. and P. Serra (2000). "Regulating the Electricity Sector in Latin America." Center 
for Applied Economics, University of Chile. 
Flin, D. (2003). Barca Power Project. Power & Water Magazine: 66-67. 
FNEE (1994). Fonds Nationale de l'Energie Electrique. No. 94-244 du 28 avril 1994. Abidjan, 
Republique de Cote d'lvoire. 
Ford, N. (2003). Tunisia is Looking for Alternatives to Oil. Alexander's Gas and Oil 
Connections. Volume 8. 
Ford, N. (2004). Generating Investment in the Tunisian Power Sector. Alexander's Gas and 
Oil Connections. Volume 9. 
Fournier, J. (2005). The Criterion for a Public Service: Public Interest. Washington D.C., 
Embassy of France in the US. 
Gaba, K. (2001). Azito Power Project: A Case Study of a Speedy Financial Close in Africa. 
Formation IEPE - ENERDA T A, Grenoble, France, Societe Generale. 
Gambhir, V. (2006). The Electricity Act 2003-0pportunities for Investment & Growth. 
National Seminar on "The Electricity Act 2003-0pportunities for Investment & 
Growth", New Delhi, India. 
Gardner, D. T. and J. S. Rogers (1999). "Planning Electric Power Systems under Demand 
Uncertainty with Different Technology Lead Times." Journal of Management Science 
4S( I 0): 1289-1306. 
GEF (1999). Project Brief. Morocco: Solar Based Thermal Power Plant. Washington D.C., 
Global Environment Facility. 
253 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
GGEA (2008). Government Offers T AQA US$30m. Newsletter No. 36. Ghanaian-German 
Economic Association. Accra, Ghana. 
Ghana Districts (2007). K warne Pianim Resigns as PURC Chairman. Accra, Ghana. 
Ghana News (2002-2008). Dossier: Dr Charles Wereko Brobby. Accra, Ghana, Ghana Web. 
Ghana News (2007a). TICO Shares Take-over Done Deal. Accra, Business Week. 
Ghana News (2007b). Rawlingses Must Give Kufuor a Break. Accra, Ghana, Joy FM. 
Ghanadan, R. and A. Eberhard (2007). "Electricity Utility Management Contracts in Africa: 
Lessons and Experience from the T ANESCO-NETGroup Solutions Management 
Contract in Tanzania, 2002-2006." MIR Working Paper, Graduate School of 
Business, University of Cape Town. 
Gillham, B. (2000). Case Study Research Methods. London, Continuum Publishing. 
G6kgUr, N. and L. Jones (2006). Privatisation of Senegal Electricity. Assessing the Impact of 
Privatization in Africa, Norwegian Trust Fund and The World Bank. 
G6mez-Ibar'iez, J. A. (2007). "Alternatives to Infrastructure Privatization Revisited: Public 
Enterprise Reform from the 1960s to the 1980s." The World Bank Sustainable 
Development Network (Policy Research Working Paper 4391). 
Gongo News (2007). Electricity Tariffs to go Up. Accra, Ghana. 
Government of Ghana (2003). The Position of Ghana on the Arrangements with VALCO. 
Press Release. Accra, All Africa Global Media. 
Gratwick, K. (2007). Independent Power Projects in Africa: Balancing Development and 
Investment Outcomes. Faculty of Commerce, University of Cape Town. 
Gratwick, K. and A. Eberhard (2008). "Death of the Standard Model." MIR. 
254 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
wn
Gratwick. K. N. and A. Eberhard (2008). "An Analysis of Independent Power Projects in 
Africa: Understanding Development and Investment Outcomes." Development Policy 
Review 26(3): 309-338. 
Gray. P. and T. Irwin (2003a). "Exchange Rate Risk: Reviewing the Record for Private 
Infrastructure Contracts." Public Policy Journal for the Private Sector. The World 
Bank Group Note 262. 
Gray. P. and T. Irwin (2003b). Exchange Rate Risk: Allocating Exchange Rate Risk in Private 
Infrastructure Projects. Public Policy Journal for the Private Sector. The World Bank 
Group. Note 266. 
Gros. J.-G. and O. Prokopovych (2005). When Reality Contradicts Rhetoric: World Bank 
Lending Practices in Developing Countries in Historical, Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives. CODESRIA Monograph Series. SenegaL Council for the Development 
of Social Science Research in Africa. 
GRTE (2006). Le Secteur Electrique Mediterraneen, Gestionnaire du Reseau de Transport 
d'Electricite. 
GTZ (2002). Producing Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources: Energy Sector 
Framework in 15 Countries in Asia. Africa and Latin America. Part of the 
Supraregional TERNA Wind Energy Programme. Eschborn, Germany, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fUr Technische Zusammenarbeit. 
Guerbaa. A. (2005). Risques d'Opportunismes dans une Concession de Service Public: Cas 
du Secteur Electrique Tunisien. Premier Colloque International: Gouvernance, 
Investissement Prive et Developpement, Tunis, Faculte des Sciences Economiques et 
de Gestion de Tunis. 
Gupta. P .. R. Lamech, et al. (2002). Mitigating Regulatory Risk for Distribution Privatization 
- The World Bank Partial Risk Guarantee. Washington D.C., The Energy and Mining 
Sector Board. The World Bank. 
Haile-Mariam. Y. and B. Mengistu (1988). "Public Enterprises and the Privatisation Thesis in 
the Third World." Third World Ouarterly 10(4): 1565-1587. 
255 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 o
wn
Halawi, M. (2003). Carthage Power Company Presentation. Tunis, Presentation by Majed 
Halawi - Plant Manger of the Carthage Power Company. 
Hall, D. (2007). "Energy Privatisation and Reform In East Africa." Public Services 
International Research Unit. 
Hall, D. (2008). EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Public Services and Trade 
Unions. European Federation of Public Service Unions, Public Services International 
Research Unit. 
Harris, C. (2003). "Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Trends, 
Impacts, and Policy Lessons." Private Sector Advisory Services, The World Bank 
Working Paper No.5. 
Harris, c., J. Hodges, et al. (2003). "Infrastructure Projects: A Review of Canceled Private 
Projects." The World Bank Group, Private Sector and Infratructure Network Note 
No.252. 
Harris, D. J. and B. C. L. Davies (1980). "Resource Allocation in the Nationalized Energy 
Sector of the United Kingdom." Journal of Managerial and Decision Economics 1(1): 
28-36. 
Heath Lambert Group (2002). Heath Lambert - Specialist Brokers to Power Generators and 
Distributors. Power and Utilities Profile. London, United Kingkom, Heath Lambert 
Group, Power and Utilities Team. 
Heller, T. c., H. I. Tjiong, et al. (2003). "Electricity Restructuring and the Social Contract." 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #15. 
Heller, T. C. and D. G. Victor (2004). A Political Economy of Electric Power Market 
Restructuring: Introduction to Issues and Expectations. Programme on Energy and 
Sustainable Development, Stanford University. 
Hill, L. (1999). Power to the People: Integrated Resource Planning in Developing Countries, 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review, US Department of Energy. 
256 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Hirschhausen. C. v. and P. Opitz (2000). "Power Utility Re-Regulation in East European and 
CIS Transformation Countries (1990-1999): An Institutional Interpretation." 
CEPMLP Internet Journal. University of Dundee. 
Hirsh. R. F. (1999). "PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring." The 
Electricity Journal 12(7): 60-72. 
Hirst. E. and C. Goldman (1991). "Creating the Future: Integrated Resource Planning for 
Electric Utilities." Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 16: 91-121. 
Hjalmarsson. E. (2000). "Nord Pool: A Power Market without Market Power." Department of 
Economics. Goteborg University Working Paper in Economics No. 28. 
Hodges. J. (2003). "Unsolicited Proposals: Competitive Solutions for Private Infrastructure." 
Public Policy Journal(Note Number 258). 
Hodges. J. T. and G. Dellacha (2007). "Unsolicited Infrastructure Proposals: How Some 
Countries Introduce Competition and Transparency." Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility Working Paper No.1. 
Hoekman. B. (1998). "Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement." The 
World Bank Research Observer 13(2): 249-269. 
Huber. P. (1987). "Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority." 
Harvard Law Review 100(5): 1002-1065. 
Hunt. S. (2002). Making Competition Work in Electricity. New York. Wiley Finance. 
Hunt. S .. Graham. et al. (1996). Competition and Choice in Electricity. Wiley Publishers. 
IDA (1995). Development Credit Agreement (Private Sector Energy Project) between 
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire and International Development Association, International 
Development Association. 
lEA (2003). Power Generation Investment in Electricity Markets. Paris, France, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment. 
257 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
lEA (2006). "World Energy Outlook 2006." International Energy Agency: 567-572. 
lEA (2007). Cote d'ivoire Natural Gas Production (1994-2006), International Energy Agency. 
InfraCo (2007). Kpone IPP. London, United Kingdom, InfraCo Management Services. 
Irwin, T. and C. Yamamoto (2004). "Some Options for Improving the Governance of State-
Owned Electricity Utilities." The Energy and Mining Sector BoardThe World Bank 
Group (Discussion Paper No. II). 
Irwin, T. C. (2007). Government Guarantees: Allocating and Valuing Risk in Privately 
Financed Infrastructure Projects. Washington, DC, The World Bank. 
IWP&DC (2006). Ghana Balances Hydro and Thermal. International Water Power and Dam 
Construction, Wilmington Media Ltd and Progressive Media Markets Ltd. 
Izaguirre, A. K. (2004a). "Private Power Projects: Annual Investment Flows Grew by 44 
Percent in 2003." Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Note No. 
281. 
Izaguirre, A. K. (2004b). "Private Infrastructure: Activity Down by 13 Percent in 2003." 
Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank Note No. 274. 
Jacobs-Gibb (200 I). Takoradi II Addendum Environmental Report. Takoradi Thermal Power 
Plant Expansion Project (T2) Addendum Environmental Report Prepared in Support 
of March 1999 Supplementary Environmental Statement. 
Jacobson, C. D. and J. A. Tarr (1995). Ownership and Financing of Infrastructure. Policy 
Research Working Paper 1466. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
Jamasb, T., D. Newbery, et al. (2005). "Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of 
the Electricity Sector in Developing Countries." World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3599. 
Jamison, M. A. and L. Holt (2005). "Measuring and Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Private 
Infrastructure Investment." The Electricity JournaI18(6): 36-45. 
258 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Jamma!. Y. and L. Jones (2005). Cote d'lvoire Electricity. Towards Growth and Poverty 
Reduction: Lessons from Private Participation in Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Interim Report for Conference, Cape Town, South Africa, Boston Institute for 
Developing Economies. 
Jerjini, R. (2002). ONE Prepares for Liberalisation of Morocco's Electricity Sector. ESI 
Africa. Volume 3. 
JLEC pers. com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from Jorf Lasfar Energy Company and 
ABB. El Jadida, Morocco. 
Jones, L. Poo Y. Jammal, et al. (2002). Impact of Privatisation in Cote d'lvoire. Cote d'lvoire 
Privatisation Committee, Boston Institute for Developing Economies. 
Joskow, P. L. (1998). Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the US 
Electricity Sector. Designing Competitive Electricity Markets. H.-P. Chao and H. G. 
Huntington, Springer Publishing. 
Kagiannas, A. Goo D. T. Askounis, et a1. (2004). "Power Generation Planning: A Survey from 
Monopoly to Competition." International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy 
Systems 26(6): 413-421. 
Karekezi, S. and D. Mutiso (1998). "Restructuring and Privatization in the Power Sector in 
Africa." African Energy Policy Research Network. 
Kerf, M. (2000). "Do State Holding Companies Facilitate Private Participation in the Water 
Sector? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, and Senega1." Policy 
Research Working Paper 2513, The World Bank. 
Kessides, 1. N. (2004). Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition. 
Washington D.C., World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Ketkar, S. and D. Ratha (200 I). Development Financing during a Crisis: Securitization of 
Future Receivables. Economic Policy and Prospects Group Working Paper Series 
2582. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. 
259 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 T
wn
Kikeri, S., J. R. Nellis, et al. (1992). Privatization: The Lessons of Experience. Washington 
DC, The World Bank. 
Klein, M. (1996). "Competition in Network Industries." World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 1591. 
Klein, M. (1996). Risk, Taxpayers, and the Role of Government in Project Finance. Policy 
Research Working Paper 1688. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
Klingebiel, D. and J. Ruster (2000). Why Infrastructure Financing Facilities Often Fall Short 
of Their Objectives. Policy Research Working Paper 2358. Washington D.C .. The 
World Bank. 
KNUST pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Kwame Nkrumah University 
of Science and Technology. Kumasi, Ghana. 
Koh, D.-S., S. V. Berg, et al. (1996). "A Comparison of Costs in Privately Owned and 
Publicly Owned Electric Utilities: The Role of Scale." Land Economics 72(1): 56-65. 
Kotecha, M. (2005). Introduction to Workshop on Risk Mitigation for African Financings. 
Fifth Biennial U.S-Africa Business Summit, Baltimore, Maryland, The Corporate 
Council on Africa. 
Kramer, R. (2003). Ghana: US Firm Opens Talks to End Dispute with Ghana's Government. 
Washington, DC, All Africa News. 
Kriaa, A. (2008). La Tunisie Planifier son Avenir Energetique. Cooperation Tuniso Francaise. 
Tunis. 
Krishnaswamy, V. and G. Stuggins (2003). "Private Participation in the Power Sector in 
Europe and Central Asia." The World Bank. 
Kusi, G. E. (2005). Ghana's Experience with Power Sector Reform: Legislative and Policy 
Issues. Parliamentarian Forum on Energy Legislation and Sustainable Development, 
Cape Town, South Africa, Parliamentary Select Committee on Mines and Energy. 
260 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
Kuznetsov. O. K. A. (1999). "The State as a Shareholder: Responsibilities and Objectives." 
Europe-Asia Studies 51(3): 433-445. 
Lamb. P. M. (2006). The Indian Electricity Market: Country Study and Investment Context. 
Working Paper # 48. Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. Stanford, 
California, Center for Environmental Science and Policy. Stanford University. 
Lamech. R. and K. Saeed (2003). What International Investors Look For When Investing In 
Developing Countries: Results from a Survey of International Investors in the Power 
Sector, The Energy and Mining Sector Board. The World Bank. 
Lampietti. J. A. (2004). Power's Promise: Electricity Reforms in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, World Bank. 
Lavigne. J.-c. (1999). Les Le~ons des Contrats de Concession en Cote d'Ivoire. Les Retour 
d'Experience. Annales des Mines. Aout 1999. 
Liyanage. D. (2005). Reforms to the Public Procurement Policy of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka 
Development Forum. Colombo, National Procurement Agency, Department of 
External Resources. Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
Loayza. N. V. and R. Soto (2003). On the Measurement of Market-Oriented Reforms. 
Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
Louali. H. (2004). La Regulation du Secteur de l'Electricite, Royaume du Maroc. 
Lovei. L. (2000). "The Single-Buyer Model: A Dangerous Path toward Competitive 
Electricity Markets." The World Bank Group. Private Sector and Infrastructure 
Network Note 225. 
Malgas. I. (2002). Towards Risk Management in a Deregulated and Competitive Electricity 
Supply Industry. Graduate School of Business, Faculty of Commerce. Bellville, South 
A frica, University of Stellenbosch. 
Mangwengwende, S. E. (2002). "Tariffs and Subsidies in Zimbabwe's Reforming Electricity 
Industry: Steering a Utility through Turbulent Times." Energy Policy 30(11-12). 
261 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Marais, C. (2006). Best Practices in Designing Power Purchase Agreements. Independent 
Power Producers: Frontiers of International and African Experience, Cape Town, 
Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town. 
Marlow, E. (2008). Independent Power Producers: Some Thoughts. Namibia's Electricity 
Crisis: What to Expect and What to Do?, Windhoek, Namibia, HSBC. 
Mascarenhas, B. (1988). Reviewed work: The Evolution and Management of State-Owned 
Enterprises, Volume 33, No.1, Administrative Science Quarterly. Y. Aharoni, 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 33: 165-167. 
Mazzolini, R. (1979). Reviewed work: Foreign State Enterprises: A Threat to American 
Business. by Douglas F. Lamont (Winter, 1979-1980), pp. 712-713. Political Science 
Quarterly. D. F. Lamont and R. Mazzolini. New York, The Academy of Political 
Science. 94. 
McLaughlin, J. L. and D. Owusu-Ansah (1994). Historical Setting. A Country Study: Ghana. 
L. V. Berry. Washington D.C, Library of Congress Federal Research Division. 
MEED (2007a). One Scraps Cap Ghir Plan. Middle East Economic Digest. 
MEED (2007b). Rabat's Power Strategy in Disarray. Middle East Economic Digest. 
MEED (2008). Rabat to Launch Coal-fired Plant at Safi: Kingdom's Second Independent 
Power Project on the West Coast to come on Stream in 2012. Middle East Economic 
Digest. 
Michelfelder, R. A. (1993). "Evolving Electric Utility Regulatory Policy: Internalizing the 
Social Costs of Production." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 52(2): 
227-239. 
Ministry of Energy (2006). National Energy Policy: Assuring Ghana's Energy Security for the 
21st Century. Accra, Ghana, Republic of Ghana. 
Ministry of Energy (2007). Operationalization of the Osagyefo Power Barge. Accra, Ghana. 
262 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 o
wn
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2007). Government Moves to take Over 
Aboadze Plant. Accra, Government of Ghana. 
Ministry of Finance and Privatisation (2004). Privatisation: Bilan et Perspectives. Direction 
des Entreprises Publique et de la Privatisation. Marrakesh, Ministere des Finances et 
la Privatisation. 
Ministry of Industry and Energy (1999). Republic of Tunisia: Energy Sector within Economic 
and Investment Climate in Tunisia. Tunis, Tunisia Prime Ministry. 
Ministry of Industry and Energy (2008). Appels d'Offres Internationaux pour la Realisation de 
Deux Centrales Electriques: La Premiere Cle en Main a Sousse et la Deuxieme en 
BOO a Bizerte. Tunis, Republique Tunisienne: Ministere de l'lndustrie, de l'Energie 
et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises. 
Ministry of Industry and Energy pers. com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from the 
Tunisian Ministry of Industry and Energy. Tunis. 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (2006). Energy Sector Statistics in Cote d'lvoire. Abidjan, 
Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (2007). Energie et Mines des Chantiers en Marche. Rabat, 
Maroc. 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (2008a). Grandes Lignes de la Strategie Energetique: 2020 -
2030. Dossier de Presse, Ministere de l'Energie, des Mines, de l'Eau de 
I' Environnement. Rabat, Maroc. 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (2008b). Secteur de I'Energie Plan National d'Actions 
Prioritaires. Dossier de Presse, Ministere de I'Energie, des Mines, de l'Eau de 
I' Environnement. Rabat, Maroc. 
Ministry of Mines and Energy pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Cote 
d'ivoire Ministry of Mines and Energy. Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire. 
Moholola. K. (2007). Electricity Capacity Planning and Independent Power Producers. 
SA WEP Workshop, Pretoria, South Africa, Department of Minerals and Energy. 
263 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Momodu, A. S., K. N. Gratwick, et al. (2006). Negotiations and Renegotiations: Nigeria's 
Independent Power Projects. Unpublished Draft Working Paper, Management 
Programme for Infrastructure Reform and Regulation, University of Cape Town, 
Graduate School of Business. 
Morocco Country Profile (1998). The Electrical Energy Sector in Morocco. Morocco 
Electrical Energy Sector Report, India Electric Market. 
Mouton, J. (1996). Understanding Social Research. Pretoria, J.L. van Schaik. 
Muller-Jentsch, D. (200 I). The Development of Electricity Markets in the Euro-
Mediterranean Area: Trends and Prospects for Liberalization and Regional 
Integration. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
Munasinghe, M. (1990). Energy Analysis and Policy. Guildford, United Kingdom, 
Butterworths. 
Munasinghe, M. (1990). Energy Analysis and Policy, Butterworths Publishing. 
Mwenechanya, J. M. (2005). Regulation of State-Owned Utilities. Frontiers in Managing 
Reform and Regulation of the Electricity Sector, Cape Town, South Africa, Graduate 
School of Business, University of Cape Town. 
Naidoo, A. (2006). Financing Power Projects. Independent Power Producers: Frontiers of 
International and African Experience, Cape Town, Graduate School of Business, 
University of Cape Town, ABSA Capital. 
Nandjee, F. (2006). Le Projet Azito: Un Modele de Production Independante d'Electricite en " 
BOOT " et de Partenariat Public Prive en Afrique Subsaharienne. Visite de la 
delegation du Mali, Mali, International Monetary Fund. 
Nellis, J. (2005). "The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned 
Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure - and Back?" The Centre for 
Global Development FE EM Working Paper No. 117.05. 
264 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Newberry. D. M .• Ed. (2006). Electricity Liberalization in Britain and the Evolution of 
Market Design. Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective, Elsevier 
Publishing. 
Newbery. D. (2005). Refining Market Design. Implementing the Internal Market of 
Electricity: Proposals and Time-Tables. Brussels. Sustainable Energy Specific 
Support Assessment. 
Newbery. D. (2006). Power Reform. Private Investment and Regional Co-operation. South 
Asia Regional Integration and Growth. Delhi, India. World Bank. 
N'Guessan. E. (2000). Privatization of the Power Sector in Cote d'ivoire. Power Sector 
Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. J. K. Turkson. London. Macmillan Press Ltd: 26-49. 
NIGC (2001). Country Analysis Briefs: Africa: Cote d'lvoire, National Iranian Gas Company. 
2005. 
North Africa Infrastructure Development (2007). Inward Investment Needed for 
Infrastructure. Issue: July - August 2007: 49-53. 
OECD/IEA (2007a). Ghana: Evolution of Electricity Generation by Fuel from 1971 to 2005. 
Paris. France. lEA Energy Statistics. 
OECD/IEA (2007b). Cote d'lvoire: Evolution of Electricity Generation by Fuel from 1971 to 
2005. lEA Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency. 
OECDIIEA (2007c). Morocco: Evolution of Electricity Generation by Fuel from 1971 to 
2005. lEA Energy Statistics. Paris, France, International Energy Agency. 
Oliviera. A. d. and J. Girod (1990). "Energy Diagnosis: Toward a Policy-Oriented Approach 
for Energy Planning in Developing Countries." World Development Journal 18(4): 
529-538. 
OME (2003). Independent Power Plant Projects in the Mediteranean Region. Tripoli, 
Observatoire Mediterraneen de I'Energie. 
265 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
OME (2003). Possible Innovative Schemes to Facilitate Energy Investment in Southern and 
Eastern Mediterranean Countries. Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference 
"Towards a New Euro-Med Partnership on Investment Promotion, Infrastructure 
Financing and Energy Supply Security", Rome, italy, Observatoire Mediterraneen de 
l'Energie. 
Omran, M. (2003). "The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises and Newly Privatized 
Firms: Empirical evidence from Egypt." Economic Policy Institute (UAE) (FEEM 
Working Paper No. 73.2002). 
ONE (2003). Quarante Ans d'ONE: l'Energie d'un Pays en Mouvement. Casablanca, 
Morocco, Office National de l'Electricite. 
ONE (2006a). Cooperation entre Ie Maroc et l'Espagne dans Ie domaine de l'Energie 
Electrique. Journee sur la Cooperation Maroco-Espagnole dans Ie Domaine de 
l'Energie Electrique, Office National de l'Electricite. 
ONE (2006b). Assurer l'Eguilibre Offre-Demande avec une Energie: Disponible, Au moindre 
coOt, Propre. l'Energie au Rendez vous du Developpement, Skhirat, Office National 
de l'Electricite. 
ONE (2007b). Quand l'Energie ... vient du Vent. Casablanca, Office National de l'Electricite. 
ONE (2008). Systeme Electrique Marocain: Bilan 2007. Casablanca, Maroc, Office National 
de l'Electricite. 
ONE Annual Report (2004). Casablanca, Office National de l'Electricite. 
ONE Annual Report (2006). Casablanca, Office National de l'Electricite. 
Onuki, T. (200 I). Managing the Politics of Power Sector Reform in East Asia. Program on 
US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. 
Oxford and Beaumont (2006). Case Law Review: Faroe Atlantic Co Ltd v Attorney General: 
Foreigners Beware. Oxford and Beaumont Quarterly. Fourth Quarter 2006. 
266 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
PDCI-RDA (2005). Biographie de Henri Konan Bedie. Abidjan. Partie Democratique de 
Cote-d'lvoire - Rassemblement Democrate Africain. 
Pineau. P.-O. (2002). "Electricity Sector Reform in Cameroon: Is Privatization the Solution?" 
Energy Policy 30(11-12). 
Plane. P. (1999). "Privatization. Technical Efficiency and Welfare Consequences: The Case 
of the Cote d'lvoire Electricity Company (CIE)." World Development Journal 27(2): 
343-360. 
Pollitt. M. (2004). "Electricity Reform in Argentina Lessons for Developing Countries." 
Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge University and the Development 
Research Group. The World Bank. 
Pollitt M. (2005). "Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries." 
Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge University and the Development 
Research Group, The World Bank. 
PPA pers. com. (2008). Personal Communication with Personnel from the Public 
Procurement Authority. 
Project Finance and Guarantees (1999). Sub-Saharan Africa Benefits from the first IDA 
Guarantee for Azito. Washington D.C., Project Finance & Guarantees Department, 
Private Sector and Infrastructure Vice Presidency. 
PSEG Press Release (2004). PSEG Global Closes Sale of Tunisia Plant, Public Service 
Enterprise Group. 
PURC (1997). "Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act." Act 538 of the Republic of 
Ghana. 
PURC pers. com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission. Accra, Ghana. 
PWC (2005). Under Pressure: Utilities Global Survey 2005, Price Waterhouse Coopers. 
267 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
w
Raineri, R. (2006). Chile: Where it all started. Electricity Market Reform: An International 
Perspective, Elsevier Publishing. 
Ramamurti, R. (1987). "Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises in Theory and 
Practice." Management Science, 33(7): 876-893. 
RCEER (2005). Guide to Electric Power in Ghana. First Edition. Resource Center for Energy 
Economics and Regulation. Accra, Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research, University of Ghana, Legon. 
Rector, J. (2005). The IPP Investment Experience in Malaysia. Working Paper #46, Program 
on Energy and Sustainable Development. Stanford, California, Center for 
Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University. 
Reddy, A. K. N. (2005). Integrated Electricity Planning: Some Personal Retlections. 
Bangalore, India, International Energy Initiative. 
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire (1985). Energie Electrique: Production - Transport - Distribution. 
Reuters (2008). Balkan Energy Chairman and Company President Meet with Lapologang 
Caesar Lekoa, Ambassador. .. A. Wills. Dallas, Thompson Reuters. 
Rigby, P. (2004). "Energy Merchant Debt Prospects: When "Worst-Case" Scenarios Become 
the "Base Case"." The Electricity Journal17( I): 37-50. 
Root, H. L. (200 I). "Do Strong Governments Produce Strong Economies?" The Independent 
Review 5(4). 
Roseman, E. and A. Malhotra (1996). "The Dynamics of Independent Power: IPPs Seed Top-
to-Bottom Reform." Public Policy for the Private Sector, The World Bank (Note No. 
83). 
Rudnick, H. and J.-P. Montero (2002). "Second Generation Electricity Reforms in Latin 
America and the California Paradigm." Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 
2( 112). 
268 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Sader. F. (2000). Attracting Foreign Direct Investment Into Infrastructure: Why is it So 
Difficult? Washington. D.C., The World Bank Group. 
Sadiq. M. K. (2001). Private Water and Power Markets in the Arab World. UIP, United 
Infrastructure Projects. 
Seidman. H. (1954). "The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls." Public 
Administration Review 14(3): 183-192. 
Sheppard. R .. S. von-Klaudy, et al. (2006). Financing Infrastructure in Africa: How the 
Region can Attract More Project Finance. Gridlines. Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility, The World Bank. Note 13. 
Shirley, M. (1983). "Managing State-Owned Enterprises." World Bank Staff Working Paper 
577 Management and Development Series No.4. 
Shirley, M. M. (1999). "Bureaucrats in Business: The Roles of Privatization versus 
Corporatization in State-owned Enterprise Reform." World Development Journal 
27( I). 
Shirley. M. M. and L. C. Xu (1997). "Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An 
Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises." Policy 
Research Working Paper 1769, The World Bank, Policy Research Department, 
Finance and Private Sector Development Division. 
Simon, E. (2006). Le Cadre d'lnvestissement dans Ie Secteur de l'Electricite en Cote d'lvoire. 
44 Colloque Internationale du Reseau Francophone Monder (Mondialisation, Energie, 
Environment), Salle de I'Hotel de Ville, Martigny, Suisse. 
Sioshansi, F. P. and W. Pfaffenberger (2006). Electricity Market Reform: An International 
Perspective, Elsevier Publishing. 
Smith. V. L. (1996). "Regulatory Reform in the Electric Power Industry." Cato Review of 
Business & Government 19( I). 
SOGEPE (2004). Societe de Gestion du Patrimoine du Secteur de l'Electricite. Abidjan, Cote 
d'lvoire: www.sogepe.com. 
269 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
Sotkiewicz, P. (2007). Review of Selected International Experience in Electricity Reform. 
Frontiers in Managing Reform & Regulation of Infrastructure Utilities in Africa, 
Cape Town, South Africa, UCT Graduate School of Business. 
Spalding-Fecher, R. and D. K. Matibe (2003). "Electricity and Externalities in South Africa." 
Energy Policy Journal 31(8): 721-734. 
STEG (2004a). Rapport d'Activite: Direction de la Production et du Transport de l'Electricite. 
Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG (2004b). Rapport d'Activite: Direction de la Production et du Transport Gaz. Tunis, 
Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG (2006). History ofSTEG. Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG Annual Report (2004). Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG Annual Report (2005). Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG Annual Report (2006). Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG Annual Report (2007). Tunis, Societe Tunisienne de l'Electricite et du Gaz. 
STEG pers. com. (2006). Interview with Personnel from the Societe Tunisienne de 
l'Electricite et du Gaz. Tunis. 
Stern, J. and J. Cubbin (2005). "Regulatory Effectiveness: The Impact of Regulation and 
Regulatory Governance Arrangements on Electricity Industry Outcomes." World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3536. 
Sweeney, J. L. (2006). California Electricity Restructuring, The Crisis and its Aftermath. 
Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective. F. P. Sioshansi and W. 
Pfaffenberger, Elsevier Publishing. 
Tangri, R. (1991). "The Politics of State Divestiture in Ghana." African Affairs 90(361): 523-
536. 
270 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Tenenbaum, B. and A. K. Izaguirre (2007). Private Participation in Electricity: The Challenge 
of Achieving Commercial Viability and Improving Services. Gridlines, Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, The World Bank. Note 21. 
TERNA (2004). Energy-policy Framework Conditions for Electricity Markets and Renewable 
Energies: 21 Country Analyses. Technical Expertise for Renewable Energy 
Application. Eschborn, Germany, German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
The Chronicle (2005). VRA abandons Osagyefo Barge? Accra, Ghana, Ghana Resource 
Centre. 
The Chronicle (2007). Aboadze Goes To Arabs. Accra. All Africa. 7 May 2007. 
The Oil Drum (2008). Algeria & Morocco: Natural Gas Cartels, Fertilizer Mercantilism, and 
Rising Tensions, The Oil Drum: Discussion about Energy and our Future. 
The Statesman (2007). NPP Cuts Sod for Bui Dam. Accra, Ghana. 
The Times (2007). Ghana Given Raw Deal. Accra, Ghana. 3 Apr 2007. 
Toninelli, E. b. P. A. (2000). The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western 
World, Cambridge University Press. 
Tunisia Watch (2008). Tunisia Caucus Co-Chair Calls Despot Moderate and Wise. 
Washington D.C. The Hill. 
Tunisian Privatisation (2004). La Privatisation en Tunisie 2004. Tunis, Republic of Tunisia 
Prime Ministry. 
TurkL H. (1999). "Les Reformes Institutionnelles du Secteur Electrique: Le Cas de la 
Tunisie." Liaison Energie Francophone 3e Trimestre (No. 44). 
Turkson. J. K. and M. B. Amadu (1999). Environmental Protection Implications of the 
Electric Power Restructuring in Ghana. Working Paper No.8. Roskilde, Denmark and 
KumasL Ghana, United Nations Environment Programme and Kumasi Institute of 
Technology, Energy and Environment. 
271 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
U.S. Commercial Service Morocco (2007). Morocco: Power Generation Systems. 
Cassablanca, Prepared by the United States Commercial Service Morocco. 
UK Ministry of Justice (1989). Electricity Act 1989 (c. 29). UK Statute Law Database. 
UNDP (2003). Sustainable Local Financing Advisory Note: Guarantees (Draft Report), 
United Nations Development Programme. 2007. 
UNDP (2004). The Development of On-Grid Wind Electricity in Tunisia for the 10th Plan, 
United Nations Development Programme, Global Environmental Facility. 
UNDP/World Bank (1985). Ivory Coast: Issues and Options in the Energy Sector. 
Washington D.C., Joint United Nations Development Programme / World Bank 
Energy Sector Assessment Program. 
UNECA (2002). "Cameroon Energy Report." United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa. 
US DOE (1990). Implementing PURPA: Renewable Resource Development in the Pacific 
Northwest. United States Department of Energy. 
Vagliasindi (2008). "Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises." The World 
Bank, Sustainable Development Network(WPS 4542). 
van Edig, A. (2000). Electric Hydropower in Ghana. Bonn, Germany, Center for 
Development Research of the University of Bonn. 
Vanie, B. I. (2000). Zoom on SOPIE. EUROSTAG. Newsletter No. 12. 
Vei, G. (1999). Les Reformes du Secteur Electrique: Le Cas de la Cote d'Ivoire. Liaison 
Energie-Francophonie. 44. 
Verma, R. (2007). Swiss Challenge System for Infrastructure Projects. Mumbai, India, Project 
Monitor. 
Vernon, R. (1971). Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. New 
York, Basic Books. 
272 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Vernon. R. (1979). "The International Aspects of State-Owned Enterprises." Journal of 
International Business Studies 10(3): 7-15. 
Vernon. R. (1984). "Linking Managers with Ministers: Dilemmas of the State-Owned 
Enterprise." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 4(1): 39-55. 
Vernon. R. and R. J. Barnet (1974). "Does Society Also Profit?" Foreign Policy,(13): 103-
122. 
Victor. D. G. and T. C. Heller (2006). The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Victor, D. G .• T. C. Heller, et aL (2004). The Experience with Independent Power Projects 
(IPPs) in Developing Countries: Introduction and Case Study Methods. Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development, Center for Environmental Science and Policy, 
Stanford Institute for International Studies. Stanford, California, Stanford University. 
Working Paper #23. 
Volpi. G .. G. Jannuzzi, et aL (2006). "A Sustainable Electricity Blueprint for BraziL" Energy 
for Sustainable Development X( 4): 14-24. 
VRA (2006). Abridged History of the Volta River Authority. Accra, Ghana, vRA 
Communications Department. 23 June 2007. 
VRA Annual Report (2003). 42nd Annual Report and Accounts. vRA Communications 
Department. Acca, Ghana, Volta River Authority. 
VRA pers.com. (2007). Interview with Personnel from the Volta River Authority. Accra, 
Ghana. 
Wamukonya. N. (2003). "African Power Sector Reforms: Some Emerging Lessons." Energy 
for Sustainable Development VIle I). 
WeIch, C. and J. Oringer (1998). "Structural Adjustment Programs." Foreign Policy, 3(3). 
Williams, J. H. and R. Ghanadan (2005). "Electricity Reform in Developing and Transition 
Countries: A ReappraisaL" Journal of Energy 31: 815-844. 
273 
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Williamson, O. E. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead." Journal of Economic Literature 38: 595-613. 
Woo, P. Y. (2005). Independent Power Producers in Thailand. Working Paper # 51, Program 
on Energy and Sustainable Development. Stanford, California, Center for 
Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University. 
Woodhouse, E. J. (2005a). The IPP Experience in the Philippines. Working Paper #37, 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. Stanford, California, Center for 
Environmental Science and Policy, Stanford University. 
Woodhouse, E. J. (2005c). A Political Economy of International Infrastructure Contracting: 
Lessons from the IPP Experience. Working Paper #52, Program on Energy and 
Sustainable Development. Stanford, California, Center for Environmental Science 
and Policy, Stanford University. 
Woolf, F. and J. Halpern (2001). "Integrating Independent Power Producers into Emerging 
Wholesale Power Markets." The World Bank Group. 
World Bank (1984). Morocco: Issues and Options in the Energy Sector. Washinton D.C., 
Report of the Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Assessment Program. 
World Bank (1990). Review of Electricity Tariffs in Developing Countries in the 1980s. 
Industry and Energy Department Working Paper, Energy Series Paper No. 32. 
Washington D.C. 
World Bank (1993). The World Bank's Role in the Electric Power Sector: Policies for 
Effective Institutional, Regulatory, and Financial Reform. Washington D.C. 
World Bank (1995). Republic of Ghana Thermal Power Project. World Bank Staff Appraisal 
Report. Industry and Energy Operations Division - West Central Africa Department. 
Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
World Bank (1995a). Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership. New York, Oxford University Press. 
274 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
World Bank (\995c). Republic of Cote d'lvoire Private Sector Energy Project. Staff Appraisal 
Report. Industry and Energy Operations Division - West Central Africa Department. 
Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
World Bank (\995d). Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of 
US$79.66 million to the Republic of Cote d'lvoire for a Private Sector Energy 
Project, Report No: 32564. Washington D.C., The World Bank. Energy Group, Africa 
Region. 
World Bank (\996). From Plan to Market, Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1998). Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed IDA Guarantee of up to 
US$35m of a Syndicated Commercial bank Loan to Cinergy for the Azito Power 
Project in the Republic of Cote d'lvoire. Washington D.C., International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
World Bank (2003a). Private Sector Development in the Electric Power Sector, A Joint 
OED/OEGIOEU Review of the World Bank Group's Assistance in the 1990s. 
Washington D.C., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2007. 
World Bank (2003b). Etude sur la Participation Privee dans les Infrastructure en Tunisie: 
Compte-rendu de l'Atelier sur la PPI en Tunisie. Republigue Tunisienne Ministere du 
Developpement et de la Cooperation Internationale et Bangue Mondiale et 
Programme Participation Privee dans les Infrastructures Mediterraneennes (PPM!). 
Tunis. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Volume II. 
World Bank (2007). Enterprise Surveys. Washington D.C. 
World Bank (2007). MIGA and World Bank Group Guarantee for Multi-Country Projects. 
NEPAD Workshop, Lusaka, Zambia. 
World Bank (2008a). "Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database." 
World Bank (2008b). Public Sector Reform: What Works and Why? An lEG Evaluation of 
World Bank Support. Washington, D.C.. International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
275 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
World Bank (2008c). Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of92.1 
Million (US$150 Million Equivalent) to the Office National de l'Electricite with a 
Guarantee of the Kingdom of Morocco for an Office National de l'Electricite Support 
Project. Washington D.C., The World Bank. 
World Bank pers. com. (2007). Telephonic Communication with World Bank Staff. Accra, 
Ghana. 
World BankJUSAID (2004). Sustainable Power Sector Reform 111 Emerging Markets -
Financial Issues and Options. Deloitte Touche Tomatsu Emerging Markets, Ltd. 
(Emerging Markets Group), World Bank and US Agency for International 
Development. 
Yeboah, C. N. (2008). Aboadze Plant: Government Goes For 100% Shares. Business Section. 
Accra, Ghana, Daily Guide. 4 July 2008. 
Yergin, D. and J. Stanislaw (1998). The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World 
Economy. New York, Simon and Schuster. 
Vi-chong, x. (2006). "The Myth of the Single Solution: Electricity Reforms and the World 
Bank." Journal of Energy 31: 802-814. 
Zif, J. (1981). "Managerial Strategic Behavior in State-Owned Enterprises -- Business and 
Political Orientations." Management Science 27( II): 1326-1339. 
276 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
